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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia after the fall of the 
authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. It argues that despite wide-ranging changes to 
Indonesia's political system, the .armed forces continue to play a significant role in politics and 
society. Beside the opposition of the officer corps to substantial military reform, this study points 
to divisions within Indonesia's civilian elite as a major factor behind the stagnation in the current 
civil-military transition. 
In order to explain Indonesia's problems in establishing democratic control over its armed 
forces, the thesis focuses oil deeply entrenched socio-political structures, the character of the 
1998 regime change and difficulties in the process of democratic consolidation. The analysis of 
these three areas makes it possible to locate Indonesia;s position in comparative schemes of post-
authoritarian civil-military-relations. 
Discussing the historical legacy of military politics in Indonesia, the study exposes important 
structural and ideological features of the involvement of the armed forces in politics. Structurally, 
the territorial command. structure and the practice of self-financing have nurtured a sense of 
institutional autonomy in the military that post-1998 governments found difficult to overturn. 
Ideologically, the feeling of entitlement to political supremacy, fed by highly derogatory views on 
civilian leadership qualities, has survived the fall of Soeharto and continues to shape the political 
mindset of the officer corps. 
On the civilian side, long-standing divisions between major societal constituencies have 
hampered the development of strong political institutions and have offered. the armed forces 
opportunities for intervention. This thesis discusses the cleavages within Indonesia's Muslim 
~ . 
community, particularly between traditionalist and modernist groups, as one of the most 
important sources of conflict in the civilian realm. 
·The 1998 regime change also posed significant challenges to the civil-military reform process. 
Moderate military officers succeeded in negotiating an orderlytransfer of power from Soeharto to 
his deputy, avoiding the complete breakdown of the authoritarian system. Consequently; residual 
elements of the New Order were able to extend their influence into the post-Soeharto polity and 
slow down initiatives for refonn The regime change also highlighted· the inability of the 
. oppositional civilian elite to seize upon the opportunities presented by Soeharto's demise. Deeply 
v 
divided and anxious not to alienate Soeharto, key civilian leaders failed to present a democratic 
alternative to the faltering regirrie. When the government finally collapsed, the non-regime elite 
found itself excluded from executive and legislative institutions for the first 18 months of the 
post-Soeharto era. 
The conflict between Indonesia's largest socio-political groups continued throughout the post-
authoritarian transition, allowing the armed forces to repair their image damaged in decades of 
repressive rule under the New Order. The constitutional crisis of 2001, during which conflicts 
between the executive and the legislature paralysed political life, led to a surge in the reputation 
of the armed forces in society and the elite. Subsequently, retired officers emerged as influential 
actors in party politics and regional as well as national elections. Ultimately, the rise of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in 2004 completed the successful adaptation of 
Indonesia's armed forces and their personnel to the new democratic framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
MILITARY REFORM IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN TRANSITIONS:. 
EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS AND THE CASE OF INDONESIA 
"One of our greatest challenges is now to sideline the military from politics. They 
have dominated our political system, our society, our economyfor too long.( ... ) It is 
now time for us civilians to take charge and reform the foundations of this nation." 
Amien Rais, June 19981 
"My party cannot rule this country alone. I need a partner( ... ) with a wide network 
to win the people's hearts, somebody strong and with charisma. He has to be from 
TNI. My second reason for choosing a military man to run as my vice~presidential 
candidate is to safeguard the national integrity of the·whole of Indonesia's wide 
· territory.( ... ) We are really gratefulto TNI." 
Amien Rais, September 20032 
Indonesia's political system has undergone dramatic structural change since the 1998 downfall of 
the New Order regime that had ruled the country for more than three decades. A multitude of 
political parties has replaced the tightly controlled three-party system; free and fair elections were 
held that ·resulted· in three successive coalition governments with a weakening. presidency; 
political power was transferred from the once omnipotent centre into the regions; the previously 
sacrosanct constitution was extensively rewritten; civil society organisations have mushroomed; 
and one of the most diverse media landscapes in Asia has emerge~. One area that has seen some 
of the most significant changes is the security sector. Indonesia's armed forces (TNI, Tentara 
. . 
Nasional Indonesia) had to give up their institutional engagement in politics, accept their removal 
from the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council) and the MPR 
1 Arnien Rais at a public rally in Bandung, 5 June 1998, personal notes by the author. 
2 'Amien Rais Pilih Wapres dari Kalangan TNI', Kompas 13 September 2003. 
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(People's Consultative Assembly),3 and were mandated by law to reduce their role in domestic 
security affairs. The Police, formerly a part of the armed forces, were separated from the military 
and assigned the task of managing internal security. 
The extent of institutional reform affecting Indonesia's security sector has led many observers 
to the conclusion that 'the civil-military balance has tilted against the military, and state-soldier 
relations are in the midst of substantial change' .4 In this view, the process of change is continuing 
and will lead to a further reduction of the military's political influence. Such assessments tend to 
focus on formal changes made to the security sector, like the abolition of institutions attached to 
the old regime or the creation of new ones charged with exercising increased control over the 
armed forces. Yet statements like those cited above, issued by veteran politician Arnien Rais, 
indicate that more than five years after the fall of the New Order, civil-military relations in 
Indonesia are far from being a classic case of gradual transition towards democratic control of the 
armed forces. It appears that TNI's political powers in the post-Soeharto era, as eloquently 
highlighted by Arnien's courtship of IIlilitary support of his presidential bid, consist of much 
more than just the residual authority of a previously powerful component of the fallen·regime. 
Instead, evidence points to the possibility that Indonesia's armed forces have assimilated 
successfully to the new political structures and maintained a great deal of their influence on elite 
negotiations and societal processes. 
The complexity of the military's new role in post-Soeharto Indonesia does not only pose 
difficult challenges to the process of further reforming the country's political system, but also to 
the theoretical debate on democratic transitions in general. The existing literature on civil-military 
relations in post-authoritarian states has found it difficult to grasp the nuances of continued 
military influence on evolving democratic polities. Classic theories on military intervention in 
politics have largely focused ·on -0pen . interventions by the armed forces and the formal 
mechanisms of their political participation. They ate insufficient, however, to describe the fluid 
3 The DPR is Indonesia's parliament, while the MPR is nominally the highest institutional authority in the 
country. Under the New Order, the MPR consisted of the members of the DPR, regional representatives 
and functional groups. Every five years, it elected a president and vice-president, and issued policy 
directives for the government in the form of decrees and regulations that ranked higher than the legislation 
passed by the DPR. As a result of the constitutional amendments adopted in 2002, however, the MPR has 
lost its electoral powers and its legislative authority. It now comprises the members of the DPR and the 
DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representative Council), a senate-like body consisting of 
representatives from Indonesia's provinces. The post-2002 MPR only swears in the president elected 
directly by the people, and can be part of impeachment proceedings if initiated by the DPR. . 
4 Mutiah Alagappa, 'Iritroduction', in: Mutiah Alagappa (editor), Coercion and Governance: The Declining 
Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2001: 16. · 
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power relations in emerging political systems, with militaries often using their non-institutional 
powers to gain access to political and economic resources. More recent models, on the other 
hand, have used a predominantly normative approach, proposing reform steps countries in post-
authoritarian transitions have to introduce in order to establish democratic control over their 
militaries. Authors of this school have set the concept of democratic governance of the security 
sector as a normative ideal that allows them to identify diversions (and their causes) in particular 
countries. The ideal often proves difficult to achieve, however, with even some developed 
democracies failing to meet the benchmarks set up by the theorists. This creates problems in 
defining the very specific conditions faced by countries that have_ only recently emerged from 
decades of military-backed rule. Thus while both the classic and normative theories have captured 
some important aspects of the role militaries can play in post-authoritarian politics, it appears 
necessary to expand the existing models to tackle the complex case of Indonesia. 
This thesis is a study of civil-military relations in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It will discuss the 
causes and consequences of the country's problematic attempt_to establish democratic control of 
the armed forces as a major agenda of its post-authoritarian reform program. The aim of this 
introduction will be to provide an overview of theoretical models of civil-military relations and 
evaluate their applicability to the case of Indonesia. The theoretical discourse will help to expose 
the strengths. and shortcomings of the existing models and lead to three analytical propositions 
that will guide the composition and structure of the thesis. Most importantly, the crucial role of 
civilian politics and societal relationships in determining the outcome of civil-military transitions 
makes it necessary that the study divide its attention equally between analyses of military politics 
and developments in the civilian political sphere. Thus in addition to the discussion of military 
attitudes towards the transition, the study will look at the causes of the fractured state of civilian 
politics and its negative repercussions for military reform. This point will be illustrated by 
focusing on the divisions within Indonesia's Muslim community as one of the most significant 
sources of political conflict. The second important element is the role of historical legacies for the 
evolution of post-authoritarian civil-military relations. Accordingly, the thesis will look closely at 
the level of entrenchment of military influence and civilian divisions in Indonesian politics. 
Finally, the importance of the character of regime change requires that this study provide a 
detail_ed analysis of the events preceding the democratic transition. Thus a large part of the thesis 
will discuss the 1998 transfer of power from Soeharto to his successor, and its consequences for 
the pace and quality of the post-authoritarian transition. The conclusions drawn from these three 
main discussions will ultimately allow the extension of existing theoretical models presented in 
this introductory chapter. 
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I. DEMOCRATIC VS CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
Democratic control of the armed forces is one of the key factors in successful transitions from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. Militaries that have supported, participated in or dominated 
authoritarian regimes are likely to be crucial players in the transition, trying to preserve as much 
as possible of their previous political and institutional privileges. In order to minimise the 
military's influence on the shaping of post-authoritarian political structures, it is a major 
challenge for civilian forces to quickly initiate the establishment of constitutional mechanisms 
that put democratically elected, civilian state institutions in charge of all aspectS of governance, 
including the security sector. Whi~e O'Donnell and Schmitter have asserted thatit is 'civilian 
control' that is most important in democratic transitions,5 recent discussions put more stress on 
the quality of civilian control, and how it is achieved and exercised. Cottey; Edmunds and 
Forster, writing on transitional processes in Eastern European states and the former Soviet 
Republics, propose that what really matters is the 
'.'control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the 
state. It thus concerns more than the simple maximisation of civilian power over the 
military, and is fundamentally about the democratic legitimacy, governance, and 
accountability of a state's civil-military relationship.',i; 
Democratic control of the military is, therefore, best understood as an inter-institutional process 
in which legitimate state bodies authorise the structure, size, function and use of the armed 
forces.7 Civilian control, on the other hand, can be tindemocratic if exercised by civilian forces 
not sufficiently . legitimised through proper democratic procedures. In some cases, the 
establishment of civilian control by only one dominant civilian element in the post-authoritarian 
transition can reinforcethe very manipulability of the armed forces that the regime change aimed 
to remove. 
The distinction between 'civilian' and 'democratic' control of the armed forces will prove 
crucial in discussing the Indonesian case. The transitional process in Indonesia has seen several 
5 Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter (editors), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions from Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1986: 32. 
6 Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster, 'The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe', Civil-Military Relations in Central 
and Eastern Europe Project, Unpublished Paper, 2001: 4. 
7 Jean Callaghan and Juergen Kuhlmann, 'Measuring the Civil-Military Complex: Tools and Some 
Empirical Evidence', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series 
No. 46, July 2002: 4. 
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presidents making atternpts to use the armed forces in the competition with their political 
opponents. Such examples underline ~e necessity of further defining what exactly democratic 
control of the armed forces entails, The first level of explanation concerns the decision-making on 
military policy. In a democratic state, such decisions are made by the democratically elected 
executive in coordination with the legislature. By entrusting the decision-making process to an 
institutionalised system of checks and balances, the possibility that a single political actor can 
gain monopolistic power over the military is reduced. Parliamentary oversight of the armed forces 
is the most crucial element on this level of democratic control, with the legislature approving 
defence-related policies, adopting legislation and allocating the budget for the military.8 · 
Countries in transition often face difficulties in empowering their legislatures to exercise these 
control functions properly, due to a variety of reasons ranging from lack of expertise in military 
affairs to divisions within the political elite. The second level is related to the implementation of 
decisions made by political authorities through the bureaucracy. AB Edward Page has outlined, 
the adequate implementation of political decisions made by state institutions is a major element of 
functioning democracies.9 In the area of democratic control of the military, the Department of 
Defence is the bureaucratic tool through which policy decisions are translated into concrete action 
on the ground. In military-backed authoritarian regimes, armed forces officers who seek to retain 
. control of policy in military hands often dominate the· defence bureaucracy. This deliberate 
exclusion of civilian defence officials can lead to serious problems in the subsequent democratic 
transition. '° Finally, the third level of democratic control highlights the importance of societal 
scrutiny of the armed forces, largely exercised through civil society groups and the media. Their 
participation in the management of defence policy and its implementation are crucial additions to 
the traditional concepts of 'civilian control' .11 
The extent of military adherence to these three levels of democratic control is determined by the 
quality of the civilian institutions that oversee them. Successful empowenilent of civilian leaders, 
and effective cooperation between them, is likely to result in the acknowledgement of democratic 
8 Hans Born (editor), Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and 
Practices, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva/Belgrade 2003. 
9 Edward Page, Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power, 2nd edition, Harvester Wheatsheave 1992: J 74. 
10 Yuri E. Fedorov, 'Democratic Transformation of the Security Sector in Russia: A Sad Saga of Failure', 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control .of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series No. 98, August 2002: 
16. ' 
11 This element of democratic control has been referred to as 'horizontal control'' as opposed to the 
'vertical c.ontrol' exercised by formal state i:n.stitutions. Hans Born, Marina Caparina and Karl Haltiner, 
'Models of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Multi-Country Study Comparing "Good Practices" 
of Democratic Control', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper 
Series No. 47, Jilly 2002: 11. · 
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control by the military leadership. On the other hand, problems in the establishment of civilian 
state and societal institutions, whether provoked by sabotage, inter-civilian disputes, indifference 
or lack of expertise, are almost certain to encourage the armed forces to disobey or ignore orders 
by civilian control authorities. This inter-connectivity between empowerment of civilian state 
institutions and democratic control of the armed forces has led most recent authors on the subject 
to integrate democratic control into the broader concept of 'security sector reform' .12 The 
inclusion of democratic control into the concept of security sector reform is important for the 
Clarification of two major issues. First, it defines military reform as part of a larger process of 
reforming no~ only other security institutions (police, armed militias, forces of executive 
agencies), but the system of governance as a whole. It links the success of establishing 
democratic control. of the armed forces with the levels of consolidation shown by both the 
democratically authorised state instifutions and those security agencies charged with carrying out 
the functions previously monopolised by the military. Second, it clarifies that the 'key civil-
military problem in the post-authoritarian state' is not only, as Alagappa put it, 'the need to curb 
the military's political power', 13 but also to guararitee that this reform process does not result in 
an erosion of general security conditions. Such erosion is likely to undermine the project of 
democratic consolidation, and includes the possibility that the public will demand the retention of 
military powers. unless other credible alternatives are presented. 
The expansion of traditional.theories on 'civilian control' to the more comprehensive concepts 
of 'democratic control' and 'security sector reform' carries significant methodological 
consequences for this study, and has played an important role in defining its scope. It suggests 
that the interaction between civilian forces, their struggle for control of the political institutions 
and the fora of civil society are as important to the outcome of the civil-military reform process as 
the classic concentration on corporate interests of the military. 14 Accordi~gly, it will be one task 
of this study to analyse how the relationships and rivalries between civilian. groups have affected 
the chances of establishing democratic controi of the armed forces. On the other hand, the 
12 Nicole Ball, 'Transforming Security Sectors: The IMF and World Bank Approaches', Conflict, Security, 
Development l: l, 2001: 45-66; Douglas Bland, 'Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations', 
Armed Forces and Society 27:4; Summer 2001: 525-540; Chris Smith, 'Security Sector Reform: 
Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?', Conflict, Security, Development l: 1, 2001: 5-19. 
13 Mutiah Alagappa, 'Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework', in: Mutiah 
Alagappa (editor), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford 2001: 54. 
14 For theories that emphasise the corporate interests of the military, see Bengt Abrahamson, Military 
Professionalism and Political Power, Sage, Bervely Hills 1972; Amos Perlmutter, The Military and 
Politics in Modern Times, Yale University Press, New Haven 1977; Muthiah Alagappa, 'Military 
Professionalism: A Conceptual Perspective', in: Muthiah Alagappa (editor), Military Professionalism in 
Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, East-West Center, Honolulu 2001: 2. 
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application of the concepts will provide important normative evaluation tools regarding the 
reform steps Indonesia has taken in its process of democratic consolidation. Where the notion of 
'civilian control' would fail to grasp the complexities of the relationship between the executive, 
the military and other civilian forces, the norms and standards enshrined in the model of 
democratic control are much more likely to identify those areas where the reform efforts have 
produced insufficient results to carry the process forward, and are therefore more ·useful in 
identifying Indonesia's place in the comparative scheme of civil-military transitions. 
The discussion so far has identified democratic control of the armed forces as a crucial element 
of security sector reform and, ultimately, democratic transition. The literature on this topic is of a 
largely normative nature, with authors giving recommendations to countries in transition . 
regarding reform measures they are· expected to take and risks they should avoid. In contrast, the 
academic exchange on the causes and dimensions of milltary interventions in politics has been 
vast, and filled with numerous case studies from the 1950s to the 1990s. Samuel E. Finer argued 
that theories on military intervention in politics could be negatively applied in order to explain 
military non-intervention or 'extrusion' .15 While this is not entirely true, the description of the 
various causes of military intervention in politics, the different models of military-state relations, 
and the theoretical approaches to the downfall of military-backed regimes provide an important 
background for this srudy. Especially the analysis of the last area, the disintegration of 
authoritarian regimes, will demonstrate that the study of the transfer of power does not only 
deliver invaluable insights regarding the fall of the ancien regime, but also leads to important 
conclusions for the ensuing problems in democratic consolidation. 
II. AREAS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, 
INSTITUTIONAL, SOCIO-CULTURAL 
Before discussi~g the various models of military intervention in politics, it is important fo 
introduce the political, economic, institutional and socio-cultural sectors of state organisation in 
which inilitaries traditionally seek to exert influence. The description of these areas, and the 
opportunities of intervention they offer, will make it easier to identify diversions from the 
normative model of democratic control of the armed forces, and will provide analytical tools for 
the analysis of the Indonesian case. First, and most important, is the participation of the military 
15 Samuel E. Finer, 'The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military 
Withdrawal from the Seats of Power', in: Third World Quarterly 7:1, 1985: 23-24. · 
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in the political institutions of the state. In countries where democratic control of the armed forces 
has been established, the military is part of the political process only in terms of submitting policy 
options if the civilian authorities ask for such advice, and implementing the policy militarily once 
the relevant decisions have been made. Military officers may, of course, exert political influence 
by voting in general elections, lobbying politicians, shaping public opinion by engaging with the 
media or aligning themselves with civil society organisations or think tanks. Such interventions 
remain, however, within the democratic political framework. In non-democratic states, on the 
other hand, militaries have not only tried to influence the decision-making process, they have 
used coercion. to put pressure on state institutions, have pushed for participation in legislatures 
. and executive bodies, and, in some cases, have taken over government. Koonings and Kruit have 
outlined two major motivations for military interventionism in political institutions: 
"First, there is the notion that the military institution is exceptionally well placed not 
only to defend but also to define the essence of the nation by birthright and 
competence. Second, the military 'knows' that 'civilians', that is to say, civilian 
politicians, the institutional framework of civic governance, the actions of societal 
interest groups, and the overall political culture tend to be inadequate to address the 
needs of the nation."16 · 
These interventions transform the armed forces from an advisory and executive instrument of the 
state into a decision-making institution, with the corporate interests of the military becoming a 
major element in general governance. AB a result, the institutional set-up of the state is 
fundamentally changed. 
The second area where militaries tend to seek involvement is the economic sector. George 
Philip, for example, pointed to the importance of 'economic fiefdoms' for 'bureaucratically 
autonomous and politically interventionist' militaries in South America between 1925 and 1982.17 
In this field, analysts have differentiated between two types of intervention: first, the economic 
activities aimed at raising funds for the operational costs of the armed forces and the personal 
enrichment of its officers; and second, the engagement in national development projects, boosting 
the political legitimacy of the armed forces and institutionalising their role in governance. The 
first type of engagement includes ·military-owned businesses and cooperatives, stakes in large 
conglomerates that seek security and political protection in return, illegal activities such as 
16 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruit, 'Military Politics and the Mission of Nation Building', in: Kees 
Koonings and Dirk Kruit (editors), Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of 
Democracy, Zed Books, London & New York 2002: 19. . .. 
17 George Philip, 'Military Governments: Continuity and Change in Twentieth-Century South America', in: 
Patricio Silva (editor), The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations, 
Palgrave, NewYork2001: 74. 
8 
extortion, drug trafficking, backing of prostitution and gambling, and involvement in natural 
resource-extraction. 18 The second type of socio-economic activity is of a developmentalist nature: 
the military participates in programs such as the building of crucial infrastructure, family 
planning and public health, management of sports and youth organisations, education in rural and 
remote areas, and disaster relief. These activities grant the armed forces access to non-military 
items within national and regional budgets, increase the participation of military personnel in 
governance, and help to legitimise political intervention in the eyes of society. The extent to 
which militaries are independent from financial resources provided by the state, and the level of 
socio-economic engagement of the military in civilian areas of governance, are reflective of the 
position the military can assume in its interaction with other state institutions. 19 
The third field of military intervention is related to the institutional and organisational 
autonomy of the anned forces. Often the involvement of militaries in the two areas mentioned 
above, the participation in political institutions and the economy, are functions of the inherent 
tendency of the armed forces to protect and expand their instittitional autonomy. Military officers 
are inclined to view issues of defence management, such as force structure and size, purchase of 
equipment, senior appointments and the development of military strategies, as matters of internal 
organisation rather than policy fields directed by civilian authorities. This belief is based on what 
Peter D. Feaver called the 'information asymmetries in civil-military relations', which points to a 
level of technical expertise of the armed forces in the 'management of violence' that civilian 
controllers do not possess.20 The drive for instittitional autonomy can lead militaries to seek direct 
participation in or control of state institutions in order to limit their intervention opportunities vis-
a-vis the armed forces.21 Equally, the involvement of militaries in the economic sector is often 
motivated by their desire to remain financially independent from the control institutions of the 
state. There are, however, two areas of institutional autonomy in which even participation in 
political institutions or budgetary independence can prove insufficient to prevent interference by 
civilian forces: first, the authority over senior appointments and second, decisions on major 
defence and security policies made by civilian state institutions. fu many post-authoritarian states, 
18 LarrfDiamond and Marc F. Plattner, 'Introduction', in: Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (editors), 
Ci-iii-Military Relations and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1996: 
xix. 
19 Jorn BrommelhOrster and Wolf Christian Paes, 'Soldiers in Business: An Introduction', in: Jorn 
Brommelhorster and Wolf . Christian Paes (editors), The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in 
Business, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2003: 16. 
20 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University· 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London 2003: 68. 
21 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, Prentice-Hall 1977. 
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the control over appointments. constitutes the only civilian bargaining power in the interaction 
with militaries that have preserved large elements of their institutional and organisational powers 
built up under the previous regime. The confrontation between civilian appointment authority and 
the institutional power of the military often leads to civil-military negotiations over the terms of 
the transition.22 These negotiations can result in alliances between civilian power holders and 
military leaders aimed at establishing new forms of semi-authoritarian rule. Alternatively, 
civilians may concede organisational autonomy to the armed forces in exchange for their support 
of the democratic transition. 
Besides institutional autonomy, militaries also often seek jurisdiction over the formulation and 
implementation of defence and security policies, In his study on the armed forces of Chile, 
Gregory Weeks described this area as 'highly salient' for the military.23 Many militaries view it 
as their prerogative to manage the security of the state, insisting that civilians are politically too 
divided or do not possess the necessary. skills to be left in charge of national security issues. In 
transitional states, militaries tend to utilise their organisational autonomy to obstruct decisions on 
security matters made by civilian authorities. Unable to influence the decision-making process 
itself, and aware that overthrowing the government is politically unfeasible, the anned forces may 
run counter-operations that undermine the goal of the policies set by the executive. In Indonesia, 
the armed forces formally endorsed the decision by the Habibie government to hold a referendum 
. . 
in East Timor, but immediately began to support the buiid-up of pro-integration militias assigned 
with sabotaging the process. In addition to the control of defence and security policies, militaries 
often demand legal jurisdiction over their own personnel. The extent to which the military has 
authority ovedegal investigations into its officers is a major issue of democratic consolidation. 
Militaries may insist on the autonomy of their legal systems in order to fend off demands for legal 
inquiries into crimes and violations that occurred under the . previous regime. While such 
investigations are often essential for the success of democratiC transitions, civilian authorities 
may find it necessary to reach compromises with the military, resulting in de facto amnesties for 
incriminated officers. The ability of militaries to sabotage and obstruct the implementation of 
. government directives in other policy fields is the major consideration for such compromises, 
which in turn are important analytical indicators of the quality of civil-military relations in the 
country concerned. 
22 Carolina G. Fernandez, 'Controlling Asia's Armed Forces', in: Larry Diamond and .Marc F. Plattner 
·(editors), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 
1996: 72. 
23 Gregory Weeks, The Military and Politics in Postauthoritarian Chile, The University of Alabama 
Press, Tuscaloosa and London 2003: · 15. 
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The fourth area that militaries traditionally attempt to participate in or establish control over is 
the socio-cultural sector. Civil society and its socio-cultural expressions are important elements in 
stabilising or undermining political structures, and their control and manipulation is a major 
component of regime maintenance in authoritarian states. Not only does military surveillance of 
cultural activities dampen criticism of the regime, but the armed forces may also initiate or 
support religious events, literary works, ideological indoctrination courses, theatre plays, media 
features or concerts aiming to influence public opinion on policy issues in general or the role of 
the military in particular. The socio-:eultural sector is in fact the most difficult to establish definite 
control over, and the decline of authoritarian regimes often begins with subtle manoeuvres by 
protagonists of cultural life to voice the very opposition towards the government that formal 
institutions were unable to express. Intellectuals, writers, artists and musicians have often had a 
larger impact on the fate of regimes than politicians, either in destabilising or legitimising them.24 
The interaction of the armed forces with civil society and the cultural sphere is often overlooked 
in studies on civil-military relations, with the main focus remaining on state institutions and 
military participation in them. The widened concept of democratic control of the armed. forces, 
however, acknowledges the importance of non-political actors in the civil-military equation, and 
looks critically at how socio-cultural factors either catalyse democratic consolidation, or, on the 
contrary, help the armed forces in preserving their privileges. 
III. MODELS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION: PRAETORIAN, PARTICIPANT-
RULER, GUARDIAN, REFEREE 
After having identified the areas in which military intervention occurs, it is important to describe 
·the various typological models that have dominated the discourse ·on civil-military relations in 
authoritarian states so far.25 Although they are less precise in analysing civil-military dynamics in 
transitional states, they are helpful in picturing the level of military intervention a particular state 
had to overcome when the democratic transition began. 
The most extreme form of military intervention in politics has·been termed as 'praetorian' rule. 
. . 
In praetorian models of governance, the military is the main component of the regime, and all 
24 Michael H. Bodden, 'Seno Gumira Ajidanna and Fictional Resistance to an Authoritarian State in 1990s 
Iridonesia', Indonesia 68, October 1999: 155-56. 
25 The following typology of states with different. levels of military intervention is largely based on 
Perlmutter 1977 and Nordlinger 1977. 
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other forces and institutions are under its control. Executive, legislature and judiciary are either 
directly occupied by members of the armed forces or loyalist civilians. Praetorian regimes often 
rule under emergency regulations or legislation passed under its supervision. Many of the Latin 
American and African states that were the focus of the classic studies on military interventionism 
in the 1950s were countr~es under praetorian rule. In the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea and 
Thailand had praetorian regimes, and Burma and Pakistan still fall under this category today. 
Although Pakistan has officially returned to civilian rule, the elections that installed the new 
· government were so heavily manipulated by the military, and powers so centralised in General 
Musharraf s presidency, that the country still fulfils all criteria of a praetorian· state. A second 
model iS that of 'participant-ruler', describing countries with direct military participation in, but 
not full control o±: government bodies. The armed forces may form alliances with or serve the 
interests of a particular civilian elite, and receive government participation and control over 
security policies in return. The Philippines under Marcos, Thailand for much of the 1980s and the 
majority of communist states were examples of this type of state-military relations. Communist 
leaders in particular may have calculated -that the inclusion of the military in governance would 
not only bind the armed forces to the ruling elite and neutralise the potential for opposition, but 
also transform the military into one of the main pillars of the regime. 
In the model of 'guardian' rule, on the other hand, rnilitaries do not necessarily have to 
participate in or dominate the government. They have enough institutional powers to judge the 
performance of civilian governments and remove them if deemed necessary. Such militaries 
define theinselves as protectors of national values and goals, whether it is to preserve the 
territorial integrity of the state or the adherence to a specific national ideology. Turkey has been a 
classic example of the guardian model, with the military now staying out of most government 
institutions, but still powerful enough to engineer the downfall of any government viewed as 
violating the principles of secularism or not doing enough to contain the Kurdish threat to 
Turkey's borders.26 In contrast to this, the 'referee' model refers to the role of militaries in 
countries with high levels of political competition, where the armed forces act as 'king makers'. 
The backing by the military may decide the power struggle in favour of a certain group, and the 
top brass will receive concessions for its support. Such concessions can have the form of regime 
participation or other privileges serving themilitary's interests. More important in this model are 
the non-political powers possessed by militaries, whether based on coercion or collective 
26 Gareth Jenkings has asserted that by 'January 2001, the military continued to insist that the twin threats 
to Kemalism from Kurdish nationalism and radical Islam had been contained rather than defeated.' See 
Gareth Jenkins, '.Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics', The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 337, 2001.: 84. 
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acknowledgement by civilian forces. The notion of the military as a 'referee' suggests, however, 
that the armed forces are a neutral mediator in political conflict, which is rarely the case. 
Huntington therefore introduced the concept of a 'praetorian society' in which no single force is 
able to exercise full authority, including the military. 
Most countries with long histories of military intervention have found themselves changing 
from one model into another at various stages of their development. Arguably, Indonesia went 
through all four paradigms since the 1950s. The role of the armed forces under parliamentary 
democracy conforms to the guardian model as the military· helped to terminate the democratic 
system amidst threats to Indonesia's territorial integrity. During the Sukarno regime of 1959-
1965, the armed forces were participant-rulers, sharing power with the President and confronting 
the rising influence of the communists. The army intervened in 1965, establishing a praetorian 
regime with military control of all state institutions. By the early 1990s, however, the increasing 
stake of civilian elements in the New Order reduced the military's role in state institutions again 
to that of a participant-niler. The armed forces were increasingly critical of the more sultanistic 
aspects of the President's rule,27 but withdrew their support ollly after a public uprising had 
cornered him. The 'referee model', finally, is able to describe some elements of the transition to 
post~authoritarian rule. It positions the armed forces as a power broker between the competing 
civilian forces, highlighting one of the main developments in post-Soeharto civil-military 
relations. The model fails, however, to grasp the nuances of this interaction. It remain8 debateable 
whether the military in post-New Order Indonesia still has the power to determine the 
composition of the government; international and domestic considerations make such forms of 
intervention rather unsustainable. Instead, the armed forces have received substantial concessions 
from both incumbent governments and oppositional forces in return for support in political crises. 
In . addition, retired generals have played a key role in the democratiC competition after 2002. 
Evidently, the existing models for military intervention are poorly equipped to explain these 
dynamics of post-authoritarian transitions. 
27 Linz and Stepan defined sultanism as a form of government in which 'there is high fusion by the ruler of 
the private and the public. The sultanistic polity becomes the personal domain of the sultan. In this domain 
there is no rule of law and there is low irtstitutionaiization.' Linz and Stepan· contrasted sultanistic rule with 
authoritarianism, in which 'there may or may not be a rule of law, space for semi-opposition, or space for 
regime moderates who might establish links with opposition moderates ( ... ).' Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 
Post-Communist Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and LondQn 1996: 52-53. 
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IV. REASONS FORMILITARY INTERVENTION: PROFESSIONALISM, THREAT 
LEVELS, STRENGTH OF STATE INSTITUTIONS 
The various models of military intervention in politics have been linked to different sets of 
explanations. The question why some militaries intervene in politics and others do not, and which 
factors influence the level of intervention, has been the focus of numerous case studies and 
theoretical discourses. Three approaches stand out as the .most proml.nent ones, and they Will· be 
discussed shortly in this section: first, the classic Huntingtonian notion of professional militaries 
versus non-professional ones; second, the reference .to internal and external threats as a major 
determinant of military engagement; and third, the linkage between the functionality and 
legitimacy of civilian institutions on the one hand and the intensity of military involvement on the 
other. 
The proposition of a nexus between military professionalism and the involvement of the anned 
forces in politics has been challenged by new theories and contradicting evidence, but it remains a 
prominent school of thought in the study of civil-military relatious. Huntington asserted that a 
professional military will maintain its· neutrality and isolate itself from the temptations of political . 
interference. Militaries that concentrate on . the development of technical ·expertise and the 
fulfilment of their institutional responsibilities, said Huntington, are very likely to obey policy 
decisions made by civilian authorities.28 Professional militaries allow for what Huntington calls 
'objective civilian control', a concept that in its substance comes close to what has been 
introduced above as 'democratic control' of the armed forces, but Jacks its procedural 
understandfug.29 Unprofessional militaries, i.e. those that do not focus· on skills development, 
technological innovations, and improvement of strategic thinking; are prone to become interested 
in practical politics. David Shambaugh, commenting on the reform process of the Chinese PLA 
(People's Liberation Army), used Huntington's theory to describe the depoliticisation of the PLA 
in the second half of the 1990s: 
"Senior PLA officers( ... ) are now promotedbased on meritocratic and professional 
cnteria, while political conscio~sness and activism account for little. The officer 
corps is thus becoming increasingly professional, in classic Huntingtonian terms. · 
( ... )The military's mission today is almost exclusively external, to protect national 
28 Samuel P, Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1957. 
29 Huntington 1957: 121. 
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security, rather than internal security, The role of ideology is virtually nil, and 
political work has declined substantially ( ... )."30 
Huntington's model continues to be influential in the field of foreign military assistance to 
countries in transition, where many donors believe that professionalisation of the armed forces is 
a precondition for establishing democratic control. Accordingly, large parts of the available funds 
are being allocated for training officers in classic military courses, with the expectation that this 
may instil sufficient levels of interest in their military profession, which in turn will reduce the 
tendency to intervene in politics. 
The problem with Huntington's assertion lies, of course, in its definition of 'professionalism'. 
The concept of 'professionalism' does not exclude the possibility that militaries acquire 
professional skills that may encourage intervention in politfos. Stepan's notion of a 'new 
professionalism' captures this possibility, and identifies internal security and national 
· development as the two areas in which militaries have increased their professional skills, driving 
them into the political arena.31 Stepan argues that the expansion of military professionalism: into 
areas of non-military expertise, like economic management and community development, has 
increased the dependence of civilians on the advise of the armed forces in various fields of 
governance. In addition, a series of case studies has also questioned Huntington's findings. In his 
study on the armed forces of Pakistan, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema maintained that the military 'played 
a very important role in the Pakistani polity and no significant decision was taken, in domestic or 
security affairs, without the military's input'.32 Yet he also concludes that the anned forces are 
'disciplined and well-trained' .33 Military professionalism in praetorian states? The majority of 
academic research suggests that such cases exist, casting doubt on the very linkage between 
professionalism and levels of military intervention that forms the essence ofHuntington' s model. 
Besides the issue of professionalism, the discussion on the causes of military intervention in 
politics has concentrated on internal and external threat levels in particular states. While there is 
agreement that high levels of internal threat (political coilflict, social inequalities, ethnic rivalries, 
30 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, University of 
California Press; Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 2002: 13. 
31 Alfred Stepan, 'The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion', in: 
Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (editors), Armies and Politics in Latin America, Holmes and 
Meier, New York 1986: 134-150; Costas Danopoulos, 'Civil-Military Relations in the Postcommunist 
World', Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series No. 38, July 
2002: 4. 
32 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest 2002: 157 
33 Cheema 2002: xiii. 
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separatism, lawlessness) lead to increased political intervention of the armed forces, the literature 
remains divided on the consequences of high levels of external threat (wars, international 
terrorism, piracy). Some, like the proponents of the 'garrison state', have argued that the constant 
threat of war may lead to the institutionalisation of the military's role in politics.34 Others, like 
Andreski, have maintained exactly the opposite. They have explained that external threats keep 
rnilitaries occupied and, therefore, out of politics.35 Hunter, writing on civil-military relations in 
Latin America, even asserted that expanding the political relevance of external defence 
cooperation played a significant role in the post-authoritarian transitions of the 1980s and 1990s, 
compensating p~liticised militaries for lost terrain. 36 Further developing this argument, Michael 
Desch introduced a model that analyses the interplay bet:Ween external and internal threats on the 
one hand and the quality.of 'civilian' control of the military on the other.37 He suggests that high 
levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat result in 'stronger' civilian control; high 
levels of external threat and high levels of internal threat lead to 'poor' civilian control; low levels 
of external threat and high levels of internal threat produce the 'worst' civilian control; and low 
levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat are likely to see 'mixed' civilian control. 
Theories that link the levels of internal and external threat with the extent of military 
intervention in politics inay have some descriptive value, but their explanatory strength is rather 
limited. They tend to view levels of threat as objective_ facts, established by scientific means and 
under conditions of political neutrality. The reality is, of course, quite different. There is 
- -
sufficient evidence that militaries have not only created public perceptions of threat levels that 
consolidated their political positions, but have also actively engineered conflict situations that 
illcreased the levels of threat, both internally and externally. Threat levels are part of the political 
discourse within societies, and their interpretations are therefore informed by the-vested interests -
of particular groups and institution8.38 Militaries may give their assessments of threat levels not 
only based on objective facts, but also from the perspective of how such an analysis can generate 
. . . . ' . 
additional funding and other institutional privileges for the armed forces. In the same context, 
· militaries may stimulate, create or prolong conflicts, particularly in the domestic arena, if such 
-
34 Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Garrison State', American Journal of Sociology 46, January 194 l: 455-468. 
35 Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society, Routledge & K. Paul; Loridon 1954. _ 
36 Wendy Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military's Role in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. 1996. 
37 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1999. -
38 David R. Mares, 'Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and the Regional Neighborhood', in: David R. 
Mares (editor), Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, 
-Southern Asia, and Central Europe, W estview Press, Boulder and Oxford 1998: 9. -
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acts of manipulation are deemed favourable to their interests. In Indonesia, many observers have 
argued that while the secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua have constituted serious threats 
to the state, their operations have been partly encouraged by elements of the armed forces in order 
to highlight ~eir indispensability as guardians of national unity. This problem of manipulability 
exposes threat level theories to another analytical question: what has made militaries in a small 
number of states so powerful that they can control the public perception of threat levels, and even 
create conflict situations to increase them? With this, the threat level theories arrive back at the 
very question that they claimed to answer. 
A third school of thought has highlighted the quality of civilian state institutions as an important 
factor in determining the extent Of military involvement in politics. Samuel Finer laid the grounds 
for this model by asserting that countries with a 'developed political culture' are more likely to 
see strong civilian control over the military than those with low levels of societal respect for the 
governmental and legal institutions of the state.39 Militaries tend to seek political participation, 
and ultimately control, if state institlitions lack the legitimacy and functional strength to run 
effective and stable administrations. The failure of civilian governments to maintain political 
stability, manage security threats, provide economic growth and uphold law and order has 
'forced' militaries to intervene. Finer's argument carries the risk of being tautological: military 
non-intervention does not only result from a developed political culture, it is one of its key 
features. The importance of Finer's theory, therefore, is less based on its explanatory strength 
than its ability to shift the analytical emphasis from the military-focused professionalism and 
• threat level theories to the discussion of political culture. For Finer, the key to understanding the 
reasons for involvement of the armed forces in politics lies as much in society as in the 
institutional interests of the military. 
In this context, several authors have looked at levels of economic development as indicators for 
the likelihood of military intervention.40 Proponents of development-based theories have argued 
. . 
39 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, with a new introduction by Jay Stanley, New Brunswick and 
London 2003: 86-89. Larry Diamond has defined political culture, based on Finer's assumptions, as 'a 
people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political 
system of its country, and the role of the self in that system.' See Larry Diamond, 'Introduction: Political 
Culture and Democracy', in: Larry Diamond. (editor), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing 
Countries, Boulder 1994: 7-8. . . 
40 In some of his later works, Huntington, for example, has postulated a correlation between per capita 
income and the possibility of military coups. Countries with a per capita gross domestic product of $3000 
or above are very unlikely to witriess successful coups, while countries with per capita levels of below $500 
are extremely prone to such forms of military intervention. Samuel P. Huntit_J.gton, 'Reforming Civil-
Military Relations, in: Laey Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (editors), Civil-Military Relations and 
Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, London and Baltimore: 9. 
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that higher levels of economic development produce new political actors with increased demands 
for participation in state institutions, challenging traditional players such as the bureaucratic elite, 
large business corporations and the military. The emergence of a new middle class in Asia in the 
late 1980s has been credited with the removal of the military from power in South Korea and 
Thailand. There, economically inspired demands for free markets, eradication of corruption, 
abolition of monopolies and the impartiality of the legal system formed the conceptual core of the 
oppositional movements. As one observer of Thai politics noted, the 1992 uprising was 'not so 
much pro-democracy, as it is often claimed, but rather a movement opposed to the possibility of a 
new alliance of the military and business leading to a dictatorship. ' 41 There are more complex 
examples, however. The military in Indonesia did not only survive three decades of economic 
growth without major challenges to its privileged position, but has drawn its political legitimacy 
from it. It was precisely when the economic boom ended, and the new middle class was thrown 
into crisis, that the armed forces had to accept Soeharto's departure and the subsequent 
democratic reforms. It appears, therefore, that it is not always economic development as such that 
erodes military interference in politics. Rather, it is often the sudden downturn after long periods 
of growth that increases the likelihood of opposition by the middle class towards the very 
authoritarian rulers that facilitated its rise. 
The theories that focus on society, the economy and institutions of the state as key indicators for 
military interventions in politics have considerable advantages over the models based on military 
professionalism and the various levels of threat. They establish an important (and so far missing) 
link between the quality of governance as a whole and the political intervention opportunities of 
militaries, and analyse the issue of civil-military relations in the wider institutional framework of 
the state. Substantial weaknesses remain, however. To begin with, the issue of weak civilian 
institutions cannot be debated in a political vacuum. Militaries may have the power to weaken 
institutions of the state in order to prepare their own rise to power. This is particularly relevant for 
countries in which political institutions are in an early stage of their development and thus 
vulnerable to outside interference. Daniel Lev, for example, has argued that the disintegration of 
Indonesia's parliamentary democracy in the late 1950s, was the result of political manoeuvring by 
·the army: 'Why? In part because it could, but also because it had compelling interests in a quite 
different political system. ' 42 Conceptually, the identification of weak civilian institutions as a 
41 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, 'Old Soldiers Never Die, They Are Just Bypassed: The Military, Bureaucracy, 
and Globalisation', in: Kevin Hewison (editor), Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and 
Participation, Routledge, London and New York 1997: 53. 
42 Daniel S. Lev, 'On the Fall of the Parliamentary System', in: David Bourchier and John Legge (editors), 
Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31, Clayton 1994: 39 
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factor in motivating military intervention in politics raises new questions related to the causes for 
such weaknesses, and the institutional interests of the military may well be part of the answer. A 
second problem is the omission of international factors. The shifts in policy priorities after the 
Cold War, the role of international donors and the increased importance of human rights since the 
1990s have, however limited in scale, influenced the political aspirations of militaries in 
developing states. While insufficient to form a theoretical model on their own, arguments centred 
around international factors have to be taken account when explaining the elements that facilitate 
political involvement of militaries or force them to disengage. 
V. THE FALL OF MILITARY REGIMES: ERODING LEGITIMACY, INTRA-
MILITARY FACTIONALISM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
PRESSURE 
The discussion of the causes of political interference by militaries leads into the debate about 
their 'extrusion' from politics. Thus tl}e following section will examine the reasons for the 
disintegration of military-backed or military-dominated regimes, and build analytical bridges to 
the study of civil-military relations in transitional states. 
Some of the theories developed to explain the downfall of military regimes deal specifically 
with the unsustainable aspects of military rule, while others propose more general explanations 
for the end of authoritarian governments. The notion of an inherent non-sustainability of military 
rule has traditionally been based on the inability of the armed forces to explain their political 
engagement beyond the short-term legitimacy of emergency intervention.43 Militaries tend· to 
intervene in times of political and economic crisis, claiming that civilian authorities have failed to 
protect the interests of the state. Such intervention may be popular for as long as the emergency 
persists, but becomes problematic once stability is restored and the role of the military is 
institutionalised. Some militaries can argue that their institutional engagement is necessary to 
prevent the reoccurrence of the very emergency situation that provoked it to intervene, but such 
situational frameworks of legitimacy are unlikely to sustain military rule for a longer period of 
time. Accordingly, militaries expanded their basis of legitimacy to include national development, 
the defence of particular ideologies or, more generally, the maintenance of national unity. The 
linkage of military legitimacy with the achievement of certain goals, however, has thrown the 
armed forces into what Huntington called a 'performance dilemma'. If they fail to achieve their 
43 Alagappa 200lb: 50-51. 
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self-set targets, societies are likely to seek a quick end to military rule; if, on the other hand, the 
goals are achieved, the reasons for continued military intervention may be questioned as well. 
Sustained economic growth, the unchallenged dominance of a particular ideology or the 
permanent neutralisation of threats to national unity remove not only the emergency context 
under which militaries came to power, but also erode the claim to institutionalised rule. Theories· 
of disintegrating military regimes have therefore concentrated on the linear process of emergency 
intervention, expansion of legitimacy claims and subsequent erosion of the regime by either 
performance failures or, on the contrary, the long-term consequences of its successes. This 
erosion can facilitate a change ofregime, and in some cases initiate post-authoritarian transition. 
One important factor in limiting the life span of military regimes is the growing distance 
between those officers who staged the initial emergency intervention and assumed executive 
powers of government, and those who are in charge of the day-to-day management of the armed 
forces. Jn addition to these two major factions, Stepan emphasised the importance of military 
intelligence operators, or the 'security community', as a third group with specific interests.44 
Military leaders in positions of political power may, like Indonesia's Soeharto, try to create 
factionalism within the armed forces in order to prevent a challenge to their rule. These efforts of 
weakening potential rivals for political power are closely related to the issue of succession.45 Only 
very few military regimes have seen non-violent changes in leadership, with coups and internal 
elimination of competitors the most common way of transferring governmental authority. The 
ouster and arrest of Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in October 2004, for example, 
illustrated the non-institutional character of succession in military-dominated states. Equally, 
Thailand has seen a series of coups within its military regimes between the 1930s and the early 
1990s. It was partly this prospect of being violently deposed and persecuted that has discouraged 
military-backed rulers like Soeharto from addressing the issue of succession at all. Instead, they 
t~nded to postpone the topic for so long that society began to tum not only against them, but 
. against the system of military-based governance itself. 
While there are some military-specific aspects in the downfall of regimes controlled or backed 
by the armed forces, most of the factors that lead to the erosion of such polities can be applied to 
other forms of authoritarian rule as well. Alagappa divided the possible explanations for the 
breakdown of authoritarian governments 'into two categories: international factors (war, 
44 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 1988: 30. 
45 Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers 324, 1998: 20. 
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conquest, changes in the global material and normative structure, changes in the global economy, 
changes in the foreign policy of major powers), and domestic factors (economic crisis, loss of 
legitimacy, · conflict within the ruling bloc, growing public opposition, civil war, internal 
conflict).'46 Apart from very obvious cases where regimes are overthrown by external military 
intervention (like the US-led invasion of Iraq and subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein from 
power), there seem to be only very few cases in which international factors played the lead role in . 
bringing authoritarian reigns to an end.47 futernational economic crises, multinational alliances 
and development aid may, in fact, stimulate and sustain authoritarian interventions as much as 
they can help remove autocratic regimes. The role of international donors in the fudonesian crisis 
of 1998 is a case in point: while the credits extended by the futernational Monetary Fund (IMF) 
had the potential of saving Soeharto' s rule, it was the President's mishandling of the aid package 
that fueled opposition to the continuation ofhls government. It appears, therefore, that the major 
causes of the disintegration of authoritarian regimes lie in the domestic area. Regimes become 
vulnerable if they are no longer able to serve the interests of the societal groups that originally 
benefited from authoritarian rule, triggering a series of phenomena that ultimately cause the 
regime to fall: internal splits within the elite, the revitalisation of opposition groups through new 
power configurations, societal protest against the inefficiency of government and conflicts within 
the military. While all these developments take place within an international context, and may 
well be influenced by it, they follow the inherently domestic logic of the contested regime and the 
opposing forces it has produced. 
As demonstrated in the course of this introduction, the literature on civil-military relations has 
been expansive on the areas in which militaries seek intervention; on the various models of 
military participation in politics; on the reasons that cause some militaries to intervene and others 
to stay disengaged; and, finally, on the explanations for the downfall of military regimes. Among 
.the presented theoretical approaches and models, however, there were only very few that could 
capture the dynamics of the role militaries play in post-authoritarian states. The classic 
categorisations of military intervention (praetorian, participant-ruler, guardian, referee) have 
proven too general to describe .the complexity of civil-military interactions in transitional states, 
and the various reasons linked to them (lack of professionalism, internal and external threat 
46 Alagappa200lb: 53. 
47 Samuel Decalo, for example, doubts the effectiveness of the 'economic deterrence of the West in case of 
military coups'. While it helped in the short term to create some of Africa's 'New Democracies', its failures 
are clearly 'visible in the pattern of mutinies and attempted coups that have punctuated the rhythm of 
political life in the 1990s.' See Samuel Decalo, Civil-Military Relations in Africa, FAP Books, Gainesville 
and London 1998: 199. 
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levels, quality of state institutions) have only limited explanatory power. The theories on the fall 
.of military regimes, on the other hand, do not extend to the residual powers the armed forces may 
use in post-authoritarian transitions, or the way they may assimilate to new democratic 
frameworks. According to Robin Luckham, the fluid contexts of political transitions have created 
'new problems for analysis, including how to decipher underlying shifts in military power 
relations when these are no longer flagged by open military intervention. '48 The following section 
will, therefore, look at the very limited number of studies that have attempted. to describe the 
nuances of civil-military relations in transitional states, and will subsequently introduce a new 
model that may be of help to investigate the subject of this study, the civil-military relations in 
post-Soeharto Indonesia. 
VI. CIVIL-1\flLITARY RELATIONS IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN STATES: CLASSIC 
MODELS FOR NEW CONTEXTS 
Most of the recent case studies on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states have used 
classic models in order to explain the complexities of new contexts. This leads to problems in 
connecting the theoretical model with the empirical material, and may even result in 
· inconsistencies between the model-based argument and narrative-based conclusion. Herbert C. 
Huser's study on civil-military relations in Argentina, for example, uses the Finerian model of 
'political culture' to explain the military's exit from politics after 1983. Using Finer's notion of 
·legitimacy as the major element of a developed political culture, he maintains that 
"Argentine politics may be characterized as different sources of legitimacy being 
advanced, simultaneously and exclusively, by groups in contest. In other words, 
democracy is not a given in the political culture, and a single rule of legitimacy does 
not apply; fragmented legitimacy and conflicts are apparent."49 
In Finer' s model; such a diversity of competing legitimacies, reflected in a lack of respect for the 
existing institutions, would lead to increased military intervention. Yet Huser concludes that 'the 
historical role of the military as an autonomous political contender appears to have run its course, 
as have the contests between the military and the civilian government for legitimate. political 
48 Robin Luckham, 'Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict', in: Gavin Cawthra and 
Robin Luckham (editors), Governing. Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security 
Establishments in Transitional Democracies, Zed Books, London & New York 2003: 11. · 
49 Herbert C. Huser, Argentine Civil-Military Relations: From Alfonsin to Menem, National Defense 
University Press, Washington DC 2002: 23. 
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authority. ' 50 Apparently, the evolution of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Argentina 
was much more complex than Finer's model would suggest; Huser describes the persistence of 
major differences between the civilian forces over the legitimacy of the political framework, but 
at the same time reports substantial progress in depoliticising the armed forces. This disconnect 
between theoretical assumption and the presented material points to the ineffectiveness of classic 
models in capturing the nuances of developments in transitional states. · 
Other authors have approached the problem of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian 
states in a very normative way. They identify democratic control of the armed forces as an 
important element of successful democratic transitions, and describe the conditions countries 
have to fulfil to achieve this goal.51 These conditionS read like the reversed catalogue of the 
.reasons classically given for military intervention: empowerment of civilian institutions of the 
state, reducing the use of coereion in managing political conflicts, installing democratic 
paradigms into the mindset of the officer corps, professionalisation of the armed forces and their 
concentration on external defence matters, restructuring of the security sector and isolation of the 
old top brass from the political process. There is some disagreement about the importance of 
reform initiatives taken in the early phase of the transition. O'Donnel and Schmitter have argued 
that the process of reforming the military is a generational project, and that initial institutional 
changes may have only limited impact. Aguero, on the other hand, has asserted that 'the initia.l 
conditions are critical in shaping the first transition outcome.' 52 Among others, he names civilian 
control over the reform agenda as a crucial element of the transitional process. The widely .held 
view that democratic transitions in general and establishment of democratic control of the armed 
forces in particular are long-term developments likely to proceed for decades, has discouraged 
most observers from analysing the early period of the transition in much detail. This study will 
argue that many of Aguero's 'initial conditions' are determined by the charact~ of the regime 
change from authoritarian rule to the new government, as well as by developments in the early 
days of the democratic era when the political landscape takes shape. This focus will hetp to·. 
identify the extent to which the normative conditions for initiating democratic control of the 
armed forces were addressed at art early stage, and where delays and omissions have caused 
serious problems in later phases of the transition. 
50 Huser 2002: 196. 
51 J. Samuel Fitch, 'MiHtary Attitudes Toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We Know If 
Anything Has Changed?', in: David Pion-Berlin (editor), Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New 
Analytical Perspectives, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001: 61-63. 
52 Felipe Aguero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 
. . 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1995: 39. 
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Besides the concentration on classic models and the proposition of normative conditions, 
another prominent approach has been the analysis of transitions as interplays ·of competing 
political and economic interests. Such a model, which authors like David Pion-Berlin have called 
a theory of 'strategic action' ,53 allows for a high extent of analytical flexibility, and calls for case 
studies to explain the specific situations of particular countries. The downside of this approach is, 
of course, that it is largely self-evident. There is little doubt that the scale and the outcome of the 
competition between interest groups over political privileges and economic resources have a 
major impact on transitional processes, including on the evolution of post-authoritarian civil-
military relations. The strength of this model, therefore, lies more in its ability to concentrate its 
analytical focus on what it views as the primary source of conflict in transitions and draw 
attention away from secondary factors such as conflicting values and long-term structural change. 
Thus the interest-based approach is less an explanatory theory than a methodological guideline 
for the description of particular transitions. It is interesting to note that even proponents of 
structuralist explanations of democratic transition, while rejecting the interest-based model as 
narrow and ignorant of global dynamics of change, tend to describe the conflicts in transitional 
states as power struggles between old elites and new political forces, between 'predatory' and 
'neo-liberal' interests. Richard Robison criticised the interest-based approach as the product of 
'rational choice theorists' who explain democratic transitions as processes 'driven by the rational 
calculations of rising and declining elites facing rising costs of suppressing opponents and forced 
to seek a new political format that, while second best, is preferable to mutual destruction. '54 He 
then continued, however, by analysing the Indonesian transition as 'the struggle to shape the 
institutions that define the new democracy', involving 'alliances and coalitions of state power and 
social interest' connected to the Soeharto regime on the one hand and the 'reformist camp' on the 
other.ss While contextualised in a framework of capitalist expansion,. it appears that even 
structuralist approaches like Robison's rely heavily on the analysis of competing interest groups 
to make their case. 
The multitude of theoretical approaches introduced so far has indicated that particular aspects of 
some models may be helpful in capturing the dynamics of civil-military relations in post-
53 David. Pion-Berlin, 'Introduction', in: David Pion-Berlin (editor), Civil-Military Relations in Latin 
America: New Analytical Perspectives, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001: 
18 
54 Richard Robison, 'What Sort of Democracy? Predatory and Neo-liberal Agendas in Indonesia', in: 
Catherina KinnvaU and Kristina Jonsson (editors), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: . The 
Construction of Identity, Routledge, London and New York 2002: 95. 
55 Robison 2002: 93. 
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authoritarian states. Some authors have tried, therefore, to combine the various theories into a 
single model that can address the specific conditions of democratic transitions, and explain why 
some civil-military reform projects succeed and other run into serious obstacles. Alagappa, for 
example, has amalgamated the most influential writings on civil-military relations into one 
inclusive 'analytical framework'. 56 The downside of such eclectic models is their vagueness and 
generality. Forced into a united theoretical approach, most of its components lose their sharp 
analytical edge and explanatory power. The following section will discuss one model that tries to 
integrate diverse aspects of the existing _civil-military literature without insisting on their 
analytical combination. Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster, writing 
comparatively on civil-military relations in post-authoritarian transitions in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, have designed a model that· appears to be well 
equipped to explain the hybrid state of civil-military relations in post-Soeharto Indonesia. 
VII. CRITIQUE: THE TWO-GENERATION MODEL OF CIVIL-MILITARY REFORM 
The model developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster integrates normative and empirical 
elements into one comprehensive framework of gradually evolving civil-rililitary relations of 
transitional states. They recognise the establishment of democratic control over the. armed forces 
as a crucial component of democratic consolidation, and assert that the academic discourse on 
such issues has been misguided by its narrow focus on the circumstances, traditions, and histories 
of Western states.57 Traditional theories of civil-military relations developed in the West have 
often stressed the likelihood of the armed forces seizing political power, instead of explaining the 
· wide spectrum of intervention levels between the extremes of democratic control and praetorian 
rule. Not only have most Western models proven ineffective in capturing the dynamics of civil-
military relations in post-authoritarian contexts, they have already moved on to paradigms of a 
'post-modern military'. Analysts like Charles Moskos have characterised the post-modem 
military by its increasing 'interpenetrability' between civilian and military spheres; its internal 
modernisation in terms of gender equality and acceptance of different sexual orientations; its 
involvement in non-traditional operations such as peacekeeping; and its integration into supra- or 
multinational command structures. 58 Obviously, such models have little relevance for transitional 
56 Alagappa 200lb: 29. 
57 Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2001: 2. 
58 Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David R. Segal, 'Anhed Forces after the Cold War', in: 
Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David R. Segal (editors), The Postmodern Military, Oxford 
University Press, New York 2000: 6-9. 
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. states struggling to build workable institutions of governance and reduce military intervention in 
politics. Cottey et. al. try to address the ineffectiveness of both traditional theories and post-
modern models by developing an approach that fits the political circumstances of post-
authoritarian transitions, and also allows for sufficient levels of analytical flexibility to establish 
differences between particular countries . 
. The explanatory focus of the model is directed towards security sector governance, the process 
of multi-level interactions through which democratic control of the armed forces is exercised. 
This approach investigates the relationship between state institutions (executive, legislature, 
bureaucracy), the security forces (armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, state-legitimised 
armed formations) and civil society (defined with Linz and Stephan as the arena in which 'self-
. organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to 
articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests' 59). The quality 
of this relationship determines whether countries are successful in their attempts to establish 
democratic control over the armed forces, or whether problematic civil-military interactions 
become obstacles to further democratic consolidation. Specific indicators are the extent to which 
the democratically legitimised executive is able to formulate and implement policy decisions on 
foreign relations, th~ deployment and use of force, and defence management; the effectiveness of 
parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; and the involvement of civil-:-society groups with 
expertise in defence and security affairs (which make up what Cottey et al. call the 'non-
. governmental security community') in informing the civil-military discourse. 
The most. significant contribution of the Cottey et. ·al. model to the debate on civil-military 
relations in post-authoritarian states is the introduction of a two-generation model of reform 
phases in democratic transitions. According to· Cottey et al., most countries that have initiated 
democratic reform after long periods of military-backed, authoritarian rule begin the transitional 
process with changes to their institutional framework: abolition of security institutions associated 
with the old regime, establishment of new civilian bodies to control the armed forces, changes to 
' the command system, and empowerment of parliament. This first phase of institutional measures 
is what Cottey et. al. call the 'first generation' of civil-military reforms.60 The first g~neration of 
refofIIlS is important for the dismantling of old power structures as. well as for the definition of 
what the end goal of the democratic transition should be. It is irisufficient, however, to address 
capacity problems of the newly created institutions, and to control residual powers the armed 
59 Linz and Stepan 1996: 7-8. 
6° Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2001: 5. 
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forces may be able to exercise through non-institutional political networks.61 Political institutions, 
as well as civil society groups, can only function properly if they have the capacity to fulfil their 
tasks. Lack of expertise, experience, funds, infrastructure, supporting staff, technology and 
information can cause even: highly sophisticated institutional frameworks to collapse or simply 
become dysfwictional. Accordingly, the 'second generation' of reforms is crucial. The second 
generation consolidates the frameworks created in the first; it provides the democratic substance 
. to the structures established by political decisions. The challenge of the second-generation 
reforms is centred around building capacity of both state institutions and civil society, and it 
concerns three main areas: first, the 'development of working mechanisms for the implementation 
and oversight of defence policy'. Second, the establishment of 'effective systems of security 
sector governance, which allows a country's defence and security requirements to be adequately 
assessed, reassessed, and addressed'. And third, 'the engagement of "civil society'' as a core 
. component of oversight and accowitability in defence and security matters. '62 
Cottey, Edmunds and Forster have used their two-generation model to evaluate processes of 
civil-military reform in numerous states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, most of which had 
highly politicised armed forces during decades of communist rule. Their assessment of the reform 
processes concludes that despite strong traditions of military praetorianism in most of the 
investigated countries, and despite the chaos of post-communist transition, none of the states has 
seen the recurrence of military rule. hlstead, the majority of cowitries have experienced various 
degrees of progress in military reform, ranging from initial measures in first-generation reforms 
to consolidating steps in second-generation efforts. Cottey et. al. have developed four categories 
of countries, each defining the position of a particular state on the two-generation scale of civil-
military reforms.63 The first group consists of states that have largely addressed the first-
generation agenda, but in some cases have experienced problems in implementing second-
. generation reforms. ill their research, Cottey et.al. have identified eleven states that belong to this 
group, among them Bulgaria, Estonia, the. Czech Republic and Hungary. The second type is 
characterised by cowitries that have faced persistent problems with the first-generation agenda, 
although some civil-military reforms have been initiated. This group contains two COWltries: 
Russia and the Ukraine. The third group ofcountries is made up of states that have not even seen 
61 David Betz, 'Comparing Frameworks of Parliamentary Oversight: Poland, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine', 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series No. 115, July 2003: 2. 
62 Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2001: 5. 
63 A summary of the country classifications can be found in Graeme P. Herd and Tom Tracy, 'Civil-
Military ·Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: "Capacity Building" to Democratic Institutional 
Development?', Unpublished Paper, 2003: 5. 
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first-generation measures of reforms. There are seven countries m this group, including 
Turkmenistan and Belarus. The fourth category, finally, describes states that have initiated both 
first and second-generation reform steps but were too weak to sustain them, leading to either 
stagnation or collapse of the reform process. This group includes seven states, among them 
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. 
In order to explain why some countries have progressed further than others in the process of 
civil-military reforms, Cottey et. al. have developed five explanatory propositions64: first, the 
historical legacy ofmilitary engagement in politics under previous regimes can influence the pace 
and scope of military reform in post-authoritarian transitions. While transitions are not 
predetermined by historical contexts of the preceding. regime, the persistence of its power 
structures may play an important role in the emerging democratic polity. Second, the state of 
civil-military relations is a reflection of the democratisation process as a whole. Countries in 
which alternatives to liberal democracy have largely been delegitimised have seen more 
significant moves towards. establishing democratic control over the armed forces than states in 
which the principles of political organisation are still contested. Third, international incentives 
have had a major impact on the willingness of states to pursue civil-military reforms. The 
majority of Central and Eastern European countries have established democratic control over 
their armed forces as a precondition for acceptance into NATO and the European Union. The 
economic and political advantages offered by membership in these multi-national associations 
have even convinced the more conservative militaries in the region to comply with the normative 
standards of the organisations they sought to enter. Fourth, the depth of domestic institutional 
reform in the security sector can be an important factor for the state of civil-military relations. 
Consolidated institutional reforms 'reduce the vulnerability of civil-military relations towards the 
vagaries of domestic political change' ,65 while artificially implemented reforms are unlikely to be 
sustainable over longer periods of time. Fifth, specific 'military cultures' can support or obstruct 
. the efforts of establishing democratic control. In this regard, the level of professionalism 
(understood as 'the extent to which the military view their core mission as to undertake in a 
64 The five propositions are outlined in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, 
'Introduction: The Challenge of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe', in: 
Andrew C.ottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (editors), Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe. Guarding the Guards, Palgrave, New York 2002: 10-14. 
65 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, 'Soldiers, Politics and Defence: Some Initial 
Conclusions on the Democratisation of Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Central and Eastern 
Europe', Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Project, Unpublished Paper, 2000: 3. 
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professional manner the military tasks defined for them by civilian political leaders')66 is of 
crucial importance. 
The Cottey et. al. model leads to important insights regarding the case of Indonesia. To begin 
with, it delivers an explanatory framework for the preliminary analysis that despite a series of 
institutional reforms, Indonesia's armed forces have retained considerable political powers and, 
accordingly, democratic civilian control has not been successfully established. The model 
suggests that Indonesia has experienced serious difficulties in completing the first-generation 
refon:nS and/or initiating second-generation measures. The two-generation categorisation allows 
for a much more precise identification of Indonesia's place in the comparative scale of countries 
with transitional civil-military relations than the traditional models of praetorian, participant-
ruler, guardian and referee levels of military intervention. In addition, it also points to the wider 
context of democratisation in Indonesia, and particularly requires studying the correlation 
between institutional military reform and the political discourse on competing inodels of 
governance. Such a focu8 may help to discover the extent to which political disputes between 
major political forces may have obstructed the process of institutional military reform and, 
therefore, delayed its second-generation consolidation. Furthermore, the model highlights the 
absence of international affiliation&· and alliances that could have forced Indonesia to pursue 
military reforms faster and with more depth. Finally, the emphasis on institutional reform 
questions the extent to which the structures of Indonesia's security sector were reformed after 
1998. In this context, the persistence of the entrenched territorial command structure suggests that 
the process of institutional reform remains incomplete. 
Despite its explanatory advantages over other models of civil-military relations, the Cottey et.al. 
approach shares one fundamental weakness with most of its counterparts: it says very little about 
the factors that obstruct the empowerment of civilians to control the security sector. Cottey e~.al. 
tend to focus on the lack of technical expertise and infrastructure, and pay only secondary 
attention to· the dynamics of post-authoritarian power struggles among civilian forces. They 
concede that there is significant 'willingness of some civilian elites to try and draw the armed 
forces (or .elements of the armed forces) into politics in order to gain their support in what are 
primarily civilian, domestic political conflicts.;67 This is an important ·assessment, and· shoUld 
deserve further analysis. In his study on the Nigerian military, 'Emeka Nwagwu has focused on 
66 Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2002: 14. 
67 Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2001: 4. 
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tribalism and regional conflicts as the main reasons for military intervention in African politics.68 
Equally, Indonesia's social, religious and political landscape is a complicated web of long-
standing alliances and rivalries, with the conflict over the role of Islam in politics standing out as 
one of the primary sources of tension in the civilian sphere. In fact, the impact of inter-civilian 
disputes on the pace and quality of civil-military reforms appears to be one of the most important 
explanatory components of the two-generation model, and should have been integrated into the 
typology of causes for successful, failed or stalled transitions. Instead, Cottey et.· al. mention the 
extent of institutional reform as a main indicator for the state of civil-military relations; this 
assertion runs the risk of circularity as the depth of institutional refor:m is in itself the result of the 
.other four factors outlined in the model (legacy of the previous regime, legitimacy of democratic 
rule, international incentives, and specific military cultures). The aim of this study is, therefore, 
not only to test existing models in the context of civil-military relations in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia, but also to expand such theories with the· lessons learnt from the Indonesian case. This 
expectation is reflected in the structure of the thesis. 
VIII. LEGACY, TRANSITION AND POWER: THE STRUCTURE OF TIDS STUDY 
The discussion of the existing literature on civil-military relations has pointed to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various theoretical models. It has also provided important suggestions as far as 
the focus and the structure of this study are concerned. In this context, there are three crucial 
conclusions that will guide the composition of the thesis. To begin with, the critique of the classic 
theories of military intervention in politics suggests that studies on the topic have to divide their 
attention equally between analyses of military politics and internal developments in the civilian 
political sphere. Accordingly, this thesis will focus as much on the role of key civilian groups in 
the democratic transition as on the interests, attitudes and discourses within the armed forces. The 
overview of theories has also shown that many authors pay much attention to the building of 
civil}an capacity in military management, but have only marginally touched on the impact that 
conflicts between civilian groups can have on the quality and pace of civil-military reforms. The 
Indonesian case suggests, however, that such conflicts play an important part in explaining the 
problems of establishing democratic control over the aimed forces. The working hypothesis of 
this study is that long-standing rivalries between key civilian constituencies have undermined 
efforts for effective military reform in the post-authoritarian transiti?Ii. In this context, the 
68 'Emeka Nwagwu, Taming the Tiger: Civil-Military Relations Reform and the Search for Political 
Stability in Nigeria, University Press of America, Lanham, New York, Oxford 2002: 73. 
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controversy within Indonesia's Muslim community over the role of Islam in political life stands 
out as one of the main sources of intra-civilian conflict. Historically, Muslims with secular-
nationalist attitudes have been engaged in heated debates with more devout followers of the faith 
over the relationship between the state and religious affairs. Equally important, however, are 
. divisions within the community of devout Muslims itself, with modernist and traditionalist groups 
split over doctrinal, social and political aspects of their religion. These conflicts have stretched 
from the colonial period over parliamentary democracy and two authoritarian regimes to the 
current democratic transition. Consequently, this thesis will analyse developments within the 
Muslim community as a case study of conflicts within the civilian political sphere and their 
repercussions for the process of civil-military reforms.69 
The second crucial conclusion from the suivey of theoretical models relates to the importance 
of historical legacies for the evolution of current civil-military affairs. Cottey, Edmunds aild 
Forster asserted that in countries where military ideologies and power structures were imposed by 
historical coincidences and/or external force, their disintegration was fast and complete. The 
armed forces in such states found it easy to support post-authoritarian polities as their 
identification with the deposed power holders was artificial. If, on the other hand, military 
dominance of political institutions was deeply entrenched in society, transitional processes were 
much more problematic. Accordingly, this study will have to analyse in some detail the historical 
legacies of military involvement in Indonesian polities and the divisions within the civilian sphere 
that helped to sustain it. The third crucial proposition drawn from the theoretical discussion is 
concerned with the study of the character of regime change and its consequences for the transition 
outcome. Aguero's emphasis on the 'initial conditions' suggests that the analysis of events that 
marked the transfer of power from the ancien regime to the post-authoritarian polity is essential 
for the understanding of civil-military transitions. The discussion of the 1998 regime change in 
69 There are, of course, other· important reasons for choosing Muslim groups as the ·main focus when 
studying conflicts in Indonesia's civilian sphere. First, Islamic groups represent the largest segment of 
Indonesian society, both numerically and in terms of political significarice. The study of their interests, 
relationships and conflicts will reflect general patterns· of political interaction in Indonesia. Second, the 
. discussion of Indonesia's civil-military affairs between 1998 and 2004 will point to the critical relevance of 
the Abdurrahman presidency in the transitional process. Abdurrahman's rise and fall was closely related to. 
the factionalism and alliance-building between Islamic groups, and facilitated intervention opportunities for 
the armed forces that ultimately· consolidated the military's position. Third, the study of intra-Islamic 
relationships and conflicts will inherently extend to other socio-political segments. The central position of 
Islamic forces in Indonesia's political landscape makes them a main target for the build-up of cross-
constituency coalitions. In fact, Islamic forces and secular-nationalist groups have cooperated more often 
than Muslim-based groups among themselves. The role of secular-nationalist constituencies is, therefore, 
an integral part of any study of the relationship between forces of political Islam. 
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Indonesia will, therefore, form an important part of this study. It will show that the roles played 
by the armed forces and key civilian groups during the political crisis of 1997 and 1998 assisted 
elements of the New Order to extend their influence into the post-authoritarian era and obstruct 
efforts for wider institutional reform, including in the security sector. The discussion of historical 
legacies and the character of regime change will, finally, provide. the analytical and empirical 
background for the explanation of civil-military developments in the post-Soeharto transition. 
The three conceptual conclusions mentioned above are mirrored in the structure of the thesis. 
The study will be divided into three major parts, comprising two chapters each. The first part will 
focus on historical legacies that have had a profound impact oh the state of Indonesian civil- . 
military relations. Chapter 1 discusses the history of military politics,. the structural entrenchment 
·of the armed forces in society and ideological developments within the officer corps. Chapter 2, 
for its part, highlights the divisions within Indonesia's Muslim community as one of the primary· 
. sources of conflict in the civilian political sphere. The chapter will explain the. religious, social 
and political gap between secular-nationalist and devout Muslims on the one hand and the 
conflicts between traditionalist and modernist Islam on the other. The second part of the study 
describes the regime change of 1998. and its impact on the civil-military transition after. 
·soeharto's fall. Chapter 3 argues that moderate.elements in the arined forces helped to negotiate 
an intra-systemic transfer of _power from Soeharto to his deputy, avoiding. a more radical break 
with the authoritarian past. The diverse attitudes of key civilian forces and figures towards the 
disintegrating.regime are the subject of Chapter 4, with the main focus on the divisions between 
the largest Muslim groups. The inability of civilian elites to form a united front against the regime 
and assume control of the government facilitated the emergence of the student movement and 
popular resistance as the main vehicles of opposition. The collapse of the regime amidst violence 
. and societal protest left a power vacuum that was filled by residual components of the New 
Order, with serious consequences for the democratic transitioil. The third part, finally, will 
discuss the dynamics of civil-military relations in the post-authoritarian transition after 1998. 
Chapter 5 will evaluate the process of military reform in the post-Soeharto period and explain the 
reasons for its successes and failures. Concluding, Chapter 6 maintains that the fragmentation of 
civilian politics during the transition created obstacles to the establishment of democratic control 
over the armed forces and facilitated. th~ rise of former generals as . key participants in the 
electoral competition. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
DOCTRINE, POWER AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: 
THE LEGACY OF 
MILITARY POLITICS IN INDONESIA 
Cottey, Edmunds and Forster have identified the historical legacy of the armed forces, 
· especially their relationship with the previous regime, as one of the main factors determining 
·the quality of post-authoritarian civil-military relations. In the same vein, other authors have 
stressed the importance of contradictory interpretations of the past for civil-military 
interactions in transitional states. Patricio Silva, writing on South America, maintained that 
" ( ... ) deep divisions between the military and the civilian world remain. The 
clearest expression of this lies in the existence of two conflicting and mutually 
excluding readings about the recent authoritarian past. On the one hand, the 
military and their civ.ilian supporters in countries like Argentilla, Uruguay and 
Chile argue that the armed forces actually saved their nations from complete 
chaos and disintegration. On the other, the left and human rights organizations 
blame the armed forces for having destroyed the old democratic system and for 
the systematic use of state terrorism against their opponents. The passing of time 
has definitely not reduced the enormous breach between these two 
·interpretations." 1 
There are five aspects of TNI' s historical legacy that will be of analytical significance for the 
study of post-Soeharto civil-military relations. First, the military's perception of itself as a 
'people's army' that - in contrast to civilian nationalist leaders - made no· compromises in 
their fight against Dutch colonial forces and led the country to independence in 1945. This 
perception supported both a sense cif entitlement to participate in government and an 
engrained disdain for civilian politicians. Second, the perception. that democratic civilian 
rule in the 1950s failed to establish gciod government and led to regional revolts that 
threatened to bring about the disintegration of the nation. Third, the gradual evolution since 
the 1950s of a doctrine to justify military involvement in government, and the creation of an 
organisational format to support such involvement. This doctrine - later known as Dual 
Function (bwi Fungsi) - and the accompanying territorial command structure provided-the 
foundation for the New Order regime after 1966. Fourth, the deep penetration by the military 
into civilian institutions under the New Order between 1966 and 1998. The TNI's 
1 Patricio Silva, 'The Soldier and the State in South America: Introduction', in: Patricio Silva (editor), 
. The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations, Palgrave, New York 
2001: 1-2. 
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participation in government and society was so extensive that the post-authoritarian reform of 
civil-military institutions would have to go much deeper than in other countries with more 
elite-oriented regimes. Finally, the broadening of Soeharto's power base during the late New 
Order and the increasingly sultanistic character of his rule led to a growing gap in the 1990s 
between the ageing president and the military. This gap had considerable consequences for 
the character of the 1998 regime change and the role of the armed forces in it, as well as for 
the development of civil-military relations in the post-Soeharto era. 
I. INDONESIA'S ARMED FORCES AND THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE: 
BETWEEN IDENTITY, MYTH AND POLITICAL LEGACY 
The Indonesian armed forces view themselves as a 'people's army'. The idea that the military 
was born out of a revolutionary struggle for national independence, and that its creation was 
mandated by the people rather than the authorities of the state, has been a central element in 
the civil-military discourse since the 1940s. Propagating the concept of 'being one with the 
people' (manunggal dengan rakyat), the military has invariably maintained that it was the 
decisive force in the fight for independence. The events during the guerrilla war against the 
Dutch between 1945 and 1949, or the military's historiographical interpretation of them, have 
served to legitimise the armed forces' claim that Indonesia's civil-military relations are 
fundamentally different from those in other countries. In fact, some elements in the armed 
forces leadership have traditionally rejected the term 'civil-military relations' as a Western 
concept aimed at creating an unpatriotic 'dichotomy' between the military and its people.2 In 
1999, the then Commander of the Anned Forces General Wiranto emphasised that 
"ABRI views itself as the creation of the people's army that gave birth to the 
state. ( ... ) This was the situation that led to the character of ABRI's roles and 
perceptions in society until today. The differences of opinion between TNI and 
the politicians in several historical events strengthened TNI's perception that 
differentiated between armed struggle and political-diplomatic struggle. Out of 
this historical perception grew ABRI's self-perception that Indonesia's 
independence was more determined by armed struggle than by the diplomatic 
struggle."3 
2 Interview with Maj.Gen. Suwisman, Assistant for Territorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff, 
Jakarta 28 November 2000; interview with Let.Gen. Agum Gumelar, Governor ofLemhanas (Lembaga 
Ketahanan Nasional, National Resilience Institute), Jakarta 9 June 1998; interview with Let.Gen. 
Soeyono, Secretary-General of the Department of Defence, Jakarta 15 October 1998; see also 
Zainuddin Malild, Birokrasi Militer dan Partai Politik dalam Negara Transisi, Galang Press, 
Yogyakarta 2000: 90. 
3 Wiranto, 'Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI Dalam Kehidupan Bangsa: Merupakan 
Pokok-pokok Kebijakan Menhankarn/Pangab yang Melandasi Reformasi Internal ABRI', Edisi II, 
Mabes ABRI, Jakarta 1999, Widya Dharma, Majalah Sesko ABRI, Edisi Khusus 1999: 85. ABRI 
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The belief that the armed forces 'gave birth' to the nation, and the claim of a direct mandate 
from the people, consolidated TNI's conviction that it was destined to guard the integrity of 
the nation state. This sense of historical mission, and its derogatory view of civilian 
achievements, are at the centre of TNI' s political perceptions and interpretations. While the 
historical accuracy of these self-perceptions is secondary to their impact on Indonesia's civil-
military relations today, it is nevertheless important to provide a brief assessment of the most 
crucial historical events that formed the nucleus of TNI' s political identity. 
The Indonesian armed forces were founded in October 1945 as TKR (Tentara Keamanan 
Rakyat, People's Security Force).4 The nationalist movement under Sukarno had declared 
independence in August 1945 after the Japanese capitulation, but Dutch colonial forces soon 
returned to Indonesia, where they were confronted by a Wide range oflocal guerrilla forces.5 
The TKR was tasked with coordinating the operations of these militias, but in reality it 
exercised little authority over them. The situation was further complicated by the fact that 
many of the militias were linked to political parties and charismatic local leaders. As rival 
groups struggled for power, civil-military conflicts. were inevitable. For example, the leftist 
politician Amir Sjarifuddin, who became Minister of Defence in November 1945, attempted 
to enforce civilian control over the TKR.6 Wiranto's 1999 speech identified Sjarifuddin's 
moves as the beginning ofTNI's 'involuntary' engagement in politics: 
"TNI's involvement in politics began as a reaction against efforts by politicians 
to control or at least subordinate TNI, which since its founding had been 
relatively independent in its internal affairs, to their political influence. The 
efforts to control TNI became especially apparent when Amir Sjarifoedin 
became Minister of Defence( ... ) and established an armed wing of leftist groups 
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik: Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) was the term 
· used for the military from the 1960s until the early post-1998 polity. 
4 In January 1946, Sukarno changed the name to Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Tentara 
Republik1ndonesia). At the same time, he ordered the restructuring of the military's organisation. See 
'Penetapan Pemerintah No. 4/S.D., Presiden Republik Indonesia', and 'Keputusan Presiden TgL 23-2-
1946 Tentang Panitija Besar Penjelenggaraan Organisasi Tentara Dalem Negeri', in: Kodam 
VII/Diponegoro, Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro 
(Djawa Tengah), no date: 71-73. In June 1947; the name changed again, this time to TNI (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia), marking the integration of former paramilitary groups into the official hierarchy of 
the army. See Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, Sejarah TNI AD 1945-1973, Jilid 8: Sendi-Sendi 
Perjuangan TNI~AD, Bandung 1979: 8. 
5 The militias consisted of elements from the former coloniai army KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-
Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army), auxiliary forces trained by the Japanese (Heiho, 
Giyugun and Peta), and locally recruited Islamic and ethnic armed groups, the lasykar. Yahya A. 
Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer dalam Politik di Indonesia 1945-1966, Cetakan Kedua, Gadjah 
Mada University Press, Yogyakarta 2002: 31-34. 
6 Jaques Leclerc, 'Amir Sjarifuddin, Between the State and the Revolution', in: Angus Mclntryre 
(editor), Indonesian Political Biography: In Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding,· Monash Papers 
on Southeast Asia No. 28, Clayton 1993: 20-21. 
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named TNI of the People (TNI-Masyarakat). He tried also to( ... ) create splits 
within TNI through all sorts of slander and intrigues."7 
The determination of the armed forces to manage their own affairs and resist civilian 
intervention is a major concern of militaries everywhere, and has been described by authors 
like Nordlinger as a key motivation for military participation in politics. Evidently, Wiranto's 
recollection of civilian interference in matters of military organisation was not disinterested 
historiography but intended as a military contribution to the civil-military debate in the post-
Soeharto era. In the turmoil of the armed struggle against the Dutch, the armed forces had 
even defied the civilian government by electing its own Commander-in-Chief, the legendary 
Sudirman.8 Sudinnan would remain the only TNI chief directly elected by his fellow officers, 
making him an iconographic reference point in TNI history. In 2003, the governor of Jakarta, 
himself a retired military officer, inaugurated a statue of Sudirman, overlooking the capital's 
main boulevard named after the general as well. While widely considered a national hero for 
his contribution during the war of independence, for Indonesia's military Sudinnan has been 
primarily a symbol of military autonomy, heroic defiance of misguided civilian leadership 
and absolute self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation, beyond and above the intrigues of 
divisive politics.9 
Sudirman highlighted the institutional autonomy of the armed forces by frequently 
disregarding the political strategies set by the civilian government. The cabinet favored 
negotiations with the Dutch and continued diplomatic engagement with international powers 
as the best way to achieve independence. The armed forces, on the other hand, proposed the 
continuation of the military struggle at all cost. Neither of the two strategies appeared to be 
successful, however. Negotiated agreements with the Dutch were short-lived and regularly 
followed by Dutch offensives against the remaining Indonesian positions. The military, for its 
part, was unable to resist the growing military dominance of the Dutch, and the area 
controlled by the Republican government shrank rapidly as a result. Military officers were 
outraged at what they saw as the cowardice of Sukarno· when the latter allowed himself to be 
captured by the Dutch, and regarded the civilian leadership as divided and ineffective. In the 
view of the armed forces, this contrasted sharply with their own determination to continue the 
fight. TNI's limited, but internationally publicised attacks and the resistance of large parts of 
the population made it impossible for the Dutch to establish effective control over their 
7 Wiranto 1999: 84 . 
8 Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian 
Revolution, 1945-1949, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1991: 119; and Ian Mcfarling, The Dual Function of 
the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia, Australian Defence Studies Centre 1996: 
37. 
9 Syarwan Hamid, 'Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Perspektif Sejarah', in: Djoko Subroto (editor), Visi 
ABRJ Menatap Masa Depan, Gadjah Mada University Press, Magelang 1997: 129. 
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former territory. In the end it was the international outcry over what increasingly looked like 
an anachronistic and brutal colonial war that convinced the Dutch to give in. 1? At a round 
table conference in the Netherlands, Dutch and Indonesian negotiators agreed on the transfer 
of authority to the United States of Indonesia for late 1949 .11 
The military rhetoric of unrivalled sacrifice could hardly hide the fact, however, that the 
armed forces had been just as weak and divided as their civilian counterparts. Most 
significantly, the government's rationalisation program, which aimed at bringing the various 
militias and regional units unde~ the control of the centre, led to conflicts within the rarucs.12 
In addition, regional sentiments created considerable tensions between military units 
operating in particular territories. There was little communication between local 
commanders, complicating larger operations that required cooperation beyond the boundaries 
of their designated areas. Finally, the endless string of defeats damaged the military's 
reputation, and even triggered doubts about the armed forces' capacity to continue the armed 
struggle. Kahin reported that Soekamo only agreed to sign a major agreement with the Dutch 
because field commanders had told him how bad the military situation was, especially in 
terms of ammunition supplies.13 Sudirman even felt the necessity to issue an official denial 
regarding such rumours.14 Episodes of internal fragmentation, regional splits, military 
shortcomings and implicit acceptance of the strategy of negotiations do not figure 
prominently in TNI's official historiography, however. Instead, the major stress is laid on 
either TNI's defiance of civilian orders to surrender (illustrated by Sudirman's rejection of 
Sukarno's order to remain in Yogyakarta after the 1948 attack15), or its reluctant acceptance · 
of policy directives (exemplified by TNI's compliance with some of the agreements . 
negotiated with the Dutch). 
10 Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and tire United Nations, Stevens & Sons Limited, 
London 1960: 171-72. 
11 The annyhad been reluctant to acknowledge the UN-sponsored negotiations with the D~tch, 
reminding the government of former agreements broken by the former colonial power. Sudirman wrote 
in April 1949 that if the negotiations were to be successful, the Indonesian side had to be represented, by 
the 'real fighters' in the struggle, i.e. the army ('orang jg benar2 berdjoeang pokoknja'). Instead, . 
Indonesia's delegation was made up of the very civilian leaders who, in the eyes of the military, had · 
unnnecesarily surrendered to the Dutch in December 1948. See Tjokropanolo, Jenderal Soedirman -
Pemimpin Pendobrak Terakhir Penjajahan di Indonesia: Kisah Seorang Pengawal, Jakarta 1993: 253. 
12 Audrey R. Kahin, 'Introduction', in: Audrey R. · Kahin (editor), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian 
Revolutio: Unity from Diversity, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1982: 17. 
13 George Mc Tuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York 1952: 228. · · 
14 Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945~49, 
Pustaka Sinar Harapan and Institute of Southeast Asiati Studies, Jakarta and Singapore 1992: 70 . 
. 
15 Hamid 1997: 129-130. 
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The extent to which the guerrilla war contributed to the defeat of the Dutch invasion has 
been the subject of intensive debates .in Indonesia's civil-military discourse.16 These 
controversies have little do with an analytical assessment of historical facts, but more with 
the contested legitimacy of military participation in politics. President Soeharto, for example, 
insisted that the armed struggle was the key to independence, thus legitimising the political 
role of the anned forces in his regime. In fact, he considered the historiography of the 1945-
49 period as such an important element of political legitimacy and regime stabilisation that he 
ensured that his own personal role in it was not overlooked. The Republican attack on 
Yogyakarta in March 1949, during which army troops managed to recapture the city for 
several hours, was re-interpreted by New Order historians to portray Soeharto as the main 
strategist and executor of the operation.17 Annual memorial services reminded the public of 
Soeharto's role in the military campaign, and even the dates of political events were tailored 
·around the anniversary of the attack.18 Only after Soeharto's fall did relatives of the Sultan of 
Y ogyakarta have the courage to credit Hamangkubuwono IX. with the initiative for the 
military action, and describe Soeharto' s participation iii it as rather marginal. 19 
The role of the armed forces in the war of independence, despite its importance for the self-
perception of the· armed forces, does not, however, provide a strong explanation for 
Indonesia's tradition of military intervention in politics. As Alagappa ·pointed out, 'that a 
military did or did not participate in the struggle for national liberation or won or lost the war 
is by itself unimportant as an explanation' .20 He stre~sed that neither the Indian nor Pakistani 
military participated in the struggle for independence; yet the former has consistently stayed 
out of political affairs, while the latter has dominated politics for most of Pakistan's post-
colonial history. Equally, the Burmese military, the Chinese People's Liberation Army and 
the Vietnamese People's Army have all played crucial roles in their respective independence 
wars. But while the Burmese armed forces have run a series of praetorian regimes, the 
Chinese and Vietnamese militaries have remained subordinated to their communist 
leaderships. The reference to major historical contributions ofmilitaries has, therefore, rather 
limited relevance in explaining the level of their intervention in politics. In combination with 
other factors, however, the claim to a unique historical role; often intertwined with 
corresponding missions and mandates, can consolidate and sustain military intervention in 
politics for a remarkable period of time. 
16 Barbara S. Harvey, 'Diplomacy and Armed Struggle in the Indonesian National Revolution: Choice 
and Constrafut in a Comparative Perspective', in: Daniel S. Lev and Ruth MvVey (editors), Making 
Indonesia: Essays in Honor of George McT. Kahin, Cornell University, Ithac, New York 1996: 79-80. 
17 Kahin, for instance, makes no mention ofSoeharto in describing the attack. Kahin 1952: 411. 
18 Most of the sessions of the MPR during the New Order, for example, would start on the 1 March, the 
date of the attack, and end on 11 March, the day Sukarno handed over power to Soeharto in 1966. 
19 'Soeharto Bukan Penggagas Serangan Oemoem 1 Maret 1949', Kompas 1 March 2000. 
20 Alagappa 2001b: 63. 
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II. PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY: OVERTHROWN OR ABANDONED? 
The interaction between the military and civilian authorities during the period of 
parliamentary democracy between 1950 and 1957 is of particular relevance to contemporary 
perceptions of civil-military relations. The failed experiment with liberal democracy in the 
early 1950s was fudonesia's only experience of non-authoritarian rule before the fall of 
Soeharto in 1998. fu comparative terms, the political dynamics of that period were similar in 
important respects to those emerging after the demise of the New Order, with unregulated 
activity of political parties, free elections, wide-ranging parliamentary powers, strong 
regionalism and a pluralist press. This period was therefore the only historical reference point 
for both the post-Soeharto leadership of the armed forces and civilian politicians in 
anticipating the character of civil-military relations after 1998. The period gains additional 
significance from the widely held view that parliamentary democracy did not fail due to its 
own weaknesses alone but was deliberately undermined by the armed forces. If true, the 
involvement of the military in bringing down a democratic regime comparable to that 
established after Soeharto's resignation could constitute a critical historical precedent in the 
minds of military officers, and thus affect the ongoing process of democratic consolidation . 
. The armed forces leadership during the time of parliamentary democracy had manifold 
reasons to be dissatisfied with the political system. Nasution, Army Chief of Staff during 
most of the 1950s, blamed the rise and fall of a series of cabinets, anti-centralist sentiments in 
the regions and the spread of corruption on 'the parties and groups (which) fought for all 
sorts of principles and goals, namely a variety of -isms' .21 This aspect of the military's 
political memory of parliamentary democracy has remained influential to this day. In his 
1999 speech, Wirantorepeated Nasution's interpretation of.liberal democracy in an almost 
unchanged anti-pluralist thrust: 
"The fear that the Republic could fall apart amidst the various conflicts between 
political parties motivated TNI in the 1945-57 period to take measures with 
political nuances, which were outside of its role as an instrument of defence and 
security. The events of 17 October 1952, when the military asked President 
Sukarno to dissolve Parliament and take over the government, form the most 
outstanding example of the anger of TNI officers over the manoeuvres of 
political parties, which they viewed as the main reason for the instability of the 
nation and the short-lived rule of several govenunents."22 · 
21 A. H. Nasution, Menudju Tentera Rakjat: Hasil Karya dan Pikiran Djenderal Dr. A.H. Nasution, 
Jajasan Penerbit Minang, Djakarta 1963: 213. 
22 Wiranto 1999: 85-86. The '17 October Affair' had been triggered by a parliamentary motion 
criticising the armed forces for, among other things, their internal promotion system and the alleged 
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An equally important source of dismay within the armed forces, however, was their sense of 
political marginalisation. Nasution complained that 'when we lived under the atmosphere of 
liberalism, TNI slowly but steadily lost its identity.' According to Nasution, the military 
'operated in a very limited environment, namely only in the sector of its military duties, and 
was nothing more than a dead instrument like the previous KNIL. ' 23 The civilian perception 
that the post-war military was merely a tool of the state to achieve military goals, and that in 
times of peace the armed forces had no particular political role to play, ran contrary to TNI's 
self-perception. Finally, the military also felt that civilian leaders tried to subordinate the 
armed forces to the interests of political parties.24 In the view of the top brass, politicians 
formed alliances with individual officers for political purposes and threatened the unity of the 
officer corps as a result. 
Civilian intervention in military affairs was not only driven by vested interests of 
politicians, however, but was also the result of internal divisions within the armed forces. 
The differences between officers concerned appointments and structural reforms. Officers 
who had been part of the former Japanese auxiliary forces claimed that a new promotion 
system discriminated against them by requiring educational qualifications that they did not 
possess. It was this dissatisfied group within the military that lobbied both politicians in 
Parliament and the President to overturn the recruitment regulations, providing a significant 
'pull' factor for civilian interference from the side of the armed forces.25 In addition, the 
various factions within the military also disagreed over the general political direction of the 
country and the role· TNI should play in politics. Some regional commanders toppled 
provincial governments in Central and South Sumatra in December 1956, and in Sulawesi in 
March 1957. The military leaders in these provinces demanded more rights for the regions, 
and the return of Vice-President Hatta, who had resigned over differences with Sukarno, to 
the helm of government. Nasution, on the other hand, sought more institutional powers for 
the armed forces but without a coup and without challenging Sukarno. Nasution, who had 
resumed his post as Army Chief of Staff in 1955, joined forces with the President to launch a 
military campaign against the rebellious officers in Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia, which 
intervention in the formation of cabinets. Outraged by this move, officers close to Nasution confronted 
Sukarno and demanded the dissolution of Parliament and elections. The President refused, and 
Nasution and his supporters within the army had to resign. See Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: 
Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur 1982: 65; and Kemal 
Idris, Bertarung dalam Revolusi, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta 1997: 136-142. 
23 Nasution 1963: 205. 
24 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Revised Edition, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca and London 1988: 31. 
25 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Mengabdi Negara Sebagai Prajurit TN!: Sebuah Otobiografi, Pustaka 
Sinar Harapan, Jakarta 1997: 155-157. 
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ended in mid-1958 with the complete victory of Nasution's forces. The end of the regional 
rebellions consolidated Nasution's leadership and strengthened his concept of institutional 
participation in politics without praetorian dominance.26 Furthermore, the political turinoil 
created by the Um-est had produced a political landscape in which Nasution's ideas were 
likely to find quick application. 
The defeat of the regionalist forces was followed by a power-sharing. agreement between 
Nasution and Sukarno that restored the presidential system under Sukarno and granted the 
military .an institutional role in politics. In July 1959, Sukarno decreed the return to the 1945 
constitution, with the armed forces represented as a 'functional group' .27 The question of how· 
much the armed forces contributed to the downfall of the democratic polity has not only been 
discussed by historians, but is also of importance for the theoretical discourse on the 
prospects of democratic control of the military in Indonesia. As mentioned earlier, Daniel 
Lev argued that the armed forces sabotaged liberal democracy simply because 'it could'. 
Lev's assessment was echoed by Jamie Mackie who stated that 'the roles played by Sukarno 
and the Army in pressing for substantial changes in the political system, culminating in the 
1958-59 drive to "return to the UUD 1945", were crucially important in undermining popular 
support for the parliament and parties at that tinie. '28 Robert Elson, on the other hand, 
balanced the 'destructive' role of the military with the political context that made this 
destruction possible: 'Together, Sukarno and the Army conspired to deliver the "death blow" 
to parliamentary democracy, in the face of only token opposition by the political parties - a 
sign of the flaccidity of party politics and the fact that, in their discredited position, they were 
no longer the pivot of politics' .29 Similarly, Herbert Feith asserted that 'constitutional 
democracy was both overthrown by its opponents and abandoned by those who had earlier 
upheld it. ' 30 The diversity of views points to the problematic nature of theoretical models that 
view military intervention in politics as a direct result of failing state institutions; there 
appears to be equally convincing evidence for military-driven acts of sabotage against 
civilian bodies in state and society. Feith's analysis suggests, however, that the two 
approaches are not mutually exclusive. Failing institutions do not necessarily lead to military 
rule unless the armed forces make use of the presented opportunity, while military sabotage 
26 Crouch 1988: 33. 
27 Sukarno had promoted the concept of functional groups as an alternative to the political party system. 
Douglas Ramage has noted that the army, on the other hand, saw the ·concept as a welcome 'way to 
legitimize military participation in pol_itical life'. Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, 
Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, Routledge, London and New York 1995: 22. 
28 Jamie Mackie, 'Inevitable or Avoidable? Interpretations of the Collapse of Parliamentary 
Democracy', in: David Bourchier and John Legge (editors), Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 
1990s, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31, Ctayton 1994: 36. 
29 R.E. Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography, Cambridge University Press; Cambridge 2001: 58. 
30 Herbert Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in: Ruth McVey (editor), Indonesia, Second 
Revised Printing, Hraf Press, New Haven 1967: 322. 
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of governments has a greater chance of succeeding when state institutions are already 
dysfunctional. 
The period of parliamentary democracy in fudonesia constituted a failed post-authoritarian 
transition, and as such can be analysed by the comparative models introduced earlier to cope 
with the phenomena of the post-Soeharto era. Applying the model proposed by Cottey, 
Edmunds and Forster, fudonesia's democratic regime in the 1950s belonged to the group of 
states in which first and second-generation reforms had been initiated, but failed due to the 
weakness of the state. Post-independence fudonesia had established the structures for 
effective democratic control of the military (civilian Department of Defence, parliamentary 
committees, free and critical press), but they disintegrated under the pressure of rapidly 
spreading political conflicts. Evidently, fudonesia failed to meet the conditions that Cottey 
et.al. outlined as crucial for successful transitions. To begin with, there was a variety of 
alternatives to liberal democracy in circulation. The political spectrum reached from 
communism and nationalist authoritarianism to proposals for the establishment of an Islamic 
. state. With only a few supporters left, liberal democracy proved unsustainable. Moreover, the 
political system had to deal with the legacy of military prominence during the revolutionary 
period. Ultimately, the transition from protagonist of the armed struggle to neutral instrument 
of civilian authorities proved too big a leap for a military unfamiliar with processes of 
political change. Finally, there was very little international support for the struggling 
democracy and, implicitly, the establishment of democratic civil-military relations. The 
Dutch refusal to transfer West Irian to fudonesia was one of the factors that fuelled the 
divisions within the political elite and encouraged military demands for a larger political role. 
The United States, on the. other hand, supported the regional rebellions. against the central 
government, expecting them to topple Sukarno. This policy, however, effectively provided. 
the opportunity for the military to expand its influence and remove what was left of liberal 
democracy. 
ID. NASUfION, THE DUAL FUNCTION AND TERRITORIAL CONTROL: 
INSTITULIONALISING MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT 
The evolution of what later became the military's 'Dual Function' (Dwi Fungsi) is the third 
central element in the collective memory of the armed forces. The growing alienation of the 
military from the principle of civilian-led democratic governance resulted in the formulation 
of a doctrine that could be used to justify military involvement in politics. Although the 
'Dual Function' doctrine was· only formulated in those terms after the military took full 
power in 1966, its origins went back to the 'Middle Way' concept proposed in the late 1950s. 
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Most importantly, the search for a suitable doctrine was accompanied by the development of 
the territorial comm.and system that anchored 1NI firmly in local politips. 
The philosophical justification of military involvement in politics was authored mainly by 
Nasution during the political crisis of the mid-1950s, and it has impacted on the doctrinal 
thinking of military officers ever since. Nasution was influenced by the writings of Karl von 
Clausewitz, a 19th century military strategist from Prussia. Clausewitz' notion of the 
inseparability of military affairs and politics provided the conceptual basis for Nasution's 
drive for deeper political invoivement of the . armed forces, and developments in other 
countries served as useful reference points: 
"1'1 defending TNI's position, I have strong arguments· based on the history of 
struggle and the practice in Eastern European countries, where it is not the 
separation between the military and civilians that is being highlighted, but the 
· totality of the participation of all elements of society arid the people. ( ... ) I lean 
towards the Eastern interpretation that ( ... ) finally, the political, military, 
economic and cultural strategies have to come together into one concept of· 
'great politics' ( ... )."31 
Nasution argued that the military Q.ad to participate in politics in order to avoid coups like in 
. . . 
South American and Middle Eastern countries. Suggesting that Indonesia.might well be the 
next in line in terms of military take-overs, Nasution presented institutionalised power 
. sharing with the armed forces as the only solution to satisfy the military' s inherent drive for 
. . . 
political leadership. In November 1958, he finalised his ideas .in the concept of the 'Middle 
Way' betw~en a praetorian dictatorship on the one hand and the Western ideal of non-
participation of the military in politics on the other. Nasution stressed the urgency of his 
proposal by outlining a threatening scenario: 1NI had to be given its share in governing the 
country, he said, 'because to hold it back is like putting a cork on the volcano of Merapi, 
which certainly will erupt at some stage. ' 32 
Nasution's model encapsulated the sentiments of many within the officer corps who 
instinctively felt that the armed forces had a legitimate right to political power but were 
unable to formulate a conceptual justification for that claim. The importance of Nasution's . 
ideas for the. development of 1NI's political identity was recognised in ·wiranto's 1999 
speech,. in which he maintained that the armed forces had learnt from Nasuti on that 1NI was 
''Not ollly an 'instrument of the government' like in Western counµies; also ilot 
an 'instrument of one party' like in communist countries; and of course not some 
31 Quoted ill Hendri Supriyatmono, Nasution; Dwifungsi ABRI dan Kontribusi · ke · Arah Reformasi 
Politik, Sebelas Maret University Press, Surakarta and Yogyakarta 1994: 103-4. 
32 ibid: 114 
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sort of 'military regime' that dominates the state. TNI is an 'instrument of the 
people's struggle', as one of the national political forces, and with its 
participation in political life, TNI will never remain inactive."33 
The model of the 'Middle Way' was gradually implemented throughout the second half of 
the 1950s, affecting three major areas. First, the establishment of the National Council in 
May 1957 institutionalised the military's participation in policy-making, with the chiefs of 
staff of all services represented· on the body. The Council had the task of finding a new 
format for the post-democratic polity, and provided Nasution with a platform to present his 
ideas. Second, the army was given more access to the economic resources of the state. In 
December 1957, Nasution decreed military control over a large number of Dutch businesses 
that had been occupied by workers protesting against the inactivity of the UN vis-a-vis the 
West Irian issue. Third, the implementation of the 'Middle Way' in the sector of state 
bureaucracy was supported by the declaration of martial law in March 1957.34 Nasution and 
his commanders obtained extra-constitutional powers, and many officers were put into 
leadership positions of local administrations, particularly in West Java and the Outer 
Islands.35 Most importantly, this presence did. not end with the lifting of martial law. As 
Herbert Feith observed, 'these incursions were difficult to reverse; the army's actual role did 
not diminish significantly when its formal powers were reduced by a change in the martial 
law level in a particular region. '36 
Closely related to the development of the 'Middle Way' doctrine was the consolidation of 
the army's territorial command system, another major legacy relevant for the evolution of 
Indonesia's current civil-military relations. The structure of TNI's territorial commands was 
first put in place in Java after the Dutch attack on Y ogyakarta in December 1948, but its 
expansion and consolidation as a permanent form of military organisation was carried out 
only in 1957 and 1958. Nasution contended that' Indonesia's geographical, demographic and 
financial condition did not allow for a highly concentrated military with modem equipment 
and rapid deployment capacities. Instead, the country would ~ve to rely on a network of 
military micro-units with strong roots in the local population, collecting intelligence, 
preparing for warfare and mobilising the people should need arise. The units were placed 
alongside the hierarchy of the civilian administration, so that every military command had a 
33 Wiranto 1999: 86. 
34 Crouch 1988: 33. 
35 J.D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local 
Administration, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1961: 219. 
36 Feith 1967: 333. 
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i. 
civilian counterpart.37 Consequently, the military became an influential political and 
economic player in local affairs, even in areas not under martial law. 
The most critical aspect of the territorial command system, as far as democratic civil-
military relations are concerned, was its principle of self-financing. Military commanders 
during the war did not receive contributions from the government but raised funds from local 
sources, including small businesses. After the end of combat operations in 1949, the 
government was supposed to provide the armed forces with a regular defence budget. 
Financial constraints and political divisions, however, convinced the armed forces to 
continue with their own fund"."raising efforts. The events of 1952 led Parliament to further cut 
. the military' s budget, driving. regional commanders into sensitive areas of smuggling,· rent-
seeking, extortion and business alliances with local entrepreneurs. The increasing financial 
independence of military commanders at the grassroots was one of the factors in the regional 
rebellions of 1956-58.38 After Nasution had defeated the rebellion, he split the regional 
commands into smaller territories in order to reduce the danger of political adventurism by 
regional military leaders, but their budgetary autonomy was maintained. Subsequently, the 
territorial command structure became the institutionalised instrument for mobilising the 
economic resources of the regions for the operational costs of the anned forces and the salary 
. supplements of its officers.39 This financial autonomy of the military made it extremely 
difficult for future civilian governments to establish control over the armed forces. Militaries 
that can determine their own budgets simply have fewer reasons to subordinate themselves to 
democratic control than those that depend on budget allocations approved by civilian 
authorities, and Indonesia's armed forces were a case in point. 
37 The territorial command system, as it evolved under the New Order, is comprised of Regional 
Commands · (K.omando Daerah Militer, Kodam), which corresponds to either one large province or a 
number .of smaller provinces; Resort Commands (Komando Resort Militer), covering the boundaries of 
the old Dutch regencies, often one smaller province or a number of kabupaten (districts); District 
Commands. (Komando Distrik Militer, Kodim), corresponding to districts; Subdistrict Commands 
(Komando Rayon Militer, Koramil), supervising the kecamatan level; and the NCOs . for Village 
Supervision (Bintara Pembina Desa, Babinsa), responsible for kelurahan and desa (villages). 
38 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London 1995: 55. 
39 Immediately after Nasution announced the formal strllcture of the territorial system, regional 
. . 
colnma.nds set up special offices assigned with fund-raising and establishing bu$iness cooperatives. See 
Daud Limbagau, 'Keterlibatan TN1 dalani Perdagangan di Sulawesi Selatan dari MasaRevolusi Sarnpai 
Tahun 1970-an', in: Edward L. Poelinggomang and Suriadi Mappangara (editors), Dunia Militer di 
Indonesia: Keberadaan dan Peran Militer di Sulawesi; Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta 
2000: 326. 
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IV. ESTABLISIDNG PRAETORIAN RULE: TNI AND THE EARLY NEW ORDER 
Writing in 1963, at the height of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, Herbert Feith reflected upon 
the question why fudonesia's armed forces, despite their obvious privileges and powers, had 
not sought exclusive dominance over the government. futernal military conflicts were Feith's 
first possible answer, but he suggested that there were more fundamental reasons: 
"Secondly, there is fairly widespread opposition among civilians generally to the 
idea of government by the army. This is partly a reflection of the army's 
unpopularity, which has grown· markedly since the army began its large-scale 
movement into politics and administration in 1957-58. In addition, it reflects a 
common view that. military rule is the very antithesis to democracy and 
sovereignty - very much more so than, for instance, rule by a single party or 
national movement. Thus . the advocates of an army take-over are told that it 
would be hard to find acceptable justifications for this, that they would gain only 
grudging support from civil servants and the people generally, and so be forced 
to govern by something more like naked force. Neither General Nasution 
personally nor the army leaders as a group are seen as having an mbom. or 
acquired right to rule Indonesia.'.40 
Only two years later, the armed forces assumed authority over the government, 
institutionalised their rule by revamping the political system, and expanded Nasution's 
'Middle Way' to become the 'Dual Function' as a model of dominance over the state. The 
New Order would last for more than three decades,. and despite its various internal 
transfoi-mations, it remained a military-backed regime throughout its history .. 
The ascendancy of the armed forces to direct political rule was preceded by growing 
tensions between Sukarno and the senior military leadership. Several factors were 
responsible for this. Most significantly, Sukarno was increasingly leaning towards the 
Communist Party (PK.I, Partai Komunis fudonesia) for political support in order to keep the 
military in check. The majority of officers had been staunchly anti-communist since the so-
called 'communist coup' in Madilln. in 1948, which military leaders saw as a 'betrayal' of the 
nationalist struggle ~gainst the Dutch.41 Consolidating its grassroots support throughout the 
early 1960s42, and enjoying political protection from the President, the PK.I had e~erged as a· -
serious challenger to the armed forces . as the second main component of the Guided 
Democracy 'triangle' under Sukarno. As the President grew older, speculation about 
communist ambitions for a post-Sukarno take-over of the government was rampant. 
40 Feithl967: 329 . 
. 
41 K.ahin1952: 303. 
42 Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963, University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964: 300. 
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Moreover, from the beginning of the 1960s onwards, Sukarno appeared determined to assert 
his control of the armed forces by placing loyalists in key military positions.43 This produced 
tensions within the ranks, as some officers approached either Sukarno or the PK.I to promote 
their career interests. Finally, the armed forces became increasingly concerned with 
Indonesia's international isolation. Sukarno's course of confrontation with the West, 
culminating in his campaign against Malaysia and the withdrawal from the United Nations, 
had severe political and economic consequences for the country. While supporting the 
'Konfrontasi' campaign against Malaysia in public, senior officers worked behind the scenes 
to deescalate the situation.44 
Despite the widespread dissatisfaction with Guided Democracy, nurtured by rapidly 
declining economic conditions and escalating political conflicts at the grassroots, there was 
very little societal support for the idea of military rule. Thus the quest for erecting a military 
regime had to be driven by 'naked force', just as Feith had predicted. The opportunity for 
assuming political control by force emerged on 30 Septen:iber 1965: Six of the highest-
ranking armed forces officers were killed in what the army called a communist coup attempt. 
Major-General Soeharto, Commander of Kostrad (the Army Strategic Reserve), one of the 
top officers not arrested and killed in the abortive 'coup', brought the situation under control 
within a day. Hundreds of thousands of suspected PK.I followers were murdered or arrested 
in the months after the September inCident, with the army backing Muslim organisations that 
settled old accounts with their communist archrivals. Sukarno, suspected of involvement in -
or at least knowledge of - the alleged coup attempt, never regained control. In March 1966, 
he was forced to hand over effective government authority to Soeharto, and was gradually 
stripped of his presidential insignia. Finally, in March 1968, Soeharto was appointed by the 
MPR to become the second President of Indonesia. 
The purge against the Communist Party and political activists suspected of association with 
it violently removed much of what Feith had diagnosed three years earlier as 'widespread 
opposition among civilians' to the idea of military rule. In spite of the major role of coercion · 
in installing the military regime, however, several other factors assisted the pr~cess of 
establishing praetorian control. To begin with, the opposition of non-communist political 
groups towards the ascendency of the armed forces was not significant enough to pose a 
serious threat to the ambitions of the military. In fact, large segments of society supported the 
43 J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography, Second edition, Allen & UnWin, Sydney, Wellington, 
London and Boston 1990: 326. Nasution was replaced as Anny Chief of Staff in July 1962, but was 
'kicked upstairs' to serve as Minister .of Defence. He also became Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, a 
post vacant since the 1952 events. . . 
44 J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966, Oxford University Press, 
London, New York and Melbourne 1974: 213-214. · 
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armed forces in their campaign against the PKI, and the remaining political parties assisted in 
creating the necessary legal framework for institutionalised military rule. The divisions 
between communists on the one hand and Islamic forces on the other had been so· deep that 
many Muslim groups prioritised wiping out their PKI rivals over questioning the political 
intentions of the armed forces. In addition, the economic decline had reached alarming levels, 
and the existing civilian groups appeared poorly equipped to overcome the crisis. According 
. to Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, 'the economy was in chaos, with inflation headed towards 
1000 per cent, while (the) central government was unable to maintain even the most minimal 
standard of administrative services. '45 After years of political cleavages, social tensions and 
declining living standards, many Indonesians seemed willing to accept a limited period of 
military rule. Finally, the armed forces partially succeeded in avoiding the impression of a 
. military dictatorship. The gradual transfer of authority from Sukarno to Soeharto extended 
over a period of two and a half years, pointing to the effort of the armed forces to portray 
their ascension to power as a constitutionally legitimate change of government. 46 The 
combination of force, civilian . fragmentation, economic decline and manipulated public 
images of the regime drove the process of establishing praetorian rule, which was largely 
completed by 1968. 
The armed forces showed uncompromising determination in consolidating their claim to 
national leadership. The military placed its officers in senior political positions in the central 
and local administrations, and kept civil society and potential political players of the post-
Sukarno era under tight surveillance. In addition, the officer corps also sought ideological 
confirmation of its new dominance by adjusting the military's doctrine at a seminar in April 
1966 .. The involvement of the armed forces in political and economic development, their 
defence of the state ideology Pancasila, and the upholding of the 1945 constitutioµ became 
the core elements of the new doctrinal concept.47 The conclusion of the seminar was an 
ideological justification for praetorian rule: 
45 Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, 'Introduction', in: llal Hill (editor)~ Indonesia's New Order. The 
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards 1994: xxiv. 
46 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, 'Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: The Case of ABRI's Dual Function', 
ill: David R. Mares (editor), Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Sectirity in. 
Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe, Westview Press, Boulder 1998: 52-53. 
47 Sukarno had announced five ideological principles in June 1945, which he believed were suitable to 
reflect the ideals, customs and convictions of all Indonesians. The five principles, collectively called 
Pancasila; were: nationalism, internationalism (or humanitarianism), democracy (or consent), social 
prosperity and belief in one God. The principles were designed to overcome the ethnic, religious~ social 
and political differences within Indonesian society. They were subject to diverse, politically charged 
interpretations, however, with different groups and regimes attempting to ·use Pancasila in their struggle 
for political hegemony. The New Order would be no exception, launching Pancasila as its main 
ideological instrument to maintain political stability, eradicate extremism and limit individual freedoms. 
In doing so, the Soeharto government claimed to have saved the state ideology from the political 
manipulation it suffered under the Sukarno reign. See A.H. Nasution, 'Angkatan Bersendjata - Orde 
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"Recently, all hopes of the people have been directed towards the armed forces 
in general, and the army in particular, to lead it to prosperity. Accordingly, there 
is only one alternative for the armed forces, and that is to implement what has 
been entrusted to them by the people, Based on all of this, the armed forces have 
an interest in taking part in the formation and guidance of a govemmerit that 
enjoys respect, a govenirilent that is strong and a government that is 
progressive."48 
Arguing that the emergency situation forced the military to increase its representation in the 
bureaucracy, the seminar suggested that it was the army's duty to support the Ampera cabinet 
~ the post-coup cabinet formally headed by Sukarno, but in practice led by Soeharto. In fact, 
the military's e-\tolving doctrine constituted a retrospective legitimation of what had already 
been implemented - 12 of 29 ministers of the Ampera cabinet were military officials, and a 
. rapidly increasing number of officers asstimed senior positions in local bureaucracies.49 .· 
. . 
By the early 1970s, the armed forces had taken either control of, or established dominance 
over, the four major areas in which militaries traditionally .seek to intervene: the political 
· sector, the economy, military organisation and the socio-cultural arena. 
In _the political field, the armed forces were especially well entrenched in the executive 
branch of government. Supported by the doctrinal concept of kekaryaan (the secondment of 
c;>fficers in non-military posts), the military leadership filled the most senior positions of the 
regime. Soeharto controlled the administration a.S both head of state and head of government, 
and military officers held key cabinet posts, including the Departments of Defence and 
Security, Internal Affairs and the State _Secretariat. Even in departments led by civilians, a 
military officer routinely held the post of secretary-general. In addition, generals also 
·'usurped the top strata of the diplomatic and consular corps' .50 Military officers ran the 
national logistics board (the institution in charge of distributing basic food items such as rice) 
and controlled the government's news agency. In the provinces,. 80 percent of governors were 
·officers, and an equally high percentage held positions as regents. 
Baru - Sapta Marga ...., Undang-Undang 1945 (Coaching Ketua Madjelis Permusjarawatan Ralrjat 
Sementara Dr. A.H; Nasution kepada para Instruktur Akademi Angkatan Bersendjata Repubik 
Indonesia .di Magelang pada achir September 1966)', in A. H. Nasution, Ketetapan-Ketetapan 
· MP.R.S.: Tongggak Konstitusionil Orde Baru, Pantjuran Tudjuh, Djakarta 1966; 24. 
48 Seskoad; Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD Tri Ubaya Cakti, Angkatan Darat, Djakarta 1966: 10. 
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.Suharto-had formed the Ampera cabinet after the 4th General Session of the MPRS (the provisional 
MPR) in July 1966. The MPRS legalised the transfer of authoritY to Soeharto and the banning of the 
PK.I, and took the title 'President for Life' away from Sukarno. See McFarling 1996: 84, 87 .. 
so Ulf Sundhaussen, 'The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society', in: Karl 
D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (editors), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, University 
of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978): 51. . . 
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·'; 
On the legislative side, 75 officers were delegated to Parliament, and more were appointed 
to the MPR. General. Nasution, the former leader of the armed forces who had been 
'honourably' sidelined by Soeharto, presided over the MPR that dismissed Sukarno, 
inaugurated Soeharto and adopted major changes to the political system. Military dominance 
of the national and regional legislatures was also exercised through the crucial role its 
officers played in the government's electoral machine Golkar,51 which won the 1971 
elections with the help of massive military intervention and intimidation. Most importantly, 
· Soeharto had a threefold grip over the legislatures: as supreme chairman of Golkar, he had 
the authority to select the party's parliamentary candidates; as head of the armed forces, he 
was authorised to exclude parliamentary nominees of both Golkar and the other parties for 
security reasons; and as head of state, he had the right to select representatives of functional 
groups for the MPR. Two years after the· 1971 elections, the remaining political parties were 
merged into two, the secular-nationalist PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesi~ 
Democratic Party) and the Islamic PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development 
Party). Both parties were heavily supervised and their leaderships screened before being 
allowed to compete in the next general elections. The third branch of state administration, the 
judiciary, saw similar levels of military intrusion. The attorney general's office came quickly 
under military control, as did the courts, while the Police remained one of the four services of 
the armed forces. This allowed the military to maintain supremacy over all aspects of legal 
investigations and proceedings. 
Political control was reinforced by increased participation in the economy. The intervention 
in economic affairs was an integral part of the Dual Function, which called on the armed 
forces to provide the necessary conditions for economic growth.52 Moreover, it delivered 
increased income opportunities for the military as an institution as well as its officer corps. 
Military officers had held senior management positions in several state enterprises since the 
late 1950s, but their number grew rapidly under the New Order. The national oil company 
Pertamina, for example, provided substantial contributions to the budget of the armed forces 
51 Golkar was established in October 1964, when a large number of pro-military functional groups 
were merged into one organisation. The merger was conducted in response to a government regulation 
requiring all organisations in the National Front (a body of mass organisations established in 1959) to 
seek affiliation with existing . political parties or to merge into one organisation. This regulation 
motivated the anti-conununist members of the National Front to found a joint secretariat of functional 
groups, or Sekber Golkar. 53 of 97 founding members were army-sponsored trade unions and civil 
servants organisations. See Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of 
Indonesia's Golkar, Ohio University. Center for International Studies, Monographs in International 
Studies, Southeast Asia Series Number 85, Athens, Ohio 1989: 13. 
52 Jun Ronna, 'Military Ideology in Respon8e to Democratic Pressure During the Late Suharto Era: 
Political and Institutional Contexts', in: Benedict R. O'G Anderson (editor), Violence and the State in 
Suharto's Indonesia, Southeast Asia Program Publications; Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 2001: 
5~ . 
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as well as to its military directors.53 Regional commanders also forged business alliances with 
local entrepreneurs, offering a service that Robert Lowry called 'facilitation'. In addition to 
obtaining business licenses, this covered assistance 'in resolving land disputes, calming labor 
umest, overcoming bureaucratic obstacles, relocating squatters, and so on.' The business 
elite, Lowry concluded, found it 'prudent to· keep the local military on side against the day 
when social unrest might threaten their lives and property,'54 Politically, the military's new 
grip over local administrations, legislatures and political parties handed it a virtual monopoly 
in brokering business deals and implementing projects. In order to institutionalise its newly 
acquired economic privileges, the military established a large number of companies, 
foundations and cooperatives that managed its increasing business interests. The officers in 
· charge of these business operations had, according to Richard Robison, 'now almost 
unlimited access to the resources and facilities of the state and power to influence allocation 
of import/export licenses; forestry concessions and state contracts. ' 55 This was particularly 
evident ·after the economy began to recover in the early 1970s, and foreign investment 
entered the country. The armed forces viewed the economic boom as a result of its political 
intervention and, as one officer put it, believed it had a legitimate claim on 'its share of the 
cake' .56 
The commercial involvement of the armed forces did· not only impact heavily on the 
institutional standing of the military vis-a-vis other socio-political groups. It also changed the 
social . profile of its officers, and · created additional incentives for them to defend the 
praetorian regime. Military commanders, often cdming from lower-middle class families, 
suddenly enjoyed the prospect of rapid social advancement. In fact, a successful career in the 
New Order officer corps virtually ensured entry into the most exclusive elite. Senior officers 
. often owned several houses in elite compounds and luxury cars, travelled widely and sent 
their children to expensive universities abroad. Ibnu Sutowo, the army officer in charge of 
Pertamina, purchased Indonesia's first and only Rolls Royce in the early 1970s, symbolising 
the extent of self-enrichment within the officer corps. In later periods of the New Order, 
sponsors would provide officers with credit cards for use at their convenience, or accompany 
them on shopping trips to attend to theirwishes and consolidate the relationship.57 Soeharto 
himself handed out substantial. gifts to his senior officers or made sure that his business 
associates did. The prospect of rapid rise up the social ladder drove more and more young 
. . . . . . 
53 
· Iswandi, Bisnis Militer Orde Baru: Keterlibatan ABRI dalam Bidang Ekonomi dan Pengaruhnya 
Terhadap Pembentukan Rezim Otoriter, Remaja Rosdakarya, Bandung 1998: 146-151. · 
54 Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, alien & Unwin, St Leonards 1996: 1996: 141. 
55Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1986: 252. 
56 Interview with Maj.Gen. Sudrajat, Senior Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Jakarta 28 November .• · 
2000; 
51 Confidential interview with a weaponry contractor, Jakarta 29 April 2003. 
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men to seek entry into the military academies. Between 1970 and 1975, an average of nearly 
four hundred officers graduated from Ak:abri, the armed forces academy. In 1963, only 113 
graduates had been listed.58 
The hegemony of the armed forces delivered a multitude of post-retirement opportunities 
for officers and their families. If retiring military leaders were not placed in military-run 
enterprises or state companies, they were almost certain to receive offers from private 
business corporations. Expected to use their past connections to gain access to the ruling 
military elite, they were provided with offices and considerable salaries. Wiranto has given 
an illuminating insight into this phenomenon. After his retirement, he called in some of his 
tycoon friends and asked who had office space available for him. All hands went up. When 
he asked further who among them had no bad debts with the state, only two entrepreneurs 
still felt qualified. Wiranto finally chose one among the last two offers.59 The special 
treatment of senior officers contrasted sharply with the retirement packages for lower ranking 
personnel, creating additional pressure to seek civilian positions before reaching pension age 
or to use all possible means to achieve a rank that would encourage interest from the business 
sector. 
The increased economic powers of the armed forces also strengthened their organisational 
autonomy. The unprecedented flow of off-budget funds into the military allowed it to 
exercise a high degree of managerial autonomy, with unit commanders now also functioning 
as heads of rent-seeking foundations and cooperatives. Soeharto encouraged this trend60, 
despite obvious fears that the armed forces might grow too independent from his executive 
control. Drawing from his own experience as regional commander in the late 1950s, he 
apparently believed that granting senior officers access to additional sources of funding 
would strengthen their loyalty towards him as the patron of the system that made such self-
service possible. ill order to anticipate any challenges to his regime from inside the ranks, 
however, Soeharto also introduced wide-ranging changes to the command system. At the core 
of his reform program was the integration of the services into a strong central command 
under ABRI Headquarters and the Department of Defence and Security. Soeharto 
downgraded all service commanders to chiefs of staff, thus depriving them of direct 
58 The number of gra\luates dropped by 75 percent, however, in 1975-1976. While no official 
explanation was provided for this decline, it is likely that recruitment was reduced after the New Order 
had consolidated its position, and most kekaryaan positions were already filled. See Douglas Kammen 
and Siddharth Chandra, A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 
1990s, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, New York 1999: 35. 
59 Interview with Gen. (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
60 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, 'Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative 
Historical Perspective', in: Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political 
Cultures in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1990: 117-118. 
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command over troops, and stripped them of their cabinet status. He also reduced the powers 
of the regional commanders, creating a system of coordinating commands overseeing several 
military territories (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, Kowilhan). While this led to some 
tension within the armed forces, there was no doubt that their leadership for the first time 
since Sudirman's election enjoyed complete j-urisdiction over internal military affairs. 
The fourth arena of military intervention is in the socio-cultural sector. It is in this area that 
militaries typically face the most serious difficulties, and fudonesia's military was no 
exception. The early New Order regime was relatively tolerant- towards expressions of 
criticism from the media and the arts, largely because different factions in the military were 
. . 
still using the press for their own purposes and Soeharto appeared anxious to avoid"the 
impression of a military dictatorship.61 This changed, however, from the early 1970s 
onwards. The government established a system of tight censorship regulations for the media 
and cultural activities. At the same time, it encouraged the development of an official culture 
consistent with the leadership principles of the regime. Barbara Hatley explained that the key 
element of that culture was the 
"celebration of conservative, hierarchical values. The central state - Java-based 
-and Javanese-dominated - supports Javanese culture of a particular type, that of 
cotirt tradition. Images of noble grandeur and hierarchical social order serve to 
display and confirm the authority of the contemporary state and its officials."62 
The indoctrination of the New Order masses with officially sanctioned forms of artistic 
expression was successful on the surface, but did not manage to penetrate all segments of the 
cultural sector. Writers, painters, cartoonists, musicians and journalists continued their 
critical work, and some went to jail or suffered intimidation and social marginalisation.63 The 
majority, however, developed a highly sophisticated system of self-censorship, producing-
language and art forms that would be understood by the audience as being critical, but deliver 
no legal pretexts for the New Order apparatus to intervene. 
61 The armed forces had two newspapers of their owll, Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersenjata, both 
established in 1965. The military also played a dominant role in the Golkar ne-WSpaper, Suara Karya. 
David T. Hill, The Press in New Order Indonesia, University of Western Australia Press, Perth 1994: 
36. 
62 Barbara Hatley, 'Constructions of ''Tradition" in New Order Indonesian Theatre', in: Virginia 
Matheson Hooker (editor), Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, Singapore and New York 1993: 50 -
. 
63 Those Indonesian authors who had gained international reputations for their literary work were the 
most difficult to control, even for the armed forces. Y. B. Mangunwijaya, for example, was one of the 
most vocal critics of the rnilitary's Dual Function during the New .Order. His collection_ of articles, 
expressing criticism through historical comparisons and philosophical contemplations, can be found in 
Y. B. Mangunwijaya, Tentara dan Kaum Bersenjata, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta 1999. 
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The historical legacy of the early New Order period for the development of civil-military 
relations in the post-Soeharto era consists of three major components. First of all, the 
evolution of the military's role from earlier forms of political participation into a praetorian 
version of the Dual Function. Despite the military' s efforts to portray its take-over as 
constitutionally legitimate, the new doctrinal guidelines issued in August 1966 provided 
philosophical justifications for political hegemony over the . state. Moreover, the 
entrenchment of the military in state institutions and civil society was so extensive that any 
successor regime would have difficulties in disengaging the armed forces from the areas it 
had intruded. Military involvement in local politics and businesses, its expansion into the 
state bureaucracy, legislature and the judiciary, its surveillance of civil society, press and arts 
- all these institutional manifestations of praetorian rule would shape long-term perceptions· 
of poHtical culture, both within the elite and the wider population. Finally, the successes of 
the authoritarian regime in stabilising the economy and controlling political conflicts 
persuaded many Indonesians that economic development is best secured by non-democratic · 
forms of government. 64 This widely held view poses very serious challenges to the pro~ess of 
democratic. consolidation in the post-authoritarian transition, including the propagation of 
. democratic civil-military relations. 
V. CONSOLIDATING THE AUTOCRACY: SOEHARTO AND THE MILITARY IN 
THE 1970s 
The successful establishment ofa praetorian regime, however~ exposed the New Order to 
divisive dynamics that affect all military-dominated governments. Alagappa pointed out that 
"( ... ) once the military rulers begin to govern, fissures develop between those 
who govern and thQse who command the troops, especially the field 
commanders. ( ... ) To consolidate their control and prevent counter coups, 
military leaders at the political helm may hold on to senior positions, appoint 
loyalists, create counter-balancing factions, develop patronage networks, 
develop extensive surveillance and intimidation mechanisms, or remake the 
political center by co-opting potential challengers. Despite these measures, the 
contradiction be.tween military as government and military as an institution is a 
fundamental and inescapable contradiction that ultimately leads to disunity and 
breakdown of the military regime."65 
64 In September 2003, the independent research institute LSI (Lembaga Survei Iiidonesia, Indonesian 
Survey Institute) conducted a poll that showed56.4 percent of the Indonesian electorate as favoring the 
system of the New Order over the current democratic polity. At the same time, 65 percent of voters 
identified the economy as the most serious problem facing the government. 'Menguat, Dukungan 
terhadap Tentara, Orba, dan Partai Golkar', Kompas 29 September 2003. 
e . . 
Ala:gappa 2001b: 51-52. 
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The phenomenon described by Alagappa was present in Soeharto's regime even in its very 
early phase. In formulating policy directives and creating the fundamentals of the political 
system, Soeharto relied heavily on long-time friends from the army who worked on the SPRI, 
the private staff of the President. Officers. at Armed Forces Headquarters observed this 
concentration of power in Soeharto's private circle with suspicion. Furthermore, regional 
commanders as well as service heads affected by the structural reforms to the military 
hierarchy expressed concern over their loss of influence.66 Their dissatisfaction, however, 
was reduced by the collective feeling within the Tanks that Soeharto's regime generated 
unprecedented political and material advantages for the armedforces as an· institution and the 
individual interests of their officers. 
The divisions between Soeharto's inner circle and the armed forces intensified when the 
political system of the New Order was fully erected after the 1971 polls and the 1972 
reelection of Soeharto. It had become apparent to many officers that Soeharto was about to 
install an institutional mechanism for the perpetuation of his personal ruie, and that he 
viewed the military only as the stabilising framework for his autocracy.67 The growing 
awareness within the officer corps that the political interests . of Soeharto were gradually 
sepatatirig from that of the armed forces left a· deep mark on TNI' s institutional memory, and · 
· would· form the fifth and final element in the complex of historical legacies relevant for the 
post-New Order period. In his 1999 address, Wiranto admitted that 
"In the New Order era under President Soeharto, we saw ABRI playing its most 
extensive socio-political role; according to some ABRI seniors who participated 
themselves in developing the concept of DWifungsi, this role even exceeded the 
proportions intended at the time when Dwifungsi was born. In this context, we 
arrive at the conclusion that the concept of Dwifungsi cannot antidpate the 
possibility that the office of Prestderit is held by someone with a direct position . 
in the system of the command hierarchy, and who manipulates his influence on . 
the command hierarchy for his own socio-political interests."68 
Throughout the 1970s, there were challenges from Within the armed forces to the exclusivism 
of Soeharto's rule, but the President was able to contain them by using his direct control over 
the military command hierarchy. He was still an active member of the armed forces for most 
. . 
. . 
of the 1970s, creating the impression that many of the disputes were linked to intra-military 
conflicts rather than the growing gap between the presidency and the army elite. In 197 4 and 
1978, Soeharto struggled to fend off threats to his· regime launched by critical student groups, 
66 Written communication with General (ret) A.H. Nasution, Jakarta 11 December 1997; Sundhaussen · 
1978: 61. 
67 David Jenkins~ Suharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983, Cornell Modem 
Indonesia Project, Monograph Series (Publication No.64), Ithaca, New York 1984: 13-14, 255-256. 
68 Wiranto 1999: 88. . 
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which claimed to have received support by some elements within the armed forces.69 Many of 
the student leaders were arrested and jailed, while the officers linked to the movement were 
removed from their commands and subsequently sidelined.70 
Soeharto's reelection to a third presidential term in 1978, and his retirement from active 
duty in the army, removed all remaining doubts that he would be more than just the 
replaceable leading officer of a military junta. Soeharto's consolidation in the presidency was 
accompanied by generational changes in the armed forces. AB Kammen and Chandra noted, 
'by the early 1980s the Anglrotan 1945 generation that had fought in the Indonesian 
revolution against the Dutch had retired, passing the leadership to a post-war generation of 
officers.' 71 The retirement wave removed both trusted associates and critics of the President 
from the military elite and redefined the relationship between the regime and the top brass. 
With Soeharto firmly established in the centre of a personalised autocracy, and a new type of 
officers in charge of the armed forces, the praetorian regime was about to undergo substantial 
changes. 
VI. PRAETORIAN REGIME OR SULTANISTIC RULE? SOEHARTO AND THE 
ARMED FORCES IN THE LATE NEW ORDER 
The legacy of the later New Order period that would impact most significantly on the 
character of post-Soeharto civil-military relations consisted of two major elements. Most 
importantly, there was a gradual reduction of the role of the armed forces in politics from the 
mid-1970s to the late 1990s. The number of military officers in cabinet, governorships, the 
legislatures and senior bureaucratic positions declined, and so did the influence of the armed 
forces on matters ·of general policy. While in the early 1970s around 80 percent of the 
gubernatorial posts were . held by active or retired military officers, that figure shrunk 
drastically to 40 percent by the late 1990s. Executive positions were increasingly filled by 
civilians whom Soeharto had integrated into the foundations of his regime: technocrats, 
Muslim leaders, technology experts, business executives, and Golkar politicians. Soeharto 
also reshuffled the composition of his inner circle, replacing confidants from the army with · 
business cronies and members of his own family. Despite the reduction of their political 
69 Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, Fontana Books, Blackburn 1980: 136, 246-247. 
70 General Soemitro, the most prominent officer losing .his job over the 1974 events, has credibly 
maintained that the students misunderstood his attitude towards their protests. 'You guys were wrong', 
he told the students later. 'You don't understand the ethics of a soldier. He will never want to bring 
down his superior, let alone replace him.' He was, however, strongly opposed to the SPRI officers in 
Suharto's inner circle. Heru Cahyono, Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari ;74, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 
Jakarta 1998: 1. 
71 Kammen and Chandra 1999: 8. 
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powers, however, the armed forces remained the backbone of the regime, and Soeharto 
continued to command their loyalty by handpicking the top brass and distributing material 
rewards to the officer corps. 
The second element was the gradual change in societal perceptions of the armed forces. 
The decline in formal regime participation allowed ABRI to blame much of the growing 
public criticism of the government on Soeharto's personal leadership style. Throughout the 
1980s until the early 1990s the military elite had been a central target of widespread 
dissatisfaction with the repressive policies of the regime. During the final years of the New 
Order, however, the discontent in many segments of society with economic favouritism,. 
political stagnation and tight social control was increasingly addressed to Soeharto and his 
family. Many even started to view the armed forces as much a victim of Soeharto's 
manipulative tactics as they considered them a crucial component of his regime.72 The 
dualism of continued loyalty towards the regime and declining formal engagement with it 
was reflected in the doctrinal development of the armed forces in the 1990s. Military 
attitudes ranged from hardline responses vis-a-vis the challenges of socio-political change to 
critical reflections on the excesses of Soeharto's rule.73 The prominence of non-military 
protagonists in the late New Order, and the development of a critical discourse Within the 
armed forces, dissociated the military to some extent from the failures of the regime. This 
disassociation, or the perception that the Indonesian public had forined of it, would have a 
profound impact on the character of the 1998 regime change. 
The key developments that drove the dissociation of the armed forces from the President 
occurred in the late 1980s. After his retirement from active duty, Soeharto had entrusted a 
. select circle of officers with the leadership of the. military. This circle consiSted of 
commanders and intelligence operators whom Soeharto had known personally from his days 
of active military service, and who had very limited prospects of succeeding him in the 
presidency. Most of these officers were restricted by their ethnicity or religion from seeking 
the top executive post, with Christians and non-Javanese holding a disproportionate 
percentage of senior command positions. Soeharto expected total loyalty from these officers, 
as they owed their position to his personal patronage. Consequently, they were most 
determined in suppressing what Soeharto viewed as one of the most serious threats to his rule 
from ·the late 1970s to the mid-l 980s, namely that of political Islam. The armed forces 
leadership, headed by the Catholic General Benny Moerdani, was the target of much of the 
. ~ 
72 Daniel Dhakidae, Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 
Jakarta 2003: 256-257. Dhakidae lamented the weakness of the armed forces, and their deliberate 
misuse as 'guards ofSoeharto's personal interests, and that of his cronies.' . 
73 Jun Ronna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New 
· York 2003: 113. 
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criticism for the regime's authoritarian methods in controlling Muslim mainstream 
organisations and destroying violent Islamist cells. In return, Soeharto's trust in his military 
elite was extraordinary. Against this background, he was irritated by reports, emerging in the 
mid-1980s, that Moerdani had developed an extensive intelligence network and was actively 
lobbying against some of Soeharto's civilian confidants in the state bureaucracy.74 In 
addition, he began to rem~nd Soeharto of the potential damage the business interests of his 
children could do to the credibility of his govemment.75 In February 1988, one month before 
the MPR convened to re-elect Soeharto for his fifth presidential term, Moerdani was relieved 
of his command. 
The incidents leading to Moerdani' s dismissal appeared to convince Soeharto that even the 
most loyalist segments within the armed forces had the potential to threaten his rule.76 
Soeharto reacted with changes to both the composition of his power base and the selection 
criteria for the military elite. From the- late 1980s onwards, he encouraged Muslim 
mainstream leaders and intellectuals to broaden their socio-religious activities and become 
part of his regime. This development will be discussed further in Chapter 2. In appointing the 
post..,Moerdani top brass, on the other hand,· Soeharto applied two major criteria; First, 
candidates for leadership positions had to be firmly opposed to the Moerdani group. 
Accordingly, officers with devout Muslim backgrounds, who had seen their promotions held 
up under the Moerdani reign, were now given special consideration.77 Second, future military 
leaders qualified for speedy promotion if they were members of his wider family, had strong 
relationships with it, or had recently served as Soeharto's adjutants and cominanders of the 
Presidential Security Squad. The post of Army Chief of Staff, for example~ was held in the 
- 1990s consecutively by the brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife, a close confidant of his 
daughter Si ti Hardiyanti Rukmana, his former adjutant and, finally, the former chief of the 
Presidential Sec\.lrity Squad. At the same tinie, Soeharto's son-in-law and several other ex-
74 In addition, Moerdani had built up a sizeable business empire, largely focusing on coffee exports, 
construction and property. The net profit of bis business group, managed by the holding company 
Batara Indra, averaged an annual 30 to 40 million US dollars in the years 1988-1990: See Indria 
Samego et.al., Bila ARRI Berbisnis: Buku Pertama yang Menyingkap Data dan Kasus Penyimpangan 
dalam Praktik Bisnis Kalangan Militer, Mizan, Bandung 1998: 121. 
75 Interview with Gen. (tet.) BennyMoerdani, Jakarta 5 September 1998: 
76 Salim Said, 'Allgkatan Bersenjata di Bawah Soeharto: Membangun Basis Kekuatan pada Masa Orde 
- Barn; 1969-1998', in: Salim Said, Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini dan Kelak, Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, Jakarta 2001: 79; 
77 Interview with Let.Gen. (ret.) Sayidirnan Suryohadiprojo, Jakarta 4 December 1997. Despite the 
increased numbers of devout Muslim officers iri the top brass, Soeharto did not exclude non-Muslim 
and secular Muslim officets from -the promotion cycle. In fact, there appears to have been a delicate 
balance between the appointments of officers with devout Muslim backgrounds on the one hand and 
commanders with non-Muslim and secular profiles on the other. This dualism led some observers to 
conclude that ABRi was divided into a 'green' (Muslim) faction and a 'red-and-white' (nationalist-' 
secular) camp. As will be argued later in this study, this division was superficial and reflected political 
calculations rather than ideological or religious dispositions .. 
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adjutants filled senior positions. Soeharto apparently came to believe that only officers with 
direct links to his personal fate would develop the kind of allegiance that was necessary to 
sustain the regime. 
The New Order state of the 1990s had undergone substantial social and political change 
since its formation in the early 1970s and its consolidation in the 1980s. The reduction of 
military participation in governance, the inclusion of various civilian groups in its power 
structure, and the increased concentration of political and economic powers in Soeharto;s 
family circle gave the regime an image significantly different from the praetorian rule it had 
exercised throughout the 1970s. Edward Aspinall argued that 'by the mid-1990s, Suharto's 
regime was undergoing a process of sultanization, in which the dominance of the president, 
and that of his family and inner circle, was becoming increasingly venal and all pervasive.' 7s 
The armed forces, while still enjoying the profits distributed by Soeharto's patronage 
network, were severely impaired in thefr ability to act as an independent political entity. 
David R. Mares saw the military in the late New Order, similarly to the armed forces under 
Chile's Pinochet, 'relegated to agent status along with the rest of~ociety.'79 In all four areas 
of traditional military interyention, their influence had declined. In the political arena, 
besides witness1.ng the · formal reduction of military representation 1n the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary, the armed forces also had to concede the leadership of Golkar to 
civilian politicians.so In its relations with Soeharto, the military suffered a series of defeats, 
and was only rarely able to translate its crucial importance for the maintenance of the regime 
into concrete political gains. In 1993, the military forced its vice-presidential candidate, 
General Try Soetrisno, on Soeharto, but the President retaliated by isolating Try and 
replacing him after one term in office. In the economic field, the armed forces had to 
surrender some of their privileges to businesses controlled by the Soerui.rto family and 
civili~n entrepreneurs protected by the State Secretariat.st The ongoing eco~omic boom, with 
growth rates of around 7 percent each year ill the early 1990s, ensured that the military still 
had considerable income opportunities, b~t the increase in the number of actors resulted in a 
reduction of its total share.82 
78 Edward Aspinall, 'Political Opposition and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Case of 
Indonesia', Doctoral dissertation, The Australian National Uiliversity, Canberra 2000: 6. 
79 Mares 1998: 7 .. 
80 Toriq Hada~ 'Mengapa ABRI-Golkar?', in: Santoso (editor), ABRI Punya Golkar?, Institut Studi 
Arus Infonnasi, Jakarta 1996: 72. 
81 Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State Secretariat, 1945-1993, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta 
1996: 57. 
82 Michael van Langenberg, 'The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony', in: Arief 
Budiman (editor), State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Monash Papers on Asia No. 22, Clayton 1990: 
128. . 
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The most drastic reduction of military influence, however, occurred in the sector of its 
organisational autonomy. Soeharto, now a civilian with a complex web of political interests 
and support groups, had almost complete control over appointments and matters of internal 
management. The rapid rise of officers with links to the Soeharto family or a history of 
personal service at the palace created discontent within the corps. Many officers with 
outstanding professional qualifications felt that they had to make way for those with better 
political connections.83 Finally, in the socio-cultural sector, intellectuals and artists became 
increasingly critical. Censorship efforts and official bans only helped to catalyse the 
popularity of the prohibited book, paper, theatre play, cartoon or song. Responding to public 
demands for fewer restrictions on the freedom of expression, the New Order declared a new 
era of openness (keterbukaan) in 1989. This led to critical discourses on a Wide range of 
issues, including on the Dual Function of the armed forces. In fact, it appears likely that 
· Speharto himself encouraged the debate on Dwi Fungsi, reminding the armed forces that their 
·future was tied to the continuation of his reign. Jun Ronna emphasised that these discussions 
'reflected Soeharto's counter-use of keterbukaan in his attempt to undermine the political 
influence of the military. ' 84 The discourse on the role of the military was a secondary debate, 
however, with the focus of criticism soon shifting to Soeharto and the longevity ofhiS rule. 
The reduction of the military's intervention in the four areas mentioned above indicated a 
change in the character of the regime. The late New Order polity could no longer be 
described as a praetorian state; The armed forces did not have full control of the government 
as they had in the early period of the regime. In the traditional scheme of civil-military 
relations, Indonesia's amied forces in the 1990s played the role of participant-ruler. They 
supported the political interests of an increasingly sultanistic civilian leader, and received 
substantial political and economic concessions in return. Writing in 1997, the last full year of 
Soeharto's presidency, Anders Uhlin contended that while 'the military is obviously an 
important power center and many powerful ministers have a military background, ( ... ) the 
New Order is not a pure military regime.' The government, Uhlin explained, 'uses military 
force to rule but its first concern is not the interests of the military, but the protection of the 
political and economic interests of the Soeharto family and the big Chinese conglomerates 
associated with Soeharto.'85 The ambivalence of its role as a beneficiary and mishandled · 
instrument of the regime created ~certainty within the military about its institutional. 
interests in the late New Order. Obviously, the armed forces were dissatisfied with their loss 
of political powers since the 1980s. But there was· also widespread anxiety in the ranks that 
83 Interview with Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Commander of the Army Staff and Command 
School, Jakarta 8 November 1998. 
84 Honna 2003: 17 
85 Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy 
Movement in a Changing World, Curzori, Richmond 1997: 58. 
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the fall of the New Order regime might end the military's role in politics altogether. The 
present arrangement, with all its shortcomings and frustrations, still appeared to many 
officers as more attractive than an uncertain future. 
The historical complex of institutionalised power structures, ideological self-perceptions 
and societal interpretations of the armed forces' intervention in politics forms the background 
for the analysis of the political crisis that unfolded in 1997 and led to the post-authoritarian 
transition in the years after 1998. The debate over the role of the military in achieving . 
. national independence; the experiences.with liberal democracy in the 1950s; the evolution of 
the Dual Function; the· institutionalisation of military· powers in the early New Order period; 
and the eroding identity between Soeharto and the armed forces in the 1990s all constitute 
elements of an influential historical legacy. The components of this legacy would emerge at 
varioiis stages of the· post-authoritarian transition, and have a considerable impact on the 
characteristics of its civil-military relations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CIVILIAN CONFLICT AND MILITARY INTERVENTION: 
THE CLEAVAGES WITHIN INDONESIA'S MUSLIM 
COMMUNITY 
The military quest for political participation is one important aspect of the civil-military 
equation, and its historical manifestations and legacies in Indonesia have been discussed 
extensively in chapter 1. Authors like Samuel Finer asserted, however, that the quality of 
civilian political leadership is equally crucial for the outcome of civil-military interactions. 
Solid civilian state institutions, consensus among key society groups over the foundation of 
the system of government, and low levels of political conflict combine into what Finer called 
a 'developed political culture'. States with sophisticated political cultures are much less likely 
to experience military intervention in politics than those with weak institutions and 
fragmentation among major civilian groups. 
For much of Indonesia's post-independence history, fissures within the civilian political 
sphere have had an obstructive effect on the development of strong democratic institutions. 
Conflicts among key societal groups have weakened the civilian capacity to run stable 
governments, eroding the confidence of the public in political parties and parliamentarism. 
The intra-civilian fractures contributed to an environment in which the armed forces were 
presented with numerous opportunities for political intervention. This chapter will focus on 
divisions within the Muslim community as one of the primary sources of civilian conflict in 
Indonesia. The case study will illustrate broader patterns of rivalry between large societal 
groups and their impact on the quality of civilian governance and the levels of military 
intervention in political affairs. Disputes among key constituencies over the role of Islam in 
state and society as well as over its diverse doctrinal, cUltural and political interpretations 
have marked Indonesian politics since 1945. The historical legacies of these debates and 
·conflicts had, as will be shown in the course of this study, important implications for the 
development of civil-military relations after 1998. In discussing the :fragmentation within the 
Muslim community, this chapter will discuss three main areas. First of all, there have been 
stark differences between groups favoring a strong role for Islam in politics and those that 
promote a nationalist vision of the state without distinguishing between followers of different· 
religions. The controversy between these two camps over the formal role oflslam in the state 
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dominated the Indonesian polity from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s and played an 
important role in the decline of liberal democracy. Second, the rivalry between traditionalist 
and modernist Muslim groups over religious, social and political questions related to the 
interpretation of the Islamic faith has been equally significant. Both currents have developed 
a deeply antagonistic relationship, fed by bitter experiences of failed cooperation during 
liberal democracy in the 1950s and mutual accusations of betrayal during decades of 
authoritarian rule. Third, the existence of small, but influential groups at the militant fringes 
. of political Islam posed security threats to civilian governments in the 1940s and 1950s and 
served as a legitimating threat for the New Order in the 1970s and 1980s. Developments in all 
three areas have undermined the civilian political sphere and strengthened the role of the 
military in politics; and despite shifts in their respective significance, they would play a 
critical role in shaping the political landscape of post-Soeharto Indonesia. 
I. NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAMIC POLITICS AND TRADITIONALISM 
VERSUS MODERNISM: THE CLEAVAGES IN INDONESIA'S MUSLIM 
COMMUNITY 
Indonesia has the largest Muslim community in the world, with 88.6 percent of its population, 
or 190.3 million people, identifying themselves as followers of the Islamic faith. 1 There are 
significant divisions within the umat,2 however, which are reflected in different practices and 
doctrinal beliefs, regional variations and conflicting political viewpoints. The most important 
of these divisions have been the split between santri and abangan on the one hand, and 
·between traditionalist and modernist Muslims on the other. 
The scholarly differentiation between santri and abangan was an influential typology in the 
1960s and 1970s, distinguishing devout from less pious Muslims.3 Santri were defined as 
devout Muslims who adhere strictly to the rituals prescribed by scripture, such as praying five 
1 These figures are based· on· the registration of voters conducted by the Central Statistics Board in 
2003, which estimated the total population at 214,827,614, and the census of 2000, which established 
the percentage of religious affiliations. 'Pemilu 2004: Menghitung Jumlah Kursi DPR', Suara Merdeka 
26 August 2003. 
2 The term 'umat' (Ar. umma), literally 'community', 'people' or 'nation', is in the Islamic context· 
used to describe the community of believers, i.e. Muslims. . 
3 The following paragraphs on the doctrinal and social differences between Muslim groups are largely 
based on Greg Fealy, 'Divided Majority: The Limits of Political Islam in Indonesia', in: Shahram 
Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (editors), Islam and Political Legitimacy, RoutledgeCurzon, London 
and New York 2003: 150-68, 
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times a day, fasting during the month ofRamadhan, avoiding alcohol and gambling as well as 
giving alms to the poor. In contrast, abangan Muslims were described as less strict in their 
practice of Islamic rituals, or as engaging in religious practices that combined elements of the 
Islamic faith with those of other religions, mostly Hinduism and Buddhism. In this context, 
the more 'lax' abangan do not view orthopraxy as a matter of importance for them, while the 
syncretistic abangan often adhere devoutly to a set of rituals developed through an 
amalgamation . of local beliefs and Islamic regulations. The distinction between santri and 
abangan, introduced by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in the 1960s while describing 
. Javanese Islam,4 has been widely criticised as inapplicable to a larger Iridonesian context and 
changing socio-demographic trends.5 The categories have remained helpful, however, to 
grasp the political preferences of voters ~th divergent religious profiles. In the 1950s and 
1960s, for example, santri typically supported Islamic parties with clearly defined demands 
for the introduction of Islamic law and state structures, while abangan voted for secularly 
oriented parties (nationalist, communist and socialist) that opposed the idea of an Islamic 
state. While the cultural features of the abangan-santri divide have undergone important 
chap.ges, its political dimension continues to influence voting behaviour to this day. 
In the santri·corrimunity, there are two major currents: modernism and traditionalism. The 
two groups have significant differences over issues of doctrine, religious practices and their 
relations with the state. In matters of doctrine and jurisprudence, the traditionalists almost 
invariably follow the Syafi'i school, one of the four main Sunni law schools (mazhab).6 
Traditionalist ulama or kiai7 often blend local influences into their religious practices, leading 
to forms of syncretism that the modernists view as deviations from the 'true' Islam.8 The 
leaders of traditionalist communities are revered by their sfudents as sources of clerical · 
expertise collected over the centuries, placing them: at the apex of their respective local 
hierarchies and handing them a degree of social control over their constituency much greater 
4 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1976. 
5 Marshall Hodgs~n, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1974. 
6 Martin van Bruinessen, 'Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse . 
Within NU', in: Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (editors), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and 
Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton 1996: 168; Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd, Imam 
Syafl';;· Moderatisme, Eklektisisme, Arabisme, Yogyakarta 1997: 3. 
7 The terms 'ulama' and kiai' are not differentiated in this study, describing religious scholars and 
leaders. Some authors have pointed out that kiai typically are heads of Islamic boarding schools or 
pesantren, while ulama do not necessarily fulfil that function. 
8 Zainuddin Fananie and Atiqa Sabardila, Sumber Konflik Masyarakat Muslim Muhammadiyah - NU: 
Perspektif Keberterimaan Tahlil, Muhammadiyah University Press, Surakarta 2000: 1-3. 
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than that exercised by modernist ulama.9 Doctrinally, modernists refer primarily to the 
· Qur'an and the Sunnah (compendia of the exemplary behavior .of the Prophet Mohammad), 
and are opposed to religious practices not based on strict Islamic prescriptions. Modernists 
promote ijtihad, the individual reasoning to understand the Qur'an, which grants Muslims the 
freedom of adopting or rejecting aspects of the mazhab. 10 These doctrinal differences are also 
reflected in socio-economic and regional splits. The traditionalist strongholds are located in 
the rural areas of Central and East Java, with its communities living in and around Islrumc 
boarding schools (pesantren) and working in lower-class jobs as farmers, small traders and 
. labourers. The modernists, on the other hand, are largely urban-based; better educated, 
typically work as traders, entrepreneurs and professionals, and are particularly strong in the 
·Outer Islands. 
The two groups differ not only in their religious practices and socio-economic profiles, but 
also in their concepts of the relationship between the Muslim community and the state. The 
two constituencies often use different reference sources in determining their position vis-a-vis 
state authorities and therefore developed very different attitudes towards incumbent regimes. 
The basis for the spiritual and political behaviour of traditionalist·leaders is the kitab kuning, 
commentaries on medieval Sunni jurisprudence. The main sources of this compilation are 
texts of Middle Eastern scholars and jurists written between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, 
such as al._Baghdadi (d. 1037), al-Mawardi (974-1058), al-Ghazali (1058-llll);Ibn Jama'a 
(d. 1333) and Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406).11 The texts reflect the political decline of the Abbasid 
caliphate. The caliphs, traditionally the political as well as the religious heads of the Islamic 
community, lost their powers gradually to a succession of foreign invaders and local 
warlords. This forced the jurists of the caliphate to adjust their religio-political theories to the 
shift in power. The majority of the ulama, as Greg Fealy has argued, opted to avoid conflict 
with the new power holders by declaring social order as the priority of the Islamic 
·community. 12 Violent opposition against the government would disrupt the very . political 
stability that the· philosophers asserted was the precondition for the enforcement of God's 
. . 
law. 13 This jurisprudential focus allowed the followers of the powerless caliph to avoid nsks 
to the umat by collaborating with the new regime. The upholding of a strong government, 
9 Endang Turmudi, Perselingkuhan Kiai dan Kekuasaan, LKiS, Yogyakarta 2004: 42. 
10 SyarifHidayatullah, Intelektualisme dalam Perspektif Neo-Modernisme, Tiara Wacana, Yogyakarta 
2000: 2-3. 
11 Gregory John Fealy, 'Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History ofNahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967', 
Doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Monash University, Melbourne 1998: 50-68. 
12 Fealy 1998: 51-52. 
13 H. Rozikin Daman, Membidik NU: Dilema· Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah, Gama Media, . · 
Yogyakarta200l: 87-88. 
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regardless of its religious orientation, was seen as preferable to anarchy, which was 
synonymous with the betrayal of Muslim interests. 
The political experience of the Sunni theorists supported the accommodative nature of 
traditionalist legal-political theory. Like the caliphs, the kiai felt responsible for the spiritual 
and material well being of their followers. 14 And, like the philosophers and jurists of the 
caliphate, the kiai feared that a possible breakdown of political order would dirriinish their 
privileged place in the social hierarchy. This concept of avoiding risks in the interests of the 
umat was also expressed in the traditionalist interpretation of the Qur'anic injunction of amar 
m·a 'ruf nahi munkar (enjoining good and preventing evil). Sunni theorists frequently used the 
injunction to justify their concept of choosing compromise with the power holders over the 
risk of challenging them. 15 The judgement about what exactly constituted dariger and what 
suitable compromise rested with the ulama, and formed a large part of the fikih discourse (the 
study of Islamic jurisprudence). In later discussions about amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, 
traditionalist. leaders laid the main stress on the obligation of the kiai to cooperate with the · 
government, give advice to those in power and thereby protect their own communities. 
The modernists, on the other hand, intended not only to reform Islam as a faith by 
challenging the validity of the medieval sources used by traditionalists, but also to make· 
Islam relevant and competitive in the modem ·world. One of the leading questions for 
Indonesian modernists has been: 'Why are the Muslims backward while the infidels are 
affluent?' The Egyptian thinker Amir Shak:ib Arsalan, one of the most prominent intellectuals 
of the global modernist movement, published a book of that title in 1930. The book was 
widely read in the Middle East and in Indonesia, and Arsalan claimed that it was an 
· Indonesian scholar who had put the question to bim.16 The improvement of social and. 
economic conditions for the Muslim community, the quest for technological innovations that 
would close the growing gap with the West, and the mobilisation of resources to recruit 
traditionalist Muslims to their cause became central issues in the theological and political 
agenda of the modernists.17 As far as their relationship with the state was concerned, 
14 Sukamto, Kepemimpinan Kiai Dalam Pesantren, LP3ES, Jakart3. 1999: 84-97. . 
15 This guideline was also reflected in the premise dar al-mafasid mugoddam 'ala jalb al mashalih, 
that prioritises the avoidance of danger over the quest for advantages that carry higher risks. See Said 
Jainhuri, Gus Dur: Pemimpin NU Kharismatik Kontroversial, Yayasan Lernbaga Pernelihara Moral 
Masyarakat, Jakarta 1998: 61. · 
· 16 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of 
Traditional Islam in Java, Arizona State University, Tempe 1990: 170. 
17 In the eyes of the modernists, the traditionalist leaders were not only competitors for resources and 
leadership over the umat, they represented the very backwardnes·s of the Muslim community that the 
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modernist intellectuals had considerable differences among themselves, but agreed that it had 
to be defined through· references to original sources of the Islamic faith. Robert Hefner, for 
example, pointed out that modernist thinkers of the pre-independence period differed on the 
question of the Islamic state, but they did so in reference to their different readings of the 
Qur' an. 18 The traditionalists, in contrast, could formulate their attitude towards models of 
state organisation on the basis of what was best for the political interests of the umat at that 
particular point of time. 
The religious, socio-economic and political interests of the modernist and traditionalist 
comnmnities have been represented since the 1910s and 1920s by two major and a number of 
smaller organisations. The main traditionalist organisation is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Revival 
of the Islamic Scholars). It was founded in 1926 and currently claims a membership of over 
35 million, with the majority of its followers concentrated in East and Central Java. The 
ulama or kiai have traditionally dominated the religious and political course of the 
organisation, with its executive board assigned to carry out the directives of the clerics. There 
are a number of smaller traditionalist organisations such as al-Jamiyatul al-Wasyliah and 
Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia or Perti (West Sumatra), Mathlaul Anwar (West Java) and 
Nahdlatul Wathan (Lombok), but their influence is limited to their local contexts. The largest 
modernist organisation is Muhammadiyah, claiming a membership of 25 million. Founded in 
1912, it drew its members from the urban upper and middle classes, providing the 
organisation with considerable funds to develop a wide network of schools, libraries and 
. hospitals. 19 Professionals, university lecturers and bureaucrats have played a large role in 
Muharnmadiyah's's leadership.20 Other modernist organisations include Persatuan Islam and 
al-Irsyad, but they are much smaller both in membership numbers and political significance. 
NU and Muharnmadiyah · have for much of Indonesia's polltical history succeeded in 
defending their status as the main representational bodies of their· communities in national 
politics .. 
modernists hoped· to overcome. The traditionalists had, so their judgment, allowed· non-Islamic 
elements to intrude the sanctity of their faith, and had therefore to shoulder the blame for its demise. 
18 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton and Oxford 2000: 40. 
19 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942, Cetakan Ketujuh, LP3ES, Jakarta 
1994: 95. 
20 Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaviour of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch 
Colonialism, Gadjah Mada University Press, Y ogyakarta 1989: 189. · 
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II. COMPETING FOR HEGEMONY: MUSLIMS AND THE STATE 
The religious and social divisions within the Muslim community resulted in stark political 
differences. Fealy asserted that 'when it came to politics, each stream had major differences 
over ideology, policy and leadership style, and each used different aspects of Islamic thought 
and tradition to legitimate their particular approach to politics. ' 21 Most of the controversies 
focused on the structure, identity and resources of the state. In this respect, .there were two 
major areas of debate: one that concerned the formal role of Islam in the state, while the other 
· related to the function of the state as the main distributor of funds, positions and privileges to 
particular constituencies. 
The controversy over the role of Islam in the state has created substantial fractures in 
Indonesia's civilian political sphere. In June 1945, when a committee for the preparation of 
Indonesia's independence discussed the issue, there were fierce debates between those who 
wanted to see syariat, or Islamic law, recognised in the constitution and those who argued for 
a religiously neutral state. Non-Muslims and abangan secular nationalists warned that the 
inclusion of syariat in the constitution would encourage predominantly non-Muslim areas to 
secede from the nation state, and some santri politicians agreed.22 The representatives of 
Mlihammadiyah and NU, however, insisted on an explicit role for Islam in legal and political 
affairs. On 22 June 1945, the delegates reached a compromise: the preamble of the 
· constitution, or Jakarta Charter, would include a seven-word clause which translated as: 'with 
the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law' (dengan kewajiban menjalankan 
syariat Islam bagi perneluk-pemeluknya). The exact meaning of this clause remained open to 
dispute, however, especially as far as its legal consequences were concerned. Muslim 
delegates pointed out that the state was given no authority to enforce the regulation, and 
demanded that, at the very least, the President had to be a Muslim in order to ensure that 
syariat was observed. Sukarno, the main nationalist leader, convinced Christian delegates to 
accept this proposal, and it was adopted as an additional paragraph in the draft constitution. 23 
The compromise did not last long, however. Delegates from the predominantly Christian 
areas of Ambon and the Minahasa reported that large segments of their societies threatened to 
21 Fealy 2003: 154. 
22 Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKJ): Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PP.KI), 28 Mei 1945-
22 Agustus 1945, Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Jakarta 1995: 213-214. 
23 J. R Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1982; Umar 
Basalim, Pro-Kontra Piagam Jakarta di Era Reformasi, Pustaka Indonesia Satu, Jakarta 2002. 
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separate from the Indonesian Republic if the Jakarta Charter came into effect. In fact, the split 
of the Republic into a large number of smaller states was exactly what the returning Dutch 
forces were hoping for. 24 Against this background, secular nationalists under the leadership of 
Hatta convinced the proponents of the 'syariat clause' on 18 August to drop their demands, 
and the constitution was subsequently passed without the 'seven words' and the stipulation 
that the President had to be a Muslim: Islamic leaders were deeply disappointed by what they 
saw as an unbalanced political compromise. They consoled their supporters, however, by 
claiming the first principle of the Pancasila ideology, the 'belief in Almighty God' 
(KeTuhanan yang Maha Esa), as the result of their insistence on monotheism. Muslim 
politicians also considered the compromise to be temporary, and intended to reopen the 
debate once the struggle against the Dutch was over. Expecting to win sufficient majorities in 
the post-independence elections, they were confident that they could implement Islamic law 
through legislation and the anticipated revision of the constitution. 
Developments after 1949, though, failed to satisfy the expectations oflslamic leaders. The . 
elections of 1955 did not produce the majority for Islamic parties that their leaders had 
predicted. Combined, parties with explicitly Islamic profiles won only 43 percent of the 
votes, denying them the necessary numbers to push syariat-based laws through Parliament. In 
addition, the Constitutional Assembly,. the body tasked with producing a new constitution 
from 1956, deliberated for three years on the reintroduction of the Jakarta Charter without 
reaching agreement on the issue. The secular-nationalist parties, backed up by Sukarno and 
. the armed forces, were opposed to its reinstatement, and in a series of votes in May and June 
.1959, the supporters of the Charter failed to reach the necessary two-thirds majority.25 On the 
other hand, the non-Islamic parties proposed to return to the presidential constitution of 1945, 
but did not manage to gain a majority either. As a result, the Assembly was deadlocked. The 
inability of Indonesia's political parties to compromise on the future constitution added to the 
increasing impatience of the public with the parliamentary system.26 In contrast to 1945, 
when the goal of independence and the threat of the returning Dutch had forced key societal 
forces to cooperate and compromise, the constitutional debates of the late 1950s deepened the 
. political divisions and accelerated the decline of the democratic polity. On 5 July 1959, 
24 Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to 
Revolt, 1880-1950, Verhandelitigen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, - Land-, en Volkenkunde 
143, KITLV Press, Leiden 1990: 198. 
2
·
5 Adnan Buyung Nasuti on, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal 
Study of the Indonesian Konstituante, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1956-1959, Jakarta 1992. 
26 Feith 1967: 361. 
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Sukarno dissolved the Assembly and declared the return to the 1945 constitution, marking the 
end of the parliamentary system. 
The debate over the role of Islam in the state polarised civilian politics along secular-
nationalist and Islamic lines, but the Muslim forces were deeply divided as well. Their 
conflicts focused largely on the second issue in Islam-state relations: the function of state 
bodies as the largest distributor of institutional and material privileges. In this regard, the . 
Department of Religious Affairs was, and is, of crucial importance to both traditionalist and 
modernist constituencies. It has responsibility for k~y aspects of Islamic life, including 
religious education, authority over marital, inheritance and divorce laws, and hajj affairs. 27 
For NU particularly, the department has been the predominant vehicle of patronage and 
material advancement for its supporters.28 It offers civil service positions to both kiai and 
pesantren-educated santri, and its control of funds, contracts and licenses has given NU much 
needed access to the economic infrastructure of the state. While modernists tend to posses the 
necessary educational backgrounds to gain employment in other ministries as -well, NU 
politicians typically had to focus on Religious Affairs as their sole source of bureaucratic 
power.29 The struggle to control the department has created serious tensions between 
modernist and traditionalist organisations and parties for much of fudonesia's post-
independence history, including the transition after 1998. It was a critical issue for the 
formation and disintegration of cabinets in the 1950s, and provided the authoritarian regimes 
. . 
of Sukarno and Soeharto with a welcome tool to lure Muslim groups into backing their rule. 
III. CONFLICT AND DECLINE: ISLAMIC POLITICS IN THE 1950s AND 1960s 
The fight for the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter was one of the few political issues that 
traditionalist and modernist Muslim politicians agreed on. The differences over other 
doctrinal, social and political questions were substantial, and ultimately carnied the failure of 
attempts to create and maintain a single Islamic party. fu 1945, most Islamic organisations 
had united to fonn the party Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Mruilimin Indonesia, Indonesian 
Muslim Advisory Council). Tensions within Masyumi grew continuously after 1949, 
· 
27 The hajj is the pilgramage to the holy site of Mecca. It is required for all Muslims who can afford it. 
28 While kiai raise some of the funds necessary to run their boarding schools from the payment of 
. tuition fees and businesses, many pesantren are dependent on outside funding. Pradjarta Dirdjosanjoto, 
Memilihara Umat: Kiai Pesantren - Kiai Langgar di Jawa, LkiS, Y og)rakarta 1999: 151-153. 
29 Martin van Bruinessen, NU:· Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuezsa, Pencarian Wacana Baru, LkiS, 
Yogyakarta 1994: 79-80. 
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however, when younger modernist politicians took control of the party and demanded that it 
acquire a more 'rational' and 'modern' outlook. In the following years, the political authority 
of the NU-dominated supervisory board was gradually reduced in favour of the central board 
led by the modernist Mohamad Natsir, leading to a widespread feeling of marginalisation 
within NU. 30 The number of Muhammadiyah representatives in the party leadership increased 
steadily, from under 30 percent in 1949 to around 50 percent in 1952.31 Many of the old 
animosities between traditionalists and m9dernists re-emerged during· the conflict over the 
party leadership, with modernists portraying their traditionalist counterparts as obstacles to 
political reform and social modernisation, and the traditionalists fearing that their rivals 
wanted to erode their authority over the NU santri. The control of the Department of 
Religious Affairs was an equally contentious issue in the party. Consequently, it was a 
conflict over the department in 1952 that escalated tensions within Masyumi. When 
modernist elements claimed the ministry,· NU declared its separation from Masyumi and the 
establishment of its own party. 
The secession of NU from Masyilmi . convinced both communities that political 
representation of their interests through an Islamic umbrella organisation was impossible. AS 
a result, each constituency felt that they needed their own party in order to compete in 
politics, catalysing a tendency for particularism in the Muslim community that would, .much 
later, cause the proliferation of Islamic parties in the post-Soeharto era. The split also 
sharpened the specific profiles of the political vehicles used by the various groups. NU 
established itself as a Java-centric, pragmatic party that sought to protect the interests of the 
traditionalist community by approaching politics in a flexible, moderate and compromise-
oriented fashion. Its populist sentiments ·brought it close to the Sukarnoist PNI (Partai 
Nasional Indonesia, fudonesian Nationalist Party), whi~h in tum was attracted by NU's 
sympathies for syncretistic religious practices: 'The modernist Masyumi, on the other hand, 
pursued political and economic modernisation in a 'rational' and technocratic manner, and 
30 Even decades later, the feeling within NU circles remained that modernist politicians had cheated 
them. An NU-sponsored pamphlet of 2002 recalled that '( ... ) Masyumi successfully cheated NU. At · 
the beginning, activists who had initiated Masyun:ii lured NU leaders to support Masyumi because the 
latter controlled large masses, with the promise of strategic positions like chairman of the Advisory 
Board or 'Consultative Council' with full authority to determine the course of Masyumi. lt is indeed 
true that K.H. Hasyim Asy' ari became .chairman of Masyumi 's Advisory Board. But unfortunately, his 
·role and functions were 'sterilised'. His talks were never given attention. His fatwa were always 
ignored.' Bahrul 'Ulum, "Bodohnya NU" Apa "NU Dibodohi"? Jejak Langkah NU Era Reformasi: 
· Menguji Khittah, Meneropong Paradigma Politik, PW IPNU JaWa T~gah, Lembaga Pers dan 
Penerbitan, Yogyakarta 2002: 34. · 
31 Syaifullah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, Jakarta 1997: 
190. 
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rejected NU's compromise-seeking policies as lacking conviction and conceptual thinking. 
This rationalist interpretation of politics allied Masyumi with socialist and non-Muslim 
parties which, like Masyumi itself, had their strongholds in the Outer Islands. The political 
and regional preferences of the Islainic parties and their secular counterparts were highlighted 
·by the outcome of the 1955 general elections. Masyumi gained 20.9 percent oftJ:ie vote, and 
emerged as the dominant political force in the Outer Islands. NU came third with 18.4 
percent, with its supporters largely concentrated in Central and East Java. On the_ secular-
nationalist side, PNI became the strongest of all parties with 22.3 percent, and the PKI fook 
the fourth place with 15.4 percent. The split between Java-based parties, like NU and PKI, 
and the parties dominating the Outer Islands, had a significant impact on -political 
devel_opments in the post-election period.32 
Both NU and Masywni were drawn into the spiralling political crisis of the mid to late 
1950s. As the strongest party in the Outer Islands, Masyumi played a major role in the 
regional uprisings on Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1956-58. There, several regional 
administrations were toppled by alliances between Masyumi politicians critical of the 
centralist policies of the Jakarta government and local military commanders dissatisfied with 
the dominance of army headquarters over their affairs. The rebellions ·were defeated 
militarily, discrediting Masyumi in the eyes of the political elite and making it largely 
ineffective in defending the increasingly embattled parliamentary system. Combining with 
widespread societal apathy towards liberal democracy and its parties, the regionalist 
insurgencies provided Sukarno and the armed forces -with welcome arguments in their 
lobbying for an authoritarian solution to the crisis.33 NU, for its part, appeared unwilling to 
resist the mounting calls for replacing the democratic system. The 1955 result for the PKI had 
come as a shock to many NU leaders, and the communists had improved their position further 
in local elections on Java in 1957. If the PKI was able to sustain this trend under the existing 
democratic polity; it might have emerged as the largest political party at the next national 
election. The prospect of having an atheist party dominating parliament and government, and 
the fear that communist grassroots leaders would expand their influence at the expense of the 
kiai, undermined the support of NU politicians for parliamentary democracy. Thus when 
- -
Sukarllo erected his Guided Democracy, Masyumi and NU were incapable or reluctant to 
offer meaningful resistance. 34 
32 Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Eledions of 1955, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, New 
Yorkl957. 
33 Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Instability in Indonesia>, Far.Eastern Survey 26:4, April 1957: 49-54. 
34
_Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, [957-1959, Cornell 
Modem Indonesia Project, Ithaca, New York 1966. 
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The imposition of Guided Democracy marked the beginning of almost four decades of 
authoritarian rule and political marginalisation of Islam. The early phase of Sukarno's regime 
.. saw the evolution of a general pattern that applied the divisions between Islamic groups as an 
instrument of political legitimacy and· regime maintenance. Based .on the presumption that 
any form of non'-dernocratic rule in Indonesia needed the endorsement of at least one of the 
two major currents of political Islam, Sukarno invited NU to join his regime and excluded 
· Masyumi. In the lead up to the presidential decree, Sukarno had observed that NU was 
. - . . . 
reluctant to support Guided Democracy, but appeared ready to compromise. Masyumi, on the 
other hand, was uncompromisingly· opposed to the authoritarian shift.35 The difference in 
NU's·and Masyumi's attitudes towards Guided Democracy contributed significantly to the 
consolidation of non-democratic tuk Fealy suggested that 'had NU joined Masyumi in 
rejecting the Konsepsi atid Karya cabinet, Sukarno would have been forced to abandon or 
. moderate his plans.'36 After long internal debates, NU accepted Sukarno's inviW:tion, and in · 
exchange retained the Department of Religious Affairs and significant representation in the 
restructured parliament.37 The main argument of the NU.board for joining Guided Democracy 
was to ensure that Muslim interests were sufficiently represented, and that participation in the 
regime was necessary to control the expansion of the PKI.38 Masyumi, by contrast, was 
banned in 1960, and two years later many of its leaders were arrested and imprisoned. 39 
The differences within Islamic groups over their attitude towards Guided Democracy not 
only helped Sukarno and the armed forces to establish and sustain their authoritarian rule, but 
· also had long-term effects on the relationship betWeen civilian forces and non-democratic ' 
polities. Nahdlatul Ulama's acceptance of Sukarno's regime in exchange for political 
·concessions signalled that representation in government was more important to its 
35 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam ·dan Politik: Teori Bel.ah Bambu - Masa Demoh-asi Terpimpin (1959-
1965), Gema Insani Press, Jakarta 1996: 54. · · · 
36 Fealy 1998: 223. Sukarno had presented his idea (konsepsi) of 'burying the political parties' and 
erecting a 'guided democracy' in October 1956. In response, Natsir contended that 'if the parties are 
buried, demoeracy will be buried automatically.' In April 1957, Sukain~ installed the Kabinet Karya, a 
'business cabinet', replacing the last democratic government elected by the 1955 parliament. Herbert 
. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York 1962: 518. · · · 
37 In the Sukarno~appointed parliament, NU had 51 seats (1955: 45 seats). As Masy0mi. had no 
representatives at all, however; the total number oflslamic members was only 67out of283, giving the 
nationalists a comfortable majority. · 
38 M. Ali Haidar, Nahd(atul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia: Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik, 
Gramedia, Jakarta 1994. 
39 RudolfMrazek;Bjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1994: 
463-464. 
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institutional interests than the nature of the political system it participated in.40 The support 
for democratic principles of state organisation appeared to be negotiable if authoritarian 
actors offered the same political resources that otherwise were only accessible after intense 
competition in parliamentary systems. NU's indifference towards the destruction ofMasyumi 
also gave rise to a sense of bitterness in some sections of the modernist community, 
. aggravating the tensions within the umat and allowing future authoritarian regimes to 
manipulate them for their political purposes. The prioritisation of regime engagement over 
democratic values and the growing intra-Islamic antagonism developed into important 
elements of Indonesia's political culture, and they have remained influential features in post-
Soeharto politics. 
IV. FRUSTRATED EXPECTATIONS: MUSLIM GROUPS AND THE EARLY NEW 
ORDER 
Soeharto's rise to power in 1965 further marginalised political Islam. This greatly 
disappointed Muslim groups, which had hoped for increased regime participation after 
·assisting the army in its purge of the PKI. In fact, in the years preceding the military take-
over, some Islamic leaders had entered into an informal alliance with anti-communist 
segments within the armed forces. Traditionalist kiai in particular had been concerned that the 
rapid expansion of the PKI into rural areas could threaten their dominance over Nahdlatul 
Ulama's core constituency.41 They established militias to defend their interests, which in tum 
sought contacts with and· advice from military officets.42 The political turmoil surrounding 
the events of 30 September 1965, during which the army claimed to have aborted a 
communist coup attempt, led to almost institutional cooperation between the armed forces· 
and Muslim groups in eradicating the PKI. Islamic youth organisations, mostly but not 
40 The allegations of political opportunism, directed against NU by a variety of political forces, were 
reflected in the derogatory reference to NU's spiritual leader, Wahab Chasbullah, as 'Kiai Nasakom'. 
Nasakom had been promoted by Sukarno as an all-encompassing ideological concept, combining 
Nationalism (Nasionalisme), Religion (Agama) and Communism (Komunisme). See Saifullah. 
Ma'shum, Karisma Ulama: Kehidupan Ringkas 26 Tokoh NU, M;izan, Bandung 1998: 151. 
41 In 1963, the communists had started a campaign, named the 'unilateral action' (aksi sepihak), for the 
. immediate implementation of land reform legislation introduced in 1960. As owners of pesantren and 
agricultural land attached to it, kiai became targets of the campaign. Aminuddin Kasdi, Kaum Merah 
Menjarah: Aksi Sepihak PKllBTI di Jawa Timur 1960-1965, Jendela, Yogyakarta 2001: 230-231. 
42 The NU youth activist Subchan ZE became one of the main contacts between NU militias and 
military officers. AriefMudatsir Mandan, 'H.M. Subchan Z.E. - Sang Maestro: Politisi Intelektual dari 
Kalangan NU Modem', in: Arief Mudatsir Mandan (editor), Subchan Z.E.: Sang Maestro: Politisi 
Intelektual dari Kalangan NU Modem, Pustaka Indonesia Satu, Jakarta 2001: 50. 
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exclusively NU-affiliated, played a major role in destroying the infrastructure of the PK.I and 
killing probably several hundred thousand of its members. In many cases, the army rounded 
up suspected communists, loaded them on trucks and delivered them to a location where 
members of Muslim militias stood by to kill them. 43 The involvement of civilian groups in the 
killings not only fulfilled logistical purposes, however. More significantly, it created political 
interests in the establishment and continuatiOn of a regime that would prevent investigations 
into the legality of these actions. The New Order administration offered political protection to 
those involved in the unlawful killings, and could count on sufficient civilian and military 
support in return. 
While neither the traditionalist nor the modernist Muslim groups intended to facilitate the 
rise of a military-run dictatorship, they assisted the army in dismantling the political 
structures of Guided Democracy and establishing the New Order polity. By doing so, they 
demonstrated that under conditions that threatene"d their core interests, key civilian 
organisations were prepared to accept military intervention in politics as a legitimate 
instrument for settling societal disputes. Like most political actors at that time, Islamic 
organisations· and parties believed that the intervention of the arined forces in politics was 
temporary, and that the regime emerging from the post-coup turmoil would serve their 
interests better than previous political systems. The modernists expected to end their 
marginalisation from political life and return to the arena of the leading societal forces. 
Nahdlatul Ulama politicians, on the other hand, hoped that the post-Sukarno state would 
reward· them for their close cooperation with the army· in destroying the. PKI. · Accordingly, 
NU members of parliament played a crucial role in Sukarno's political demise and Suharto's 
ascent to the presidency.44 In the same vein, modernist student leaders were at the forefront of 
the movement that demanded Sukarno's resignation, allowing Soeharto and the. armed forces 
to consolidate their grip on power. It was only by 1967 that Islamic leaders began to realise 
that their support for the army had not only resulted in the collapse of SUkarno's pro- . 
4j Kenneth R. Young, 'Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965', in: Robert Cribb 
(editor), The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali,· Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Monash University, Clayton 1990: 79. 
44 Andree Feillard, 'Traditionalist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's New Order: The Awkward 
Relationship', in: Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (editors), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and 
Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton 1996. In contrast to the younger NU 
politicians, however, the 'old guard' under NU General Chairman ldham Chalid supported Sukarno 
until it became evident that the latter's decline"was irreversible. 
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communist regime, but also in the creation of another authoritarian polity with equally strong 
reservations towards political Islam.45 
The optimistic cooperation among Muslim groups that had accompanied the decline of 
Guided Democracy and the rise of the Soeharto regime ended soon after the new rulers had 
consolidated their position. With the PK.I destroyed, the single most important bond of 
solidarity between Islamic organisations had vanished~ and their diverging interests began to 
dominate the political attitudes within the . umat once again. Faced with . an unsympathetic 
regime, the two currents of Indonesian Islam competed for the· few privileges and resources 
available under the new polity. The fractures within Islam were likely to result in different 
attitudes towards the regime, and offered Soeharto opportunities to demonstrate the powers of 
retribution and patronage at his disposal. Like Sukarno's Guided Democracy, Soeharto's 
regime was aware that it was crucial to gain the support of at least one of the major currents 
of Indonesian Islam to legitimise its authoritarian rule. In theory, the integralist nature of the 
New Order sought the cooperation, and eventual cooptation, of both constituencies, but more 
often than not, the support of only one stream was forthcoming. For the government, the most 
. important goal in this regard was to prevent both constituencies from uniting against the 
government and withdrawing the Islamic credentials they supplied to the regime. 
In defining their relationship to the new regime, traditionalist and modernist groups had, 
rather predictably, different approaches. In fact, their attitudes towards the early New Order 
were a direct reversal of their roles in establishing Guided Democracy. This time; NU chose a 
more confrontational strategy. The reason for this was not so much opposition towards the 
non-democratic nature of the regime, but its gradual exclusion from it. NU lost the 
Department of Religious Affairs in 1971, was severely intimidated by the military in the 
elections of the same year and had to give up its status as an autonomous political party in 
1973 when it was merged into the all-Islamic PPP under modernist leadership. By the mid 
1970s, Soeharto counted NU among the· opponents of his regime, and removed most of its 
officials from public office.46 The modernist community had a more diverse approach, but 
none of its key groups chose to confront the New Order state. Arguably, it was the bitter 
experience of marginalisation under Guided Democracy that led most modernist 
organisations to drive an accommodationist course. Muhammadiyah decided at its 1971 
. 
45 Nusron Wahid, Membongkar Hegemoni NU: Di Balik Independensi PMII (1966-1972), Bina Rena. 
Pariwara, Jakarta 2000: 74-75. 
46 Young NU activists even suspected that the government wanted NU to 'disappear', and called this 
period a time of 'NU phobia'. Choirul Anam, Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor: Sebuah Percikan 
Sejarah Kelahiran, AULA, Surabaya 1990: 128-129. 
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congress to eschew active politics, followed by an influx of bureaucrats into the national and 
regional leadership boards.47 A substantial proportion of them would later become members 
of Golkar. By the 1990s, 78 percent of Muhammadiyah's leadership personnel were state 
bureaucrats.48 Many former modernist politicians, on the other hand, joined Parmusi (Partai 
Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party), the 1$lamic party sanctioned by the 
government after it had objected to the rehabilitation of Masyumi in 1967.49 At the same 
time, prominent members of Masyumi founded Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, 
Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication), which assembled modernists with a more 
formalist, scripturalist understanding of Islam. It concentrated on missionary and social work 
( dakWah) in order to avoid open confrontation with the increasingly repressive regime. 50 
The reversed intra-Islamic power relations tinder the early New Order pointed to the 
continued divisions between the modernist and traditionalist constituencies. Many of the 
doctrinal and socio-cultural differences· remained · relevant; and the key organisations 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah still viewed each other as competitors in the struggle 
for religio._political hegemony and access to the socio-economic infrastructure ofthe state.51 
Just as Nahdlatul Ulama had reacted with indifference to the destruction ofMasyumi in 1960, 
and had accepted regime participation in return, so did modernist elements in the 1970s and 
early 1980s tolerate, or even applaud, the marginalisation ofNUfrom the political arena. In 
· · fact, modernist politicians actively sidelined NU representatives from the leadership of PPP; 
assisting the regime iri maintaining high levels of conflict between modernists and 
traditionalists throughout the New Order period. The internal competition within PPP not 
only allowed the regiine to hand out rewards to loyalists and retaliate against opponents but 
also reduced the capacity of the party to challenge Golkar at the general elections. 52 The intra-
47 The regime had banned civil servants from joining political parties, so former Muslim politicians 
k~en ori keeping their jobs in the bureaucracy saw Muhammadiyah as their primary option for 
remaining active in Islamic affairs. . 
48 For the research results, see Haedar Nashir, Perilaku Politik Elit Muhammadiyah, Tarawang, 
Yogyakarta 2000: 8. 
49 Ken Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indones_ia, Cornell University, Modem Indonesia 
Project, Ithaca, New York 1970; M. Syafi'i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah 
Kajian tentang Cendeldawan Muslim Orde Baru, Paramadina, Jakarta 1995: 27-28; Abdul Azis Thaba, 
Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta 1996: 246-252. 
so R. William Liddle, 'Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political ·Thought and 
Action in New Order Indonesia', in: Mark Woodward (editor), Toward a New Paradigm: Recent 
Developments in Indone8ian Islamic Thought, Arizona State University, Program for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Tempe 1996: 323-356; Masykuri Abdillah, Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna: Respons 
Intelektual Muslim Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi (1966-1993), Tiara Wacana, Yogyakarta 
1999: 261-262. 
si Azyumardi Azra, Islam Substantif: Agar Umat Islam Tidak Jadi Buih, Mizan, Bandung 2000: 37L 
52 Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, Gramedia, Jakarta 1991: 98-.106. 
78 
Islamic fragmentation, therefore, served to stabilise the authoritarian regime, which both 
created and cultivated the divisions to prolong its rule. 
V. ADAPTATION AND CONFRONTATION: SOEHARTO AND ISLAMIC FORCES 
·IN THE LATER NEW ORDER 
The capacity of the regime to distribute favours and inflict punishment encouraged modernist 
and traditionalist intellectuals to reformulate the political and ideological guidelines for their 
relations with the state. This led to significant changes within the ideological frameworks of 
both Islamic constituencies from the early 1970s onwards. In the pre-New Order period, 
traditionalist thinkers had defended NU's endorsement of regimes that differed from the ideal 
of an Islamic state by referring to the accommodationist principles of Sunni theology. The 
modernists, on the other hand, had accepted the democratic system of the 1950s as a means to 
achieve their ultimate goal, the establishment of an 'islamic democracy', and had refused to 
cooperate when Guided Democracy put an end to that option. In contrast, controversial new 
concepts that emerged in parts of the Muslim community in the early 1970s questioned the 
benefit of elite politics as such and, therefore, used the banner of the 'reform movement' 
(gerakan pembaruan) and, in later years, 'cultural Islam' (Islam kultural). These new 
conceptual patterns were motivated by three major conclusions related to the history of 
Islamic politics in Indonesia: first, the major Muslim parties had failed to achieve any of their 
goals. They had not gained a majority in elections, had not succeeded in implementing 
syariat, and had created anything.but unity within the umat. Second, the partial confrontation 
with the New Order had only worsened the situation of Muslims. Finally, the ooncentration 
on political competition had · distracted Muslim leaders from further developing the 
int~llectual, cultural and doctrinal principles of Islamic life. 
The intellectual reform movement in the Islamic community called on Muslims to practise 
their faith in a manner that was not only concerned with formal fulfilment of religious 
regulations, but emphasised the doctrinal substance of Islam: justice, social equality and 
human dignity. While 'cultural Islam' appeared to mark the departure from Islamic politics, it 
in fact paved the way for increased participation of Muslim organisations in the structures of 
the New Order by shifting attention from the ideal of an Islamic state to the religious and 
79 
social goals achievable under existing political regimes.53 In the modernist discourse, the 
yourig intellectual Nurcholish Madjid called for the depoliticisation of Islamic theology, 
proposing that Muslims concentrate on the application of basic Islamic values in the context 
of modem, industrialising states.54 In the framework of the New Order, this stress on Islamic 
ideals such as social equality amidst a booming economy created a strong incentive for 
modernists to cooperate With the regime instead of pursuing the ideal of an Islamic state or 
society from the political margins. Intellectuals like Adi Sasono legitimated interaction with 
the state as an instrument to propagate economic redistribution of resources· from well-
connected Chinese tycoons to Muslim entrepreneurs: 
"How can you change the situation without power?. You can become someone at 
the periphery whose job it is to· read poems. But power is not the same as 
government. Om Liem (the Chinese tycoon Liem Soei Liong, M.M.) is not the· 
government, but who would deny that he has power?"55 
This concept saw engagement with the regime not as ·an act of transitional cooperation in 
times of emergency, but a8 a legitimate effort to improve the. social conditions of Muslims 
and to uphold justice. Similar processes of theological modernisation occurred in the 
traditionalist conununity. Under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, who became 
chairman ofNahdlatul Ulama in 1984,56 young NU intellectuals began to review the sources 
of traditionalist thinking. They argued that the kitab laming had to be reinterpreted in order to 
53 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia, 
Paramadina, Jakarta 1998: 189-193; M. Syafi'i Anwar, 'Politik Akomodasi Negara dan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Masa Orde Barn: Sebuah Retrospeksi dan Refleksi', in: Naiirullah Ali-Fauzi (editor), ICM!: 
Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi, Mizan, Bandung 1995: 240. . 
54 A major focus of the new generation of Islamic intellectuals was the refutation of claims that 
industrialisation led to the decline ofreligiousness. See NurcholishMadjid, 'Masyarakat Religius dan 
Diniunika lndustriaJisasi', in: Nurcholish Madjid, .Islam.: Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan, Bandung 
1987: 149. 
55 Adi Sasono, 'ICMI ItuDariMenteri Sampai Sri Bintang, Kok', in: Lukman Ha:kiem, Tamsil Linrung 
and Mahmud F. Rakasima (editors), Mereka Bicara Tentang ICM!: Sorotan 5 Tah.un PeTjalanan ICM!, 
Penerbit Amanah Putra Nusantara, Jakarta 1995: 31. 
56 Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as 'Gus Dur', was born in 1940, grandson of the NU 
founders Hasjim Asj'ari and Bisri Syansuri, and son of Wahid Hasjim. In 195:3 he was with his father 
when the latter died in a car accident. After spending several years in.various pesantren on Java, he left 
for Cairo in 1964, and later for Baghdad. In 1971, he went to Europe fur further studies, butretumed to 
Indonesia soon afterwards, teaching in his hometown of Jombang. He moved to Jakarta in 1978, 
founded his own pesantren in Ciganjur; and became active in NU's executive board as well as in a 
wide range of cultur~l organisations. In 1984, he was nominated by a number of senior kiai to take 
over the chairmanship of NU. Prior to his election, he had attracted Soeharto' s attention by proposing 
the 'pribumisation' of Islam, meaning the adaptation of Islamic teachings to national Indonesian 
culture. He also called attempts to confront Islam with Pancasila 'stupid', paving the way foi: NU's 
·endorsement of Pancasila as its ideological guideline .. See M. Saleh Isre (editor), Tabayun Gus Dur: 
· Pribumisasi Islam, HakMinoritas, Reformasi Kultural, LkiS, Yogyakarta 1998. 
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fit into the contexts of modem state organisation.57 In their view, cooperation with 
unsympathetic power holders was not, as the Sunni theorists had proclaimed, a necessity in 
times of exceptional circumstances, but an integral part of the political process. 
Despite reservations from more scripturalist Islamic scholars, the new doctrinal frameworks 
eventually allowed traditionalist and modernist organisations to compete openly for the 
resources and institutional privileges that the state had at its disposal. After having suffered 
from continued economic isolation throughout the 1970s, NU reconciled with Soeharto in 
1984 by endorsing the government's controversial plan of prescribing Pancasila as the sole 
ideological principle for all mass organisations. In an interview with John Bresnan, an NU 
leader, presumably Abdurrahman Wahid, left no doubt about the motivation behind NU's 
decision to seek cooperation with the regime: 
"I reached an agreement with the government. They agreed that all NU people 
who had been civil servants, and left the civil service to take political posts with 
PPP would be reinstated. They also agreed they would give preference to NU 
people in making new appointments to the civil service, assuming they met the 
necessary requirements. The government also agreed that· NU would receive 
licenses for economic activities, so we can support ourselves by our own 
efforts. "58 
Under Abdurrahman's leadership, NU declared its departure from party politics, withdrawing 
its organisational support from PPP and opening the traditionalist constituency for Golkar's 
electoral efforts. 59 The modernists, on the other hand, were pleased with a series of political 
moves by Soeharto, from the late 1980s onwards, that indicated his willingness to revise 
some of the restrictions on political Islam. Soeharto initiated a number of laws strengthening 
Islamic courts and educational institutions, went on a much-publicised hajj and approved the 
foundation of a modernist-dominated organisation of Muslim intellectuals, ICMI (Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intelletcuals).60 Under 
57 Badrun Aleana, NU, Kritisisme dan Pergeseran Makna Aswaja, Tiara Wacana, Yogyakarta 2000: x. 
58 John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy, Columbia University Press, 
New York 1993: 240. 
59 This policy shift was rewarded with the very material concessions that Abdurrahman had hoped for: 
the civil service was opened for NU cadres, and leading bureaucrats took senior positions in NU's 
regional chapters; government officials resumed handing out donations to pesantren; and the army 
extended training to NU's security forces, organised under its youth wing Ansor. See Andree Feillard, 
'Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia. The Road to Legitimacy and Renewal', in: Robert W. 
Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (editors), Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious 
Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1997: 139. 
60 Robert W. Hefner, 'Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia', in: Robert W. Hefner and 
Patricia Horvatich (editors), Islam in an Era of.Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in 
Muslim Southeast Asia, University ofHawai'i Press, Honolulu 1997: 111. 
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the leadership of Soeharto's trusted Minister of Research and Technology, BJ Habibie, ICMI 
became the main political vehicle for government bureaucrats and modernist leaders for 
promoting explicitly Islamic policies in the field of economic distribution and socio-religious 
representation.61 
The increased integration of modernist Muslim figures into the regime led to fresh tensions 
between the traditionalist and modernist currents of Indonesian Islam. Abdurralunan Wahid 
was highly critical ofICMI and warned that it could facilitate the ris~ of 'sectari~sm'.62 In 
order to counter the political manoeuvres of modernist politicians ancl activists, Abdurrahman 
began to forge . alliances with opponents of ICMI, including nationalist intellectuals, 
. . 
politicians in the PDI and military officers close to Benny Moe_rdani. The ~regime retaliated by 
challenging Abdurrahman's leadership of NU. In 1994, Abdurralunan was able to fend off a 
regime-sponsored attempt to unseat him as NU chairman. 63 The government continued to 
apply pressure on NU's branches, however, withholding . economic resources ·and 
marginalising NU· officials from political life. By 1995, Nahdlatul Ulama was confronted 
With a similar situation to that of the early 1980s, when the economic problems of many 
pesantren communities forced the NU leadership to reconsider its stand towards the regime. 
Left with very few political options, J\bdurrahman reconciled with Soeharto in 1996, much to 
the pleasure of local NU leaders who saw an immediate change in the attitude of government 
. offices and the security forces towards their organisation.64 Just likein the post-reconciliation 
period of the mid 1980s, previously withheld funds for the pesantren were made available, 
and regime support for anti-Abdurrahman elements within NU was suspended. The 1997 
elections consolidated the accord, with Abdurrahman introducing Soeharto's daughter to key 
pesantren leaders and helping to secure an unprecedented electoral triumph for Golkar. 
61 Budi Susanto, 'Siapa Cendekiawan Modern fudonesia .. ?', in: Ahmad Bahar (editor), ICMI: 
KekUasaan dan Demokrasi, Pena Cendekia, Yogyakarta 1995: 35-36; M. Rusli Karim, Negara dan 
Peminggiran Islam Politik: Suatu Kajian Mengenai Implikasi Kebijakan Pembangunan Bagi 
Keberadaan "Islam Politik" di Indonesia Era 1970an dan 1980an, Tiara Wacana, Yogyakarta 1999: 
229. 
62 Abdurrahman Wahid, 'ICMI Memang Sektarian, Kok', in: Lukman Hakiem,·Tamsil Linrung and 
Mahmud F. RakaSima (editors), Mereka Bicara Tentang ICMI: Sorotan 5 Tahun Perjalanan ICM!, 
Penerbit Amanah Putra Nusantara, Jakitrta 1995: 20. · · 
63 Greg Fealy, 'The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid, Suksesi and the Battle 
. for Control of NU' in: Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (editors), Nahdlatul mama, Traditional Islam and 
Modernity in Indonesia, Monash Asia fustitute, Clayton 1996: 257-278; Marzuki Wahid, Abd. Moqsith 
Ghazali and Suwendi, Dinamika NU: Perjalanan Sosial dari Muktamar Cipasung (1994) lee Muktamar 
Kediri (1999), Kompas danLakpesdam-NU, Jakarta 1999: 28. 
64 Mahmud Sujuhti, Politik Tarekat: Hubungan Agama, Negara dan Masyarakat, Galang Press, 
Yogyakarta 2001: 121. 
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NU's reconciliation with the regime coincided with a sharp decline in the relationship 
between Soeharto and senior modernist leaders. Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais,65 a 
senior member of the IC:MI leadership, started criticising the President in late 1996 on a wide 
variety of issues, ranging from the businesses run by Soeharto's family to his failure to 
provide a schedule for his departure from politics. Once a staunch supporter of regime 
accommodation in order to defend the interests of political Islam from within the 
administration, Amien now believed that the New Order had gained more from this 
cooperation than the Islamic forces he represented.66 The government responded to Amien's 
criticism with the well-established mechanisms of regime exclusion, socfo-political isolatiOti 
and creation of internal divisions. Amien was forced to resign from ICMI, and calls for him 
to stand ·down from the Muharnmadiyah chairmanship were heard from within the 
organisation. The very policies of repression and intimidation that ·were lifted from NU 
branches and their affiliated pesantren in late 1996 began to impact on Muhammadiyah and 
its network of educational institutions.67 AB the 1997 elections approached, the key figures of 
traditionalist and modernist Islam found themselves, once again, in diametrically opposed 
positions vis-a-vis the regime. 
The fact that the political antagonism between key Muslim groups persisted despite the 
gradually narrowing doctrinal and cultural gap was largely related to the absence of unifying 
. . 
themes of all-Islamic concern in the late New Order, Ironically, the support of the Soeharto 
regime for the process of cultural Islamisation, and the concessions it had made to some of 
the legal-political demands of the umat since· the late 1980s, had taken away the few 
opportunities in which major Muslim organisations could demonstrate the potential strength 
of Islamic solidarity. In 1973 and 1978, modernists and traditionalists had united to oppose 
new marriage laws and an MPR decree on the role of syncretism, forcing the regime to revise . 
65 Amien Rais was born in 1944 in Solo, Central Java. Active in several modernist student 
organisations, he pursued an academic career that led him to doctoral studies in the United States. He 
-graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a Masters in 1974 and received his doctorate from 
the University-Of Chicago in 198 L Despite his long periods of study iri the West, he was highly critical 
of the US and Europe for what he viewed as their pro-Israel policies. He became a specialist on Middle 
East politics . at the University of Gadjah Mada in Y ogyakarta, engaging in research projects such as 
'Zionism: Its Meaning and Function.' He joined ICMI in the early 1990s and became an increasingly 
important figure in Muhammadiyah. In 1994, he was appointed as its chairman. Zaim Uhrowi, 
Mohammad Amien Rais: Memimpin dengan Hati Nurani -An Authorized Biography, The Amien Rais 
Center, Teraju, Jakarta 2004. 
66 Interview with Ami en Rais, Yogyakarta 27 November 1997. 
67 Despite these acts of intimidation, many Muhammadiyah branches encouraged Amien to continue 
his confrontation with the regime. He received numerous.invitations to speak at branch activities and 
on Muhammadiyah campuses. See Andi Wahyudi, Muhammadiyah Dalam Gonjang-Ganjing Politik: 
Telaah Kepemimpinan Muhammadiyah Era 1990-an, MediaPressindo, Yogyakarta 1999: 123-i24. 
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some of its positions. These moments of Islamic unity had become rare, with the regime 
allowing for a larger role of Islam in society and granting rewards to those organisations that 
supported its rule. In fact, the pro-Islamic policies of the regime in the early 1990s proved to 
be a divisive factor in intra-umat relations. While Abdurrahman·was opposed to state support 
for the Islamisation of society, and viewed religious practice as a personal matter, the 
modernists threw their full support behind Soeharto's new approach. The policies of 
retribution and patronage exercised by the regime on the one hand, and the continued rivalry 
between its leaders on the other, sustained the disharmony between the modernist and 
traditionalist communities and impaired their ability to formulate an alternative to the non-
democratic polity of the New Order .. 
The New Order left imponant legacies that highlighted and consolidated the linkage 
between political conflict and military intervention in politics: first, the support for the army 
by key Muslim organisations in the turmoil of 1965 and 1966 defined the conditions under 
which major civilian groups viewed military intervention in politics as an acceptable form of 
political interaction, The massive threat of the PK.I towards the religio-political privileges of 
both the traditionalist and modernist communities legitimised, inthe eyes.ofMusliin leaders, 
temporary praetorian rule. When Islamic groups realised that the armed forces had no 
intention of handing back power to civilian actors, the authoritarian regime was already · 
deeply entrenched in the political system. Second, their emphasis on gaining representation 
and resources under the New Order suggested that civilian forces largely interpreted politics 
as the fight for regime participation rather than the quest for a democratic system in which 
different concepts and ideas compete for acceptance at the ballot box. Allan A. Samson 
concluded that 'Nahdlatul Ulama is. not so much a goal-centered political party as it is a 
religious welfare organisation governed by a confederation of religious and political 
.notables.'68 The focus on constituency welfare made the form and quality of the political 
system in which it was achieved an issue of secondary concern, allowing Isllimic groups to 
accept military•backed authoritarian rule as long as it paid attention to their interests. Third, 
the continued divisions between modernist and traditionalist groups provided the regime with 
. the opportunity of applying the means of retribution and patronage at its disposal, securing 
the cooperation of and legitimation by at least one of the major Islamic groups at any 8i:ven 
time. 
68 Allan A. Samson, 'Conceptions of Politics, Power and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam', 
in: Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (editors), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978: 200. 
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VI. ISLAMIC MILITANCY AND THE STATE: BETWEEN EXTREMIST THREAT 
- -
AND POLITICAL MANIPULATION 
The differences between Islamic and secular groups on the one hand and the divisions within 
the umat on the other had a significant impact on the political landscape of Indonesia. The 
-divisions led to tensions and self-destructive behavioilr within the civilian sphere of politics, 
affected the institutional functionality of liberal democracy, and provided opportunities for 
non-democratic actors to seize power and sustain it for extended periods of time. These 
_conflicts were, however, of a largely political nature, and provided indirect 'invitations' for 
the armed forces to intervene. In contrast, the existence of a small but militant segment of 
political Islam has. constituted a direct security threat to all regimes from the emergency 
governments during the guerrilla war to the current post-authoritarian order. This threat has 
resulted in extensive security and military operations, and has in return widened the political 
space of the armed forces and other security agencies. The rise of Islamic militancy in the 
post-New Order environment since 2000, and the fact that most of these groups have their 
roots in radical movements under previous regimes, requires a closer look at the historical 
legacies of Islamic radicalism in fudonesia, and their impact on democratic_ consolidation in 
the post-Soehai:to era. 
-Extremist Islamic groups in post-colonial Indonesia first emerged during the guerrilla war 
against the Dutch, with Muslim clerics and leaders commanding militias· consisting of their 
students and followers. In the context of only rudimentary administrative control of the 
Republic over its territories, these militias· exercised conSiderable authority in areas with 
ongoing combat operations. In West Java, one such militia was led by ~ekarmadji Maridjan 
Kartosuwirjo, who had previously been involved in Masyumi politics but later focused on 
building up his own political and military network,- the Darul Islam ('Abode of Islam'). In 
early 1948, he declared the establishment of the Islamic Army.of fudonesia {Tentara Islam 
Indonesia, TII) . and subsequently refused to acknowledge the central command authority of 
the national army under Sudin:llan. By early 1949, there was open war between Darul Islam 
and the Republic. When the Siliwangi division marched into West Java after the Dutch attack 
_on Y ogyakarta in December 1948, their leaders were stunned by heavy resistance from TIT 
fighters: 
''Their way was bitterly contested not only by the Dutch but by the troops of 
Darul Islam as well, with as many casualties being lost to the latter as to the 
former. (This was totally unexpected, many Siliwangi units being caught 
85 
completely off guard, for at the time they set out they had believed Darul Islam 
still backed the Republic). Wherever the units of the Siliwangi went, they were 
enthusiastically received by the local inhabitants as deliverers not only from the 
Dutch, but from Darul Islam as well."69 
Despite the decimation of his forces by government troops, Kartosuwirjo announced in 
August 1949 the creation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), 
which claimed authority not only over West Java, but the entire Indonesian territory. Except 
· for regionally limited rebellions in South Sulawesi and Aceh, which were temporarily part of 
the Darul Islam movement, Kartosuwirjo's rebel state never gathered much support outside of 
its West Java strongholds. The armed forces had to allocate substantial resources to suppress 
the insurgency, however, and only in 1962 did the army manage to capture Kartosuwirjo. He 
was put on trial and executed later that year. 
While the Darul Islam rebellion had been a serious threaito the authority of the government 
and the capacity of the armed forces, several actors in Indonesian politics were able to use the 
insurgency for ideological and political purposes. For the nationalist groups, references to the 
militancy of the movement served to fend off demands for an Islamic state. 70 Opponents of 
parliamentary democracy pointed to the failure of a series of governinents to end the 
rebellion, calling for more 'decisive' leadership and regime change. Muslim grassroots 
leaders, while not sympathetic to the rebels, considered Darul Islam a potential counterweight 
to the expanding mass. organisations of the PKI. And the armed forces, finally, enjoyed 
increased political support, operational autonomy and budget allocations to destroy Darul 
Islam, exposing the indispensability of the military to any incumbent regime. Given this 
. . 
instrumentalisation of i;,lamic militancy under previous regi~es, it was not surprising that 
some factions in the intelligence services of the New Order too tried . to utilise it to 
consqlidate their grip on power~ In 1977, the government announced that it had uncovered .a 
conspiracy by former Darul Islam figures to regroup under . the name of Komando Jihad. 
Many leaders of PPP felt that the announcement constituted a deliberate effort by the 
intelligence apparatus to undermine the chances of the Muslim-based party at the 
approaching general electfons.71 Ali Moertopo, a senior military officer entrusted by Soehario 
69 Kahin1952: 409. . .. 
70 Hendra Gunawan, M Natsir dan Darul Islam: SfudiKasus Aceh dan Sulawesi Selatan Tahun 1953-
1956, Media Da'wah, Jakarta 2000: 39. · 
71 Shoitly after ann~uncing that the security forces had rounded up the Komando Jihad, Admiral 
Sudomo, the head of the ~11-powerful security agency Kopbmtib, declared that there were four major 
limitations on campaigners for the g~eral elections: first, no attacks on political opponents; second, no 
· offenses to the dignity of the government and its officials; third, no attempts to destabilise national 
unity, and fourth, no criticism of government policies .. The catalOgue of limitations virtually paralysed 
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with 'special' intelligence operations, was widely believed to have engineered the emergence 
of Komando Jihad, and even some of his colleagues in the intelligence community confirmed 
this: 
"So, for instance, you talk about Komando Jihad. ( ... )(Ali Moertopo) had the 
opinion that we must create issues. He said, 'One time we will have to use this' 
and so·on and on. Let's say it's always in his mind."72 
In the wake of the Komando Jihad affair, the government clamped down on several other 
militant groups. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a leading member of one such group, was ~ested in 
November 1978 and sentenced to prison for subversion.73 Ba'asyir would later come to 
prominence in the post-Soeharto era as the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamyiah, a terrorist 
group that carried out a series of bombings throughout the archipelago, including the Bali 
attacks of October 2002; 
The political manipulation of radical Islam helped the New Order regime to broaden its 
legitimacy base and to justify the continued use of repression against opponents. After a 
decade of political consolidation, and the almost complete destruction of the communist 
network, the regime had to remind the public that its main mission was to defend the 
Pancasila state against extremist threats from both ends of the ideological spectrum This 
manipulative use of Islamic militancy, however, did achieve significantly more than was 
initially envisaged; Sidney Jones, in an International Crisis Group report, has pointed to the 
'unintended consequences' ofMoertopo's intelligence operations: 
"It renewed or forged bonds among Muslim radicals in South Sulawesi, 
Sumatra, and Java. It promoted the idea of an Islamic state that the original 
Darul Islam leaders had perhaps not intended, and in doing so, tapped into an 
intellectual ferment that was particularly pronounced in university-based 
mosques. That ferment was only beginning when Komando Jihad was created, 
but through the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was fuelled by the Iranian 
revolution, the availability of writings on political Islam from the Middle East 
and Pakistan, and anger over Soeharto government policies."74 
the PPP campaign, which had planned to ride to victory on a wave of widespread disenchantment with 
the Soeharto regime. Despite these obstructive measures introduced by the government, however, PPP 
won nearly thirty percent of the vote. See R. William Liddle, Pemilu-Pemilu Orde Baro, Jakarta 1992: 
67. 
72 Jenkins 1984: 57. 
73 Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, Pakwah dan Jihad Abubakar Ba'asyir, Wihdah Press, Yogyakarta 2003: 
89-202. 
74 International Ctjsis Group, 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngukri Network" in 
Indonesia', Indo.nesia Briefing, 8 August 2002: 8-9. 
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The regime began to feel the consequences of this ferment in September 1984, when Muslim 
demonstrators clashed with army troops in the Jakarta harbour district of Tanjung Priok. The 
unrest was sparked by soldiers who had entered a mosque without removing their shoes, 
· tearing down Islamic posters they viewed as critical of the government. When troops opened 
fire on the . protesting crowds, at least 34 people were killed, but unofficial reports put the 
number of deaths in the hundreds:75 The incident was followed by a ·series of bomb 
explosions on Java, including the January· 1985 bombing of the Buddhist temple of 
Borobudur, one of Indonesia's cultural landmarks. Four years later, army troops under Col. · 
Hendropriyono, who would later rise to become the head of intelligence under the Megawati 
government, attacked a group of Muslim. militants in Way Jepara, Lam.pung. The group had 
attracted followers from JavaJ offering an 'authentic' Islainic lifestyle isolated from 
government intervention and secular influences. When the military sought to disperse the 
compound, around 100 people died. 
The late New Order saw a drastic decline in violent Islamic opposition towards its fule. By 
the late 1980s, most of the radical leaders with rootS in the Darul Islam.movement had either 
been imprisoned or fled the country. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, for example, went to Malaysia and 
developed a new militant network from there. The younger generation of radicals, on the 
· other hand, chose to study in Pakistan or join the guerrilla war in Afghanistan as well as the 
Muslim insurgency in the South Philippines. Moreover, Soeharto' s efforts to increase Muslim· 
participation in his regime, and his support for cultural Islamisation policies, reduced the need 
for intelligence operations aimed at manipulating radical movements for political purposes. 
Finally, some of the ultra-modernist Islamic groups that had withdrawn into dakwah activities 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s began to reconcile with the New Order. While not directly 
linked with the most militant of the· groups, Dewan Dakwah leaders had considerable 
influence over those elements of radical Islam that opposed the regime but were unwilling to 
use violence to achieve their goals. Since the early 1990s, some of these clerics and activists 
developed ties with central figures of the regime, in particular with a group around Prabowo 
Subianto, Soeharto's son-in-law. and seen as a rising star in the armed forces.76 This 
improvement of the relationship between the government and the most radical elements of the 
modernist mainstream contributed to the decline in Islamic militancy in the first half of the 
1990s. 
75 Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Informasi, Tanjung Priok Berdarah: Tanggung Jawab Siapa? 
Kumpulan Data dan Fakta, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta 1998. 
76 Flefner 2000: 201. . 
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The activities of militant Islamic groups throughout Indonesia's post-independence history 
have left important legacies for the current democratic transition. These legacies are largely 
related to theories of threat levels as explanations for military intervention in politics. Authors 
like Michael Desch identified high levels of internal threat as incentives for military. 
intervention,· with security operations against insurgencies and terrorist cells providing the 
. armed forces with expanded resources and authority. As the introduction has shown, 
however, the threat level theories are vulnerable to cases in which regimes or elements Within 
them have an interest in creating artificial threats in order to serve their political purposes, 
such as the justification of repressive measures against dissidents or higher budget allocations 
for security forces. Evidently, the history of Islanlic militancy in Indonesia is a case in point. 
. On the one hand, the military campaign against the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java 
confronted a 'real' threat to the stability of the state and strengthened the armed forces vis-a-
vis civilian politicians as a result. On the other hand, the case of the Komando Jihad 
campaign in 1977 exposed the importance of manipulated images of militant Islam for 
purposes of power maintenance and regime legitimation. 
This chapter has introduced societal divisions over the role of Islam in the state as one of 
the most important areas of political conflict in Indonesia. The severity of the splits has 
assisted non-democratic actors, including the armed forces, to gain political control and 
sustain decades of authoritarian rule. The internal fractures within the Muslim community 
between traditionalists and modernists have been a particular source for instability in the 
civilian realm. Despite the gradual reduction of doctrinal and socio-cultural differences, the 
cleavages have remained politically volatile. In addition to the political conflict between 
mainstream constituencies, the existence of a tiny, but high-profile extremist segment of 
. . 
Islam created fissures within the civilian polity. The political impact of these tensions both 
weakened the civilian capacity to establish strong governance and increased threats to 
domestic security. Consequently, Indonesia became a classic example of a state in which 
serious conflicts between key civilian forces and rising internal threat. levels resulted in 
increased military intervention in politics. The legacy of this civilian fragmentation, which 
stretched from the. colonial period to the late New Order polity, was about to leave its mark 
on the 1998 regime change and extend into the subsequent post-authoritarian transition. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FACTIONALISM, REFORM AND THE END OF SULTANISM: 
THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN THE FALL OF THE NEW ORDER 
The introduction to this study has presented a number of theoretical approaches to explain the 
possible complications in establishing democratic control over the armed forces in transitional 
states. Most of these models are concerned with historical legacies and particular developments in 
the post-authoritarian polity. The introduction also emphasised, however, that the character of 
regime change is a crucial determinant for the outcome of civil-military .reform processes. In 
particular, the role of the armed forces in the transfer of power from the previous regime to its 
successor government plays a significant role in shaping the conditions of civil~military . 
interactions in the democratic transition. In fudonesia, the engagement of the armed forces in the 
events leading to Soeharto's resignation has been critical in two aspects. Both of these aspects are 
. closely related to the dynamics of military factionalism; but cover different analytical areas. In 
more general terms, the· success of moderate elements in the militaiy in negotiating an intra-
. systemic transfer of authority from Soeharto to his deputy helped to prevent the complete 
breakdown of the regime typically associated with the fall of sultanistic systems. Linz and Stepan 
asserted that sultanistic polities 'present.an opportunity for democratic transition because, should 
the ruler (and his or her family) be overthrown or assassinated, the sultanistic regime collapses' .1 
One possible explanation for the fact that this total disintegration of the regime infrastructure did 
·not occur in fudonesia is Aspinall's proposition that Soeharto's system was not purely sultanistic 
but included strong authoritarian features. Aspinall suggested that the combination between 
sultanistic and authoritarian characteristics resulted in a 'democratic transition (that) occurred in a 
tumultuous way, involving substantial mobilization and a sharp break with the authoritarian 
system, yet ( ... ) produced successor governments marked by strong underlying continuity with 
the Suharto era '2 This .chapter will argue, however; that in addition to such structural factors, the · 
political behavior of moderate military leaders was equally crucial· in producing a regime change 
1 Linz and Stepan, 1996: 70. Linz and Stepan explained that the low level of institutionalisation in 
sultanistic regimes makes them particularly Vulnerable to violent . overthrows, and power is typically 
transferred to provisional governments composed of n0n-regime forces. In contrast, the stronger roles. of 
political institutions under authoritarian nile, both within and outside the regime, provide the preconditions 
for a negotiated, institutional transfer of power to a successor regime. Linz and Stepan 1996: 52-53. 
2 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in /ndonesia. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2005 (Forthcoming). 
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that avoided the complete collapse of the existing system. Consequently, the first post-Soeharto 
government consisted oflarge segments of the New Order elite, impacting on the pace and depth 
of refomi efforts, particularly in the area of civil-military relation8 .. 
The second important influence of military factionalism on the character of regime change is 
related to the societal perceptions of the ann~d forces during the political crisis of 1997 and 1998 .. 
The failure of the 'hardliners', Who had preferred a more confrontational approach to oppositional 
forces and suggested that martial law be declared, not only defused political tensions and 
facilitated the intra-systemic regime change discussed above. It also pointed to the fact that, for 
the first time, factionalism in the aimed forces had linked up with the discourse on Soeharto's 
departure from politics.. In the eyes of many Indonesians, the emergence of a military group 
fav~ring an orderly end to sultanistic rule, and its eventual victory over the 'hardliners', reflected 
·the gradual process of dissociation between the military and Soeharto that had begun in the 
1980s .. The outcome of the factional dispute confirmed the perception within large segments of 
the political elite and society that moderate officers in the military had assisted in removing 
· Soeharto froni power, and that they had done so by sidelining the most problematic elements 
within the anned forces. Accordingly, the marginalisation of officers seen as most ~esponsible for 
the military excesses during Soeharto's rule appeared to satisfy some of the societal demands for 
change in the post-authoritarian military, and public pressure for more wide-ranging reform 
decreased as a result. The following chapter will develop the two main arguments outlined above 
by discussing the factionalism that marked the political behavior of the military and its various 
sub-groups during the crisis of 1997 and 1998. Interpreting military politics within the context of 
Soeharto's rapid political decline, the chapter ·win point to the c'onsequences of the intra-military 
conflicts for the nature of regime change and the likelihood of successful civil-military reforms in 
the post-authoritarian transition. 
I. COMPETITION AND LOYALTY: MILITARY FACTIONALISM IN THE NEW 
ORDER 
. . . . 
·. Factionalism was a common phenomenon in the armed forces under the New Order regime. The 
divisions within the ranks had very diverse, and often overlapping, demarcation lines. To begin· 
with, there were important ethnic differences, with Javanese and officers from the Outer Islands 
competing for key posts. Rivalries also occurred between soldiers attached to the large military 
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commands, especially the Siliwangi, Diponegoro and Brawijaya units on Java.3 Generational 
differences created tensions between the 'generation of 1945', the transitional officers and the 
'younger' generations trained in the Magelang academy. Officers from the intelligence services 
were engaged in conflicts with the rest of the armed forces as well as among themselves. The 
'financial' officers involved in running business-related and political operations had major 
differences with more 'professional' military leaders. Religio-political divisions related to the 
controversy over abangan 'syncretism' in Soeharto's inner circle in the 1970s, the prominence of 
Christian officers in the 1980s and the perceived split between 'Islamic' and 'nationalist' 
commanders in the 1990s. Finally, personal patronage networks were also important, such as the 
close ties of some officers to the palace that marked many· of the intra-military rivalries of the 
mid-1990s. 
For much of the New Order period, the factionalism within the armed forces did not result in the 
kind of serious cleavages that various authors have described as causes for the destabilisation, and 
ultimately degeneration, of authoritarian regimes. The divisions within the Brazilian armed forces 
between moderates and hardliners, for example, contributed significantly to the erosion of the 
military government in the early and mid-1980s.4 Similarly, severe regional splits within the 
Nigerian and South Korean militaries accompanied the rise and fall of several authoritarian 
regimes in these countries. 5 In Indonesia, on the other hand, most of the ethnic, regional and 
generational divisions could be managed by higher levels of centralisation and the increased rate 
ofreshuffles in the officer corps since the 1970s.6 In fact, the factionalism in the Indonesian 
armed forces from the mid-l 980s onwards was largely an instrument used by Soeharto to 
consolidate his rule. The creation and cultivation of intra-military competition ensured that no 
camp within the armed forces grew strong enough to challenge Soeharto's grip on the presidency. 
The competitive atmosphere also encouraged rival groups to report indications of disloyalty 
among their counterparts directly to Soeharto, feeding the intra-regime intelligence network 
developed by the President in order to detect potential threats to his regime. The positions of 
ABRI Commander and Anny Chief of Staff were at the centre of Soeharto's efforts to engineer 
conflicts over authority and resources, with the incumbents in both posts seeking presidential 
3 These regional rivalries did not always coincide with ethnic identities, however. In the Siliwangi 
Command of West Java, for example, many non-Sundanese officers were prominent. 
4 Kees Koonings, 'Political Orientations and Factionalism in the Brazilian Armed Forces, 1964-85', in: 
Patricio Silva (editor), The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations, 
Palgrave, New York 2001: 147-148; 
5 Nwagwu 2002: 73; Jinsok Jun, 'South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control', in: Mutiah 
Alagappa (editor), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford 2001: 124. 
6 Kammen and Chandra 1999: 83. 
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backing to decide the competition in their favor; In major reshufiles, Soeharto paid careful 
attention to the 'equitable' .distribution of key positions among competing factions, balancing 
their interests and consolidating their loyalty to his government. 
One of the most important elements of New Order military factionalism was the forming of 
strategic alliances between competing officers and civilian socio-,political forces. Military leaders 
sought to advance their interests by building civilian support groups, hoping that their attachment 
to and influence on key political constituencies would convince Soeharto of their indispensability 
in mobilising support for the regime.7 These attachments were not necessarily of an ideological 
nature, but reflected perceptions within competing groups of Soeharto's political priorities. The 
formation of alliances between senior officers and ultra-modernist Islamic ~oups in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, for instance, was a direct reaction to Soeharto's campaign against the 
Moerdani group. Other officers believed, however, that Soeharto had no intention of 'Islamising' 
the armed f<.~rces and was determiried to keep a stable balance within the military. Accordingly, · 
these officers aligned themselves with civilian opponents of modernist groups, largely in the 
. traditionalist Muslim connnunity. Geoffrey Robinson has· asserted that the formation of Civilian-
. military alliances caused by intra-military factionalism has 'enhanced the power of civil society', 
and sometimes even allowed civilians to 'challenge the military or the regime itself.'8 This 
enhancement of civil society may have occurred occasionally as a by-product, but fa most cases, 
the alliances focused on promoting the interests of both partners within the regime by gaining 
access to Soeharto's patronage system. In the very few instances that civilian-military alliances 
carried ideas of political· change to advance their positions, these were largely aimed at 
weakening competitors within. the New Order state rather than at presenting conceptual 
alternatives to Soeharto's rule. 
The successful isolation of reformist ideas from high-level competition within the armed forces 
allowed Soeharto to turn military factionalism from a potential source of instability into an 
instrument ofregime maintenance. Criticism ofSoeharto's sultanistic leadership eme~ged ·in the 
lower and middle ranks in the mid-1990s, but was not part of the competition within the elite. The 
1 Officers ~ere under strong pressure, however, to provide evidence to Soeharto that thei~ alliances with 
civilians served the interests of the regime and were not designed to undermine it. Particularly in the 1970s 
and 1980s,. Soeharto was highly suspicious of military officers who built support bases outside the military 
to pursue their own interests more than those ·of the government. The increased integration of civilian 
groups into the New Order in the 1990s eased some of these concerns, but Soeharto remained alert to 
indications that officers might tum their cooperation with civilians against him. 
8 Geoffrey Robinson, 'Indonesia: On a New Course?', in: Mutiah Alagappa (editor), Coercion and 
Governance: The Declining. Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
2001:239. 
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various factions in the top brass, despite their concerns about the military's loss of political 
influence and widespread dissatisfaction with the government, viewed Soeharto as the key to 
advancing their careers, and feared the complete collapse of the Dual Function should he be 
removed from office. Thus it needed a change in the substance and quality of intra-military 
divisions for them to pose a serious threat to the regime. Soeharto's control over the armed forces 
. was in danger if one or more of the competing factions utilised reformist ideas, and ultimately 
notions of regime change, as instruments of inter-elite conflict; and if alternatives to Soeharto's 
leadership began to offer higher rewards than continued loyalty. The increasing social and 
political tensions of the late New Order re~me provided the platform for such a scenario, but it 
needed the dramatic shock of the crisis unfolding in the second half of 1997 to change the nature 
·of rriilitary factionalism dramatically and elevate previously is~lated discourses on political 
reform to the centre of intra-military divisions. 
II. CONFLICT AND REFORM: THE DEBATE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES ON· . 
THE 1997 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
The political landscape of Indonesia ahead of the 1997 elections showed classic indicators of an 
autocratic regime that was approaching its end. To begin with, Soeharto's age (he had turned 75 
in 1996) played a crucial role in fuelling expectations that his political departure was near. While 
. Soehartci was stili the epicentre of political authority, he suffered from a number of setbacks from 
the beginning of 1996.9 His wife and key political confidante Siti Hartinah, popularly referred to 
as Tien Soeharto, died in April 1996. Shortly afterwards, Soeharto spent some time in Germany 
for medical treatment, sparking speculation about his health and possible succession scenarios. 
The sudden vulnerability of Soeharto's rule encouraged critical forces both within and outside the 
government to intensify their political activity. Most significantly, the chairwoman of the secular-
nationalist PDI, Megawati Soekarnoputri, openly challenged her replacement by a regime-
appointed party official. The public protests against her removal provided a platform for criticism 
of Soeharto's leadership. In July 1996, after several weeks of anti-regime speeches in front of 
Megawati's PDI headquarters in Jakarta, the military mobiHsed thugs and supporters of.the new, 
government-backed chairman to storm and occupy the party offices. The attack led to the worst 
9 Greg Fealy, 'In:donesian Politics, 1995-1996: The Making of a Crisis', in: Gavin W. Jones and Terrence 
H. Hull (editors), Indonesia Assessment: Population and Human Resources, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore 1997: 19-38. 
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· rioting in the city since 1974, leaving at least 5 people dead and sending hundreds of Megawati 
followers to prison. 10 
The unrest not only indicated the increasing opposition towards the repressive methods of the 
regime, but created cracks within the political system of the New Order. Megawati's call on PDI 
members to ignore the instructions of the new party leadership was largely obeyed, undermining 
the very three-party system that had supplied Soeharto's regime with a modicum of formal · 
legitimacy. In addition, a series of ethnic, religious and social riots and clashes ·occurred 
throughout 1996 and 1997, with government. offices, banks and Chinese businesses being the 
primary targets. 11 The power erosion typical for late sultanistic regimes, coinciding with ruptures 
. in the previously static polity and increasing levels of social unrest, challenged the key 
components of the New Order, including the armed forces, to define their level of commitment 
towards the embattled ruler. With the general elections approaching, they had.to make decisions 
that wbuld neither threaten their position in the regime nor exclude them from participation in a 
possible post-Soeharto government. 
Hardliners and Moderates: Military Factionalism Ahead of the 1997 Elections 
The internal military discourse on the. general elections . catalysed the emergence of two large 
factions in the senior ranks of the armed forces with divergent political views and highly 
antagomstic personal relationships. 12 Despite significant levels of heterogeneity within them, the 
·
10 The number of victims who died in the actual attack on the party offices remains in dispute. According to 
estimates from the PDI faction led by Megawati, 23 people were 'unaccounted for' after the incident. 'Alex 
Litaay: Kasus 27 Juli, Ada Korban )rang Hilang', Kompas 5 September 2003; Lukas Luwarso (editor), 
Jakarta Crackdown, Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), Asian Forum for Human Rights and 
Development (FORUM-ASIA) and Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI), Jakarta 
1997: 14-42. . 
11 Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesia Between 1997 and 2000, Verhandelingen van het 
.Koninklijk Insituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde No. 186, KITLV Press, Leiden 2001: 12; 'Fresh 
Violence Breaks Out in Java as Polls.Approach', Singapore Straits Times 22 April 1997. · 
12 The term 'faction' used in this discussion does not describe groups of officei-s who shared comm0n 
religious, ethnic; political or social backgrounds and had clearly defined goals and agendas. Instead, it 
portrays complex networks. of associations and contacts among officers who under. the specific 
circumstances of the mid-1990s developed similar attitudes and interests. The two 'factions' highlighted in 
this study are best understood as broad categories with particular subgroups an<i patronage networks within 
them. Many officers did not belong to either faction or maintained contacts with both of them. In general 
terms, the major dividing line between the two factions was their attitude vis-a-vis societal criticism of the 
· regime. and the most effective way to respond to it This issue, which during times of high regime stability 
was not of primary importance, emerged as the decisive question that officers faced in the crisis of 1997 
and 1998. The position of military leaders on this problem eventually determined whether they sought 
96 
composition of the two camps remained largely intact throughout the crisis that led to Soeharto's 
resignation. The split between the factions was triggered by a controversy regarding the extent to 
which the armed forces were prepared to support Golkar in the upcoming poll. The first camp 
. . 
consisted of hardliners who demanded unconditional military support for Golkar's electoral 
machine and viewed any criticism of Soeharto's ·leadership as an act of subversion. The 
hardliners commonly blamed the increasing societal dissatisfactiOn with the New Order on 
internal and external provocateurs who deserved sWift and uncompromising 'treatment' by the 
security forces. Guided by a militaristic paradigm of solving political conflicts, their conceptual 
thinking rejected institutional changes to the New Order system for the foreseeable future and 
saw a reduction of military engagement in politics as neither necessary nor appropriate. 
··Prominent members of the hardline faction were Anny Chief of Staff General Hartono, a close 
confidant of Soeharto's daughter and leading Golkar politician Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana; 
Commander-:in-Chief General Feisal Tanjung; and the head of Kopassus (Special Forces) 
Maj.Gen. Prabowo Subianto, Soeharto's son-in-law.13 The three generals had influential 
patronage networks below them, with a large number of regional commanders, staff officers and 
intelligence operators depending on their favours and protection. There were important fissures 
within the hardline faction, particularly over appointments and resources, but the increasing 
· pressure on the regi~e ensured a sufficient level of solidity and coherence. 14 An important bond 
between the various components of the group was their cooperation with ultra-modernist Muslim 
. organisations, which aimed at building up constituents willing to defend the regime against 
mounting societal dissent. They were also strongly opposed to former ABRI chief Benny 
Moerdani and his patronage of non-Muslim officers, a policy that many of them felt had 
hampered their careers in the past. 
association with one of the two broad factions, or remained neutral and cultivated alternative relationships 
or patronage connections. 
13 Prabowo had a reputation of being a highly professional but ill-tempered soldier. Coming from a well-
connected political and diplomatic family, he had grown up abroad atid spoke several languages fluently. 
His tendency for emotional outbursts, however, was the subject of wide discussion within the ranks and the 
political elite. In 1974, he graduated from his military academy class with a one-year delay because of a 
conflict with a superior. After marrying into the Soeharto family, he became widely known as the 
President's 'special envoy' for sensitive political and military tasks, dealing with officers and affairs way 
above his rank. For Prabowo's reputation in the political elite, see Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies, . 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 2003: 324. 
14
. The most important of these divisions was that between Feisal and Hartono. Despite their very similar 
views on how to deal with opposition to the regime, they were engaged in a deep personal rivalry over the 
position of Commander-ill-Chief. Hartono was widely known to be interested in the job, and with his 
retirement age approaching, he needed a quick decision on the matter. Feisal, on the other hand, was 
determined to stay on at least until March 1998, when he could expect a cabinet appointment. 
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The second group was equally diverse, but was held together by a joint sense of political 
moderatism and flexibility. Members of this faction viewed discontent with the government as a 
result -of complex social - processes that demanded political solutions instead of repressive 
measures against critics. Despite its intolerance towards the militant fringes of the opposition, the 
moderate group believed that there were legitimate complaints over the static nature of the New 
Order and its inability to accommodate public calls for institutional change. The moderate 
officers also had a mixed perception of the role of the_ armed forces in the regime. While they 
_ agreed that regime participation was important for political stability and the institutional interests 
of the military, they feared that too close an identification with the government could damage the 
. 
reputation of the armed forces. Accordingly, the group argued against open support for Golkar in 
the 1997 elections, insisting that it was not the mission of the armed forces to support a particular 
political party. The moderate faction comprised three major subgroups: the reluctant reformers, 
the gradual reformers, and the rapid reformers. The reluctant reformers formed the largest 
element in the moderate group. Its members included officers with strong personal ties to 
Soeharto and his family, but in contrast to the hardliners, they were prepared to adjust their 
position vis"'.a"'vis the regime to changing social arid political contexts. Wiranto, then Commander 
. ofKostrad, was the most prominent leader of this subgroup. Having served as Soeharto's adjutant 
_for four years, he was seen as destined to replace Feisal Tanjung as head of the armed forces 
when the latter's term expired in 1998.15 Wiranto felt a deep personal affection for Soeharto, but 
understood that the longevity of his rule was a source of concern -among ordinary Indonesians. 
This flexibility in accomniodating societal developments turned Wiranto and officers in his 
_ patronage network into barometers of the political crisis. They were certain to back Soeharto as 
long as societal resistance to the continuation of his rule was low; but a drastic drop in public 
support for the President was likely to reduce their willingness to defend the regime at all cost. 
-In contrast to the reactive attitude of the reluctant reformers, the other two subgroups in the 
moderate faction actively developed sharp critiques -of the New Order government and 
contemplated scenarios for an Iridonesia Without Soeharto. The gradual reformers viewed -
Soehart9 as a major problem for _the arnied forces and society as a whole, but were well aware 
that they were not in a position to challenge his rule. They wanted to continue the gradual 
disengagement of the armed forces from the regime, is<;>lating the military from the growing 
·discontent with Soeharto's government. Expecting that regime change was most likely to occur 
15 Wiranto had been presidential adjutant between 1989 and 1993. After his term in the_ palace, his career 
skyrocketed. The soft-spoken, low-profile officer became Chief of Staff of the Jakarta Command in 1993, -
its Commander in 1995, and Commander ofKostrad in 1996. Despite his moderate image, however, he had 
shown no indication that he had any political vision beyond defending Soeharto' s grip on power._ 
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through the President's death or voluntary resignation, the proponents of gradual reform projected 
their ideas of opening up the tightly controlled political system into the post-Soeharto polity. 
While stopping short of suggesting an unrestricted democratic system, they were prepared to 
introduce more political rights and greater institutional transparency. The group consisted largely 
of younger officers and was represented by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who in late 1996 was 
regional Commander in South Sumatra. Regarded as 'military intellectuals', most members of the 
group had served for long periodS at the military's staff and command schools in Bandung, 
providing them with the time,· resources and distance to reflect on the future of ABRI' s 
engagement with the regime. 16 fu addition, some among them had extensive foreign experience, 
including study in the US. The same professional profile defined the third subgroup in the 
moderate faction, the rapid reformers. This very small group, under the leadership of Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, believed that the military should take a more active role in catalysing the 
process of regime change. Bitter over what he saw as his marginalisation by officers close to the 
palace, Wirahadikusumah thought that waiting for Soeharto's departure could come at a high cost 
for the armed forces. fustead, he proposed that the military present a comprehensive reform 
package that included Soeharto' s orderly resignation.17 fu 1996 and 1997, the differences between 
gradual and rapid reformers were tiny. Both groups were too far from the power center to 
influence high-level decision-making, convincing them to foster their cooperation in discussion 
circles and seminars instead. For the time being, they concentrated on supplying advice to the 
reluctant reformers and consolidating their position in the debates with the hardliners. 
Support or Neutrality? The Intra-Military Debate on Golkar 
The dispute over the role of the armed forces in the 1997 general elections brought the conflict 
between .hardliners and moderates into the open. Let.Gen. Soeyono, then Chief of Staff of 
- . . -
· General Affairs, recalled how the two factions clashed at an ABRI leadership meeting in October 
1995, bickering over Hartono's proposal to support Golkar in the ballot: 
"Hartono got upset with Ma'ruf (Moh. Ma'ruf, Chief of Staff of Socio-Political 
Affairs, M.M.). Ma'ruf had just recommended that ABRI remain neutral in the 
general lections. That really enraged Hartono. He shouted at Ma'ruf, and claimed 
that he had his own political agenda, and that kind of stuff. It got really tense. Pak 
Tanto (Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Tanto Kuswanto, M.M.) had to intervene and 
16 Ronna 2003: 74-81. 
17 Interview with Agus Wirahadik:usumah, Jakarta 6 January 1998. 
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calm Hartono down. ( ... ) We thought that, after this incident, Hartono might be a bit 
more careful with his support for Golkar. But we were wrong: It got worse." 18 
Hartono did indeed step up his efforts to strengthen ABRI's institutional ties with Golkar. In 
March 1996; he declared his 'personal allegiance' to Siti Hardiyanti in her capacity as Deputy 
Chairwoman of the Golkar Central Board. He began to tour severalpesantren at Siti Hardiyanti's 
. . 
side, wearing Golkar' s yellow jacket and giving campaign-like speeches.19 In late 1996, he piayed 
a significant role in organising the reconciliation between Abdurrahman Wahid and Soeharto, and 
. subsequently lobbied the NU leader to open his community to the Golkar campaign. By early 
1997, the Army Chief of Staff was seen as a key political player, balancing his contacts to the 
Muslim community, Golkar politicians and the presidential family. 
The controversy between the two factions provided important insights into the politics of 
factionalism within the armed forces. Most importantly, officers from both camps. exercised 
considerable pressure on their subordinates to endorse their individual viewpoints and affiliations . 
. They offered speedy promotion in case of obedience, and threatened to obstruct the careers of 
disloyal commanders. Djadja Suparman, then Chief of Staff at the South Sumatran Sriwijaya 
Command, reported that 
· "Hartono was incredibly blunt about all this. He called people up and said 'Hey, I 
can promote you to such and such post. But you have to help me. Golkar needs our 
support. I am sure you know what your duty is.' ( ... )Most of us, however, just 
ignored him. I felt that he wouldn't last long."20 
The second element in the factional competition was association with civilian partners in order to 
build societal support and launch attacks against rivals. Hari:ono, for example, supported the 
· Center for Policy Development. Studies (CPDS), a think tank staffed largely with researchers 
from a modernist Islamic background. Ahead of the 1997 elections, the organisation published a 
paper that accused Wiranto of planning Soeharto's downfall.21 Wiranto, for his part, commented · 
18 According to Soeyono, besides himself and Ma'ruf, officers who supported ABRI's neutrality against 
Hartono in the meeting included the head of Al3RI Intelligence {BIA, Badan Intelijen ABRI), Maj.Gen. 
Syamsir Siregar, and the Governor of Lemhanas (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional, National Resilience 
Institute), Let.Gen. Sofian Effendi. Interview with Let.Gen. Soeyono, Jakarta 15 October 1998. . 
19 
'Mengapa ABRI-Golkar', Tempo Interaktif 23 March 1996; 'Gus Durdan Mbak Tutut Bicara di Depan 
· 100 Ribu Warga NU', Media Indonesia 3 April 1997; 'Gus Dur-Mbak Tutut Tak Langgar Khittah', Suara 
Merdeka 13 April 1997; A. Made Tony Supriatma, 'Politik Genealogis dan Cita-Cita "ABRI diatas Semua 
Golongan'", in: Santoso (editor), ABRI Punya Golkar?, Institut Studi Arus Informasi, Jakarta 1996: 158. 
20 Interview with Let.Gen. Djadja Suparman, Bandung 21June2000. 
21 'Analisis Perkembangan Sosial-Politik Menjelang ].>emilu 1997 dan SU-MPR 1998', Unpublished Paper. 
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that the paper 'contained nothing but lies and garbage' .22 The badmouthing of competitors had, as 
the incident showed, turned into an important feature of intra-military factionalism in the armed 
forces in the late 1990s. 
· The intensity of the factionalism required both camps to consolidate and sharpen their 
conceptual views. Most importantly, Hartono's militancy in supporting Golkar encouraged the 
gradual and rapid reformers to overcome some of their internal differences and formulate more 
coherent critiques of hardline positions. Wirahadik:usumah acknowledged that 'retrospectively, I 
think we should be grateful to Hartono because he pu8hed us to address our own divisions and 
increase our efforts to package reform ideas in a more presentable way. ' 23 Accordingly, 
Wirahadikusumah organised an army seminar in June 1996, at the height of the PDI crisis and 
Hartono's campaign for Golkar. The seminar criticised the political 'superstructure', i.e. the 
government, for excessive intervention in socio-political life, nepotistic and corrupt practices, and 
. inconsistency in policies. Significantly, papers presented at the seminar suggested that the armed 
forces mediate between the 'superstructure' and society, effectively defining ABRI as a non-
participant in the New Order regime.24 Based on their analysis, the gradual and rapid reformers 
developed a new doctrinal concept for ABRI, which was discussed within the ranks in the first 
half of 1997. The concept contained four points: frrst, ABRI had to accustom itself to the idea that. 
it was not always to be at the forefront of political developments; second, the concept of 
'occupying' would be transformed into a concept of 'influencing'; third, ABRI's method of 
exerting influence would be changed froni a direct to an indirect way; and fourth, ABRI was 
ready for political role sharing with civilian forces.25 The four suggestions added up to what its 
authors called the 'New Paradigm of ABRl's Dual Function'. The reluctant reformers under 
Wiranto did not endorse the concept, however. Despite its deep antagonism towards the 
hardliners, Wiranto's group saw no reason to reformulate the military's doctrine .. The political 
and economic situation still seemed sufficiently stable, and as long as this did not change, officers 
. . 
close to Wiranto chose the status quo over the uncertainty associated with a possible revision of 
ABRI's role. 
22 futerview with General (ret} Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. Asked if he believed that Hartono was 
behind the paper, Wiranto said '!don't know, but a lot of my colleagues thought so.( .. ,) Whoever wrote 
. the paper, it didn't bring him any good. I don't think Pak Harto believed it.' One account had Soeharto 
questioning Hartono's loyalty as the President saw the paper as an attempt to create splits in the ranks. As a 
result of his anger, Soeharto reportedly planned to send Hartono as ambassador to the United States. See 
'Soeharto Marah Setelali Baca Dokuinen CPDS', Siar 14 April 1997. 
23 Interview with Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta 12 November 1998. 
24 Honna2003: 81-86 . 
. 
25 'Paradigma Bani Dwifungsi ABRI', Tiras 24 April 1997. 
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The military's preparations for and its conduct of the general elections indicated that the armed 
forces leadership was still dominated by hardline officers. In February 1997, shortly before the 
polls, Feisal Tanjung emphatically rejected the results of a study conducted by the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (UPI, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) in which it had proposed the 
gradual disengagement of the military from political affairs.26 The core themes of the hardline 
discourse also became apparent at an ABRI leadership meeting in April 1997. There, the military 
top brass condemned the emergence of new social organisations with leftist orientations, the 
uncontrolled circulation of pamphlets, the publication of books not in line with Pancasila, and the 
proliferation of NGOs with a tendency to 'political adventurism' .27 The gradual and rapid 
reformers had obviously very little influence on the official debates in the.immediate military 
elite, and the reluctant reformers under Wiranto remained anxious not to raise suspicions on 
Soeharto's side over possible moves by their group against the regime; The only success the 
reluctant reformers had was the abortion ·Of Hartono's campaign for direct electoral support of 
Golkar. Announcing the compromise between the various factions, Feisal Tanjung suggested that 
the relationship between individual officers and the government party was of a personal rather 
·than an institutional nature. The atmed forces backed Golkar indirectly, however, by removing 
one of the greatest obstacles to another landslide victory for the regime: the 'Mega-Bintang' 
movement.28 The initiative had been launched by PPP officials who hoped to gain the support of 
Megawati loyalists determiiled neither to vote for the government-sanctioned PDI nor for Golkar. 
. . . 
· The movement gained considerable momentum in the national media and some urban centres, but 
the security apparatus dispersed Mega-Bintang crowdS wherever they emerged.29 TowardS the 
end of the campaign, the initiative had largely collapsed, and the way was open for Golkar to 
claim its 6th successive triumph in New Order electoral history. 
, 
26 Usamah Hisyam, Feisal Tanjung: Terbaik Untuk Rakyat Terbaik Bagi ABRI, Dhannapena Nusantara, 
Jakarta 1999: 619; 'Peran Sospol ABRI Terns Dikaji', Tempo Interaktif 16 April 1997; and interview with 
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Jakarta 23 September 2003. Bhakti was a member of the research team. 
27 'Rapim ABRI Bahas Pemantapan Stabilitas Menjelang Pemilu', Pildran Rakyat 4 April 1997; 'Ada 
. Kelompok yang Mencoba Bangkitkan Paham Komunisme', Kompas 4 April 1997. 
28 The term. 'Mega-Bintang' suggested an alliance of Megawati's PDI and PPP. The Islamic PPP had 
adopted the 'Bintang' (Star) a8 its party symbol in the l 9.80s. · 
~9. MudrickMalkhan Sangidoe, the chairman of the PPP branch in Solo and widely seen as the leader of the · 
movement, witnessed how his supporters were arrested en masse: 'Police and military officers came to our 
campaigns, and asked us to go home. They said Mega-Bintang was not a registered political party, and 
therefore we wen~. not allowed to campaign. When we refused, they arrested our supporters, mostly 
students, young people. ( ... )They demanded that our supporters hand over their Mega-Bintang t-shirts, 
only then they would be released. I protested. I asked them: "Didn't you say ABRI would remain neutral·in 
the elections?"' They only looked at me and said: "Orders from above."' Interview with Mudrick Malkh~ 
Sangidoe, Solo May 1997; See also Mohammad Thoyibi, Menentang Arogansi Kekuasaan: Kasus Mega 
Bintang, Solo 1999: 43; and 'Lakonnya Apa, Bung? Mega-Bintang .. ', D&R 17 May 1997. 
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Triumph or Decline? The Post-Election Landscape 
The result of the 1997 general elections exposed the growing gap between the political sentiments 
in large sections of the population and the 'theatre politics' performed by the New Order 
establishment. Despite high levels of social unrest, 'widespread criticism of corruption and the 
inability of the.elite to absorb demands for reform, Golkar won 74 percent of the votes and the 
largest majority in Parliament since the creation of the New Order. Golkar chairman Harmoko 
presented the outcome of the polls as an unprecedented vote of confidence in the regime, but in 
reality it delivered the ultimate proof of its inherent failure to accommodate change. 30 The 
clearest indication of this failure was not the ridiculously inflated result for Golkar, but the almost 
complete disappearance of the PDI. Only three percent of the electorate supported the party, a: 
decline of almost 12 percent. The majority of nationalist voters had expressed their resentment 
towards government intervention in party affairs by withdrawing their support for one of the main 
pillars of Soeharto's restricted party system. Even the President appeared to be uncomfortable 
with the election results and the way several government officials claimed credit for them. Only 
one week after the elections, Soeharto dismissed Harmoko from his post as Minister of 
Information, and filled the vacancy with General Hartono . 
. Hartono's departure from the army was followed by the most extensive reshuffle in the armed 
forces since early 1995. The reshuffle improved the position of the moderates, with the leading 
hardliner Hartono replaced by Wiranto as Army Chief. of Staff. The factional affiliations of 
~ubagyo HS, who was installed as Wiranto's Deputy, and Sugiono, who became Commander of 
Kostrad, were difficult to establish, but they too had opposed Hartono's electoral support for 
Golkar. The hardliners defended their grip on key positions, however, with Feisal still in 
command of ABRI Headquarters and Prabowo retaining his control. of Kopassus. In addition to 
the factional implications, personal links with Soeharto had once again proved the most crucial 
criteria for promotion .. Officers who had served in the palace either as adjutant (Wiranto ), in the 
Presidential Security Squad (Subagyo), or both (Sugiono) were elevated in the promotion,31 and 
· Prabowo as well as the head of National Police, former presidential adjutant General Dibyo 
Widocio, remained central figures in the security apparatus. Across the factional divisions, the 
30 Sitok Srengenge.(edjtor), Surat Rakyat Tentang Pemilu 1997, Instittit Sttidi Arus Infonnasi, Jakarta 1998. 
31 Subagyo had been in the Presidential Security Squad since 1986 and left the service only in 1993 as 
. Commander of its Group A. In 1994, he was appointed to head Kopassus before becoming Commander of 
the CentralJava Diponegoio Command in 1995. Sugiono, also a former presidentialadjutant, commanded 
the Presidential Security Squad from 1995. See 'Di Balik Pergantian Menpen dan Kasad', Tiras 16 June 
1997; 'Mutasi dengan Sejumlah Kejuatan', D&R 14 June 1997; 'Mengisi Kursi di Gerbong Kereta ABRI', 
Forum Keadilan 30 June 1997. 
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armed forces were in the hands of officers with long-standing personal ties to the Soeharto 
family.32 
The contrast between the mechanical conduct of the elections and the general mood in the 
country pointed to signs of decay within the regime. The cracks in the elite that O'Donnell and 
Schmitter have identified as the major cause for degenerating authoritarian systems were clearly · 
visible.33 The destruction of the PDI in the elections exposed ruptures not only in the elite, but in 
the whole political framework. The loss of credibility in the political system of the New Order 
cast a shadow over Soeharto's re.,:election through the MPR scheduled for March 1998'. In 
addition, the factionalism in the armed forces had facilitated the emergence ofreformist military 
elements that incorporated ideas of regime change into their conceptual thinking. These ideas,· 
while unable to penetrate the decision-making process of the military elite, had the potential of 
influencing the attitude of the· 1argest subgroup in the moderate faction,· the reluctant reformers 
. under Wiranto. The group had so far extended firm support to Soeharto, but a further 
destabilisation of the New Order polity was likely to change that. 
III. MILITARY FACTIONALISM IN A DECLINING REGIME: ABRI, POLITICAL 
LEGITIMACY AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
The New Order state of mid-1997 was crippled by inter-elite conflict, social umest and political 
stagnation. Despite old divisions and newly emerging ruptures in its political system, however, 
the Soeharto regime appeared stable enough to neutralise serious threats to its rule. The single 
most important factor in this was the continued economic growth. The New Order's rise to power 
· in 1966 had been· underpinned by promises of political stability and economic development, and 
for most of the time, the government had delivered. Anne Booth contended that 'whatever its 
exact dimensions, a prolonged and broad-based improvement in living standards under the New 
Order did take place. '34 In the eyes of many Illdonesians, the robust economic growth had 
32 In a separate reshuffle a month after Hartono's replacement; Syarwan Hamid left his post as Chief of 
Staff of Socio-Political Affairs .. He was sent to the parliament and finally became Deputy Speaker of the 
House in October. Syarwan's replacement in ABRI was Let.Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, an officer who made no 
secret of his admiration for Habibie who, like him, originated from Sulawesi. He thought that Habibie's 
contribution to the nation's development was 'extraordinary'. Interview .with Let.Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, 
Jakarta 22 November 1997. See also 'Syarwan Diganti Mayjen Yunus Yosfiah', Bernas 15 July 1997; 
'Syarwan Datang Senayan Bergoyang', Forum Keadilan 28 July 1997. · 
33 O'Donnel and Schmitter 1986: 19. 
34 Anne Booth, 'Development: Achievement and Weakness', in: Donald K. Emmerson (editor), Indonesia 
Beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London 1999: 129. 
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justified restrictions on political activity and individual freedoms, and even supported certain 
levels of tolerance towards corruption in the elite. The economic strength of the regime, however, 
made it politically vulnerable. With the legitimacy of the government tied to its economic 
performance, any significant disruption in the economy was certain to alter the political attitudes 
of large segments of society. 
The role of economic development in legitimising non-democratic forms of governance was a 
central theme in the political thinking of the armed forces elite, but it was even more relevant to 
Soeharto's sultanistic rule. The.gradual disengagement of the armed forces from politics since the 
1980s had left Soeharto in the center of a personalised web of patronage networks. Consequently, 
the public was much more likely to identify Soeharto as the main cause of economic difficulties 
than any other component of the regime. The business empire of the presidential family had been 
exposed to public criticism for some time, but was certain to become the focus of public outrage 
if economic conditions deteriorated.35 The emergence of a regime-critical discourse in segments 
of the armed. forces provided the public with additional reasons for differentiating between the 
President and the institutions he used to stabilise his government. Thus, when the economic crisis 
began to affect Indonesia in July 1997, following the float of the Thai baht and the fall of the 
Malaysian ringgit, Soeharto was the most vulnerable target in the search for the causes of this 
downtum.36 The crisis, which initially appeared to have hit the monetary sector only, soon 
spiraled into political dimensions. Economic observers noted that Soeharto's anachronistic 
system was incompatible with the requirements of global markets, and pointed to the uncertainty 
of Soeharto's succession as a major reason for the massive capital outflow. The sharp drop in the 
stock market and the Indonesian currency paralysed the real sector, with foreign debts increasing, 
investment projects cancelled or postponed, and consumption declining. Unemployment rose, the 
numbers of corporate bankruptcies exploded, and inflation reached levels last seen in the mid-
l 970s. By the end of the year, the free fall of the economy was accelerated by a drought that cut 
back agricultural production.37 
35 Ahmad D. Habir, 'Conglomerates: All in the Family?', in: Donald K. Emmerson (editor), Indonesia 
Beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London 1999: 186. 
36 Andrew Macintyre, 'Political Institutions and Economic Crisis in Thailand and Indonesia', in: TJ. 
Pempel (editor), Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1999: 
143-162. 
37 Ross McLeod, 'Indonesia', in: Ross McLeod and Ross Gamault (editors), East Asia in Crisis: From 
Being a Miracle to Needing One?, Routledge, London 1998: 37-38. 
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Crisis and Competition: The Wiranto-Prabowo Rivalry 
While critics largely focused on the institutional inflexibility of Soeharto's rule, the economic 
decline also affected the legitimacy of military participation in politics. The armed forces had 
traditionally presented their role in securing economic growth as a key reason for their political 
engagement, but the sudden downturn in the economy challenged this claim. The tight control of 
society, previously viewed as an important factor in containing political conflicts, was now 
widely blamed for the lack of creativity and competitiveness of Indonesian businesses. With 
central components of its doctrine eroded by the crisis, the various factions in the military were 
confronted with difficult strategic choices as far as their relations with Soeharto were concerned. 
For the time being, unconditional defence of the President appeared as the only realistic option 
for both the hardline faction and the group of reluctant reformers. From their perspective, the risk 
that Soeharto's fall would end the Dual Function was seen as more harmful than the political cost 
of maintaining the regime. The gradual and radical reformers, on the other hand, were not in a 
position to influence the decision-making in the top brass. Susilo was promoted in August 1997 
to the post of Assistant to the Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs, but was still unable to 
implant ideas of substantial reform into the political attitudes of the most senior military elite. 
Agus Wirahadikusumah, then Deputy Assistant of General Planning; felt frustrated by the 
conservatism of his superiors, both within the hardline faction and the reluctant reformers: 
"The world was collapsing around them (the ABRI leadership, M.M.), with Soeharto 
clearly responsible for what was happening, but all they talked about was giving him 
his fifth star. I couldn't believe it."38 
Before conferring a fifth star on Soeharto and declaring him a 'Grand General' in early October,39 
the ABRI leadership had announced in August that it would. re-nominate Soeharto for the 
presidency. Outgoing Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs, . Let.Gen. Syarwan Hamid, 
explained that ABRI had decided to put its trust in the President as the majority of Indonesians 
wanted to see a continuation of his rule.40 At the same time, ABRI backed Soeharto's request for 
the restitution of a 1988 MPR decree giving the President special powers to deal with security 
38 Interview with Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta 12 November 1998. 
39 'Penganugerahan Bintang Lima: Tidak Ada Motif Politik', Kompas 3 October 1997. 
40 'ABRI Juga Dukung Pak Harto', Kompas 2 September 1997; 'Golkar and Abri Back New Term for 
Suharto', Singapore Straits Times 28 August 1997. 
106 
threats in emergency situations.41 Furthermore, ABRI rejected suggestions to limit presidential 
terms to two periods, the idea coming closest to public criticism of Soeharto at that early stage of 
the crisis. 42 
The caution exercised by both factions suggested that the system built by Soeharto was still 
strong enough to detect and prevent disloyalty towards him. The norms and rules of that. system 
continued to dictate the dynamics of intra-military conflict. In the s.econd half of 1997, 
competition within the armed forces focused on the position of Commander-in-Chief. Feisal 
Tanjung was· expected to be replaced soon, and there were only two prospect.ive candidates for 
the job: Wiranto, the Army Chief of Staff, and Prabowo Subianto, who was still only a two-star 
general, but had much more influence within ABRI than his .rank suggested.43 Evidently, the 
hardline and moderate factions were now in open competition for the leadership of the armed 
forces. Throughout August and September, rumours supported Prabowo's hopes of a promotion 
to Chief of Staff of General Affairs and a third star, therefore qualifying him for the top post.44 
But the promotion never came. Prabowo later reported that the chemistry between him and 
Wiranto was bad, blaming cultural differences between the traditional Javanese villager and the 
Western-educated intellectual.45 Despite the relevance of Prabowo;s observation, it appears that 
their rivalry had much more to do with factional affiliations and personal ambitions: as Soeharto 
rarely changed Commander-in-Chiefs before the end o~ their five-year term, only one of them 
could make it to the top, with the loser likely to be sidelined under the leadership of the winner.46 
The competition between Wiranto and Prabowo over the armed forces leadership was 
accompanied by the same features of military factionalism that had marked many of the intra-
41 'Soeharto Ready to Crush Protest', Sydney Morning Herald 18 August 1997; 'Pak Harto Hanya Minta 
Dipertimbangkan', Kompas 16 August 1997; 'Pangab: ''Tap VI Hanya untuk Berjaga-jaga"', Jawa Pos 15 
August 1997. . 
42 'Pangab: "ABRI Tak Ikut-ikutan'", Jawa Pos 30 August 1997. Soeharto himself made his rejection of 
any restriction on presidential terms very clear. Like Feisal, he referred to the constitution that knew no 
such limits. See 'Soeharto Rejects Call to Limit Presidential Term'; Singapore Straits Times 30 August 
1997. 
43 In September, close Prabowo friend Syafrie Syamsuddin had been promoted to Jakarta Commander; and 
other Prabowo ·allies fod several regional commands. Syafrie Syamsuddin was a classmate of Prabowo, 
·graduating from the military academy in 1974. From 1974 to 1984, Syafrie served in the Presidential 
Security Squad, anq returned to command its Group A in 1993. Another Prabowo ally in an important 
position was Zacky Anwar Makarim as head of BIA, who was appointed in August 1997. 
44 'Wajar jika Prabowo Kasuni ABRI', Suara Merdeka, 7 September 1997. 
45 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?', Asiaweek 3 March 2000. 
46 Commanders-in-Chief were typically replaced shortly before or after the S~yearly sessions of the MPR. 
That was the case with M.Yusuf (197~-1983), Benny Moerdani (1983-1988) and Try Soetrisno (1988-
1993), with the only exception of Edi Sudradjat, who spent a short time on the post in 1993 before being 
. transferred to the Department of Defence and Security. 
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military conflicts of the 1990s: the promotion of loyalists to key positions, the establishment of 
links with· civilian supporters, and the badmouthing of competitors. The crisis, however, catalysed 
the political relevance of the rivalry. It was obvious that Soeharto would look favourably upon 
military officers whose political activities and interactions assisted in overcoming the crisis~ 
Prabowo apparently believed that Soeharto wanted to shift the blame for the crisis to. Chinese 
tyeoons and confront his critics with hardline methods of repression. Accordingly, Prabowo 
strengthened his links with Islamic groups on the far right of the political spectrum, and 
encouraged them to p~omote their traditional views that Chinese rent-seekers had undermined the 
Indonesian economy. 47 At the same time, he ordered a special unit in Kopassils to prepare for the 
· kidnapping of several political activists who had spoken. out against the re-election of Soeharto. 
Wiranto, on the other hand, consolidated his relationship with the .main opponent of Prabowo' s 
. civilian allies, Abdurrahman Wahid. Wiranto· viewed the alliance with the moderate Muslim 
leader as an effective instrument to appease the critics of the regiine and demonstrate its openness 
towards ideas of change .. According to Abdurrahman, Wiranto was not convinced that Soeharto 
endorsed Prabowo's tactics of political radicalisation and physical violence against opponents to 
restabilise the regime: 
"Wiranto sent his confidants to me to convey messages .. Wiranto said that Prabowo 
was taking a very dangerous path. Of course I agreed. Pak Harto is in trouble, and we 
have to make sure that the country stays safe. (.,. ).''411 
Despite their close ties with Soeharto, however, neither Wiranto nor Prabowo could predict with 
· absolute certainty the strategies and methods the President had in mind for solving the economic 
and political difficulties .. Thus the political manoeuvres of both officers were conducted in 
secretive ways for i:p.ost of the first period of the crisis between July and December 1997.49 
The divisions betweenPrabowo and Wiranto were not, despite the claims of many observers, an 
indication of a religious. split within the military. Robert Hefner, for example, suggested that 
Prabowo was a member of the 'ascendant "Islamic" wing ~fthe armed forces.' 50 Opposed to this 
'green' faction was the 'red-arid-white' group, which Hefner identified as 'nationalist'. It appears, 
however, that the political alliances both Prabowo and Wiranto built were to a much larger extent 
47 According to Fadli.Zon, one of the key contact persons between Prabowo and Islamic groups, Prabowo 
increased the frequency of bis meetings with ultra-modernist organisations as the crisis intensified, citing 
his 'concern for the future of the nation'. Interview with Fadli Zon, Jaka$ 14 April 1999. · 
48 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 17 December 1997. 
49 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 17.December 1997. Wiranto asked A}>durrahman to keep 
their communication and cooperation confidential until the MPR session scheduled for March. 
50 Hefner 2000: 151. · 
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shaped by their respective hardline and moderate military paradigms than by individual religio-
ideological preferences. The major difference between these two paradigms was the degree to 
which the military was prepared to nurture and mobilise militant societal elements in defence of 
the regime, and was not related to the role of Islam in society or politics. Prabowo was hardly an 
Islamic radical, with his family rooted in the former PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian 
Socialist Party), ideals of Western education and acceptance of non..: Muslims. 51 Prabowo . had 
learnt, however, that Islam could be a powerful instrument of political engineering, using it in the 
early 1990s to confront the remnants of the Moerdani group.52 Wiranto, on the other hand, was a 
practising Muslim; and not opposed to a greater role of Muslim groups in political life. What the 
two officers fought over at this stage of the crisis was the most suitable strategy to contain the 
mounting opposition to Soeharto's presidency, and they were bitterly opposed in their 
competition for the armed forces leadership. So far, neither the hardliner Prabowo nor the· 
moderate Wiranto had contemplated political alternatives beyond Soeharto's rule to advance their 
interests. It needed a further escalation in the crisis to not only raise the stakes of the intra-
military conflict, but to link the conflicting factions with Soeharto critics both inside and outside 
the armed forces. 
IV. THE CRISIS ESCALATES: BETWEEN DIVISIVE RADICALISATION AND THE . 
SEARCH FOR SOCIETAL SUPPORT 
The second phase of the crisis, beginning in December 1997, saw a serious deterioration in 
economic and political conditions. Soeharto suffered a mild stroke in early December, sparking 
fresh speculation on the issue of his succession. 53 The news led to negotiations between various . 
oppositional forces over forming an alliance in case sudden opportunities should arise. Amien 
Rais had already declared his willingness to run for president in September, breaking the New 
Order taboo against proposing Soeharto's replacement. By January, Megawati joined the chorus, 
offering to lead the country if nobody more appropriate was found. 54 While his re-election was 
51 Prabowo's Islamic allies frequently noted his rather erratic observance of Muslim rituals, and wondered 
why he had chosen them ~ politicat associates. They agreed, however, that such considerations were 
secondary as long as Prabowo protected their interests. See 'Mengapa Prabowo Mendekat?', Sabili 2 
September 1998. 
52 Interview with Let.Gen. (ret) Z.A. Maulani, Jakarta 5 December 1997. 
53 'Mensesneg Moerdiono: Presiden Perlu Istirahat Penuh', Kompas 6 December 1997. A few days later, 
there were even rumors that Soeharto had died. See 'Presiden Tersenyum Saat Diisukan Wafat', Kompas 
10 December 1997. · 
54 'Megawati Calls on Indonesians not to Reelect Soeharto', Kyodo News Agency IO January 1998; 'Mega 
Tak Tindak Lanjuti Pencalonannya', Jawa. Pos 13 January 1998. 
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openly challenged, Soeharto aggravated the economic decline by presenting a highly unrealistic 
state budget in early January.55 The subsequent free fall of the rupiah led to widespread panic, 
with supermarkets emptied by customers worried about the escalating prices of basic food items'. 
Only days later, the IMF intervened, forcing Soeharto to sign a second letter ofmtent after he had 
failed to meet the benchmarks set in the first document agreed upon in October. At the same time, 
. . 
Soeharto shocked the political elite by announcing his candidate for the vice-presidency: B.J. 
Habibie, his Minister of Research and Technology, who was well known for spending big on 
· ambitious but dubious development projects.56 Domestic political actors were stunned at this 
choice, as were international investors, who sent the rupiah to an all'."time low.57 
Blaming the Chinese? Habibie, Prabowo and Military Factionalism 
· The nomination of Habibie sharpened the factional divisions within the officer corps. While he 
.. was disliked by the armed forces mainstream for his· interference in ABRI' s procurement 
procedures and his political affiliation with Islamic groups, Habibie had several military . 
associates. Feii;al Tanjling, Syarwan Hamid and the then Chief of Staff of Socio~Political Affairs, 
Let.Gen. Yunus Y osfiah were known to be close to Habibie, btit his most influential ally was 
Prabowo. Their relationship was· mutually beneficiaL On the one hand, Prabowo facilitated access 
for Habibie to ABRI's formal command structure. He also provided, Habibie with an additional 
link to the presidential family, as some of Soeharto's children viewed the intimacy between the 
President and his favourite minister with suspicion. On the ot)ler hand, Prabowo hoped that the 
viee-presidential candidate would pave his way to the top post of the ~ed forces, either through 
input given to Soeharto or by succeeding the latter. According to Prabowo, Habibie used to dream 
aloud of his future presidency, under which Prabowo would be 'armed forces. chief, you'll be 
four-star.' 58 It was this promise that formed the core of their alliance, and provided a crucial 
incentive for Prabowo to secure Soeharto's re-election and, inseparably linked to it, the 
installatfon of his associate in the vice-presidency.59 
55 Soeharto a,nnounced that ecQnomic growth would slow down to four percent in the year 1998/99, while 
most observers expected zero growth or even a contraction. The rupiah was calculated at.4000 to. the dollar, 
although the currency was close to double-digit figures. See ··Disiapkan 7 Progi:am Reformasi Ekonomi', 
Suara Merdeka 7January1998. · 
56 'Muhammad Soeharto Bersedia Dicalonkan Sebagai Presiden: Wapres Harus Memahami lptek dari 
Jndustri', Surabaya Post 2.0 January 1998; 'President Hints Succession Will Reward Habibie's Loyalty', 
The Australian 21January1998. . 
51 Adam Schwarz, 'Hunting For Scapegoats in Indonesia', Wall Street Journal 3 February 1998. 
58 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?'; Asiaweek 3 March 2000. 
59 Habibie supporters appeared to confirm Prabowo's hope8. AM Saefuddin, a close Habibie confidant in 
the PPP faction and later Minister of Agriculture in his cabinet, predicted that Soeharto would use special 
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Opposition to Habibie's nomination was strong, and Prabowo played an active role in regime 
efforts aimed at defusing it. The international and domestic business community, especially 
Chinese conglomerates, objected to Habibie's lack of economic credentials and his.open support 
for indigenous, Muslim entrepreneurs. The campaign against Habibie was initiated by Sofyan 
Wanandi, a leading Chinese businessman and a central figure at the think-tank CSIS (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies), in which the retired Benny Moerdani still maintained an 
office.60 One week after Habibie's likely nomination made headlines, Sofyan's name was 
suddenly implicated in a bomb explosion in a low-class apartment in Central Jakarta. In the 
course of the investigations under Prabowo's friend Syafrie Syamsuddin, 'evidence' was found 
that linked the incident to Sofyan.61 Sofyan was investigated, but the widely expected questioning 
of Benny Moerdani was called off.62 Violent demonstrators appeared at the CSIS building for two 
consecutive days, on 26 and 27 January, demanding Sofyan be brought to court and CSIS _shut 
down. 63 According to one leading CSIS executive, the demonstrations only ·stopped after he 
called Zacky Anwar Makarim, Prabowo's associate in command of the military intelligence 
agency, BIA: 'We knew that Prabowo and Zackywere behind the mobilisation of the crowds that 
threw stones at our office, and i told Zacky that this madness had to end, otherwise we would 
make his involvement in the whole affair public. '64 If the hardliners had cornered CSIS, the 
moderates pledged to protect it. Wiranto ordered the Police to secure the CSIS offices, and the 
protests quickly died down. 
The campaign against CSIS signalled the beginning of Prabowo's accelerated efforts of 
mobilising the Muslim majority against what he portrayed as a Chinese conspiracy to bring down 
the New Order~ On 23 January, Prabowo and his ABRI associates met with prominent modernist 
intellectuals and kiai at a large fast-breaking gathering at the Kopassus Headquarters. While his 
· powers handed to him by the MPR to engineer the transition to Habibie in 2000, with Prabowo filling the 
then vacant vice-presidency. 'Hanya Sekali Yang dengan Catatan', Jawa Pos 3 March 1998. 
6° CSIS was founded in the early 1970s by intellectuals of largely Catholic-Chinese descent and 
intelligence officers close to Soeharto, among them Ali Moertopo and Sudjono Humardhani. It was widely 
viewed as being behind the anti-Islamic policies of the government of the 1970s and much of the 1980s. 
The relationship between CSIS and the regime declined drastically, however, after Benny Moerdani was 
marginalised by Soeharto in the late 1980s. 
61 'Pangdam Jaya Soal Isi Dokumen PRD: Sofyan Wanandi dan YusufWanandi Disebut-sebut Bantu Dana 
dan Dukungan · LN', Surabaya Post 27 January 1998; 'Kontroversi Sofjan Sesudah Ledakan', Forum 
Keadilan 9 February 1998. 
62 The press had speculated about a possible investigation of Benny after Prabowo's private talk about it 
had been leaked to journalists. See 'LB Moerdani tidak akan Diperiksa', Kompas 5 February 1998; 
'Wartawan Terkecoh Isu Klarifikasi LB Moerdani', Republika 5February1998. 
63 
'CSIS Didemonstrasi', Republika 27 January 1998; 'Unjuk Rasa Lagi di CSIS', Kompas 28 January 
1~8. . 
64 Interview with J. Kristiadi, Deputy Executive DirectorofCSIS, Jakarta 3 Septemberl998. 
111 
staff distributed books containing data on the Chinese dominance of the Indonesian economy, 
Prabowo called on the participants to unite against· those who threatened the stability of the 
nation.65 After the sharp devaluation of the rupiah in the first week of January, Soeharto had 
privately spoken of international machinations of the financial markets to undermine his authority 
and, after the next rapid drop following Habibie's nomination, the President was increasingly 
inclined to make his suspicions public. Officers from the hardline faction interpreted Soeharto's 
remarks as an endorsement of Prabowo's confrontational approach, and they acted accordingly. 
Feisal Tanjung phoned 13 leading tycoons in mid-January, asking them for donations in order to 
overcome the econorriic crisis,66 and he led the anti-Sofyan chorus in ABRI Headquarters.67 
Prabowo's double strategy of aggravating political conflicts and conducting covert operations to 
confront the opponents of the regime was gradually adopted by other hardlihe members of the 
military elite,· particularly those with an immediate interest in Habibie's ascension to the vice-
presidens;y. 
Countering the Hardliners: The Moderates and the Discourse of Change 
The radicalisation of Prabowo's strategic and political approach led to the consolidation of his 
· · moderate competitors. It provided the key impetus for corinecting the various subgroups in the 
moderate faction and .elevated idea.S of political change to. the centre of conflict within the armed · 
forces. Similar to the way Hartono's partisanship in 1996 had triggered counter-reactions from 
the moderate faction, Prabowo's divisive strategies for defending the regime convinced his 
opponents to increase their internal cooperation and adjust their conceptual thinking. This time, 
however, the stakes were much higher. The crisis had transformed the earlier discussions on the 
role of the. armed forces in the regim:e from discourses on long-term alternatives to matters of 
immefilatepolitical urgency. Wiranto, who had not been particularly interested in the ideas of the 
gradual and rapid reformers in the past,· now began to feel that they delivered him the necessary 
foundation for the competition with the hardliners around Prabowo: 
65 
· Kholil Ridwan, chainnan of BKSPPI (Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia, Cooperation · 
Forum for Islamic Boarding Schools. in Indonesia), gave the main speech of the evening. In line with 
Prabowo, he stressed that if ABRI and the Muslim community united, this would create a power able to . 
face any element trying to destabilise the country. See 'Umat Islam dan ABRI hams Bersatu', Republika 26 
Januari 1998; Margot Cohen, "'Us" and "Them'", Far Eastern Economic Review 12February1998. 
66 Feisal argued that the tycoons had received government facilities for the last 30 years, and that it was 
now time for them to return the favor. See 'Panglima ABRI Telepon 13 Konglomerat', Kompas 15 January 
1998. 
67 'Pangab: Sofyan takBertanggung Jawab', Republika 5 February 1998. 
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"Of course the crisis changed a lot. It forced us to reconsider the principles of our 
political beliefs. I include myself in this~ ( ... ) We had to go out to people and signal 
that we understood their problems, and that we were ready for change. That did not 
mean toppling Pak Harto, but constituted an invitation to society to work with us to 
overcome the crisis - not pinning the blame on certain groups and then taking profit 
from it. That was certain to lead to disaster.'.68 
Wiranto's approach to integrate societal forces into government efforts to stabilise the situation 
contrasted sharply with Prabowo's strategy of escalation. In meetings with Muslim leaders on 18 
and 25 January, Wiranto stressed the necessity to defuse tensions, asking the kiai to assist the 
government in fighting against what he called 'destructive rumours'.69 in addition, some of 
Wiranto's associates established contacts with critics of the regime. Maj.Gen. Agum Gumelar, 
then Commander of the Wirabuana Command in Sulawesi, spoke regularly with Amien Rais: 
"We exchanged information with Pak Amien. He told us things, we told him things. 
For instance, when some within the government thought Pak Amien should be 
arrested for treason, we told him to slow down. Susilo also knew Amien well, so we 
had pretty good relations with him~"70 · 
The polarisation between hardline officers determined to suppress oppositional groups by force, . 
and moderate military leaders prepared to open a dialogue with dissidents, pointed to the 
changing nature of intra-military competition. Traditional form8 of military faCtionalism had 
focused on efforts to demonstrate maximum levels of loyalty towards Soeharto. The divisions 
emerging amidst the political and economic decline of the regime, however~ had much stronger 
conceptual features, and none of them particularly favoured the President. ·Prabo~o's manoeuvres 
in defence of the regime were aimed at securing the electoral mechanism scheduled to install . 
. . 
Habibie in the vice-presidency, and he offered few indications about his plans beyond that date. . 
· Wiranto, on the other hand, believed at that stage that Soeharto's regirrie was reformable, and he 
· was determined to win wide-ranging societal support for this effort. Given Soeharto's fierce 
resistance towards reform, however, the group ofreluctant reformers around Wiranto increasingly 
opened up to the idea of regime change discussed by the gradual and rapid reformers since 
68 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000 
69 'KSAD Minta Ulama dan Santri Tenangkan Masyrakat', Media Indonesia 19 January 1998; 'KSAD 
·Minta Ulama dan Umaro, Hams Saling Menasihati', Media Indonesia 26 January 1998. Jn responding to 
Feisal Tanjung's accusation that Chine~e corporations had done nothing to stop the economic decline, 
Wiranto ally Chief of Staff of General Affairs Let.Gen. Tarub suggested that the media may not have 
. covered statements by leading tycoons about how to solve the economic crisis. Tarub stated that there. 
should be no differential treatment of the tycoons as the crisis called on all Indonesians to do their duty. See 
. 'ABRI Sumbang Uang dan Emas kepada Pemerintah',Kompas 27 January 1998. 
70 Interview with Let.Gen.Agum Gumelar, Jakarta 8 June 1998. 
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1996. 71 The ultimate conclusion from this gradual adaptation process within the Wiranto group 
was instinctively felt by its members,. but not yet openly addressed: Soeharto had to resign, and 
the main task of the anned forces was to secure an ·honourable . and stable departure of their 
patron. 
· V. FINAL ELECTION, FINAL RESHUFFLE: MILITARY FACTIONALISM 
REVISITED 
Military factionalism had been a major element of regime stabilisation throughout Soeharto's 
rule. Balancing rival groups and distributing important positions among them, Soeharto granted 
rewards and punished disloyalty. The fact that Soeharto did not sideline either of the major 
groups competing for hegemony iri early 1998, and used the last reshuflle of his presidency to 
allocate key posts proportionally to the two camps, indicated that the embattled leader. was still 
convinced of the continued loyalty of his top brass. Soeharto . appeared to trust the public 
assurances given by both factions that they were determined to keep him in power, and seemed 
unaware of Prabowo's understanding with Habibie on the one side and the growing influence of 
the idea of regime change in Wiranto's camp on the other. Thtis he appointed Wiranto as 
Commander-in-Chief and Prabowo as Commander of Kostrad in February 1998. Wiranto ally 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs, and Maj.Gen. 
Muchdi Purwopranjono replaced his friend Prabowo as head of i<.opassus. Subagyo HS, for his 
part, was promot~d to Army Chief of Staff.72 The reshuflle left both groups with roughly equal 
control networks within the anned forces: Wiranto headed ABRI Headquarters, with key allies 
. . 
holding crucial regional commands and most positions in the military's socio-political branch.· 
... ·. . 
Prabowo, on the other hand, had direct control of, or influence over, the brigades of the capital, 
Kopassus, the ABRI Intelligence and his oWn. unit, Kostrad. 
The reshuflle pointed to Soeharto's inability to adapt to the radically changed political context 
created by the crisis. In the same way .that he applied traditional strategies to confront the 
problems of economic and political decline, he appeared to believe that the well-tested approach 
. . 
71 Duri~g the crisis, Wiranto met regularly with civil society leaders and activists to receive updates on their 
political positions and attitudes. Hennawan Sulistyo, Lawan: Jejak Jejak Jalanan di Balik Kejatuhan 
Soeharto, Pensil324, Jakarta 2002: 190-192. · · 
72 Susilo, Prabowo and Muchdi were to take up their new positions after the session of the MPR, while 
Wiranto and Subagyo were installed in their new positions shortly after the announcement was made. 
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of engineered factionalism in the military would carry him through the turmoil. 73 Soeharto had 
obviously failed to notice that the character of this factionalism had changed substantially, and 
that it, for the first time, included scenarios of a_ post-Soeharto military. The paradigmatic shift 
became evident in Wiranto's first major policy speech after his appointment on 23 February. 
Openly contradicting the position of his hardline predecessor that the country's problems had 
been instigated by 'provocateurs' ,74 Wiranto conceded that Indonesia faced a political, economic 
and security crisis. The complexity of this crisis, Wiranto explained, affected all aspects of life. 
The middle class was losing its competitive talents and its vitality, while the lower classes saw 
their purchasing power declining. Unemployment was up, social inequality widened and crime 
was increasing,. with the vast majority of Indonesians experiencing a drastic drop in living 
standards. In such a situation, Wiranto said, it was understandable that the people felt heJpless in 
facing realities.75 Whilehe signalled that ABRI was prepared to stop potential 'troublemakers' 
from exploiting the crisis for political gains, Wiranto's empathy for those socially affected by the 
crisis marked a significant breach with Feisal's hardline approach to security politics. His analysis 
of the problems echoed many of the critical ideas discussed in the 1996 army seminar, and 
indicated how far the thinking of the gradual and rapid reformers had penetrated the views of 
Wiranto and his group. It was this increasing openness towards rising societal frustrations and 
demands that slowly eroded Wiranto's institutional loyalty to Soeharto, and not, as O'Rourke 
suggested, the predilection of the ABRI chief for Javanese 'tales of kings being overthrown by 
their trusted advisors, lieutenants or even their own brothers.' 76 
Frustrated Hopes: The Moderates and Soeharto's Inability to Reform 
The mounting tensions caused by the factional differences came into the open on the day of 
Wiranto's speech. During the hand-over ceremony of the post _of Army Chief of Staff from 
·wiranto to Subagyo, Agurn Gumelar asked Ills fellow regional commanders as well as the 
'.
3 Marcus Mietmer, 'From Soeharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during 
the Transition', in: Geoff Forrester (editor), Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 1999: 65-104. 
74 On .7 February, Feisal had spoken in front of 25,000 security personnel in Senayan. Using traditional _ 
New Order rhetoric, he threatened to deal harshly with those who wanted to disturb national stability and 
the proceedings of the MPR session. He claimed that the phenomena of the current crisis, like unrest, mass 
movements, radicalisation and terror, were all products of instigation by those who aimed at obstructing·the 
MPR session. See 'ABRI Siapkan 25 Ribu Personel', Jawa Pos 8February1998; 'ABRI Chief Warns of 
Mass Unrest', Singapore Straits Times 8 February 1998. 
15 
-'Seluruh Panglima Dukung Pangab', Kompas 24 February 1998. 
76 Kevin O'Rourke, Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, Allen&Unwin, Crows 
Nest 2002: 113. 
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' '·. 
commanders of Kostrad and Kopassus to join him in declaring an oath of loyalty to Wiranto.77 
. Agum was one of the core members of Wiranto's group, and his dislike for Prabowo was well 
known.78 The oath was a clear warning to the hardline faction, with Agum keen to 'make sure that 
everybody understood who the new Commander was, and that was Wiranto. ' 79 The obvious splits 
within the military led many in the political elite and the broader population to conclude that 
·some elements in the armed forces were prepared to reconsider their support for Soeharto. This 
perception had a strong impact on the character of subsequent events leading up to Soeharto's 
fall. The removal of the President had been the primarY target of oppositional forces for some 
time, but now these groups turned to lobbying military leaders to achieve their goal. Marking the 
beginning of the third phase of the crisis, students began to organise and demonstrate in late 
February against Soeharto's re-election, but at the same time they distributed flowers to soldiers 
and police officers who showed a niuch less repressive approach to their pr~test than some had 
feared.80 Wiranto's concept to contain and deescalate the protests rather than to violently.disperse 
them helped to convince key government critics that the political attitude of some senior military 
officers was indeed undergoing substantial change. That hardline elements in the military still 
favoured the traditional security approach only reinforced the interest of regime dissidents in 
establishing contact with moderate commanders thought to be more open towards the idea of 
· regime change. 
The public interpretation of the intra-rriilitary conflicts as a competition between moderates and 
hardliners favored Wiranto's group as far as societal support for its approach was concerned. The 
kidnappings of student activists, labour leaders and other. dissidents, starting fu February and 
widely linked to Prabowo, accelerated this polarisation and provided Wiranto with .further 
arguments for his policy of de-escalation. It was unclear, however, whether Soeharto would 
appreciate Wiranto's non-confrontational approach as much as large segments of society did. 
. . . 
Given the risk that the President might view Wiranto's tolerance of societal protest as an 
indication of declining loyalty towards him, the Commander-in-Chief had to strike a delicate 
·balance between accommodating public discontent and maintaining the political hegemony of the 
regime. The intra-military debate on Habibie's nomillation for the vice~presidency delivered a 
welcome opportimity for Wiranto to express .his continued loyalty. to Soeharto. The press had 
.77 'Seluruh Panglim~ Dukung Pangab', Kompas 24 February 1998. · 
78 Agum asserted that Prabowo was 'one of the reasons why ABRI had lost its ideals. He was. promoted 
because of his family links, he ran all these underground operations and ·was heavily involved in 
businesses, and had them protected by.military units:' Interview with Let.Gen. Agum Gumelar, Jakarta 8 
June 1998. 
79 Interview with Let.Gen. Aguin ~elar, Jakarta 8 June 1998. 
80 The 3,000 students rallying at the campus sang 'Do not hurt us. We ate your friends. We are on the same 
. side.' See 'Students Urge Riot Troops to Join Demonstration', Sydney Morning Herald 27 February 1998. 
116 
speculated that Wiranto would overturn Feisal's earlier decision to back Habibie, with many 
retired officers publicly encouraging him to do so. Wiranto, however, made it clear that ABRI 
stood by its commitment to support.Habibie.81 The armed forces leader saw little value in seeking 
an open confrontation with Soeharto, and Wiranto did not believe that Habibie's election would 
significantly alter the power balance in the military: 
"I was close to Habibie since my days as adjutant to Pak Harto. Also, my wife is 
from Gorontalo, as was Habibie's father, and Habibie's mother was from Yogya, like 
myself. ( ... )So if some people told me that Habibie's election would be bad for me, 
I just let them talk. I knew better."82 
Habibie's appointment as vice-president was confirmed by the MPR in mid-March, and Soeharto 
was handed his seventh term in office. Many observers believed that Soeharto had no intention of 
resigning any time soon, and therefore did not view Habibie's election as a final decision on the 
matter of succession. In fact, there were strong indications that Soeharto had chosen a 
controversial deputy in order to deflect demands for his departure from politics. The smooth 
procession of Soeharto's re-election in the MPR, however, contrasted sharply with the 
increasingly cynical sentiments in both the political elite and the general population. 
The moderates within the armed forces had hoped that Soeharto would use his re-election to 
begin reforms aimed at overcoming the stalemate and stabilising the political situation. Even the 
rapid reformers around Wirahadikusumah, who were sceptical about Soeharto's ability to bring 
about major change, examined the President's every statement and political manoeuvre for 
possible signals of his willingness to reform: 
"We thought he still might have a last chance, if he just offered something to calm 
down the protesters. Anything, really. More political parties, more freedoms, maybe 
early elections. Or a clear plan for his retirement. But there was just a big zero."83 
Soeharto, in delivering both his accountability and acceptance speech at the MPR, had not only 
failed to offer concrete reforms, but had presented an analysis of the situation that indicated his 
increasing isolation from political realities. Against the background of economic crisis, political 
stagnation,· social riots and demonstrating students, Soeharto read out economic statistics that 
compared the 1993/94 period with that of 1997/98, stressing the successes of his government in 
81 'ABRI Denies it was Forced to Nominate Habibie', Singapore Straits Times 26 February 1998. 
82 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000 
83 Interview with Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta 12November1998. 
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raising per capita income, life expectancy and the value of exports. 84 Mentioning air crashes, train 
and ship accidents as well as the ongoing drought, he described the events of 1997 as a chain of 
unfortunate incid,ents, ultimately culminating in the economic crisis, which he largely blamed on 
the IMF. Soeharto promised to serve out his full term, and made no reference to political reforms 
or a controlled transfer of power to his successor. The President's political immobility came as a 
great disappointment to the moderate faction in the military. Agum Gumelar, asked by the ABRI 
faction to present the response of the armed forces to Soeharto's accountability report, declined 
be.cause 'people would hate me for that sort of hypocrisy.' 85 ABRI's response to the President, 
read out by the Chief of Police, reflected a compromise between confirming Soeharto's view of 
the economic crisis as a matter of technical management and the position of the moderate camp 
that political change was inevitable. According to ABRI's official statement, two things were 
important: first, overcoming the economic crisis; and second, reform of the political system, the 
economy and the judiciary. While the first agenda was of an 'actual' and 'situational' character, 
the second was more 'fundamental, structural, and cultural'. In other words: while solving the 
. . . 
economic crisis was the priority, political reform was only a long-term project 86 
Endorsing Regime Change? The Moderate Faction and Mounting Popular Protest 
The image of Soeharto's progressing political calcification was aggrav;:tted by the announcement 
of the new cabinet shortly after the MPR session. Filled with loyalists, the cabinet featured the 
President's decades-long friend and tycoon Bob Hasan in the crucial Department of Industry and 
Trade. In addition, Siti Hardiyanti became Minister for Social Affairs, in a promotion that many 
saw as the initial step to a dynastic .solution to the succession problem. 87 The military hardliner 
Hartono was appointed Interior Minister, and Wiranto Arismunandar, the brother ·of Tien 
Soeharto's brother-in-law and notoriously hatsh rector of the Bandung Institute of Technology, 
became Minister of Education. The composition of the cabinet signalled Soeharto's unwillingness 
to reform the political system, and it had an immediate, radicalising effect on the student 
movement and other oppositional forces. Amien Rais, who had earlier softened some of his 
. . 
84 
'Pidato Pertanggungjawaban President Mandataris Majelis Permusyarawatan Rakyat Republik Indonesiii, · 
Di Depan Sidang Umum Majelis Permusyarawatan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 1 Maret 1998', Media 
Indonesia 2 March 1998. · 
85 Interview with Let.Gen. Agum Gumelar, Jakarta 8 June 1998. 
86 'F.ABRI: Reforriiasi dan Restrukturisasi Ekonomi Suatu Keharusan', Kompas 10 March 1998. 
87 John McBeth, 'Twilight Zone', Far Elistern Economic Review 16 April .1998. Siti Hardiyanti produced a 
comical moment when she claimed that the new cabinet was in line with Golkar's c0mmitment to 'anti-
coiruption, anti-collusion and anti-nepotism'. See 'Tutut: Saya Memang Antinepotisme', Kompas 18 
March 1998. 
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criticism of the regime following Habibie's selection as vice-president,88 resumed his role as the 
intellectual leader of the reform movement, travelling to campuses and providing political 
guidance to the previously disorganised student groups. The new radicalism not only facilitated 
the spread of the student protests from the cities of Java to other areas of the archipelago, it also 
questioned the effectiveness ofWiranto's concept of de-escalation. Wiranto's approach had been· 
based· on efforts to convince the protesters of the inherent ability of the ·New Order to reform 
itself, and had offered dialogue as a way of integrating the critics back into the regime. Soeharto, 
by insisting that no political reform was necessary, eroded the precondition for the ·successful 
implementation of Wiranto's strategy. With Soeharto incapable of delivering prospects for 
change, and the students determined not to give up before the President resigned, the outbreak of 
violent confrontation was only a matter of time. The escalation of the conflict would, eyentually, 
expose as unworkable and outdated the attempts of moderate officers in the armed forces to offer 
change within the existing political framework. Thus Soeharto's resignation increasingly 
appeared to them as the only solution to the crisis. 
The final phase of separating the moderates within the armed forces from the Soeharto regime 
began with the escalation of violence on the campuses in mid-March 1998. On 17 March, 103 
students were seriously injured during a confrontation with security personnel in Solo. AB a 
result, universities in Jakarta, Lampung, Bandung, Y ogyakarta, Surabaya and Makassar saw the 
numbers of protesters increasing by the day. Wiranto had earlier signalled that the armed forces 
would tolerate demonstrations on the campuses, but were determined to prevent them from taking 
to the streets. This warning was increasingly ignored, aggravating the tensions between student 
leaders and the local security apparatus. 89 In early April, apparently ignoring Wiranto's orders, 
security forces attacked the Gadjah Mada University campus in Yogyakarta, leaving scores 
wounded and seriously damaging ABRI's reputation. The violent clashes increased fears within 
the moderate faction in the military that the strategic goal of the protests might shift once again, 
and this time include the role of the armed forces as a major focus of criticism. Soeharto's . 
removal had become the main theme of the protests, but the more the amied forces were viewed 
as being inextricably tied to the regime, the niore likely they were to be targeted by the 
oppositional demandS for change.90 Wirartto was well aware of this risk, and responded by 
88 Amien and Habibi~ had cooperated closely in the 1990s in JCMI. Their relationship, md Aniien's 
changing attitudes towards the regime, will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 . 
. 
89 The students of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB, Institut Teknologi Bandung), one of the most 
prestigious universities in the country and therefore one of the most watched by both the media and the 
military, left their campus for the first time on 9 April. See 'Mahasiswa ITB Turun ke Jalan', Ko~pas 11 
April 1998. 
90 In late April, flags with the script 'People's Power' were flown by students at the Gadjah Mada campus. 
This reference to the 1986 movement against President Marcos in the Philippines had .always provoked 
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offering an open discussion forum between ABRI and the student movement on political reform 
issues. Student leaders, however, were in no mood to compromise and boycotted the ABRI-
sponsored dialogue scheduled for 18 April. It was at this juncture of the crisis that Wiranto 
realised the failure of his conciliatory approach and, by implication, the impossibility of 
defendmg Soeharto: 
"Frankly, I thought we had reached a dead end. The students were very stubborn, and 
there was no movement on the political side either. I told my staff that all we could 
do was trying to prevent people from getting killed. Because once a student gets 
shot, they will_ have a martyr, and then we will lose control."91 . 
Wiranto's impression was confirmed by his intensifying contacts with NU leaders and Amien 
Rais, mostly through Susilo. NU was publicly calling on ABRI by mid-April to 'support the 
reform process'' and Amien left no doubt about his intention to continue the criticism of the 
. regime tintil substantial change had been achieved. 92 
The gradual separation of the military's moderate wi~g from Soeharto's political interests was 
in no sense a linear process, however. Soeharto's system of patronage and personal loyalties had 
been weakened, but still proved forceful enough to prevent officers from openly demanding his 
. . 
resignation. Confronted with the .choice of assisting in Soeharto's removal or applying the 
coercive force of the military to contain the opposition, Wiranto avoided a clear-cut decision. He 
tried to combine both approaches ill order to wiri time, and temporarily damaged the reputation of 
his moderate faction as a result. But just as the paradigmatic demarcation lines between the main 
factions in the armed forces began to blur, Wiranto's hardline rivals reinforced them once again . 
. Throughout the month of April, victims of the kidnapping campaign ordered by Prabowo re-
emerged and identified the fatter publicly as the brain behind the operation.93 In addition, Hartono 
and Feisal Tanjung, now Coordinating Minister for Political and SecUrity Affairs, underscored 
their hardline images by openly sabotaging Wiranto's initiative for dialogues between students 
and the government Asked in late March why Soeharto was ready to meet farmers while refusing 
to receive student representatives, Feisal Tanjung replied that if the students would behave 
allergic reactions from the New Order establishment, but now it was widely reported in the press. See 
'Umbul~umbul "People Power" Muncul di Kampus Yogya', Suara Pembaruan 25 April 1998. 
91 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13. October 2000. · 
• 
92 Amien got Susjlo into trouble by claiming that the latter had 'asked' him to continue his criticism, 
insinuating that ABRI was satisfied seeing Amien doing the job that military officers would never have the 
courage to do. Susilo clarified Amien's statement the next day, saying he had only expressed ABRI's 
appreciation for academic criticism as long as it remained academic. Interview with Amien Rais, Surabaya 
10 May 1999; 'Kassospol Minta Amien Tetap Kritis', Jawa Pos 28 March 1998; and 'Kassospol: Kritis 
Boleh, Kebablasan Jangan'; Jawa Pos 29 March 1998. 
93 Margot Cohen, 'The Vanishings'~ Far Eastern Economic Review 7 May 1998. 
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I· 
themselves like farmers, they would get a chance to see the President.94 In early April, Hartono 
opined on the same topic that a meeting between Soeharto and students would create the false 
impression that the students had aspirations worth listening to.95 For the Wiranto group, these 
. verbal attacks on the student movement, despite further radicalising the protesters, had a fortunate 
side effect: 
"Feisal and Hartono thought they could destroy the dialogues with their offensive 
statements. Well, they did. But they also reminded the students who the real 
obstacles to reform were.( ... ) Wiranto was frustrated that the public linked him with 
the violence on the campuses, but after Feisal's and Hartono's outbursts, Wiranto 
. looked like an angel again."96 
While students certainly did not view him as an 'angel'; Wiranto remained the central entry point 
for oppositional efforts to encourage the armed forces to side with the· movement. Soeharto also 
contributed to this perception. On 16 April, Soeharto threatened to send Kopassus troops to deal 
with the unrest, implying that security forces so far had been soft in their approach to the 
protesters.97 The prospect of Kopassus soldiers under the command of a hardliner replacing 
organic troops on the ground put some of the sharp criticisms of Wiranto into a wider context, 
and helped to repair some of the damage the moderates had suffered as a result of the increasing 
violence. In this regard, William Case's assessment that Wiranto had 'retreated to a more hard.,. 
line posture' neither captured the grave tensions between the moderates and the hardliners nor the 
ABRI chiefs growing awareness that repression alone would not be able to address the source of 
the protest. 98 
With the country locked in a stalemate between calls for Soeharto's departure and the 
intransigence of the President, the moderates within the armed forces hoped for an eventual 
break-through when Soeharto ordered Indonesia's political elite to the palace on 1 May for a 
.
94 'Tak Ada Dialog dengan Presiden', Jawa Pos 27 March 1998. . 
. 
95 'Mendagri Tolak Dialog Mahasiswa-Presiden', Jawa Pos 6 April 1998. In sharp contrast to Feisal and 
Hartono, Agum Gumelar called the student's aspirations 'right, pure and positive, and representative of the 
society as a whole'. See 'Pangdam Wirabuana: Aspirasi Mahasiswa Benar dan Mewakili Masyarakat\ 
Suara Pembaruan 25 April 1998. 
96 Interview with Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta 12 November 1998. 
97 Soeharto delivered the warning in a statement read out at the 46th anniversary celebrations of Kop~sus. 
The President expressed the 'hope' that 'the people, local officials and police can maintain national security 
and order without the involvement ofKopassus troops.' See 'ABRI Can Now Take "Repressive" Action', 
Singapore Straits Times 18 April 1998. . 
98 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less, Curzon, Richmond 2002:. 62. 
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major policy speech.99 Many had given up hope that Soeharto would finally offer reforms, but 
others expected him to launch a final effort to save his presidency. According to Zarkasih Nur, 
the chainnan of the PPP faction in the DPR who was present at the meeting, the atmosphere in 
the palace was one of tense expectation: . 
"Personally, I did not have much hope. But I thought 'Who knows? Pak Harto had 
saved his head so many times in the past, why not this time?' ( ... ) But he offered 
nothing. Actually, it was worse than nothing."100 · 
Much to the disappointment o.f the audience, Soeharto suggested that Indonesians start thinking 
about political reforms for the time after 2003. This announcement provided. the final 
confirmation of Soeharto's failure to grasp the urgency of the crisis that had engulfed him. It also 
served as a further motivation for the officers around Wiranto to increase their engagement With 
the opposition in order to .evaluate the possibility of granting Soeharto a graceful departure from 
. office. This approach was in line with what William Liddle called Wiranto's 'pattern ofreaction 
instead of action', 101 with growing societal pressure forcing the military moderates into the 
gradual endorsement of regime change. Even within the hardline group, preparations for a post-
Soeharto regime were under way.· Prabowo and other hardliners expected that a possible Habibie 
presidency might facilitate their rise to the helm of the armed forces, and they began to use their 
contacts . with. Islamic groups to prepare the necessary societal support for this scenario. The 
nature of the military factionalism created by Soeharto had changed in a way that encouraged, 
both competing groups to develop political plans for a future without Soeharto. When the crisis 
approached its next, and final, phase of escalation, none of the groups in the armed forces was 
prepared to follow Soeharto into the political abyss. 
V. VICTORY OF THE MODERATES: ENDING SULTANISTIC RULE, NEGOTIATING 
REGIME CHANGE 
After the 1 May announcement had ufiderlined Soeharto's unWillingness to offer hope of refo~ 
the crisis entered into its fourth and, as far as the New Order was concerned, its last phase. on· 4 
99 Invited to the 'corisu.ltative' meeting with Soeharto were the DPRIMPR leadership, the leaders of the 
DPR factions, officials of the political parties, ministers related to political and security issues, the chiefs of 
staff of the three serVices and the head of the Police. 
100 
·Interview with Zarkasih Nur, chainnan ofthe PPP faction in the DPR, Jakarta· 10 February 1999; 
'Reformasi Politik Tahun 2003 ke Atas', Kompas 2May1998. · 
101 R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia's Unexpected Failure of Leadership', in: Adam Schwarz atid Jonathan 
Paris (editors), The Politics of Post-Soeharto Indonesia, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York 
1999: 28. 
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May, the government announced that fuel subsidies would be drasticallyreduced. The subsequent 
. sharp rise in electricity and petrol prices led to violent demonstrations in Medan, escalating into 
three days of rioting in the North Sumatran capital. The clashes in Medan triggered a chain 
reaction, radicalising the student demonstrations in the rest of the archipelago. The unrest 
involved more and more non-academic protesters, ranging from small traders to street criminals 
who hid behind a political agenda to loot unprotected shops. With Medan in flames, elements of 
the regime made the first public moves to desert Soeharto. On 4 May, Harmoko declared that the 
parliament welcomed the students' aspirations and would therefore recon8ider the five political 
. . 
laws.102 ICMI called for a special session of the MPR on 6 May. 103 The non-governmental elite, in 
turn, sped up its dissociation from the regime. NU stated on 11 May that it was preparing its own 
reform agenda, and Amien announced on the same day that he would form a Majelis 
Kepemimpinan Rakyat, a People's Leadership Council, by the end of May.104 With alternative 
political institutions in the making, the factions in ABRI had to respond quickly. On 7 May, 
Wiranto announced . the establishment of an ABRI team under Susilo to work out concrete 
. proposals for reform. 105 
The moderate faction in the military hoped to win societal approval for its efforts to allow 
Soeharto a graceful departure from office. The input from non-military forces was not only 
designed to increase the acceptability of ABRI's proposals, but also to shield the moderate faction 
from possible retaliation from Soeharto. Thus Susilo consulted various intellectuals and asked 
them to prepare concepts for political reform. Among them was Nurcholish Madjid, who enjoyed 
Soeharto's respect and was therefore well placed to develop a schedule for the latter's retirement. 
Nurcholish, for his part, saw the armed forces as the key to solving the stalemate: 
"Just look at Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea. There the cooperation of the 
military was crucial in initiating democratic change. So we had to win ABRI's 
support for reform. If they remained obstructive, no change would have been 
possible." 106 
102 'Harmoko: DPR Siap Ubah UU Politik', Jawa Pos5May1998. These laws, mostlypassed in the 1980s, 
concerned the general elections, political parties, the composition of the DPR and MPR, and mass 
organisations. 
103 
'Buka Kesempatan Sidang Istiniewa dan Reshuffle', Jawa Pos 7 May i998; 'Habibie: Itu Bukan Suara 
ICMI', Jawa Pos 10 May 1998; 'Soal Reshuffle, Habibie Telepon Ahmad', Jawa Pos 11 May 1998; and 
'Ahmad: Saya Yang Berwenang di ICMI', Jawa Pos 12May1998. 
104 'Amien Rais: Tunggu Akhir Mei', Bernas 12May1998. . 
105 While rejecting a special session of the MPR to replace Soeharto, Wiranto opened the door for 'gradual 
and constitutional change'. See 'Army Moves to Defuse Unrest', Sydney Morning Herald 8 May 1998. 
106 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 27 May 1998. . . 
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The President, meanwhile, took the risky step of leaving the country on 9 May for an 
international conference in Egypt, demonstrating, according to Robert Elson, that he 'was still 
unable to grasp the significance of the mounting movement against him.' 107 His absence gave 
both formerly loyal associates and fierce opponents the chance to draft a political map for a future -
without Soeharto. With Soeharto cut off from his network of informants and almost exclusively 
relying on Wiranto's telephone reports, ABRI Headquarters could promote Susilo's initiative 
without the fear of presidential intervention. The dynamics created by Susilo's project and 
Nurcholish's input would play a crucial role in shaping the events leading to the President's 
resignation. 
Before Nurcholish could present his proposal to ABRI Headquarters, however, developments 
took yet another escalating turn. The conflict between the Wiranto and Prabowo camps within the 
armed forces erupted in a dramatic fashion, arid the chaos arising from this split made Soeharto's 
position increasingly vulnerable. When Soeharto cut short his trip and returned almost a week 
later in the early morning of 15 May, the New Order was in ruins. 
Final Escalation: The Trisakti Shootings and the May Riots 
The escalation of violence in Jakarta began with the fatal shooting of four students during a 
demonstration at Trisakti University on 12 May 1998. Public speculation immediately connected 
the incident to army units loyal to Prabowo who was already widely known to have 
masterminded the kidnappings of activists.108 For many, Prabowo's public denial of his 
involvement in the shooting only confirmed the Widespread suspicions; 109- The Trisakti tragedy 
led to the eruption- of factional tensions within the armed forces, with Wiranto suspecting that 
Prabowo aimed at escalating the situation in order to convince Soeharto that the Commander-in-
Chief was incapable of securing the capital: 
"I _do not know who was behind the shootings and the violence that followed, but one -
thing was obvious: I was Coinmander of the Ann:ed Forces, Soeharto was away. If 
107 Elson 2001: 290. . 
108 On 17 May, Prabowo visited the parents of one of the victims, explaining that he felt the duty to pay his 
respects because the victim's father was a military veteran. He insisted that he be allowed to swear on the 
Qu'ran that he was innocent, and after the distressed parents had-refused three times, the victim's-mother 
gave in and Prabowo swore that he 'knew nothing abOut the incident nor had given any orders.' See Rene L. 
Pattiradjawane, Trisakti Mendobrak Tirani Orde Baru: Fakta dan Kesaksian Berdarah 12 Mei 1998, 
Gramedia dan Yayasan Trisakti, Jakarta 1999: 163. 
109 Soekismo Hadikoemoro, Tragedi Trisakti 12 Mei 1998, Penerbit Universitas Trisakti, Jakarta 1999: 141. 
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anything happened during his absence, it was clear that my opponents would try to 
blame me. "110 
The riots that broke out on the day after the Trisak.ti killings, accompanied by city-wide looting, 
burning and occasional rapes, went on for nearly two days, on 13 and 14 May, leaving up to 1200 
people dead and Chinese business centres devastated. Other cities, mostly on Java, were affected 
as well. Solo experienced one of the worst riots in its long violent history. m While the actors and 
motivations involved in the unrest have never been identified, public opinion saw Prabowo and 
his hardline faction as its main beneficiaries. 112 The chaos in Jakarta cornered Prabowo' s 
moderate rivals in the military and brought him one step closer to a Habibie presidency, under 
which he could exp.ect to be 'four star' and eventually chief of the artned forces. 
The suspicion that Prabowo had an active interest in the spreaq of violence was largely based 
on the inactivity of the security forces vis-a-vis the rioters.113 Troops from the Jakarta garrison, 
Kostrad and Kopassus, all under the command of Prabowo or officers associated with him,· 
remained conspicuously indifferent towards the unrest sweeping .through the city. Prabowo later 
gave defensive explanations for the insuffident number of troops and their reluctance to face the 
rioters, which contrasted sharply with the previous insistence of the hardline faction on stem 
measures against regime opposition. On the one hand, Prabowo recalled his surprise at noting the 
absence of troops on Jakarta's main roads, and claimed to have reminded Syafrie, who was in 
charge of security in the capital, of the potential damage this might incur:· 
· "I said: Syafrie, on Thamrin there are no troops. He was convinced there were 
enough. He asked me to come along, and we saw!"114 
On the other hand, Prabowo maintained that the soldiers were hesitant to 'fire at housewives and 
children looting the shops' because they shared the same low-cfass background: 'I think that was 
psychological. '115 Despite commanding Kostrad, and having close personal ties with Syafrie and 
Kopasslis chief Muchdi, he insisted that he had no influence over, or knowledge of, troop 
· deployments during the riots, pointing at Syafrie and Wiranto instead. Regardless of the truth 
110 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000 · 
111 The most prominent target of the Solo riots was the house. of Harmoko in the elite area of Solo Baro. See · 
'Terakhir, Harmoko Menginap Desember Lalu', Bernas. 17 May 1998. · 
112 John McBeth, 'Shadow Play', Far Eastern Economic Review 23 July 1998. 
113 The BBC correspondent in Jakarta, Matt Frei, described the situation on 14 May as one of 'complete and 
rampant anarchy. See "'Total Anarchy" in Jakarta', BBC News, 14 May 1998. 
114 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?', Asiaweek 3 March 2000. Jalan Thamrin is the main protocol 
road that leads to the palace. · 
115 See Prabowo's testimony to a team of investigators in September 1998, in: S. Sinansari ecip, Siapa 
'Datang' Prabowo, Mizan, Bandung 1999: 184. 
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behind the movement of troops and their behaviour in the field, Prabowo appeared to have clearly 
understood that the riots had the potential of accelerating Habibie's rise to the presidency, and 
therefore lead to his ascension to the top post in the armed forces. At the height of the rioting, 
Prabowo went to see Habibie and discussed possible succession scenarios and, most importantly, 
what they meant for him. Habibie seemed ready to claim the presidency, but was less 
· forthcoming about his plans .for Prabowo : 
"I should have n.oticed the shift. ( ... ) He said: 'If your name comes up, I will 
approve.' There's a big difference there."116 
The mounting public criticism of Prabowo and the hardliners was probably the main reason for 
Uabibie to . reconsider his alliance with the Kostrad chief. Habibie' s changing position on 
Prabowo's future role was, however, only the first in a series of setbacks for his faction, shifting 
the power balance decisively in favour of the moderates and their plans for Soeharto's orderly 
departure. 
the dramatic change in the fortunes af the two military factions was· caused by a combination 
· of factors. First of all, Wiranto had the advantage of delivering regular telephone brlefin.gs to 
Soeharto in Egypt, conveying his version of events before the President could gather information 
from other sources. Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief was able to blame the inactivity of the 
troops on Syafrie and appear as a decisive leader when he intervened on 14 May to order the 
irninediate deployment of new troops, threatening to take direct control if his directives were not 
heeded. 117 Wiranto also won the support of several regional commanders, among them Djadja 
Suparman in Surabaya, Djarnari Chaniago in Bandung and Ryamizard Ryacudu, the chief of the 
Kostrad division in Malang. Marines were flown in from Surabaya on 14 May, helping to end the 
riots within a day and supporting the perception that. the situation had only stabilised after 
Wiranto had assumed authority over the operation. Finally, Prabowo's support base in the civilian 
sphere disintegrated rapidly. Aniien Rais, whom Prabowo counted among his allies in the 
modernist Muslim constituency, distanced himself publicly from the Kostrad commander.118 
Habibie, for his part, had withdrawn his promises of further promotion, and Muslim student 
groups that had previously entered into talks with Prabowo now threw their support behind 
116 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?', Asiaweek 3 March 2000. 
117 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
118 Amien rejected a suggestion by ABRI's ailing 'elder statesman', Nasution, who had proposed that 
Amien and Prabowo take the lead in reforming the country. In front of some of his Christian friends, who 
were particularly suspicious of Prabowo, Amitlll stated that he had never made any political arrangement 
with the former, earning him enthusiastic applause from the audience. See 'Para Tokoh Bentuk Majelis 
Amanat Rakyat', Kompas·l5May1998 .. 
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. Atnien. Abdurrahman Wahid, who had a tense relationship with Prabowo in the past and whom 
the latter now visited to evaluate the chances of cooperation, also sent him home enipty-
handed.119 
Resignation or Martial Law? The Moderates Prevail 
The hardline faction in the military sought to counter the erosion of its political power base by 
trying to convince Soeharto that Wiranto was about to betray him.. The reform proposals 
developed by Nurcholish for Susilo delivered one such opportunity. Nurcholish suggested 
elections in January 2000 and a special session of the MPR three months afterwards, implying 
that Soeharto should not stand for re-election. Moreover, Nurcholish demanded that Soeharto 
return his illegally obtained wealth and apologise to the nation for his mistakes: 
"Susilo really liked the concept. But he recommended that I drop the demands 
related to Pak Harto's wealth and the apology. ( ... ) Prabowo, on the other hand, 
called the paper 'crazy'. And I am sure he let Pak Harto know what Wiranto's people 
were doing behind his back."120 . 
Ill addition to the Nurcholish initiative, Prabowo also reported a statement to Soeharto that had 
been issued by ABRI Headquarters on 16 May, indicating that the armed forces supported ciills 
for the resignation of the President.121 Wiranto was forced to retract the release and apologise to 
Soeharto. The Prabowo group also raised questions about Wiranto's trip to Malang on the 
morning of 14 May, taking with hi!Il almost the entire military leadership, including Prabowo, at 
a. time of rioting and political turmoil.122 While this information on the alleged political 
ll9.Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 26 May 1998, and Al-Zastrouw Ng, Jakarta 26 May 1998. 
120 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 27 May 1998. . . . 
121 Wiranto later disclosed ·the background of the press release. Having met Abdurrahman Wahid, Wiranto 
asked the Assistant of Socio-Political Affairs, Maj .Gen. Mardiyanto, to draft a press release underlining the 
outcome of the discussion, namely mutual support between ABRI and NU. Mardiyanto drafted the paper, 
expressing ABRI' s support for an NU statement issued the day before, unaware that one of the points in the 
declaration was an implicit call for Soeharto's resignation. Mardiyanto gave the ABRI release to the press 
without consulting Wiranto. Prabowo got hold of the paper long before it reached the newsrooms of the 
media, leading Wiranto to believe that officers from his own staff had brought the release to Prabowo's. 
attention. Wiranto later read the paper, reprimanded Mardiyanto over the mistake, retracted the release and 
expfained the affair to Soeharto. Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
122 Fadli Zon, Politik Huru"Hara Mei 1998, Institute for Policy Studies, Jakarta 2004: 117. The question of 
why Wiranto insisted on leaving for Malang in the morning of 14 May remains one of the many mysteries 
of the May riots. Prabowo claims to have reminded the Commander-in-Chief several times that it would 
have been wiser to stay in the capital. While the Prabowo supporters continue to interpret Wiranto's 
stubborn insistence on leaving Jakarta as an indication that he planned to blame the spreading riots on 
Prabowo, Wiranto's associates explained that the Commander-in-Chief went to Malang to. bring loyal 
· troops from the Brawijaya command with him back to the capital. Interview with Maj.Gen. Agus 
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manoeuvres of the moderate group proved insufficient for Soeharto to take measures against the 
Commander-in-Chief, it encouraged the President to consider ways of preventing the 
. concentration of powers in Wiranto's hands. 
Soeharto's attempt to limit Wfranto's powers, however, only provided further evidence of the 
extent to which the riots and their political implications hadstrengthened the position of the 
moderate faction in the armed forces. The President told his advisers on 15 May that he planned 
to establish a new security command that was to play a role similar to that of Kopkamtib in the 
1970s and 1980s .. The idea of reinstating one of the most notorious New Order instruments of 
repression signalled Soeharto's determination to apply a more confrontational approach towards 
the unrest. Soeharto stressed that he intended to hand the top post of this new body to a military 
officer other than Wiranto, as the latter was 'too busy'. 123 The creation of a dual hierarchy within 
the armed forces would have weakened Wiranto's faction and the military as an institution,. 
allowing the President to gain more direct control of the security operations against the protesters. 
Wiranto, however, opposed the plan, and Subagyo, whom Soeharto proposed as head of the· 
agency, declined the offer. Subagyo was . apparently aware that leading a security body · 
specifically tasked with quelling popular protest to defend a doomed regime carried high risks for 
his career, and he was not prepared to confront Wirant<? over the issue. The incident confirmed 
that Soeharto's authority over the armed forces and its officer corps was declining dramatically. 
. . . 
On 18 May, Soeharto appointed Wiranto to lead the agency he had earlier planned to hand to a 
rival officer. 
The diminishing of Soeharto'S authority was accelerated further when student activists occupied 
the parliament complex in the early morning of 18 May. The symbol of the New Order's 
manipulation of formal democracy was now in the hands of disrespectful youths who camped on 
its roof and bathed in its decorative fountains. 124 How exactly the initially moderate influx of · 
protesters was able to pass ABRI's security apparatus remains unclear. Piabowo later claimed that 
Wirahadikusumah, Jalrarta 12 November 1998; see also Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?', Asiaweek 3 
· March 2000. Wiranto himself insisted that it was Prabowo who had asked him to go to Malang to preside 
· over a ceremony that marked the transfer of regional command authority from the FirstKostrad Division to 
the Secotid, and claimed he had received no warnings from Prabowo to cancel the trip. The Commander-in-
Chief also saw no problem to leave the capital for three hours as the command was in the hands of the 
Jakarta Commander and the Police Chief. Wiranto did indeed order Marine troops from East Java into the 
capital on 14 May, but insisted that this was done through phone communication. Irtterview with General 
(ret) Wiranto, 13 October 2000. . .· . . . . 
123 Wiranto, Bersaksi di Tengah Badal: Dari Catatan Wiranto, Jenderal Pumawirawan, IDe Indonesia, 
Jakarta 2003: 77. . 
. 
124 Diro Aritonang, Runtuhnya Rezim Soeharto: Rekaman Perjuangan Mtihasiswa Indonesia 1998, Pustaka · 
Hidayah, Bandung 1999: 204. 
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Wiranto had promised student leaders to provide transportation for students who planned a march 
on the parliament, and Syafrie confirmed that he was asked by two Wiranto aides to prepare 
military vehicles for the demonstrators. 125 While most of the students refused to accept the free 
ride, Syafrie allowed them to enter the DPR complex as long as they came on wheels. On the 
morning of the occupation, Amien Rais addressed a public hearing at parliament, repeating his 
demand that Soeharto hand over his mandate.126 This was followed in the afternoon by a press 
conference in which the DPR leadership, 'encouraged' by hundreds of fanatical students, called 
on Soeharto to resign. The fact that Syatwan Hamid, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament and most 
senior military legislator, endorsed the statement was interpreted by many within the political 
elite as the official termination of ABRI's support for Soeharto, triggering a series of defections 
of long-time loyalists from the New Order state. 127 It is likely that the former hardliner Syarwan 
only sought to disengage himself individually from a polity with little prospect of survival, but 
the societal repercussions of his move were tremendous. Although Wiranto denounced the DPR 
statement as an 'individual opinion', Soeharto's regime was now in a process of rapid 
disintegration. 128 
Soeharto' s failure to push the armed forces into a more confrontational stand against the protest 
movement, coinciding with the decay of the regime from within, forced the President to launch a 
final promise of reform. He received Nurcholish Madjid to discuss the timetable for political 
change the latter had presented to Susilo, and arranged for a meeting with several Muslim leaders 
to announce his plan for early elections and the establishment ofa Reform Council. The gathering 
at the palace on 19 May did not bring the break-through that Soeharto had hoped for, however. 
Nurcholish thought that his own proposals had already been overtaken by new developments, and 
now demanded elections within six months. Soeharto, for his part, only agreed to the formulation 
'as soon as possible', provoking the Muslim figures to rule out their participation in the Reform 
Council or the new cabinet the President planned to form. 129 During the next two days, Soeharto's 
office contacted numerous societal leaders with the offer to join the Council, but only received 
rejections. In addition, fourteen of his ministers sent a letter to. Soeharto, declaring their 
125 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?', Asiaweek 3 March 2000. 
126 'Amien Rais Minta Presiden Serahkan Mandat', Bernas 19May1998. 
127 S. Sinansari ecip, Kronologi Situasi Penggulingan Soehario: Reportase Jurnalistik 72 Jam yang 
Menegangkan, Mizan, Bandung 1998: 83. 
128 Syarwan Hamid, Dari Orde Baru ke Orde Reformasi, Mutiara Sumber Widya, Jakarta 1999: 92-96; 
James Luhulima, Hari-Hari Terpanjang: Menjelang Mundurnya Presiden Soeharto dan Beberapa 
Peristiwa Terkait, Penerbit Kompas, Jakarta 2001: 150. 
129 Julitis Pour, Jakarta Semasa Lengser Keprabon: 100 Hari Menjelang Peralihan Kekuasaan, Grarnedia, 
Jakarta 1998: 131-132. 
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resignations and refusing to serve in the next cabinet. With oppositional forces unprepared to 
cooperate, and regime loyalists deserting their patron, Soeharto's position had become untenable. 
The gradual demise of Soeharto further 'undermined the position of the hardline faction in the 
armed forces. Wiranto had consolidated his control and the President was increasingly deprived 
of his tools of political intervention. Pt:abowo tried to convince Siti Hardiyanti on 18 May that her 
·father had to dismiss Wiranto or declare martial law, but Soeharto· did not have the intention.or 
. the political power to do either. The successful opposition to his plans of recreating Ko~kamtib . 
had demonstrated to Soeharto where the new power centre in the armed forces was located, and 
that he was in too weak a position to challenge it. The prospect of martial law did not offer a 
realistic chance of stabilising his regime either, with the likely escalation of violence closing the 
option of a negotiated withdrawal from the political stage. Wiranto, on the other hand, was loyal 
. . . . 
enough to Soeharto to shield him from threats to his personal safety and ensure that his interests 
were considered when arrangements for the transfer of power were made. On 20 May, Wiranto 
concluded that Soeharto had to resign immediately: 
"I knew since April that Pak Harto had to announce his resignation at some stage in 
order to calm down the protesters. But I had hop¢d for a transitional period. ( ... ) 
After the meeting With the Muslim clerics, however, and the public reactions to it, I 
knew it was a matter of days rather than months. But at the same time, Pak Harto's 
dignity had to be maintained."130 · 
The concern for Soeharto's 'dignity', based on years of personal attachment and the ingrained 
military sentiment against populist uprisings, led Wiranto to ban a mass demonstration planned 
for 20 May, which was supposed to be headed by Amien ~s and bring millions of protesters to 
the streets. Amien ultimately called the rally off. after receiving clear hints from within the 
military that it could result in massive bloodshed. At the same time, however, Wiranto worked 
towards Soehiuto's retreat. On the same day, he convened a meeting of several academic experts · 
in his office, making it clear that within three hours he expected from them a convindng concept . 
for Soeharto's resignation.131 Several options were discussed, froni endorsing Soeharto's reform 
committee to military intervention, but only one looked politically and constitutionaliy 
· reasonable: Soeharto had to resign in Habibie's favour. 132 With this concept, Wirant<? left to see 
Soeharto. 
130 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October2000. . 
131 Interview with Salim Said, Jakarta 23 November 1998. Salim was one of the academics consulted by 
Wiranto. 
132 The military option would have seen Habibie resigning with Soeharto, bringing iri a triumvirate of 
ministers, with Wiranto as Minister of Defence and Security in effect dominating the new government until 
new elections could be held. Wiranto rejected this option, and he later often referred to the moment where 
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The Final Act: Soeharto's Fall and the End of the Hardliners 
The conversation that took place between Soeharto and the head of his armed forces on that night 
of20May1998 has been the subject of much speculation, focusing on the question of how much 
this discussion contributed to Soeharto's decision to lay down the presidency. Takashi Shiraishi 
claimed that after the meeting with Wiranto, 'Soeharto chose not to test the military's resolve and 
resigned the following day.' 133 It is more likely, however, that Soeharto had already made up his 
mind to resign when Wiranto arrived. The DPR had set Soeharto an ultimatum for 23 May to step 
down or face impeachment, .and he had unsuccessfully tried to form a new cabinet and establish 
the Reform Council. Against this background, Wiranto eJ(plained to him that the use of violence 
in order to defend the government would most likely make matters worse: 
"Personally, I think he agreed with this assessment. He didn't want a repetition of 
Tiananmen either.( ... ) Did my reminder play a roie in his resignation? I don't know. 
I believe he was tired and had enough, he just wanted to get it over with."134 
Soeharto's immediate acceptance of both Wiranto's political analysis and the recommendation it 
implied suggested that the President had arrived at the same conclusion. More than three decades 
earlier, Soeharto had witnessed the fruitless attempts of an ailing and isolated President to regain 
control over the military and the political system, ending in disgrace and personal decline. 
Soeharto must·have been well aware of the historicai parallels between Sukarno's eroding powers 
in 1966 and his own loss of authority in the last days of his regime. Rather than being stripped of 
his presidency by the MPR (a procedure that Sukarno had suffered at the initiative of his eventual 
successor), Soeharto agreed to hand over the presidency to Habibie and retire from political life. 
Soeharto · announced his resignation the following morning at the palace, and Habibie was 
sworn in only minutes later. When the ceremony was over, Wiranto took the microphone and 
informed the nation that ABRI supported the new President fully, but warned that the ru;med 
forces were determined to guarantee the 'dignity' of 'all former presidents and their families'. 
he could have taken over power easily but did not do so in order to avoid a bloodbath. See Peter Waldman; 
Raphael Pura and Marcus W Brauchli, 'Changes Put Soeharto on Outside, Looking In', The Asian Wall 
Street Journal 25 May 1998; Achmad Roestandi, Masuk Letnan, Keluar Letnan: .Sisi Jenaka Pengemban 
Dwi FungsiABRI, Kreasi Wacana, Yogyakarta2003: 132. · 
133 Takash1 Shiraishi, 'The Indonesian Military in Politics', in: Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (editor), 
The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia, Council on Foreign Relations Press; New York 1999: 82. 
134 InterView with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
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The warning pointed to Wiranto's conservative understanding of the regime change that he had 
helped to negotiate: the transfer of power facilitated the replacement of the political leadership in 
order to accommodate demands for reform, but did not constitute a complete break with or 
denunciation of the New Order regime. This view had placed him ainong the reluctant reformers 
in the lead·up to Soeharto's fall,.but set him on a path of conflict with more radical oppositional 
. forces in the post-authoritarian transition. Before facing the difficulties of the post-Soeharto era, 
however, Wiranto was forced to engage in a final struggle with his adversaries in the New Order 
military. 
Habibie's ascension to the presidency triggered a last confrontation between the moderate and 
· hardline factions in the armed forces. Despite Wiranto' s dominant· role in the dying days of 
Soeharto's regime, Prabowo felt confident that Habibie would remember the earlier promise to 
facilitate his rise to the helm of the armed forces. Prabowo went to see Habibie only hours after 
·his inauguration, and according to the latter's chief of staff, 
"Prabowo came straight to the point. He proposed to promote Subagyo as 
Commander-in-Chief, and leave Wiranto only with his ministry. Of course, he 
thought of himself as the next army ·chief. He said all this in such an intimidating 
manner that Habibie began to have concerns about having such a guy in his military -
at all." 135 · 
Habibie did not only deny Prabowo the promotion he sought, he had him relieved of his Kostrad 
command. It appears that Habibie, Wiranto and the Soeharto family had all agreed that Prabowo 
could not stay on. The Soeharto family believed that it was Prabowo who had provoked the unrest 
that had led to their ouster; Habibie now viewed the ill-tempered officer as a potential source of 
instability for his government; and Wiranto took the· welcome opportunity to remove his most 
· serious competitor for the military leadership. When Prabowo learnt of his dismissal on 22 May, 
his aliies in the armed forces encouraged him to disobey the order and lead an open challenge 
against Wiranto: 
"I met. some generals who were my supporters. Their message was: Let's have a 
confrontation. I said: Just keep quiet.( ... ) lknew that many of my soldiers would do 
. what I say. But I did not want them to die fighting for my job. I wanted to show I 
placed the good of the country and the people above my own position."136 
While Prabowo obViously had at least contemplated resisting liis removal, it remains uncle~ how 
far he and his associates were prepared to go. Prabowo went to see Habibie at his home to receive 
135 Interview with Let.Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani, Jakarta 26May1998. 
136 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'The Scapegoat?', Asiaweek · 3 March 2000. 
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a personal explanation for the decision to dismiss him, but his appearance was so threatening that 
Habibie had his family airlifted to the palace. 137 After Subagyo endorsed the dismissal, however, 
Prabowo offered no further resistance. He was assigned to head the ABRI Staff and Command 
School in Bandung, leaving him without troops and isolating him from political events in Jakarta. 
The conflict between the two major factions within the armed forces that had marked and 
influenced many of the political events during the final months of the Soeharto regime had coine 
to a dramatic and abrupt end. 
VI. CONCLUSION: MILITARY FACTIONALISM, REGIME CHANGE AND 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
The outcome of the factional dispute within the military in favor of the moderates was determined 
by a combination of internal and external factors. Most importantly, the steadily growing 
intensity of popular protest since March.1998 had reduced the chances for an effective hardline 
response to the crisis. The economic collapse drove more and more ordinary citizens onto the 
streets, joining a student movement determined not to relent before Soeharto had resigned. By 
May, the societal protest had spread throughout the archipelago, and even if Soeharto had decided 
to violently confront it, the overstretched resources of the military were incapable of managing all 
trouble spots at one time. Moreover, the hardliners were increasingly isolated from the political 
elite and influential societal forces. As the media accused hardline officers of involvement in 
severe human rights violations, regime figures like Habibie and oppositional leaders like Amien 
Rais. began to distance themselves from Prabowo and his faction. This left only tiny ultra- · 
modernist Islamic· groups to provide societal legitimation for a possible hardline intervention, 
making such an option unsustainable. Finally, Soeharto's decision not to order a last crackdoW11 
on his opponents and to hand in his resignation instead played an important role in deciding the 
intra-military competition. Although his political instincts had failed him throughout the crisis, he 
felt on 20 May that there was no way out for him. He knew that his power had. all but evaporated, 
and had little interest in clinging on to ~~ office as Sukarno had tried three decades before him. 
The inevitability of regi~e change: the public discrediting of the hardliners and Soeharto's 
relatively quick surrender gave the moderates the decisive edge over their opponents. 
137 Many reports circulating in the diplomatic corps at that ti~e suggested that Habibie's adjutants asked 
Prabowo to hand over a gun that he potentially could have displayed in Habibie's presence. Prabowo has 
insisted, however, that it was standard protocol for every Visitor to deposit dangerous items such as 
firearms with the presidential guards before seeing the President. 
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The victory of the moderate faction over the hardliners had a profound impact on both the 
·character of regime change and the position of the armed forces in fudonesia's democratic 
transition.· The moderates facilitated a controlled transfer of power within the constitutional 
format of the regime, assisting residual elements. of the New Order in forming the first post'." 
Soeharto government. Habibie's assumption of the presidency ended three decades of 
authoritarian rule, but it avoided a sharp break with the political power structures that had .. 
underpinned the regime. Consequently, key elements of the New Order, including the armed · 
forces, were able to extend some of their privileges and informal powers into the new political 
system. This aspect of the moderate victory becomes evident if contrasted with the potential 
consequences of a triumph by the hardliners. The declaration of martial law, as demanded by the 
hardline faction, would have almost certainly led to a further escalation of protests and increased 
use of military coercion against demonstrators. This scenario was unlikely to prolong the life of 
the New Order, but could have resulted in the kind of tumultuous regime collapse that typically 
elevates oppositional forces to replace sultanistic rulers. 
The defeat of the hardline faction also shaped perceptions within society and the politicai elite 
abm,it the urgency of reforming the military in the post-Soeharto era. The removal of hardline 
officers viewed as responsible for the kidnappings and the May riots temporarily satisfied public 
demands for change in the armed forces and eased societal pressure for a more wide-ranging· 
replacement of the New Order military leadership. The moderates, for their part, had helped to 
negotiate Soeharto' s resignation, and thus were initially not counted among the most challenging 
hurdles for a successful ·democratic transition. This interpretation distracted from the fact, 
however, that there were substantial fissures in the moderate faction now in charge of the post-. 
Soeharto military. The reluctantreformers under Wirailto had only in the escalating stages of the 
political crisis integrated ideas of regime change into their conceptual thinking. Before that, they 
· had viewed the gradual and rapid reformers as helpful allies in the competition with the hardline 
. . . 
faction, but had considered· their ideas of political iiberalisation ·and disengagement from the 
regime as too radical. For · Wiranto, the leap from defending his patron to assisting in his · 
resignation had exhausted much of his willingness to accommodate political chan~e. Beyond that, 
he had not paid much thought to the political format of a post-authoritanan system and the way 
·the military would operate in it. The gradual and rapid reformers; in contrast, had developed ideas 
for political reform since the mid-1990s, and despite the suddenness of Soeharto's demise, they 
appeared better pr~pared to engage with the new polity. The dividing lines between reluctant; 
gradual and rapid reformers would define newly emerging military faction8 in the post-Soeharto 
era, with each group developing highly diverse responses to the political change occurring around 
. them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ELITE CONFLICT, POPULAR PROTEST AND REGIME CHANGE: 
MUSLIMGROUPS AND THE DOWNFALL OF SOEHARTO 
Divisions within the armed forces have played a crucial role in shaping the character of regime 
change in i998, and have impacted on the prospects for democratic consolidation in general and 
civil-military reforms in particular. The intra-systemic transfer of power, negotiated by moderate 
elements in the military, laid the foundation for strong lines of continuity between the New Order 
state and the post-authoritarian polity. The exclusion of oppositional forces from the first post-
Soeharto government was not only the result of the regime change engineered by the military, 
· however. It also pointed to the failure of major socio-political entities to seize upon the 
opportunities presented by Soeharto's demise. Stepan asserted that 'a crucial task for the active 
opposition is to integrate as niany antiauthoritarian movements as possible into the institutions of 
the emerging democratic majority.' 1 Groups opposed to the Soeharto regime gained almost no 
representation m; or influence over, the executive and legislative institutions of the state for the 
first 18 months of the post-authoritarian transitiQn, leaving key decisions of structural reform to 
politicians (and m1litary officers) associated with the New Order. This failure was to a large 
extent cal!Sed by cleavages in the civilian political sphere, most of them rooted in long-standing 
competition between major religio-political constituencies. The discµssion in chapter 2 has 
.· . . . 
. identified political and ideological disputes within Indonesia's Muslim community as one of the 
main sources of conflict in civilian politics, weakening the civilian capacity to maintain 
democratic rule in the 1950s and assisting two successive authoritarian regimes to establish and 
sustain their rule. If the political crisis of 1997-1998 offered the charice to overcome such 
traditional rivalries, unite against the struggling regime and set the preconditions for successful 
democratic transition and consolidation, this opportunity was largely missed. · 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner suggested that 'unity of democratic purpose. among 
civilian political elites'2 is crucial to ending military intervention in politics and creating 
democratic civil-military relations in post-authoritarian transitions. Conflict between key civilian 
protagonists, on the other hand, is likely to complicate, obstruct or even abort the process of 
regime change and democratic consolidation. Diamond and Plattner argued. that 'the failure of 
· 
1 Alfred Stepan, 'On the tasks of a Democratic Opposition', in: Larry Diamond and Marc F, Platter 
(editors), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1993: 67. 
2 Diamond and Plattner 1996: xxiv. . 
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civilian politicians and parties in Nigeria to unite against the annulment of the 12 June 1993 
presidential election allowed the military to terminate the democratic transition ( ... ). ' 3 Similarly, 
Indonesia's leading non-regime politicians did not manage to form an alliance to remove 
Soeharto from office and install a transitional government that represented a clear break with the 
past; instead, the student movement and societal unrest damaged the President to an extent that 
encouraged . the armed forces to negotiate his departure and secure a controlled transfer of . 
authority to his deputy. Thus the complexities of inter-civilian conflict were as important for the 
nature of regime change as the dynamics of military factionalism. The failure of civilian elites to 
present a democratic alternative to the faltering regime did not only allow moderate military 
officers to negotiate the conditions of Soeharto's resignation, but also set the country's major 
socio;.political forces on a path of confrontation in the post-authoritarian system. 
·This chapter will discuss the political interaction between Muslim organisations and other key 
non-regime ·groups in the crisis that led to Soeharto's downfall. Influential authors on Indonesian 
Islam have pl'.ovided largely favourable accounts of the role that moderate Muslim leaders played· 
in the democratic transition. Robert Hefuer, for example, suggested that 'Soeharto galvanized 
moderate Muslim opposition to his rule'.4 He claimed that this oppositional campaign 'aligned 
· Wahid with Amien Rais', and that 'the two leaders coordinated their actions sufficiently that each 
reinforced the other. ' 5 Abdurrahman, according to Hefuer, was 'at the forefront of those 
demanding refonns', and had joined in the 'call for Soeharto to step down'.6 In Greg Barton's 
view, the Abdurrahman of 1997 'was calling for reform and was one of the first major public 
figures to speak out about the need for Soeharto to resign' .7 The following discussion will dispute 
such interpretations and argue that many Muslim leaders were reluctant to openly align with 
oppositional forces and demand Soeharto's resignation; instead, they were at various stages 
. ptepared to help stabilise the regime in exchange for political concessions. In doing so, they were 
motivated by the competition between Muslim groups. over religio-political hegemony that had 
influenced Indonesian politics since the colonial period and continued to impact on the events of 
1997-1998. The chapter will focus in particular on the political behaviour of the senior leadership 
ofNahdlatul Ulama, Muharnmadiyah and ICMI during the crisis. Their Islamic credentials made . 
them pivotal actors in the elite negotiations surrounding Soeharto's fall, with the secular-
Iiationalist forces led by Megawati Soekarnoputri playing only a marginal role. The divisions and 
3 Diamond and Plattner 1996: xxiv. 
4 Hefner 2000: 200. 
5
.Ibd: 199-200. 
6 Ibd:199. 
7 Greg Barton, Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta 
and Singapore 2002, 228. 
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conflicts between these major non-regime organisations ran counter to Diamond's and Plattner's 
demand for 'unity of democratic purpose among civilian political elites', excluding them from the 
formation of. the first post-authoritap.al1 government and preparing the scene for the severe 
fragmentatiOn of civilian political forces in the new democratic polity. 
I. STABILITY FIRST: NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND THE CRISIS 
As the largest organisation of traditionalist Islam in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama was certain to 
play an important role in deciding the fate of Soeharto's regime in times of economic and 
political crisis. NU had in the past helped to establish and stabilise authoritarian regimes, but had 
also demonstrated in 1965 that it could be a decisive factor for regime change when it chose to 
· withdraw its support for the incumbent government. For much of the New Order, however, the 
regime was sufficiently stable, and NU needed the regime more to secure its interests than the 
regime needed NU to consolidate its rule. Since 1984, Abdurrahman Wahid had navigated NU 
through . the political minefield of the New Order,· oscillating between· strategies of 
accommodation and confrontation towards Soeharto and his government. Using his lineage as the 
.grandson of NU's founder Hasjim Asj'ari to legitimise his control over the organisation, he 
promoted doctrinal and social reforms within the traditionalist community. Many of the kiai 
questioned Abdurrahman's adaptation of secular ideru; and were concerned about his close 
· relationship with non-Muslim and pro-democracy groups, but they revered him . for his deep 
knowledge of traditionalist culture and unrivalled political skills.8 Abdurrahman's erratic and 
idiosyncratic leadership style had been subjected to regular criticiSm at NU conferences, but his 
·political longevity and frequent . involvement in elite negotiations appeared to confirm the 
accuracy of his instincts. 
The mounting problems confronting the goverriment after 1996 ·and the widespread impression 
. that the New Order had entered its political twilight presented NU once again with the choice of 
either backing up or helping to unseat afaltering regime. h1the1997 elections, viewed as highly 
manipulated even for New Order standards, NahdlatulUlama faced two alternatives: first, the 
organisation could try to establish itself as a moderate voice of protest against the anachronistic 
. inflexibility of the· Soeharto government. This option would have led NU back to· confrontation 
with the regime; with political cooperation and material support most likely cut off. by a 
8 Munib Huda Muhammad (editor), Kiai Menggugat, Gus Dur Menjawab: Sebuah Pergu~ulan Wacana 
dan Transformasi, Fatina Press, Jakarta 1998. · · . 
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bureaucracy determined to secure another Golkar victory. The second alternative, namely 
extending its course of reconciliation with the regime pursued since late 1996, guaranteed NU a 
stable political environment and continued financial support for the pesantren, but put its claim to 
democratic credentials at risk. Confronted with this strategic dilemma, Abdurrahman clearly 
chose to support the troubled regime. Even before the election campaign began, he invited Siti 
Hardiyanti Rukmana to visit a number of crucial pesantren in NU strongholds, courting her as a 
potential successor to her father and opening the NU constituency to Golkar's electoral machine. 
Consolidating the Regime: Institutional Interests or Personal Agenda? 
The decision of the NU chairman to collaborate with the regime undermined the prospects for a 
more. united opposition against Soeharto whose support in the general populace was fading. In 
defining his course, Abdurrahman was driven by three major considerations related to political 
strategy, personal ambition and the socio-economic and religious interests of his community. First 
of all,· Megawati' s failure to build up a credible alternative to the government had contributed to 
Abdurrahman's conclusion that the New Order could last much longer than the Soeharto 
opponents were ready to admit. Given Soeharto's increasingly repressive approach, it appeared 
unwise to re-open the conflict with the President. Moreover, Abdurrahman saw the failure of 
other political actors as a chance to locate himself and his organisation once again in the centre of 
Indonesian politics: 
"Many people looked to Megawati as a possible leader. But she did not have the 
courage to lead, and buried herself in Kebagusan (her residence, M.M.) Let alone 
Amien Rais. He has become a victim of his own flip-flopping.( ... ) In this situation, I 
am called upon, and NU has a great chance. I can help Pak Harto to secure an orderly 
succession. "9 
The exact role he intended to play in Soeharto's succession remained unclear, but some within the 
Muslim elite believed that he ultimately sought to assume the presidency himself. 10 The third 
element in Abdurrahman's agenda was his concern for the religious and socio-economic interests 
of the Nahdlatul Ulama constituency. Many NU kiai were dependent on subsidies from the 
bureaucracy, and they pressured Abdurrahman to view cooperation with the goverriment as his 
priority. 11 Abdurrahrnan himself was well aware of NU' s economic backwardness, and he feared 
9 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Mataram/Lombok, 16 November 1997. 
10 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 28May1998. 
11 According to Abdurrahman, in 1997 NU had 6,800 pesantren and 21,000 schools under its coordination. 
While money for development and civil society projects was increasingly coming through international 
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that other religio-political constituencies would develop faster than his own. One of the major 
themes in his addresses to NU crowds was 'not to allow it to happen that others already take off, 
and the NU kids are left on the runway'. 12 Good relations with the regime translated into access to 
the ecoii.omic infrastructure of the state, and the memory of marginalisation: in the past ser\red as a 
reminder not to confront Soeharto again. 
Abdurrahman's support for the regime led to considerable irritation in pro-democracy circles, 
and even among some NU activists and kiai. Pro-democracy groups had hoped that Abdurrahman 
would protest against the exclusion of Megawati's party. from the elections scheduled for April 
1997, and probably even support his long-time friend's veiled recommendation to boycott the 
vote. Instead, the NU chief not only ordered his followers to go to the ballot box but also helped 
Golkar to secure its best result so far by attacking its only serious rival, PPP; Adam Schwarz 
noted that Abdumilnruin's support for Golkar was motivated by his inclination to 'put the NU's 
institutional interestS ahead of the democratic agenda, and his· credentials as a democratic 
reformer suffered as a result.' 13 For many within NU, however; it was more complicated than · 
that. While the kiai supported his. decision to ask NU members to participate in the elections in 
order to avoid confrontation with the regime, they criticiSed the open courtship of Siti Hardiyanti 
and Golkar. Habieb Syarief Mohammad, Chairman of NU's West Java branch, recalled the 
confusion among many kiai over NU's relationship with Golkar: 
"Many kiai called me and asked if Gus Dur's alliance with Golkarwas official NU 
policy or Gus Dur's personal agenda. It was a good decision to call on NU members 
to vote. But bringing Tutut to our pesantren? That had more to do with his own 
agenda, and NU became a laughing stock as a consequence ofthis."14 
The doubts within NU about Abdurrahman's strategy were also nurtured by the latter's own 
implausible explanations for his actions. Abdurrahman explained that he had supported 
Soeharto's party in order to prevent an electoral victory for PPP, which he claimed would have 
been viewed by the international community as a dangerous resurgence of radical Islam in 
Indonesia.15 Many NU members appeared to disagree: in the electfons, PPP gained significantly 
channels, like the American and Australian governments, UNICEF or foundations like the Ford Foundation 
and The Asia Foundation, the majority of NU institutions remained dependent on :ftmds from local 
governments. See 'NU Kini Miliki 21,000 Sekolah dan 6,800 Pesantren', Media "Indonesia 21 October 
1997.· . 
12 'Gus Dur: Warga NU JanganTertinggal di Landasan', Suara Merdeka 21August1997. 
13 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability, Third Impression, Talisman, 
Singapore 2004: 333. 
14 Interview with Habieb Syarief Mohammad, Lombok 17 November 1997. 
15 'Gus Dur Buka Rahasia Istigotsah Bersama Mbak Tutut', Jawa Pos, 15 October 1997. 
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in traditional NU strongholds, suggesting that Abdurrahman's dislike for the party was not shared 
at the grassroots. 
Opposing the Opposition: NU and the Crisis · 
Despite the controversies over his leadership style, there was no.doubt that the majority of kiai 
supported Abdurrahman's decision to exclude NU from political initiatives towards a more united 
opposition against the regime. Most of the kiai enjoyed the newly obtained harmony with the 
government, and they shared Abdurrahman's distrust of the reliability of oppositional figures like 
Amien Rais. Thus the monetary crisis hitting the country in August 1997 could not have come at 
a more inconvenient moment for both NU and Abdurrahman personally. The kiai feared that the 
economic crisis would affect their constituency seriously, with lower-class workers, peasants and 
underemployed most exposed to the impact of inflation and food shortages. Although many 
economists initially predicted that the largely rural-based NU constituency would be shielded 
from the crisis by its strong network in the informal sector, imported inflation soon began to cross 
urban borders, causing severe loss of purchasing power in rural areas. 16 In addition, much of rural 
Indonesia was affected by a serious drought related to El Nino, a specific climatic condition. The 
kiai therefore faced the prospect of increasing discontent within their constituency, raising 
expectations that they take a more critical stand towards the government. A more confrontational 
approach, however, endangered the flow . of subsidies facilitated by the strategy of 
accommodation, which in times of crisis played an even more crucial role than during the years 
of constant economic growth. 
Thus the crisis presented itself to most NU leaders not as an opportunity to remove an 
unpopular authoritarian government, but as a disturbance in their search for a comfortable space 
in Soeharto's polity. For Abdurrahman personally, the crisis also threatened the consolidation of 
his position within Nahdlatul Ulama. He had aimed to strengthen his grip over the organisation at 
an NU conference scheduled for November 1997 in Lombok, hoping that the smooth relations 
with the government would translate into increased support of Nahdlatul Ulama officials for his 
leadership. Previous conferences had seen enormous outbreaks of dissent against Abdurrahman, 
with critics attacking both his tendency to make erratic statements and his lack of managerial 
skills. The last major NU.gathering, the Cipasung Congress in 1994, had voted for Abdurrahman 
16 Anne Booth, 'The Impact of the Indonesian Crisis on Welfare: What do We Know Two Years On?', in: 
Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (editors), Indonesia in Transition. Social Aspects of Reformasi and 
Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2000: 159. 
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only by a narrow margin.17 Since then, he had changed his approach to the Soeharto regime, and 
the Lombok conference was therefore viewed as the first internal test of Abdurrahman's new 
· ·policy of non-confrontation. 
Nahdlatul Ulama's response to the crisis was defined by spiritual and political support for the 
embattled· govemment. 18 ·In this regard, three different types of assistance were prominent. First, 
NU echoed the assessment of the Soeharto regime that the crisis was not a political phenomenon, 
but an unfortunate external shock. Consequently, the NU leadership refrained from analysing the 
structural roots of the problem, asking its members· instead to pray for the recovery of the 
economy. Second, NU issued statements of. support for Soeharto's leadership, not only 
consolidating his position during the crisis but also assisting his re-election bid. The chairman of 
NU's religious advisory board, Kiai Ilyas Ruchiat, underlined in mid-September 1997 that the 
country still needed Soeharto as its leader.19 The third element consisted of attacks on Soeharto's 
opponents, largely carried out by Abdurrahman himself. After Amien declared in late September 
that he was ready to succeed Soeharto, Abdurrahman attacked the Muhammadiyah chairman as a 
publicity-seeking self-promoter with a hidden political agenda, and threatened to mobilise one 
million NU members against possible 'unconstitutional moves'.2° Furthermore, .Abdurrahman 
demanded that Soeharto alone be given the authority to. arrange his succession, as too many 
participants in the debate would only produce a chaotic outcome.21 Abdurrahman's attacks on 
Amien and his repeated pro-regime statements appear to be at odds with Hefner's analysis that 
'the two leaders coordinated their actions' and were 'aligned' against the regime. Abdurrahman 
made little effort to hide his hostility towards the Muhammadiyah chairman, and used every 
occasion to demonstrate ~t his current interests lay in standing by the regime and not· in trying 
to overthrow it. 
NU's decision to distance itself from the growing opposition against the regime allowed it to 
hold its conference in Lombok in November 1997 without experiencing the high levels of 
government intervention so typical of previous events. In his opening speech, Ilyas Ruchiat 
17 Nahdlatul Ulama conducts congres~es every five years, with mid-term conferences (Kimferensi Besa~, or 
Konbes) organised in between tO evaluate the performance of the leadership elected at the congresses. The 
· Lombok conference was one of these mid-term ·conferences. 
18 Marcus Mietzner, 'Between Pesantren and Palace: Nahdlatul Ulama and its Role in the Transition', in: 
Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (editors), The Fall of Soeharto; Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst 1998: 
179~199. . 
19 'GM. Trikora, KH Ilyas Ruchiat Mendukung Pak Harto', Media Indonesia 17 September 1997. 
20 'NU akan Gerakan Kekuatan Massa', Kompas 7 October 1997; 'Gus Dur: Gerakan NU Bukan Basa-
Basi', Surabaya Post 9 October 1997. · 
21 'Suksesi Harus Lewat Satu Tangan, Jika Banyak Tangan Bisa Amburadul', Tempo Interaktif 31 October 
1997. 
141 
mentioned the devastating impact of the crisis, but did not link the economic misfortune to 
questions about the quality of political leadership.22 Ilyas had been a tacit supporter of Golkar in 
the past, and in a separate interview, left no doubts about his loyalty to Soeharto: 
"We can't desert Pak Harto now. He has made a great contribution to our country, 
and he is a great friend of NU. We will do all we can to overcome this crisis, and 
assist Pak Harto in every possible way." 23 
Abdurrahman, for his part, told the delegates that 'NU supports the leadership of President 
Soeharto in organising a safe and smooth succession' .24 He repeated his attacks on Amien, 
underlining that NU would not support anybody who promoted his candidacy in the press. With 
this, Abdurrahman effectively ruled out the possibility of using the crisis to unite Indonesia's 
oppositional forces against the New Order, and exposed long-standing religio-political cleavages 
as the major reason for doing so. NU branches generally welcomed the de-escalation vis-a-vis the 
bureaucracy, reporting that they now . faced. the opposite problem of. being accused of 
'collaboration'.25 Ultimately, a large majority ofNU's regional chapters endorsed Abdurrahman's 
leadership. A group of young activists, who had a more critical view of NU's support for the 
regime but hoped that it was only temporary, chose not to speak up at the conference. 
ChangeYes, Opposition No: The Crisis Escalates 
The cooperation. between NU and the regime stabilised Abdurrahman's · leadership of the 
organisation, but he was also aware of the negative side effects this strategy incurred. His 
reputation as a democratic reformer had been severely damaged, and NU was more and more 
isolated from the · key forces . of civil society that promoted political change. In order to 
counterbaiance this trend, Abdurrahman declared only a couple of days after the Lombok 
conference that NU was opposed to the status quo and demanded substantial political reform.26 
The escalating crisis had ultimately forced Abdurrahman to adjust his public rhetoric, but he 
remained opposed. to any form of organised challenge to the political framework of the New 
Order. Based on the news that Soeharto had suffered a mild stroke in early I)ecember, 
. 
22 Rais Aaffi PBNU, 'Khutbah Iftitah Rais Aam Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama Pada Pemb~ Munas 
dan Konbes NU', Bagu, 17 November 1997. · 
23 Interview with Dyas Ruchiat, Mataram 19 November 1997 . 
. 
24 Abdurrahman Wahid during his accountability speech at the Konbes NU, Mataram 19 November 1997, 
personal notes by the author. . · 
25 PWNU Jawa Timur, 'Laporan PWNU Jawa Timur Pada Konbes ·N1J di Lombok', Mataram 19 
November 1997. 
26 'Gus Du~: NU tidak Menghendaki Status Quo', Kompas 24 November 1997. 
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Abdurrahman now believed that the President could die soon, and left no doubt that NU would 
support Try Sutrisno as Soeharto's constitutional successor. William Liddle asserted that Try had 
been Abdurrahman' s preferred presidential candidate for some time, expecting him to neutralise 
the threat of political Islam and 'be less authoritarian, more consensual, and more attentive to the 
needs of ordinary Indonesians than Soeharto had been. ' 27 The other alternative, a collective 
leadership of political, societal and military leaders, as proposed by Arnien Rais, was anathema to 
the NU chairman.28 It was in this phase of the crisis that the foundations for an intra-systemic 
· change of government were laid, with key societal leaders ruling out the possibility of forming an 
oppositional collective prepared to take over from the crumbling regime: 
"What is in it for me if I joined Amien in bringing down Soeharto and forming the 
next government? Amien and his friends are not to be trusted. They now suck up 
(menjilat) to me and NU because they know we are important, but once Soeharto is 
gone, they want power for themselves. I know them.( ... ) We are much better off by 
supporting Try. He is a good nationalist, and when he assumes power, everything 
will be according to the constitution. Amien, in contrast, wants chaos."29 
In mid-January, Abdurrahman declined an invitation to meet Arnien and Megawati, holding 
political talks with Siti Hardiyanti instead in which he assured Soeharto's daughter that he had no 
plans of joining the opposition against the government.30 Despite Soeharto's waning political 
fortunes, Abdurrahman preferred the benefits of cooperation with the regime to the uncertainty of 
building a coalition with his religio-political rivals.31 The 'unity of democratic purpose among 
civilian political elites', which Diamond and Plattner viewed as crucial for ending military-
backed authoritarian rule, appeared impossible to achieve. 
· Crisis and Convalescence: Abdurrahman and the Struggle for Hegemony in NU 
Ironically, Abdurrahman's expectation of a qufok Soeharto death almost turned against himself.· 
·On 19 January 1998, he suffered a serious stroke, resulting in the complete loss of his already 
impaired eyesight and causing severe damage to his motor skills. During his convalescence, 
Abdurrahman struggled to stay informed about political events, but he lost operational control 
27 R. William Liddle, 'Regime: The New Order', in: Donald K. Emmerson (editor), Indonesia Beyond 
Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London 1999: 67. 
28 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 17 December 1997. · 
29 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 17 December 1997. 
30 'Resmi Diumumkan "Kelompok 28 Oktober"', Media Indonesia 16January1998. 
31 In an interview with a Dutch radio station, Abdurrahrnan added another reason: 'So, if you ask me why 
NU is not mobilised to, let's say, topple Soeharto, then the answer is easy: I don't want my people to be 
slaughtered by the military.' See 'Gus Dur: Soeharto Harns Turun', Kabar dari Pijar 13 January 1998. 
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over NU.32 Given the previous concentration of power in Abdurrahman's hands, however, no 
obvious replacement emerged- to lead NU in the same authoritative way as the three-term 
chairman had done. 33 There were at least three groups competing for control of the organisation: 
first, the religious leadership around Ilyas Ruchiat and Sahal Mahfudz, who were apolitical in the 
sense that they wanted to maintain close relations to the power centre in order to promote the 
interests of NU's pesantren. They demonstrated loyalty to both Soeharto arid the military, 
opposing initiatives that were likely to lead NU on the path of opposition to the New Order. 
Second, the Abdurrahman loyalists coordinated by Deputy Secretary-General Arifin Djunaidi, 
who wanted to integrate Nahdlatul Ulama into the discourse about political alternatives to 
Soeharto, but refrained from openly antagonising him. As Abdurrahman -recovered from the 
stroke at his residence in South Jakarta, the loyalists established a temporary office there to 
maintain control over the Central Board. The third-group consisted of young NU activists, who 
staged open demonstrations against Soeharto and demanded his resignation.34 The various 
factions pursued their own strategies, but the majority still backed a policy of non-confrontation. 
Consequently, an NU leadership meeting in mid-February decided to support the president to be 
elected by the upcoming MPR session, i.e. Soeharto. 35 
After Soeharto's re-election in March 1998, Abdurrahman developed a double strategy that was 
difficult to read for both his followers and his increasingly numerous critics._ While blasting the 
Soeharto government in interviews with foreign media and meetings with diplomats, he assisted 
-the President in his efforts to consolidate power in the domestic context. After the formation of a 
cabinet widely seen as ridiculously nepotistic, Abdurrahman contended that NU was satisfied 
with it as some NU members had been included. Asked who exactly these NU representatives 
were, he had to pass on the question.36 In mid-April, he claimed that demonstrating students in 
Y ogyakarta had been paid by certain parties, undermining the credibility of the protest movement 
32 Abdurrahman spent more than two months in hospital, returning to his home on 22 March. See 'Gus Dur 
Sudah Boleh Pulang', Jawa Pos 20 March 1998. 
33 NU Deputy Chairman Hafidz Utsman was· appointed Acting Chairman of NU on the day after 
Abdurrahman's stroke, and Secretary-General Ahmad Bagdja was given the mandate to act as spokesman 
for the organisation. Hafidz and Ahmad Bagdja were both low-profile functionaries without significant 
powerbases. See 'Hafidz Utsman Ditunjuk Pimpin NU Sehari-hari', Media Indonesia 21 January 1998. 
34 The activists were organised in three major NU-affiliated associations: IPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Nahdlatul Ulama Students' Association), IPPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Putri Nahdlatul Ulama, Nahdlatul 
Ulama Female Students' Association) and PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian 
Movement of Islamic Students). 'Generasi Muda NU: Krisis Ekonomi Akibat Mismanajemen', Suara 
Pembarutin 22 February 1998; Forum Aliansi OKP/LSMIMAHASISWA, 'Seman Suksesi Damai dan 
Terbuka Untuk Keselamatan dan Masa Depan Rakyat dan Bangsa Indonesia', Jakarta 5 February 1998. 
35 'NU Han ya bukung Yang Dipilih MPR', Jawa Pos 21 February 1998. 
36 'Tinggalkan RSCM, Gus Dur Langsung Komentari Kabinet', Media Indonesia 23 March 1998. Within 
the cabinet, only the Minister of Religious Affairs Quraish Shihab ·and the Minister for Women Affairs Tu ti 
Alawiyah had NU backgrounds. 
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at a time when radical elements within the regime were desperately looking for a pretext to crush 
the dissent.37 Overwhelmed by the growing societal dissent, and fearful that Abdurrahman's 
manoeuvres might damage NU's reputation irreversibly, NU officials from all three camps took 
the initiative to politically incapacitate their chairman.· Even Ilyas and Sahal, now sensing the 
shift in the power constellation, were worried that NU might ruin its prospects in the coming 
post-authoritarian era if it collaborated too closely with a doomed regime. A week after 
Abdurrahman's heedless statement about the venality of the student movement, the NU central 
board issued a declaration supporting the demands of the protesters, an~ called on the military to 
listen to the aspirations of the people.38 Abdurrahman was deliberately excluded from the drafting 
of the press release.39 Although contradicted by his subordinates, Abdurrahman did not argue 
against the declaration, suggesting that he enjoyed watching his organisation undermining 
Soeharto while he personally continued to maintain good relations with the President. 
NU's policyshift reflected the rapid decline ofSoeharfo's authority. Even conservative kiai in 
the regions strove to reconcile their traditionalistfikih with the popular demands for reform.40 The 
turn against the embattled ruler was not followed, however, by attempts to forge a broad coalition 
to prepare for the imminent succession. In this, the NU board shared the scepticism of its 
chairman. Like Abdurrahman, many NU kiai still feared a possible backlash by the residual 
powers of the regime against their constituency, and they too had little interest in helping their 
modernist rivals to replace the faltering government. The ulaina were concerned, however, that 
Abdurrahman allowed NU's general policy to be defined by what Kevin O'Rourke called 'his 
37 The Muslim poet Emha Ainun Nadjib wrote a sharp critique of Abdurrahman's behavior, cynically 
expressing his admiration for the latter's ability to analyse events despite his physical shortcomings and his 
non-involvement in the incidents he claimed to know everything about. He criticised the pre8s for 
publishing every single piece of Abdurrahman's 'gossip', while hardly reporting about the objects of the 
. dispute, the students themselves. See Ernha Ainin Nadjib, Saat~Saat Terakhir Bersama Soeharto, Jakarta 
1998: 161-162 . 
. 
38 'PB NU: ABRI Sebaiknya Dukung Reformasi', Kompas 16 April 1998. 
39 Arifin Djunaidi attempted in vain to convince the Central Board to listen to Abdurrahman before 
completing the draft, but his suggestion was ignored. Arifin had to engage in a heated argument with NU 
Deputy Chair Fajrul Falaakh, who was put in charge of writing the release in cooperation with senior kiai 
Mustofa Bisri. Fajrul reminded Arifin that it was unnecessary to carry Abdurrahman's name for all 
purposes, and that the latter was sick anyway. Interview with Fajrul Falaakh, Yogyakarta 22 November 
2000. 
40 Nur Iskandar al-Barsany, one· of Central Java's leading kiai, complained that NU should have 
popularised the ideas of refonn much earlier: 'If ideas like (those in the NU declaration in April) had been 
developed by NU Headquarters earlier; and had those ideas become the theological foundation in the NU 
community, especially in the communities of the kiai and the pesantren, I am sure that in times when the 
state is facing a crisis like this, the culture of silence would not have been so evident.' He therefore 
demanded that the kiai immediately begin developing a theological foundation for the debate of politics in 
the pesantren (fikih siyasah), including the discussion of social issues (al-fiqh al-ijtimd 'iy). KH Nur 
Iskandar al-Barsany, 'Ulatna, Santri dan Refonnasi', Suara Merdeka 21April1998. 
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determination to thwart Amien Rais' .41 The majority in the NU board did not believe that 
Amien's leadership of the protest movement was sufficient reason for Nahdlatul Ulama to reject 
its goals. In the words of one NU deputy chair: 
"Between Gus Dur and Amien, that was personal. Whenever Amien said 'A', Gus 
Dur said 'B'. If Amien said 'B', Gus Dur said 'A'.( ... ) We, however, had to defend 
the interests of NU. And by April and May, it was clear for everybody to see that the 
regime had no future." 42 
Despite Soeharto's eroding power, the diversity of views within Nahdlatul Ulama offered the 
President opportunities to divide the opposition towards him. It was in particular Abdurrahman's 
continued confrontation with Amien Rais and other modernists that allowed Soeharto to hope that 
. the fragmentation of political Islam, used and nurtured since the late 1950s tb sustain 
authoritarian rule, would secure his survival in the crisis of 1998. So long as the goal of excluding 
competitors from power motivated non-regime forces to align with Soeharto rather than with 
·reformist groups, the President's chances of maintaining his grip on the political elite remained 
high. Unfortunately for the President, however, the importance of elite politics for the solidity of 
·the regime was on the decline. In the months of April and May 1998, the political initiative 
shifted more and more from the divided elites to the uncontrollable force of the student 
movement, with substantial consequences for the character of regime change that was about to 
occur. 
II. CHALLENGING SOEHARTO: MUHAMMADIYAH, AMIEN RAIS AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 
Like Abdurrahman Wahid in Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah' s leader Amien Rais had 
experienced high levels of fluctuation in his relationship with the New Order regime. In his 
earlier years, he had criticised what he saw as anti-Islamic policies of the Soehaito government, 
condemning the disproportionat~ representation of non-Muslims in the bureaucracy and economic 
privileges for the Chinese. His predilection for sharp, witty comments, often in defence of the 
modernist community, made him popular among Islanlic intellectuals, but also consolidated his 
reputation as a 'radical' in the eyes of traditionalist, secular and non-Muslim constituencies: After 
S.oeharto's endorsement of the foundation ofICMI in 1990, Amien changed his stand towards the 
government. He now believed that the . interests of the Muslim community vis-a:-vis the regime 
41 O'Rourke 2002: 83. 
42 Interview with Fajrul Falaakh, Y ogyakarta 22 November 2000. 
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were best served by seeking representation in it, and thought that ICMI provided a political 
platform to achieve this goal. Amien built political networks with Muslim bureaucrats around 
Habibie and defended the Soeharto government against accusations that it politicised Islam for 
· the purpose of regime maintenance. Amien's cooperation with the government also reflected the 
political interests ofMuhammadiyah, and facilitated his rapid rise in the organisation. For most of 
the New Order period, Muhammadiyah had cultivated good relations with the regime, declaring 
itself a non-political organisation in 1971. Subsequently, many Muhammadiyah members held 
important positions in the bureaucracy and Golkar. For Muhammadiyah, Amien appeared to have 
all the qualifications to lead the organisation. On the one hand, he represented a new generation 
of Islamic intellectuals, promoting reforms and breaking with the conservative leadership style of 
Fachruddin and Azhar Basyir. On the other hand, his easy access to government circles offered 
protection for the vast network of schools and social institutions run by Muhammadiyah 
throughout the archipelago.hi 1994, Amien became Muhatiunadiyah's chairman. 
Once in charge, however, Amien began to question the effectiveness of cooperation with the 
New Order. He acknowledged that the Muslim community had received a number of legal-
political concessions, but admitted that the regime had not changed its repressive character. On 
balance, Amien concluded, the New Order had profited more from his regime participation than 
Muhammadiyah and the modernist Muslim constituency: 
"What have we achieved? Yes, our wives and daughters can wear jilbab now, we 
have Islamic banking, and we are more free in exercising our religious practices. But 
have we achieved a more just, equal and open society? Soeharto and his cronies are 
· firmly in power, and yes, our policy of engagement might have actually contributed 
to that.''43 
In late 1996 and early 1997, Amien issued a series of statements critical of the regime, mostly 
focusing on the excesses of economic cronyism in So('.harto's family and inner circle. The regime 
reacted by forcing Amien to resign from his senior position in ICMI, and it put pressure on the 
Muhammadiyah Central Board to distance itself.from its Chairman. Lukman Harun, a former 
Parmusi politician and Dewan Dakwah offi9ial who had joined Golkar in the 1990s, was the most 
prominent critic of Amien's confrontational course against the regime. The majority of the 
organisation, however, stood firm behind its Chairman. Muhammadiyah representatives reported 
from the . regions that while the bureaucracy had issued continued warnings against the 
organisation, there was no significant regime backlash against their educational and social 
43 Interview with Ami en Rais, Y ogy~karta 25 November 1997. 
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institutions.44 The high representation of Muhammadiyah officials in the local bureaucracies and 
Golkar boards, and the deep entrenchment of its socio-religious network throughout the New 
Order state, helped to protect Amien from regime-iilitiated punishment for his criticism.. 
Crisis and Opportunity: Amien's Challenge 
Ironically, the crisis that began to unfold in August 1997 consolidated Amien's authority within 
Muhammadiyah. In the eyes of many Muhammadiyah :functionaries, the economic decline of the 
New Order confirmed the accuracy ofAmien's earlier criticisms of the regime, which were now 
echoed in the standard commentaries of political observers. The crisis transformed Amien from a 
prominent Muslim leader into a key national figure, especially after he, rather. spontaneously, 
declared his preparedness to run for the presidency in September 1997. 45 The challenge to 
Soeharto's bid for re-election was a cultural revolution in a regime that had previously used its 
tools of repression and political engineering to secure the President's unanimous re-appointment. 
Megawati's ouster in 1996, following rumours she might challenge Soeharto for the presidency, 
had underlined. the President's insistence on undivided support for his rule. While Amien did not 
command a political party in the Assembly, and could therefore not directly intervene in the 
electoral process, the progressing crisis provided his candidacy with a momentum difficult to 
control by the regime. In anticipation .of potential manoeuvres by Amien in the Assembly, 
Soeharto had in· August already removed his name from a list of candidates for MPR 
membership.46 This decision excluded Amien from the formal structures of the New Order 
regime and strengthened his determination to undermine them from outside. 
The regime criticism launched by the Muhammadiyali chairman was unique· not only in its 
. trenchant intensity, but also ill its outreach to other socio-political constituencies. Among the 
leaders of In4onesia's major socio-political forces, Amien emerged as the only key figure 
. 
44 Interview with Muhammadiyah representatives from Padang and Makassar in the Muhammadiyah office 
in Y ogyakarta, 28 November 1997. The Chairman of the Muhammadiyah branch in Magelang described 
Amien's criticism as 'sincere, clean, and without any pretentions'; and a.S such in line with Muhammadiyah's 
mission. See 'Senat UMS Tolak Serahkan "K!l9s Dukungan"', Bernas 4 October 1997. 
45 Amien's candidacy had begun with a question from famous soothsayer Permadi at a seminar atthe Legal 
Aid Institute LBH (Lembaga.Bantuan Hukum) in Jakarta in late September. Permadi had asked Amien if he 
was ready to take up the presidency if he were elected that day. Amien responded 'God willing, rm ready'. 
See 'Caton Muhammadiyith dari Muhammadiyah', Suara Independen Oktober 1997. . 
46 Amien interpreted his exclusion from the MPR as a rupture in the relations between the regime and 
Muhammadiyah. He simply stated that 'A.R. Fachruddin was included, Ahmad Azhar Basyir was included, 
Amien Rais is not included'. See 'Amien Rais: "Apakah Habibie itu Well Qualified? Jawaban Saya, Yes'", 
. Forum Keadilan 20 October 1997. 
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working towards a united opposition against the authoritarian regime. Megawati followed 
Abdurrahman in rejecting active regime opposition because she felt responsible for the security of 
her followers. This reluctance was underpinned and aggravated further by her non-combative 
personal style. Believing that the New Order might crack down.on a possible protest movement, 
Megawati avoided any public statement that her supporters or the regime could interpret as an 
. appeal for active resistance against Soeharto. Her husband contended that 
"I know everybody was critical of Ibu Mega because she didn't do more. But these 
people have no idea how it's like to have the responsibility for millions of people. 
One wrong word, and there cquld have been a bloodbath." 47 
Amien, on the other hand, was confident that the entrenchment of Muhammadiyah' s soc10-
religious institutions in the regime would grant them immunity from potential acts of retribution, 
allowing him to ignore advice by some of his sympathisers in the government to drive . a less 
confrontational course. Thus, instead of toning down his criticism, he developed strategies to 
build up a ·broad-based alliance against Soeharto. By December, he contemplated . ways. of 
cooperating with both Abdurrahman and ~egawati. A coalition between nationalist elements, 
traditionalist Islam and modernist Muslims would have been a seriolis challenge to the crisis-
ridden government, possibly overcoming the very disunity among Indonesia's civilian forces that 
had allowed non-democratic actors to establish and sustain decades of authoritarian rule. The 
. response Amien received from Abdurrahman, however, was negative. Abdurrahman had no 
intention of aligning himself with anti-Soeharto forces and thereby putting his good relationship 
with the regime at risk.48 Megawati, for her part, was slightly more sympathetic. She was deeply 
. suspicious· of Amien because of the latter's reputation for Islamic exclusivism, but acknowledged 
. his contribution to undermining the regirrie that had excluded her from political life since 1996.49 
Megawati agreed to two public appearances with Amien in January.so The meetings failed, 
however, to overcome their mutual prejudices; .Megawati saw no reason to revise her view of 
Amien as a political · opportunist, and Amien felt that his perception of Megawati as an 
intellectually limited and politically overrated amateur had been confirmed.s1 By early February, 
the contact broke off~ 
47 Interview with Taufik Kiemas, Sanur/Bali 10 October 1998. 
48 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 17 December 1997. 
49 Laksamana Sukardi, a leading PDI official, maintained that 'of course they (Amien and Megawati, 
M.M.) had a difficult relationship. But one thing Ibu Mega knew: Amien was as disgusted about the 
machinations of the New Order as she was, and there appeared to be some common ground.' Interview 
with Laksamana Sukardi, Sanur/Bali 10 October 1998. · 
50 'Opposition in Public Attack on Soeharto', Sydney Morning Herald 26 January 1998. 
51 Jose Manuel Tesoro, 'Forging a Shaky Alliance', Asiaweek 6 February 1998. 
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Failure and Temptation: Amien's Short-lived Truce with the Regime 
The failure of Amien's efforts to forge an anti-regime alliance between key elites reflected the 
fragmentation of Indonesia's civilian forces, and highlighted once again why the New Order had · 
been able to survive for such a long time. The unwillingness of traditionalist and nationalist 
leaders to join him in eroding the regime had a profound impact on Amien, causing him to 
reconsider his opposition towards Soeharto and the inclusivist character it was supposed to 
acquire. Furthermore, Soeharto's decision to anoint )!abibie as his vice-presidential candidate 
provided an additional incentive for revising his oppositional attitude towards the government. 
Indicating his shifting position, he returned to some of his pre-crisis prejudices. He supported, for 
example, the President's attacks on Chinese conglomerates, identifying them as the source for the 
country's economic problems.52 The regime's increased use oflslamic sentiments in the crisis and 
the prospect· of a Habibie presidency, under which Amien was likely to play a prominent role, 
apparently softened the latter's criticism of the Soeharto government. In mid-February, Amien 
. told a Muhammadiyah gathering that Habibie had assured him Soeharto would do all he could to 
overcome the economic crisis. In addition, Amien advised Emil Salim, a widely respected former 
minister and fellow ICMI associate, to drop his public candidacy for the vice-presidential 
nomination, which the latter had launched in protest against Soeharto's monopolistic dominance 
over the political system.53 For Amien, Emil's move carried the risk that Soeharto might view 
Emil's campaign as representing ICMI as a whole and thus feel encouraged to cancel Habibie's 
nomination. 
The opposition to Emil's candidacy suggested that Amien was about t() redefine his political 
priorities. The efforts to secure the rise of an Islamic ally to one of the top posts of the regime had 
taken precedence over the support for expressions of protest against the non-democratic format of 
the New Order polity. Speculation was rife that Amien had suspended his criticism of Soeharto 
and thrown his support behind Habibie because he aimed at cabinet posts for Muhammadiyah.54 
The subsequent accusations of opportunism damaged Amien's reputation, and his critics appeared 
unconvinced by assurances that he only followed the political advice of the former Masyumi 
52 'Amien Rais Imbau Warga Muhammadiyah Tetap Tenang', Republika 11February1998. 
53 Amien Rais, 'Emil Salim dan Duet Soeharto-Habibie', Republika 25 February 1998. 
54 Amien offered to have his head shaved if it turned out that he sought cabinet seats for himself or his 
organisation. 'If he (Amien himself) has ambitions to get one of the ministerial seats, then it's not him 
anymore. If that happens, this is no Amien who is a Rais (leader) any longer. Or no Rais who is Amien 
(trusted) any longer. I receive bets for shaving my ]lair.' See 'Berl Pak Harto Kesempatan Lagi', Jawa Pos 
19February1998. 
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leader Muhammad Natsir 'to build up good communication channels with all segments of this 
state, but don't· make commitments'. 55 As Soeharto was re-elected in March with Habibie as his . 
Vice-president, Aiilien called on his followers to remain calm and pray for the success of the new 
government. The fundamental opposition of the previous months, driven by the analysis that 
Soeharto's continued rule was certain to result in Indonesia's political and· economic collapse, 
seemed now far away. 
From Elite Politics to Populist Power: Amien and the Student Movement 
Aiilien's sudden reconciliation with the regime raised questions about the motivation of the 
reform agenda he had driven so ferociously, and pointed to a general pattern ofstrategic interests 
within the non-regime elite. Many of his critics suspected that Atilien had sought to remove the 
. regime mainly because it had broken its promises of increased political powers for Islamic 
·leaders, and that he had hoped democratic change would deliver the levels of regime participation 
that the Muslim majority deserved. The prospect of a Habibie presidency, however, re-opened the 
possibility of ac~ieving fair political representation for Muslims without replacing the 
foundations of the NewOrder polity. From this perspective, regime change was largely a function 
. . -
of serving sectoral interests of political elites, and not a rejection of non~democratic rule as such. 
-Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz have suggested that Abdurrahman, Megawati and Amien 'still 
considered that their ambitions could be achieved from within the regime', and that one of their 
main fears_ was 'losing control. to more radical and populist forces' .56 While this observation is 
accurate for the political behavior of both Abdurrahman and Megawati throughout the crisis, it 
only partially eaptures the complexity of Aiilien's rapidly changing regime relations. After only 
one month of conciliatory interaction, Aiilien concluded that Habibie was unable to serve his 
interests 'from within the regime'. Consequently, he aligned himself with the very 'radical arid 
- -
populist forces' Robison and Hadiz asserted were contradictory to his interests. Hoping to 
combine his influence in elite politics with the moral authority and mass-driven force of popular 
protest, the chairman of Muhammadiyah linked up with the student movement in order to seek -
Soeharto's ultimate removal from power. 
Aiilien's abrupt switch from regime support to fundamental opposition was reflective of the 
many strategic choices and dilemmas that political actors faced in the constantly changing context 
55 'Berl Pak Haito Kesempatan Lagi', Jawa Pos 19February1998. - · -
56 Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an 
Age of Markets, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York 2004: 171. 
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of the crisis. But it also consolidated the view among Amien's critics in the elite that he was too 
·unstable a partner to form a coalition with. The two main faCtors that led Amien to cancel his 
temporary support for Soeharto underlined, in the eyes of his political rivals, that his interests 
were largely defined by tactical and constituency-based considerations. First, the announcement · 
of what David Jenkins called a 'Caligulean' cabinet in mid-March convinced Amien that 
Soeharto had no intention of granting Habibie greater political influence, let alone of preparing 
him as his successor.57 Instead of appointing critical Islamic figures from the activist faction of 
ICMI, Soeharto had chosen a cabinet of cronies, with his Chinese business associate Bob Hasan 
taking the crucial trade portfolio. Second, popular protest had replaced elite politics as the main 
factor driving political change, leading Amien to believe that Soeharto's fate would be decided on 
the streets rather than in political backroom deals. 58 After the cabinet line-up was made public; 
Amien started immediately to tour the campuses, ridiculing the quality of the ministers and 
gaining the sympathy of the students by mediating in their conflicts with the security forces.59 He 
stepped up his· international media campaign against Soeharto, and attempted to drive a wedge 
between the armed forces and the President by stating that the hope of the people now rested with 
the military."0 With Abdurrahman branding the students as paid agents of unnamed group 
interests and Megawati refusing to play an active role in the opposition, Amien emerged as the 
spiritus rector of the student movement. 
The failure to build an elite-based alliance with central figures of other religio-political 
constituencies led Amien to apply his pluralist strategy to the new coalition with students and 
grassroots groups. The student movement included significant non-Muslim and pluralist 
elements, and their leaders were apparently more prepared to believe in Amien's inclusivist turn 
than his traditional rivals in the political elite. Meeting with church leaders and Chinese 
57 David Jenkins, 'Suharto Digs in With His All-Crony Cabinet', in: Edward Aspinall, Herb Feith and 
Gerry van Klinken (editors), The Last Days of Suharto, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton 1999: 32'. 
58 Amien openly acknowledged that he had previously underestimated the student movement as a political. 
force. Speaking at the UI (Universitas Indonesia, University of Indonesia) campus on 12 March, Amien 
admitted that two months earlier, he thought that the young generation was already exhausted (loyo), but 
'obviously we, the older generation, were wrong. Yesterday, the students of Gadjah Mada organised similar 
protest activities, and I gave them eight out of ten. This time, I give eight and a half.' See 'Amien Tampil di 
Tengah Ribuan Mahasiswa UI', Jawa Pos 13 March 1998. 
59 'Amien: Nepotisme Tetap Berkonotasi Negatif, Jawa Pos 19 March 1998: 'Amien: Dua Tontonan 
Politik Telah Usai', Jawa Pos 21March1998. 
60 At several occasions, Amien invited ABRI 'to march together with the people while maintaining 
Pancasila, the Constitution and Bhinneka Tunggal Ilea'. By calling on the military to join the movement, 
and assuring it that the fundamentals of the state were not at risk if Soeharto was to be deserted, Amien 
hoped that ABRI would finally conclude that supporting reform was a better choice than defending the 
President at all cost. Without ABRI's 'green light', Amien declared on 21 March, a People's Power 
movement would never happen. See 'Amien Rais: Reformasi Dari Kampus Jangan Dianggap Enteng', 
Suara Pembaruan 19 April 1998; 'Amien: Saya Siap Diperiksa 24 Jam', Jawa Pos 22 March 1998. 
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businessmen, Amien tried to alter his predominant image as an Islamic politician. But like his 
earlier attempts to forge a pluralist elite coalition, Amien's efforts to expand his grassroots 
support attracted accusations of political opportunism. His critics were quick to point out that 
Amien's courting of non-Muslim ·groups was a calculated move to enhance his position in the 
crisis negotiations and improve his political career prospects for the post-crisis period.61 In 
addition, Amien's new pluralist outlook also appeared designed to polish his international image. 
The international community was likely to play an important role in determining both Soeharto's · 
fate and the shape of the political landscape in the post-New Order era, encC!uraging Amien to 
lobby Western capitals for their support. In the midst of the student demonstrations in early May, 
Amien travelled to the United States and Europe, presenting himself as the political alternative to 
Soeharto and promoting his new pluralist agenda.62 
The tension between Amien's Islamic image and the pluralist design of the coalition he tried to 
create was reflected in the continued use of Muhammadiyah as his political vehicle. While it 
provided him with the necessary operational resources, the explicit identification with his 
modernist home base discouraged the leaders of other constituencies, most notably Abdurrahman 
and Megawati, from joining his alliance .. Members of the Muhammadiyah Central Board had for 
some time allowed Amien to use the Muhammadiyah offices in Yogyakarta and Jakarta for 
political purposes.63 Since the beginning of the student demonstrations, Muh~mmadiyah 
universities had figured prominently in the protest movement, and banners supporting Amien's 
nomination as president were common on Muhammadiyah-affiliated campuses.64 In institutional 
terms, the organisation remained neutral, but prominent Muhammadiyah figures expressed their 
support openly. Deputy Chairman Malik Fajar was one of them: 
"I was extremely proud of Amien. I think everybody understood that he was 
expressing Muhammadiyah's views of reform, so there was no need for us to come 
out with additional calls for change.( ... ) My house became some kind of operational 
61 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 26 May 1998. 
62 During a discussion in Washington on 30 April, Amien underlined that for the 'last seven months, I have 
actively conducted dialogues with the leaders of other religions, like the bishops. They come to my house 
in Yogyakarta and have regular meetings with me. I am also invited to speak in front of Christian students. 
I am convinced that with meetings like these, we can cultivate a common understanding.' See 'Amien: 
Pemimpin Golkar Kehilangan Arah', Jawa Pos 1May1998. 
63 Amien often stressed that he criticised the government 'as chairman of Muhammadiyah', and he 
frequently started his catalogue of demands with sentences like 'for Muhammadiyah, reform has to contain 
three aspects ( ... ).' The reference to the organisation he led added weight to his demands, but also 
· strengthened the protection against possible punishment by the regime. See 'Amien Rais: Reformasi Dari 
Kampus Jangail Dianggap Enteng', Suara Pembaruan 19 April 1998. 
64 'Amien Rais: Orang Bisa Saja Mengeksploitasi Nama Saya', Republika 8 February 1998. 
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centre of Amien's campaign, and of course Muhammadiyah people helped us a 
1ot."6s 
Returning from his overseas trip on 11 May, Amien announced at a gathering of 5,000 
Muhammadiyah santri in Jakarta that he would establish a People's Leadership Council (Majel~s 
Kepemimpinan Rakyat) by the end of May.66 For Megawati and Abdµrrahman, the event 
represented the very combination of Amien's personal leadership ambitions, calculated pluralist 
outreach and sectoral modernist interests that had fed their skepticism about Amien for several 
years. Consequently, they stayed away from the Council although Amien had earlier claimed that 
he had secured .their participation. 
The refusal of important constituency leaders to support the protest movement against Soeharto, 
while Amien had assumed its leadership, pointed to the continued divisions within Indonesia's 
non-regime elite. Amien's efforts to forge an alliance of modernist Muslims, traditionalist Islam 
and secular nationalism to challenge and eventually replace the regime had failed. Abdurrahman 
. . 
. and Megawati harboured . deep doubts. about Amien's political sincerity, consistency and 
reliability, leading· them to believe that the · 9hairtnan of Muhammadiyah pursued the goal of 
alliance building and regime change largely to satisfy personal ambitions and constituency 
interests. As a result, the initiative for overthrowing the New Order polity shifted from societal 
leaders to the student movement, with Amien playing an intellectual, but by no means operational 
leadership role. The absence of coordination· between the main oppositional forces not only 
allowed the government to prolong its rule, but impacted . also on the nature of the eventual 
regime change. With the civilian elite unprepared to seiZe power, and the student movement 
seeking a quick change of government, moderate elements in the armed forces took the lead in 
securing a negotiated, intra-systemic transfer of power. This hand-over of authority within the 
constitutional framework of the regime lifted its main beneficiaries into the limelight: B.J. 
Habibie and his ICMI associates. 
65
· Interview with Malik Fajar, Jakarta 3 Jtine 1998. . 
66 The shape and the function the Council evolved as Amien develo~ the idea. ·an 7 May he had told a 
radio reporter in Germany that the 'team' was to be formed by the leading political figures of the country,· 
including himself, Megawati and Abdurrahman. The task of the team was to meet .with Soeharto and his 
cabinet to discuss ways out of the crisis. On 8 May, Amien explained to a Kompas journalist in Den Haag 
. that the main agenda of the team was to work out a reform platform and then, interestingly, a power sharing 
arrangement. After 11 May, Amien used the· term 'council', but Megawati's and Abdurrahman's 
participation was no longer scheduled. Instead, he suggested the formation of· a board of political and 
academic figures sympathetic to him, with the leadership of the council clearly in his hands. See 'Amien 
Rais Ingin Bentuk Tim Kepemitnpinan Rakyat', Suara Pembaruan 8 May 1998; and 'Amien Rais: Akan 
Dibentuk Majelis Kepemimpinan Rakyat', Kompas 12 May 1998. · 
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III. BETWEEN REBELLION AND COLLABORATION: ICMI, SOEHARTO AND 
HABIB IE 
The difficulty of creating a -united front against the regime was aggravated by the continued 
ability of the Soeharto government to tie key civilian elites, including some Muslim leaders, to its 
fate. Amien's oscillation between support for the regime and fundamental opposition towards it 
was not a unique political phenomenon, but was also reflective of the debate within ICMI, the 
organisation that had sidelined him in early 1997. ICMI had since its inception in 1990 
acconunodated a . variety of divergent interestS, balancing critical activists, government 
bureaucrats, and moderate Muslim intellectuals.67 The activists around Adi Sasono, ICMI's 
Secretary-General, had been hi~ly critical of Soeharto, especially of his economic policies. They 
hoped that cooperation with the regiine would grant them greater access to the policy debates 
. -
within the government elite and allow them to realise their strategic goal of redi~tributlllg 
Chinese-controlled economic assets to Muslim small-scale businesses.68 By 1997, however, many 
_ members of the activist faction were deeply frustrated with the limitations of their political 
- influence. They filled only marginal posts in the lower bureaucracy as well as in think tanks and 
were largely excluded from the decision-making in Soeharto' s power centre. Similar to Ami en, 
the activist group felt that the regime had failed to deliver on its promises of higher political 
representation for Muslims, but in contrast to the Muhammadiyah chairman, they had no power 
_base of their own. Consequently, they continued to rely on Habibie's patronage and his appeals 
for patience. The bureaucrats, on the other hand, had ~ined a number of important positions in 
cabinet, Golkar and the armed forces. Their Islamic credentials were often doubtful, however, 
with many career bureaucrats only aligning themselves with ICMI in order to improve their 
standing in the elite -competition over cruCial -government posts. -ICMI bureaucrats had very 
diverse agendas, ranging from the advancement of high technology to influence over military 
. . . . 
appointments.69 Often, these. goals appeared to have little relevance for the social, culniral or 
political needs of the Muslim community, encouraging the third ICMI faction, consisting of 
67 Schwarz2004: 176-177. · - · 
68 Adi wanted to develop_ 'a national distribution system that reaches _the whole society and reduces the 
risks of exclusive distribution as it happens these days'. See 'Sekum Adi Sasono: Unjuk Ra,sa itu Wajar dan 
Sehat', Ummat4March1998. _ - _ - _ 
_ 
69 The military group in ICMI was-led by Achmad Tirtosudiro, a retired Lieutenant-General with extensive 
experience in military business; bureaucratic jobs and diplomatic postings, who had met Habibie in 
Germany in 1973 and had maintained a close relationship ever since; becoming chairman ofICMl's Jakarta 
chapter. Rayani Sriwidodo; Jenderal dari Pesaniren Legok: 80 Tahun Achmad Tirtosudiro, Pustaka Jaya, 
Jakarta 2002. 
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moderate Islamic intellectuals like Nurcholish Madjid, to almost completely disengage from the 
organisation. 
Crisis and Exclusion: Habibie on the Decline? 
The attitudes of ICMI leaders vis-a-vis the New Order regime mirrored not only factional 
divisions within the organisation, but were also defined by the fluctuating political fortunes of 
their main patron. For much of the 1990s, Habibie was eonsidered a strong candidate for the vice-
presidency. Despite his failure to win the nomination in 1993, he had continued_ to work 
ambitiously towards the 1998 anointment. Changes in the composition of the regime in the 
second half of the 1990s, however, had not always worked in Habibie's favor. Soeharto's dislike 
for the critical comments on his government by ICMI activists had cast doubts over Habibie's 
. prospects, and new political figures had entered the inner circle of the President.. Soeharto began 
to contemplate a dynastic solution to the succession problem, and other loyalists like Hartorio, 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita or Wiranto were also mentioned as potential vice-presidential candidates. 
The impact of the economic crisis further added to Habibie's apparent decline. With Soeharto 
forced to call for international help to acquire emergency credits, and Indonesia increasingly 
exposed to the fluctuations of the currency market and stock exchanges, the economic reputation 
of vice-presidential candidates attracted particular attention. Habibie's unorthodox view on 
economic mechanisms and industrial policy, in the better days of the New Order called 
'Habibienomics', now appeared as a heavy burden for the minister. International donor agencies 
and domestic critics viewed his import-substitution program in the high-technology sector, with 
billions of dollars spent to . develop national aircraft and other prestigious projects, as an 
irresponsible waste of funds. As Habibie's chances to secure the post as Soeharto's deputy and 
possible successor appeared to wane, so did the loyalty of the ICMI group around Adi Sasono 
towards their patron. 
The impression ofHabibie's declining career prospects sharpened the factional divisions within 
ICMI and di-ove the activist group closer to regime opposition. While the camp associated with 
the bureaucratic and military elite still believed that Habibie had.a realistic chance of becoming 
Soeharto's deputy,70 the activists around Adi Sasono were convinced that Habibie's campaign had 
70 Achmad created .an uproar in Golkar when he stated in September 1997 that Habibie.was ready to tak~ up 
the vice-presidency. Supporters of Golkar . chairman Harmoko, who had vice-presidential ambitions 
himself, deplored ·the statement publicly, and Habibie finally had to distance himself from it. See 'Golkar 
Merasa Di-Fait-a-compli ICMI', Siar 19 September 1997. ZA Maulani, another retired general active in 
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been severely damaged. 71 In addition, Soeharto had taken the names of Adi Sasono, Watik 
Pratikna, Jimly Assidiquie and Dawam Rahardjo from the list of MPR candidates, further 
distancing the activist wing of ICMI from the New Order establishment. The feeling of exclusion 
from the regime and the expectation of Habibie's political derriise led the ICMI activists to 
change their strategic goal from the penetration of state institutions to regime change. In line with 
Amien Rais, Adi Sasono now believed that only an alliance of Indonesia's leading societal 
figures could force Soeharto to resign. In this coalition, ICMI was to be a major element, 
neutralising its image of a collaborator with the regime and positioning itself for the post-
authoritarian era. In early January 1998, Adi went public with the proposal for a national dialogue 
· to overcome the economic crisis. 72 The dialogue was to engage Arni en, Megawati, Abdurrahman 
and other relevant society leaders in a discussion forum, with regime change as the ultimate goal: 
"We say generally that the goal is coalition building for a better future, but I think 
everybody understands that our aim is to prepare the political landscape for the post-
Soeharto era. ( ... ) It is clear that this country needs new leadership." 73 
Like Arnien, however, Adi earned little more than suspicion from the socio-political leaders he 
sought to include in the coalition. Abdurrahman ruled out his involvement in the dialogue, and 
Megawati sent no clear signals as to whether she would participate.74 As the press still speculated 
about if and when the summit would take place, Adi suddenly called the meeting off. 
Habibie In, Opposition Out: ICMI and the Vice-presidency 
The cancellation of the national dialogue pointed to the multitude of political interests and 
motives that drove oppositional forces during the crisis. It highlighted both the· often tactical 
nature of their political considerations and the- extreme uncertainty of the environment they 
operated in. ICMI had given up on the idea of the national dialogue because its position in the 
political landscape had changed dramatically, and literally over night: Soeharto had strongly 
indicated that Habibie was his vice-presidential candidate for the upcoming MPR session in 
March 1998. With this, ICMI was transformed from an increasingly marginalised group with 
. large oppositional elements into a political force with a substantial stake in defending the regime, 
ICMI, was convinced that Habibie would surprise everybody and become the next vice-president. futerview 
with Z.A. Maulani, 11 December 1997. 
71 Interview with Adi Sasono, Jakarta 8 January 1998. 
72 'Sudah Waktunya Dengarkan Pendapat Tokoh-tokoh Kritis', Kompas 5January1998. 
· 
73 Interview with Adi Sasono, Jakarta 8 January 1998. 
74 'Gus Dur Tolak Dialog Nasional', Kabar dari Pijar 13 January 1998. 
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at least until Habibie was securely installed. The sudden turn of events surprised not only ICMI, 
but sent shock waves throughout the political system. Only days before, Soeharto had signed a 
second agreement with the IMF, which political analysts believed had excluded Habibie from the 
vice-presidential competition as it increased pressure on Indonesia to deliver concrete evidence of 
economic and political reform. Soeharto's political logic, however, worked contrary to the 
rationalism of the observers. Instead of bowing to the pressure, Soeharto chose to ·defy the 
international finance community and demonstrate his unchanged control over domestic politics. 
In addition, the choice.of a controversial vice-president allowed him to make the succession issue, 
in the words of John McBeth, 'unpalatable'.75 Had he anointed a candidate popular with both 
foreign governments and domestic political forces, the pressure on Soeharto to resign in favour of 
his deputy might have become irresistible if the crisis continued. 
Habibie's anointment facilitated the temporary revival of the concept ofregime penetration that 
many modernist intellectuals had abandoned in the mid-l 990s after it was considered a failure. 
The prospect of a Habibie presidency appeared to contradict their assessment that Soeharto had 
misused the promise of regime participation fo lure Muslim groups jnto backing his rule, but had 
proved unwilling to delegate substantial political powers to Islamic politicians. With Habibie a 
heartbeat away from the presidency, the· strategy of participating in the regime appeared to have 
succeeded. 76 Thus within days of the announcement, Adi Sasono terminated his criticism of the 
government, and saw his new task as bringing ICMI back on the track of loyalty towards Habibie 
. and, by tmplication, the Soeharto regime. In conceptual term8, Adi spoke now of an 'accelerated 
evolution' instead of regime change. 77 The adjusted terminology tried to cover the fact that, once 
again, offers of increased representation in the New Order had led a major religio-political force 
to· give up, at least temporarily, criticising the non-democratic nature of the regime. Most 
importantly, Adi and Achmad Tirtosudiro lobbied Amien Rais to end his policy of confrontation 
and put his trust in. the prospect of a Iiabibie .presidency. 78 They persuaded Amien to accept a . 
truce with the regime, and. for a while it seemed as if the promises of a prosperous era under 
·
75 John McBeth, 'Political Update', in: Geoff Forrester (editor), Post-S.oeharto Indonesia: Renewal or 
Chaos?, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 1999: 22 . 
. 
76 Adi Sasono expressed ICMrs view that 'the office of the vice-president in the upcoming term will be of 
strategic importance in the effort to change the economic · and political system in Indonesia.' Even 
Nurcholish Madjid was convinced that 'if Habibie is elected vice-president, the future of Indonesian 
democracy will be brighter.' Nurcholish had been one of the most vocal critics of ICMI's pro-regime 
approach. See 'ICMI Siap Lepaskan Habibie Jadi Wapres', Kompas 26 January 1998; '15 Tokoh.Muslim 
Bertemu Habibie', Republtka 25 February 1998. 
77 'Sekum ICMI Adi Sasono: Unjuk Rasa itu Wajar dan Sehat', Ummat 4 March 1998. 
78 "'Siapa Yang Lebih Baik daripada Habibie?'", Jawa Pos 28January1998. 
'· 
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Habibie's leadership had reunited the Muhammadiyah chairman with his former companions in 
ICMI. 
ICMI's Dual Option: Defending or Overthrowing Soeharto 
Soeharto's re-election and Habibie's installation as his deputy in March broadened ICMI's 
strategic options and anticipated yet another change in its· relations with the regime. Before 
March, loyaltyto Soeharto's rule was essential in order to secure Habibie's ascension to the vice-
presidency. After the MPR session, however, ICMI possessed two political ()ptions that were 
easily adjustable to the changing political environment: first, continued support for Soeharto if the 
latter granted enough concessions to modernist Muslims in general and ICMI in particular; or, 
alternatively, joining the opposition, eroding Soeharto's government and working towards 
Habibie' s constitutional rise· to power. It was primarily the formation of the cabinet that pushed 
. ICM! into endorsing the second option. After it had become known that Siti Hardiyanti was in 
charge of distributing the portfolios, Adi Sasono warned on 13 March that if the names rumoured 
to hold key posts in the government turned out to be trt:le, Indonesia's international reputation was 
at risk. In response to the rumours, an ICMI leadership meeting asked Habibie to secure cabinet 
positions for several critical ICMI activists. At the same time, Achmad Tirtosudirotook over the 
acting chairmanship of the organisation, increasing its autonomy vis-a-vis Habibie and preparing 
the organisation for its turn against the regime. 79 On the day before the cabinet announcement, 
. . 
Habibie accompanied Soeharto to his Friday prayers to remind him of the importance of ICMI 
. participation in the cabinet. The President, obviously unnerved, reprimanded his deputy in an 
uiuisually harsh tone. 80 When the cabinet was announced a day later, none of Habibie's nominees 
.. from ICMI's activist faction had been . included. Instead, Soeharto re~appointed the ICMI 
bureaucrat Haryanto Dhanutirto, whose questionable record had i:nade him a controversial figure 
even within his own organisation.81 · 
. The disappointment within ICMI over the composition of the cabinet drove the organisation 
· back to the col.U'Se of opposing the regime. This high fluctuation in ICMI' s attitudes exposed the 
volatility of the political context in which societal groups had to make quick and immensely 
79 'Setelah Habibie fadi Wapres: Emil Salim, Tirtosudiro, dan Azwar Calon Kuat Ketua Umum ICMI', 
Surabaya Post 4 March 1998; 'Pimpin Rapat ICMI, Pilih Pelaksana Harian', Jawa Pos 13 March 1998. 
80 Interview with Adi Sasono; Jakarta 8 Jurie 1998. 
81 In late 1995, Haryanto had been in the eentre of a corruption scandal, with the government's Inspector~ 
General accusing him of financial misconduct involving around 3 million US dollars. Gerry van Klinken, 
'Clash oflnterests', Inside Indonesia 46, March 1996. 
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consequential decisions for their constituencies. Amidst the collective uncertainty, however, a 
general pattern emerged that appeared to guide socio-political leaders in defining their position 
vis-a.:.vis non-democratic rule. Offers of participation in the regime were likely to silence 
concerns over its authoritarian nature, while exclusion from it led almost certainly to demands for 
democratic regime change. Soeharto's omission of Islamic activists led the ICMI leadership to 
believe that the President had no intention of granting Habibie a significant role in running the 
governmei:J.t.82 Within ICMI, it was now not only Adi Sasono and his critical associates who 
pushed for fundamental opposition towards the Soeharto government, but also the senior 
leadership with bureaucratic and military backgrounds. Achmad Tirtosudiro began to sel1Se that 
Soeharto was about to lose control, and he feared that continued support for him might drag ICMI 
down into the political abyss. As the student demonstrations gained momentum, ICMI took . 
. concrete steps to dissociate itself from the Soeharto government. At a leadership forum on 6 May, 
ICMI endorsed calls for a special session of the MPR to change the national leadership. This 
suggestion, however, presented Habibie with severe political· problems. Balancing loyalty to 
Soeharto and the institutional interests of ICMI_, Habibie was forced to publicly disavow the 
statement of his own organisation. 83 
Habibie's public rejection of ICMI's oppositional stand could barely mask the fact, however, 
that the Vice-president was the main beneficiary of the growing protest against the regime. Many 
within the political elite believed that Habibie encouraged ICMI's criticism of Soeharto in order 
to promote his own succession to the presidency. 84 Abd~ahman even suspected that Adi Sasono 
financed the student movement against Soeharto in order to catalyse the downfall of his regime 
and facilitate Habibie's rise.85 These widespread suspicions ware based on Habibie's unique 
constitutional position within Soeharto's web of political patronage. Habibie was the only central . 
figure of the regime Soeharto could not dispose of, and was therefore largely immune from 
potential reprisals for ICMI'sincreased criticism. Not only did ICMI's regime opposition do no 
harm to Habibie's constitutional rights as vice-president, but it in fact served his interests as the 
. most likely successor should a: popular uprising force Soeharto from office: 
82 'Adi Kecewa Susunan Kabinet',Jawa Pos 16 March 1998. 
83 'Perombakan Kabinet Hak Prerogatif Presiden', Republika 9May1998. 
84 Abdurrahman, f9r example, was convinced that 'this was all just a shadow play. In public Habibie said 
"Don't be so harsh with the poor Pak Harto". Behind the scenes he instructed them to demolish him so he 
could take his seat. Very predictable, but s_mart, lmust admit.( ... ) But see, this is exactly why you can't 
work with these people. They always stab you in the back." Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 
26May1998. 
85 'Amien: Jangan Main Kucing-kucingan Lagi ', Suara Merdeka 13 April 1998. 
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"Of course we did not finance the student demonstrations, that's absurd .. There was 
no need for that. ( ... )We had given Soeharto a chance, but he wasted it. So we 
supported the next best option, and that was a constitutional hand-over to the Vice-
president. And I will not lie to you by saying that it did not help that we knew this 
person very well, and trusted his leadership."86 
In this context, Habibie's public distancing from ICMI's demands for leadership change appeared 
as little more than a tactical manoeuvre to avoid the impression that he actively worked towards 
replacing Soeharto. Accordingly, Achmad Tirtosudiro and Habibie engaged in a public, but 
inconsequential dispute over the leadership ofICMI. Achmad asserted that it was he, not Habibie, 
who led the organisation, and that the controversial. call for an MPR session had been issued 
through proper channels and procedur~s. 87 Satisfied with. this explanation,· Habibie never raised 
the issue again. 
Between Soeharto, Habibie and Prabowo: Islamist Groups and the Crisis 
ICMI wa.S not the only political force that had a strategic interest in Habibie's rise to the 
. . . 
presidency. Maj.Gen. Prabowo, the Kopassus Commander, believed that he had an arrangement 
. . 
with Habibie to make him chief of the armed forces once Habibie was in power, In Prabowo's 
. . 
entourage were a number of ultra-modernist Muslim groups with ail Islamist religio-political 
· agenda. Their political relevance was based less on numerical strength than their capadty to 
mobilise demonstrations against selected targets. KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas 
.Dunia Islam, Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World), founded in 1986, and 
DDll formed the core of this loose association of lslamist groups, with some senior PPP 
politicians offering protection and limited access to the political infrastructure.ss KISDI had 
participated in the demonstrations against Sofyan Wanand1 in late January 1998, hut otherwise 
. appeared reluctant to formulate a clear position on the political crisis.89 As their political 
86 Interview with Adi Sasono, Jakarta 8 June 1998. 
87 'Pak Habibie Sebaiknya Konsentrasi sebagai Wapres', Kompas 18May1998. 
88 As a political force, PPP remained insignificarit throughout the crisis. Its leader, Ismael Hasan Metare~ 
took no political risks and remained a·soeharto loyalist until a few days before the collapse: On 21 April, . 
Metareum met Wiriinto and assured him that there was one demand of the reform movement PPP would 
never agree with, and that was Soeharto's resignation. See 'Ada Isyarat AliatisiFPP-FABRI', Jawa Pos 22 
April 1998. . . 
89 KISDl's pro-regime attitude also led to a rift with Arnien Rais. KISDI distanced itself from Amien as · 
much as Ami en turned his back on the organisation: In October 1997, Amien still spoke at a KISDI event in 
the Al-Azhar mosque, but afterwards Amien's confrontation with the regime and his lobbying of non-
Muslim constituencies · resulted in cool relations between the Muhammadiyah leader and the ultra-
moderriist group. See 'Amien Rais: Ada yang tak Wajar dalam Kehidupan Nasional', Kompas §October 
1997; 'Dibentuk Front Solidaritas Nasional Muslim Indonesia', Kompas 9 February 1998. . 
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affiliation with Prabowo was stronger than their ties with Habibie, the radical Islamic groups had 
difficulties in following ICMI's anti-regime tum after the March announcement of the cabinet. In 
contrast to Habibie, whose constitutional position protected him from possible Soeharto-initiated 
reprisals, Prabowo was politically vulnerable. The competition between Wiranto and Prabowo 
exposed the latter to the risk of dismissal if Soeharto concluded that Prabowo's political allies 
worked against him. Thus they could not afford to confront Soeharto in the way ICMI did. In fact, 
as Schwarz observed, 'their fervent support for Soeharto put them in a distinct minority of 
defenders ofSoeharto's family.' 90 KISDI leaders knew, however, that Prabowo began promoting 
the possibility of a Soeharto resignation in Habibie's favour, which in tum would result in 
increased political access for Islamist groups.91 The leaders of KISDI and DDII therefore 
maintained a low profile for most of the crisis, but made political preparations for the increasingly 
likely scenario of a Habibie presidency. 
Elite Divisions and Popular Protest: Falterillg Regime, Disoriented Opposition 
ICMI's interest in facilitating Habibie's elevation to the presidency by fuelling opposition to 
Soeharto added another variant to the already highly heterogenous list of political positions taken 
by influential societal groups towards the troubled regime. Nahdlatul Ulama and Megawati's PDI 
appeared reluctant to challenge the government, and the deterrent of Habibie's potential rise to 
power served as a further incentive to maintain their non-confrontational stance; Arnien, and with 
him many Muhammadiyah functionaries, had linked up with the student movement to achieve . 
regime change; ICMI, finally, aimed at a controlled transfer of power from Soeharto to Habibie, 
confronting the organisation with the delicate task of damaging the regime to cause Soeharto's 
removal, but leaving it functional enough to organise the orderly succession of Habibie. The 
diametrically opposed interests of major socio-political forces obstructed the formation of 
effective elite opposition to Soeharto and prevented the establishment of a political alternative to 
the faltering regime. The initiative for removing Soeharto thus shifted to the student movement 
90 Schwarz 2004: 331. 
91 A prayer meeting for Habibie was organised by the Cooperation Body of Indonesian Pesantren 
(BKSPPI, Badan Kerja Sama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia) on 19 February. At the event, the complex of 
common interests between ICMI, Habibie, Prabowo and the ultra-modernist Islamic groups became 
evident. BKSPPI had close relations to DDII and KISDI. At the meeting, speeches were given by Adi 
Sasono, Prabowo and Jakarta military commander Syafi:ie Syamsuddin, and the event culminated in a 
prayer for Habibie's successful election. See 'BKSPPI Doakan Habibie Jadi Wapres', Republika 20 
February 1998. One week later, BKSPPI, DDII and KISDI leaders met Habibie to remind him of the hopes 
of the modernist Muslim constituency regarding his upcoming vice-presidency. See '15 Tokoh Muslim 
Bertemu Habibie', Republika 25 February 1998. 
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and other non-elite actors, setting the country on a course of regime change driven by popular 
protest and mass violence rather than the institutional assumption of power by oppositional. 
groups. With societal forces fragmented and unprepared to take over government, the moderate 
faction of the armed forces used the opportunity to counter the populist power of the students 
with attempts to negotiate an orderly transfer of authority. It was only when the populist attempt 
to overthrow the regime and the military manoeuvring for an intra-systemic change of 
·government had reached their concluding stages that Indonesia's largest societal groups began to 
unite behind the demand for Soeharto's departure. This newly emerging unity would mark the 
ultimate end of the New Order; but came too late to influence the character of regime change. 
Their reluctanee to unite again8t Soeharto in the early phase of the crisis had turned most of the . 
crucial socio-political organisations into spectators of rather than participants in. Soeharto's 
demise. As the shape of post-New Order fudonesia was decided in the final .days of Soeharto's 
rule, its major actors had to observe from the margins how elements within the disintegrating 
regime managed to extend some of its political structures into the post-authoritarian era. 
. . 
IV. DIVIDED AGAINST SOEHARTO: POPULAR PROTEST; FRAGMENTED 
OPPOSITION AND INTRA-SYSTEMIC REGIME CHANGE 
The political divisfons within Indonesia's Muslim community had allowed authoritarian regimes 
since the late 1950s to establish and sustain their rule; But just as the turmoil of 1965 saw 
·Sukarno losing control over his carefully balanced polity, so the socio-economic upheaval of 
1998 eroded the political foundations of the New Order. The disunity among key civilian 
. . 
constituencies had helped Soeharto to survive the early period of the crisis, but the anarchic.force 
of the student movement and othet forms of societal protest made the machinations of elite 
politics an insufficient tool of regime maintenance. The power of the populist protest, 
continuously growing between March and May 1998, rendered Soeharto's resignation mevitable, 
despite the continued absence of cohesive elite opposition and intensive. conflict among ·civilian' 
groups. The street protests were not, as Edward Aspinall suggested, part of -'an ultimately 
successful two-pronged attack' launched by 'the opposition' .92 On the contrary, many of the 
oppositional elites, except for Arnien Rais, found it difficult to connect with and understand the 
dynamics of a populist force outside of their control. In this, they were not unlike Soeharto who; 
.·as Robert Elson remarked, was 'still unable to gI!lSP the significance of the mounting (mass) 
92 Edward Aspinall, 'Opposition and Elite Conflict in the Fall of Soeharto', in: Geoff Forrester and Ron 
May (editors), The Fall ofSoeharto, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst 1999: 147. · 
163 
movement against him' .93 Accordingly, the final weeks of Soeharto's rule would witness 
desperate attempts of the President to apply traditional methods of dividing the elite to a political 
process that was now largely driven by the forces of popular resistance. One by one, important 
socio-political forces felt it necessary to join with the students in calling for Soeharto's departure, 
but they maintained their deep mutual suspicions in regard to forming an alliance to take his 
place. 
Violence, Protest and Consensus-building in the Elite: Regime Change Yes, But What Next? 
The emerging political consensus between Muslim groups that the President had to step down 
was catalysed by the Medan riots in early May 1998, when fuel price increases triggered 
widespread violence in Sumatra's most important city. The NU Central Board had declared its 
support for the student movement in mid-April, but the Medan incident accelerated its gradual 
desertion of Soeharto. Shortly after Soeharto's departure to Egypt, NU official Said Agil Siraj 
declared that NU would prepare its own reform proposals. He assigned special spiritual powers to 
these plans by underlining that the word 'reform' was mentioned 41 timt?s in the Qu'ran~ On 12 
May, leading NU kiai met in Surabaya and proclaimed their commitment to reform.94 In addition, 
two NU deputy chairmen, Fajrul Falaakh and Rozy Munir, became involved in efforts to establish 
a forum of opposition figures in order to maximise the pressure on the regime; The preparatory 
meetings of the association, named Forum Kerja Indonesia (Forki, Indonesia Working Forum), 
were mostly held in the office of the NU-affiliated LKKNU (Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Institute for the Benefit of Nahdlatul Ulama Families).95 Abdurrahman, on the 
other hand, was largely excluded from the formulation ofNU's new position vis-a-vis the regime. 
While this was explained with references to his poor health, many NU figures doubted that theit 
chairman had a coherent concept for protecting the interests of the organisation in the expected 
93 R.E. Elson, 'In Fear of the People: Soeharto and the Justification of State-sponsored Violence Under the 
New Order', in: Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (editors), Roots of Violence in Indonesia: 
Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2002: 
191. 
94 Mustafa Bisri contended that not only the students, but also the kiai wanted 'total reform' - the 
frequently used euphemism for Soeharto's resignation. See 'Para Tokoh Agama Dukung Reformasi', 
Kompas 13May1998. 
95 The idea for Forlci was born earlier in the year. It was conceptualised as a solidarity forum to organise 
food deliveries to poverty-stricken areas. After having disappeared for a couple of months, the political 
dynamics of May provided Forki with the momentum for not only implementing its initial aims, but also 
for bringing together political figures with different backgrounds to unite against Soeharto. Interview with 
Fajrul Falaakh, Yogyakarta 22 November 2000. · . 
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regime change.96 Given his apparent lack of judgement and direction, NU activists intended to 
use Forki to maneuver Abdurrahman closer to the opposition around Amien and Megawati, who 
were both expected to join. But not only Abdurrahman and Megawati appeared reluctant to 
engage in the forum; Ami en too· had at that stage concluded that an elite-based coalition was 
illusionary. While Amien's private secretary Muhammad Najib took part in some of Forki's 
coordinating sessions, his boss preferred to focus on the preparations for his own opposition 
forum, the People's Leadership Council. 
Amien's blueprint for the planned Council reflected his failed effort to form a broad elite 
alliance, but also demonstrated his belief that he no longer needed the latter to achieve regime 
change. While still presented as a pluralist association of regime critics, the Council now targeted 
intellectuals close to Amien rather than influential religio-political leaders. According to David 
Bourchier, it was to consist 'of people with moral authority'· and form a 'temporary repository of 
political power if need arose.' 97 The former editor of the banned news magazine TEMPO, 
Goenawan Mohammad, assisted Amien in drafting a list of potential members, including human 
rights activists Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara and Adnan Buyung Nasution, academic Arbi 
Sanit and veteran politician Emil Salim. Involvement in . the Council was not without risks, 
however. After Amien had announced its imminent formation, the regime prepared to respond 
with its conventional catalogue of sanctions. Interior Minister Hartono questioned whether the 
Council was a rival institution to the MPR, in which case the government would be forced to 
crack down on it. As Goenawan and Amien were preparing the official announcement of the 
Council, the killing of four students at Trisakti University on 12 May provided the plan with a 
new, significantly radicalised momentum. The subsequent chaos generated by mass protests, 
declining state authority and open rifts within the regime prepared the stage for dramatic political 
change. The significance of the paradigmatic shift was captured in Amien's tour of the city on 13 
May. As Amien passed the rioters, they applauded and shouted his name, and soldiers saluted 
him. The procedural insigniae of power, introduced and defended by the New Order for decades, 
were. gradually transferred to those who challenged it. 
. With· Soeharto out of the country, and the security forces losing control over the capital, the 
inauguration of Amien's leadership forum on 14 May underscored the collective impression of 
imminent regime change. The name eventually chosen for the forum was 'Popular Mandate 
Council' (Majelis Amanat Rakyat, MAR), not coincidentally featuring Mohammad Amien Rais' 
96 Interview with Fajrul Falaakh, Yogyakarta: 22 November 2000. . 
97 David Bourchier, 'Why Indonesia Had to Explode', in: Edward Aspinall, Herb Feith and Gerry van 
Klinken (editors), The Last Days of Suharto, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton 1999: 44. 
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initials. The organisation was now tailored exclusively to the needs of the Muhammadiyah 
chairman, and its first press statement echoed Amien's political priorities. The release contained 
three major demands and appeals: first, Soeharto had to step down immediately; second, the 
security forces had to excercise restraint in handling the riots; and third, the students and the 
broader population had to remain calm to ensure the unobstructed continuation of the reform 
. process. Both in·tertns of form and substance, the declaration of MAR constituted a further step in 
.the disintegration process ofSoeharto's system of socio-political control. The New Order had 
subjected all socio-political organisations in fudonesia to a process of uniformisation, forcing 
them to obtain a series of licenses and permits, adopt the national ideology and accept their 
subordination to the Ministry of the futerior. The rules imposed by Soeharto's state began to lose 
their power of intimidation, encouraging oppositional forces to intensify their attacks on the 
regime. 
Between Pluralism and Islamic Identity: Amien's Dilemma 
The foundation of a pluralist association of regime critics not .only widened the gap between 
. Amien and the government, but also threatened to antagonise long-time political allies in the 
modernist faction of fudonesian Islam. Only one hour after the MAR press conference had 
concluded, Adi Sasono asked Amien to visit him at ICMI headquarters. There, the two Muslim 
leaders engaged in a heated debate about both the strategy behind MAR' s formation and the 
plurality of its composition. Adi objected to MAR's membership that included Christians, secular 
nationalists and particularly a gay activist. The· ICMI Secretary-General warned Amien that his 
core supporters in the modernist constituency felt increasingly alienated by his courtship ofnon-
Muslim groups, and recommended that he reassert his Islamic image by speaking at. a mass event 
of Muslim groups at the Al-Azhar mosque a. couple of days later.98 The invitation exposed 
Amien's structural dilemma that, in its various manifestations, had contributed to his reputation 
as a political chameleon: serving the interests of his own constituency while at the same time 
expanding his interaction with other religio-political ·groups was not only a delicate, but often 
impossible task . His cross-constituency approach led. to confusion over his political and 
ideological positions, with Amien more often than not surrendering to the temptation of adopting 
the stance of the crowd he addressed ·or the person he debated with. fu the discussion with Adi, he 
reassured his fellow modernist activist that the inclusion of Christians in MAR was 
98 Muhammad Najib, Amien Rais - Sang Demokrat: Dilengkiipi Catatan Hcirian Sampai Jatuhnya 
Soeharto, Gema lnsani, Jakarta 1998: 50. 
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inconsequential as he was determined to define the direction of the organisation himself. He 
managed to excuse himself from the Al-Azhar event, but agreed to give a speech after the Friday 
prayers at the same place. Adi Sasono appeared satisfied, for the time being, and the two Muslim 
figures continued their exchange of views throughout the.night as they awaited Soeharto's return 
from Egypt in the early morning of 15 May.99 
. Amien's temporary success in reducing the skepticism of his core Islamic constituencytowards 
. MAR confirmed his belief that he could bring down the regime without a broad-based coalition 
of key socio-political leaders. Although representatives from both ends of the political spectrum, 
. like the conser\rative Muslim politician Husein Umar and the leftist gay rights activist Dede 
Oetomo, decided not to join MAR, 100 Ami en appeared confident that his popularity was sufficient 
to guarantee the success of the organisation and the agenda it pursued. Thus he refused to 
cooperate when the idea of an alliance between Abdurrahman, Megawati and himself was revived 
by several civil society figures. Remaining conspicuously absent from the declaration ceremony 
of Forki on 15 May, Amien signalled that he had given up the idea of overthrowing the New 
Order government with an alliance of non-regime constituency leaders. Abdurrahman and 
. Megawati did not turn up either to the event, disappointing a crowd of domestic and international · 
journalists who had hoped that the three national figures would finally come together and: claim 
the right to executive leadership from the disintegrating regime. It waS most likely the tangible 
inevitability· of Soeharto' s · departure; brought about by the student movement and widespread 
popular. unrest, that convinced the three leaders that the regime's days were numbered even 
without their forming an alliance. In addition, Amien apparently saw Forki as an act of 
. . 
undeserved assistance for Abdurrahman and M~gawati who had kept a convenient distance to the 
. . popular protests and only emerged when the regime had almost coll~psed. 101 
Preparing the Post-Soeharto Polity: Continuity or RadicalChange? 
Despite continued disunity among them, the major religio-political organisations began to prepare . 
. their constituencies for the end of Soeharto' s rule. NU issued a statement on 15 May that 
.·welcomed Soeharto's contemplations in Egypt about resigning from office~ Within Nahdlatul 
99 Najib 1998: 51. . . . . 
100 'Empat Anggota MAR dari Surabaya Mundur, Dede: Upaya Curi Panggung', Surabaya Post 19 May 
1998. 
101 One of Megawati's adviserS explained that Megawati refrained from visiting the campuses because she 
had been told by intelligence sources that she was the target of PrabQwo-af:filiated military units. The same 
applied to her brother Guruh. Interview with Mochtar Buchori, leading PDI official, Jakarta 5 June 1998. 
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Ulama, the view was now prevailing that defending the lost cause of the regime would damage 
the organisation more than taking the risk of a final retaliation from Soeharto's side: 
"We had a leadership meeting on that Friday (15 May), during which we were 
bombarded with phone calls from the regions, all pushing us to do something. Kiai 
Imron Hamzah (a respected kiai from Surabaya, M.M.) shouted through the phone 
that he found it inconceivable that NU remained silent while everything fell apart. 
We said 'yes, yes, be patient, we are working on it.'( ... ) At the end, we endorsed 
Soeharto's alleged plan to resign." 102 
Abdurrahman, however, still preferred a negotiated settlement with Soeharto to a chaotic transfer 
· of power to a council of oppositional politicians. On 16 May, Abdurrahman predicted that the 
student movement 'will fade away like its predecessors, the 1974 and 1978 movements'. He 
brushed aside calls for Soeharto's resignation, saying that the President had been provided with 
strong legitimation from the MPR. 103 Van Dijk claimed that Abdurrahman made the remarks 
· because he was 'shocked by the violence in the middle of May'. 104 They did, however, follow an 
established pattern of his thinking reaching back to much earlier periods of the crisis, and 
appeared to have more do with his political strategy than with the distressing images of the riots. 
The prospect of either a populist transitional government dominated by Amien Rais or a 
constitutional hand-over of authority to Habibie were nightmares for both Abdurrahman and the 
Nahdlatul Ulama constituency. Accordingly, he engaged with moden1te elements in the armed 
forces that lobbied for a gradual withdrawal of Soeharto from politics, but were prepared to leave 
the latter in charge of its details and schedule. In a meeting with Wiranto, Abdurrahman 
underlined the necessity for close cooperation between NU and ABRI. Wiranto emerged from the 
encounter with the impression that Abdurrahman was a loyal ally in his efforts to seek an orderly 
transition, and asked his staff in ABRI Headquarters to draft a press release that emphasised the 
importance of ABRI-NU relations. 105 It was this press release that led to considerable irritation on 
Soeharto's part and, as described above, sparked a further escalation in the competition between 
Prabowo and Wiranto. 
After key political forces had agreed on the necessity of Soeharto's removal, their differences 
began to focus on the form and composition of a possible post-New Order government. Amien 
aimed at the disposal of Soeharto and the polit_ical system that carried him, while Abdurrahman 
supported an orderly transition process largely controlled by the outgoing President. ICMI, on the 
102 Abdurrahman was neither involved in nor informed of the press release. Interview with Fajrul Falaakh, 
Yogyakarta 22 November 2000. · 
103 'Ada Pembelokan Arab Refonnasi', Jawa Pos 17 May 1998. 
104 Dijk 2001: 199. 
105 Interview with General (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
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other hand, began to promote the constitutional solution to the crisis. On Sunday, 17 May, Adi 
Sasono suggested in a discussion with Amien that the most.likely scenario was the hand-over of 
presidential powers from Soeharto to Habibie. 106 Amien, however, was aware that a Habibie 
· presidency was not what the students had been demonstrating for. The mere replacement of 
political leaders within the paradigmatic framework of the New Order system might have been 
satisfactory to the protesters only a couple of months ago, but the increased radicalism of the 
student movement after the Trisakti incident aimed at the radical reform of the political 
foundations of the state. While personally inclined to believe in Habibie's commitment to the 
interests of political openness in general and modernist Islam in particular, Arnien felt that he 
could not· promote an intra-regime solution to the crisis without jeopardising his reformist 
credentials. But with Soeharto still clinging to power, and the threat of a military crack down 
hanging over the protesters, Ami en. conceded that removing Soeharto had absolute priority over 
everything else.107 
The Search for Compromise: Elite Negotiations and Soeharto's Endgame 
The dispute among major societal forces over the conditions of Soeharto's withdrawal and the 
format of the post-New Order sparked a hectic search for compromise. Nurcholish Madjid, who 
was widely acknowledged as a mediator between traditionalist and modernist Islam and even 
respected by the New Order authorities, appeared to be the ideal candidate to offer solutions 
acceptable to all. On 14 May, Nurcholish had presented his ideas to ABRI Headquarters, 
outlining the timetable for Soeharto's gradual withdrawal from politics. The interaction over the 
following days with a large number of political leaders, however, convinced Nurcholish that his 
plan was unsustainable. It was most of all Amien whose arguments made Nurcholish conclude 
that the country could not afford taking the risk of allowing more time for Soeharto's withdrawal 
as the latter might well use the opportunity to consolidate his power: 
"First I thought Soeharto could be given some time to organise the transfer of power. 
But Amien convinced me that Soeharto might just want exactly that, and.that he 
might come out on top again."108 
106 Some ICMI regional branches went public over the weekend with their demands for a special session of 
the MPR with the explicit agenda of replacing Soeharto. The Central Java branch even demanded the 
resignation of House Speaker Harmoko for failing to follow up on the popular aspirations regarding 
Soeharto's position. ICMI's central board would 'only' call for the President's resignation on Monday, 18 
May. See 'ICMI Jateng Tun tut Ketua DPR/MPR Diganti ', Suara Merdeka 17 May 1998. 
107 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 28 May 1998. 
108 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 28 May 1998. 
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Unaware that Nurcholish had changed his mind, Soeharto felt attracted to the idea of a controlled, 
loosely scheduled departure from the power centre. The Nurcholish initiative, in its initial form, 
provided Soeharto with the opportunity of influencing the negotiations about his replacement, 
reach agreements over the legal aspects of his retirement and seek long-term solutions for the 
business interests of his family. With the parliament demanding his resignation on Monday, 18 
May, Soeharto sent for Nurcholish to discuss the details of his plan. 
Soeharto's mam concern, it. appeared, was to avoid a concrete time frame and to use 
Nurcholish's moral authority for the propagation of his long.,.term withdrawal plans. As the 
discussion· began, Soeharto ignored Nurcholish' s opening remark that developments had 
overtaken his earlier proposals, and that reform was now identical with the President's immediate 
resignation. Soeharto replied that he wanted to withdraw constitutionally, but suggested that 
general elections had to be held beforehand: 
"I told him that the elections and his resignation had to be completed within six 
months. He got irritated, and went off about how big Indonesia is and how long 
electoral preparations would take. I signalled him that I was not convinced, so he 
tried to increase his offer by proposing to step down 'as soon as possible' after 
general elections." 109 -
Suspecting that his political credibility was irreversibly exhausted, Soeharto asked Nurcholish to 
assemble a team of Muslim leaders to announce his retirement proposals. As they went through 
the list of possible candidates for what Donald Emmerson has termed Soeharto's 'Muslims oflast 
resort', 110 it emerged that the President intended to revive the cleavages in the Islamic community 
-for his political purposes: he nominated five representatives from Nahdlatul Ulamil, including 
Abdurrahman and Ilyas Ruchiat, but insisted on the exclusion of Amien Rais. Using the divisive 
tactics practised under Guided Democracy and much of the New Order, Soeharto hoped that 
Nahdlatul Ulama once again could be tempted to back his regime. Offers of increased regime 
participation and privileged access to government resources had convinced previous NU leaders 
to give up their concerns towards authoritarian rulers, and the moderate attitude displayed by NU 
throughout the crisis apparently led Soeharto to believe that his approach could work once again. 
Amien's central role in the protest movement as well as the prospect of a Habibie presidency 
109 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 28May1998. 
110 Donald K. Emmerson, 'Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997-98', in: Donald K. Emmerson (editor), 
Indonesia Beyond Soeharto.: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London 
1999: 304. 
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provided Soeharto with deterrents potentially strong enough to lure Nahdlatul Ulama into 
. supporting his embattled government. 
Soeharto's courting of NU in order to outplay Amien Rais triggered an intense debate in 
Abdurrahman's inner circle over the question whether to participate in the presidential meeting or 
not. For Soeharto, Abdurrahman's participation was crucial. His socio-political status equalled 
Amien's, and he was therefore potentially able to neutralise the latter's radicalism. In order to 
ensure Abdurrahman's involvement in the gathering, Soeharto asked Siti Hardiyanti and Hartono 
for help. Both had been politically aligned with the NU leader in the 1997 election campaign, and 
a loose personal contact had been maintained. m Siti Hardiyanti phoned Abdurrahman in the early 
evening, explaining the reasons for the meeting. Abdurrahman immediately agreed to take part, 
provided that his health allowed him to do so. Fearing that the NU leader might finally back down 
from the event, Hartono visited Abdurrahman two hours later. As the Interior Minister left, he 
even asked Abdurrahman's assistant to make sure that the NU leader showed up the following 
day. 112 While Abdurrahman had made up his mind and was determined to participate, some of the 
younger intellectuals in his circle warned that he might be forced to lend moral legitimation to 
Soeharto's consolidation plans. Muhaimin Iskandar, his nephew and a leader of PMII, suspected 
that the President had the draft for his political future already completed and wanted only 
Abdurrahman's public blessing for it: 
"We knew what Soeharto was up to. Soeharto was cornered by Ami en, and Gus Dur 
was expected to help him out. Of course we had to be concerned about Gus Dur's 
image and NU's reputation."113 
.Others feared that rival political leaders participating in the meeting would overpower an 
unprepared Abdurrahman with their scenarios for solving the crisis. With Abdurrahman's 
younger brother, Hasyim Wahid, and Fajrul Falaakh arguing the case for participation, the NU 
chairman decided to go ahead as planned. 114 
111 Abdurrahman and Siti Hardiyanti had been scheduled to take part in an IPNU initiative to distribute 
money to poor school students on 25 May, before events determined otherwise. See 'PP IPNU dan Gerakan 
Berbagi', Republika 6 May 1998. . · 
112 Interview With Al-Zastrouw Ng, Jakarta 26 May 1998. 
113 Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, Jakarta 26September1999. 
114 Interview with Hasyim Wahid, Jakarta 14 November 1998. Fajrul compared the inter-elite politicking to 
a game of chess. As the game had already begun, and the major players already participated, NU had to 
play its part as well. Even if Abdurrahman refused to attend, Fajrul continued, there was no guarantee that 
he would not be manipulated in his absence. See Al-Zastrouw Ng, Gus Dur, Siapa Sih Sampeyan?: Tafsir 
Teritik atas Tindakan dan Pernyataan Gus Dur, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta 1999: 41-42. 
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Abdurrahman was not the only Islamic leader who was inclined to grant Soeharto a dignified, 
generously scheduled departure from politics. Within the Islamist groups around KISDI and 
DDII, there was a widespread view that Soeharto' s withdrawal· came at a stage when doctrinaire 
modernists were profiting most from his regime. On Monday evening, when Nurcholish met 
Soeharto and ABRI rejected the DPR call for the President's resignation, bDII patriarch Anwar 
Haryono sent for Amien Rais. In an attempt to deradicalise the Muhammadiyah chairman, the 
ailing Dewan Dakwah leader presented a list of Soeharto's achievements in defending Muslim 
interests since the early 1990s: the foundation ofICMI, the establishment of Bank Muamalat, the 
publication of the Islamic newspaper Republika., the termination of th~ controversial state lottery 
SDSB, and the lifting of the ban on wearing scarves in schools. In addition, according to Anwar, 
the coinposition of the last Soeharto cabinet fulfilled in quantitative terms the expectations of the 
Muslim community, meaning that the number of non-Muslim ministers had been reduced to a 
minimum.115 Based on his positive Islamic record; Anwar recommended that all Muslim groups 
support Soeharto in the implementation of his refoirn project. Anwar's explanation highlighted 
the suspicions oflslamist forces over the political uncertainty that might succeed the authoritarian 
regime. While a Habibie presidency was expected to promote Islamic interests better than the 
previous government, other scenarios were as likely as they were frightening: the military could 
take over and retuni to the anti-Muslim policies of the 1970s; a transitional government with 
representatives froni all socio-religious backgrounds could be installed, watering down Muslim 
demands in the nanie of compromise; or, as in 1955, parliamentary democracy could split the 
Muslim forces and hand victory to the nationalists. Anwar's lecture, however, failed to convince 
Amien. When Amien left Anwar's house, he kissed his senior's hand, adding that he wanted to do 
so for Anwar, but 'I won't to do it for PakHarto' .116 
Divide et lmpera, The Final Act: Soeharto and his 'Muslims of Last Resort' 
The deep divisions within the civilian elite over Soeharto's fate appeared to offer the President a 
fmal chance to play the vai-ious factions off against each other. The leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama 
and the Islamist groups were leaning towards a settlement with Soeharto, while the modernist 
organisations Muhammadiyah and ICMI openly demanded his immediate resignation. That . 
Soeharto's efforts were ultimately in vain was ncit only due to the unstoppable force of the 
popular protest, but was also the result of Nurcholish's decision: to include Amien in the 
115 Interview with Anwar Haryono, Jakarta 25 July 1998. 
116 Najib 1998: 60. 
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preparations for the presidential meeting with the Muslim leaders. On Tuesday morning, 19 May, 
one hour before. the meeting, Nurcholish and Ami en met with three modernist Muslim figures 
invited to the encounter with Soeharto, among them Yusril lhza Mahendra, an Islamist activist 
but also a speech writer in Soeharto's State Secretariat, and MalikFadjar" Amien demanded that 
Soeharto not be given a chance to consolidate his position: 
"I think this meeting was extremely important. None of us had Amien's resolve, 
determination and public standing. He warned us to be firm. You know how Pak 
Harto can be, charming, persuasive. After hearing Amien, it was clear to me that we 
could not afford to fail."117 
The Muhamrnadiyah leader insisted on Soeharto's resignation and elections within six months or, 
alternatively, the surrender of presidential authority through a decree similar to the 1966 letter 
that handed executive powers from Sukarno. to Soeharto. Equipped with .Affiien's proposals, 
Yusril, Malik and Nurcholish left for the palace and met with the NU-affiliated participants . 
. Nurcholish addressed the group before they entered the meeting room, stressing that it was 
Soeharto who had invited them, and not the ulama who had sought the encounter. As Nurcholish 
conveyed Amien's message, he reminded the participants that they had to pass on the people's 
aspirations to Soeharto, and these aspirations. clearly . demanded the President's resignation. 
Abdurrahman and some military officers who listened to Nurcholish' s words, remained silent. 118 
The coordination between Nurcholish and Amien destroyed Soeharto's hopes for a gradual 
withdrawal on his own terms. Nurcholish ahd former NU leader Ali Yafie made it clear from the 
. . 
beginning that Soeharto's resignation was not negotiable. They also objected to Soeharto's plans 
for the establishment of a Reform Council under his own coordination. Yusril raised concerns 
about the legality of the Council: 
"I pointed out that a Council is a political~legal institution that needed to be anchored 
in. the constitution and related laws. Pak Harto seemed confused, and called in 
Wiranto who had proposed the Council. ( ... ) Wiranto was rushed in, and he said he 
had used political, not legal language when making the suggestion."119 
Finally, the participants agreed on the foundation of a Reform Committee, elections at the earliest 
occasion possible and Soeharto's resignation afterwards. They added, however, that none of them 
was ready to sit either on the Committee or in any reshuffled cabinet. They also decHned 
Soeharto's request to line up behind him during the announcement. Not only Soeharto was taken 
117 Interview with Malik Fadjar, Jakarta 3 June 1998. 
118 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 27 May 1998. 
119 Interview with Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Jakarta 25 August 1998. 
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aback by the intransigence of the Nurcholish-led team. Abdurrahman, surprised about the extent 
of detailed coordination between Nurcholish and the modernist participants, remarked that he was 
amazed that Nurcholish had the guts to ask Soeharto to resign.120 Abdurrahman's generous 
biographer, Greg Barton, explained Abdurrahman's behaviour in the meeting in cultural terms, 
quoting him as saying that 'now that the knife had been thrust deftly into Soeharto's side there 
was no need to twist it for it to accomplish its work'. In addition, he also referred to 
Abdurrahman's continued concerns over a possible regime backlash.121 It is more likely, 
however, that Abdurrahman's indignation was triggered by his increasing fear of political 
marginalisation. Amien and Nurcholish had taken the political initiative away from him, 
positioning them8elves in the forefront of those deciding over the succession issue. When 
Abdurrahman left the meeting, he called on the students to stop their demonstrations in order to 
give Soeharto a chance to implement his reform program. 
Despite Soeharto's failure to force his initial agenda on the Muslim group, he had succeeded in 
creating significant levels of irritation among its participants and other societal leaders. 
Nurcholish .and Amien, for example, had very different interpretations concerning Soeharto's 
concessions to the gathering. Nurcholish felt that he had resisted Soeharto's attempts for a 
succession mechanism on his own terms, and viewed the result as the best possible outcome. 122 
Amien, on the other hand,. saw his fears confirmed that Soeharto might use the meeting to 
consolidate his power. He questioned why Soeharto had only invited Muslim leaders to the 
encounter, and criticised the use of Islamic symbols for political ends. 123 At the center of his 
criticism was, of course, Soeharto's fail~e to provide a clear date for his resignation. 
Accordingly, Amien decided to proceed with his preparations for a mass demonstration at the 
Monas Square on the · following day, 20 May. Student leaders also made it very clear that 
Soeharto's announcement was insufficient to satisfy their demands, and that they were 
determined to continue their protest. It was once again the forceful initiative of the student 
movement that drove the process of regime change, exposing the elite debate over the quality and 
reliability of Soeharto' s offers as a hypothetical deliberation with limited political impact. 
120 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 26 May 1998. 
121 Barton 2002: 242. 
122 Interview Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta 28 May 1998. 
123 'Perihal Pemyataan Presiden Soeharto: Ada yang Berharap, Ada Pula yang Kecewa', Kompas 20 May 
1998. 
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Collapse and Uncertainty: Soeharto's Exit 
The most significant outcome of the palace gathering was that Soeharto's efforts to sideline 
Amien and regain control of the political process had failed. Both in terms of his elite relations 
and his intellectual leadership of the student protest, the momentum remained with the 
Muhammadiyah chairman. This was reflected in public announcements of student leaders that 
they intended to continue their protests as well as in the political manoeuvres of elements within 
the regime struggling to save their career prospects. Amien's two operational centres, the 
Muhammadiyah office and Malik Fajar's house, were now crowded with ICMI leaders and 
prominent cabinet ministers keen on cutting their ties with the falling regime. Ministers Tanri 
Abeng, Fuad Bawazier and Akbar Tanjung felt it necessary to demonstrate their presence in 
Amien's company on Tuesday evening, preparing the stage for their resignations on the following 
day. The cabinet ministers knew that Soeharto's attempts to prolong his rule had no chance of 
succeeding. In Y ogyakarta, students geared up for a huge demonstration protected by the Sultan, 
and despite Amien's cancellation of the Jakarta tally in the early morning of20 May because of 
warnings from inside the armed forces, the disintegration of the regime proceeded at a rapid 
pace. 124 Even Wiranto viewed the banning of the protest not so much as an effort to sustain the 
regime, but as a final service to Soeharto, allowing him to withdraw ~n dignity rather than going 
down in the chaos of a populist revolt. 125 
The last full day of the Soeharto polity saw a stream of foniler loyalists turning their backs on 
the crumbling regime. With Y ogyakarta witnessing one of the biggest rallies in its history, 
combining the power of the masses with the cultural strength of the sultanate, there was no hope 
that the protest would subside. In Jakarta, Amien made his way through the street blockades to 
the DPR building, where the students celebrated the third day of their occupation. With external 
pressure remaining strong, the internal erosion of the regime continued. As Soeharto's assistants 
· tried in vain to convince credible figures to sit on his reform committee, fourteen of his ministers 
handed in their resignations. Habibie, now convinced that he would be president within days, 
undertook no attempt to save the regime of his patron. He had been deeply hurt by Soeharto's 
efforts to use the prospects of a Habibie presidency as a means of political deterrence, and felt no 
pity watching his mentor being deserted by former loyalists: 
124 In a TV address, Amien had called on his followers to pray at home. The cancellation obviously did not 
harm his image as the leader of the protest movement. Newspapers quoted students as i;aying that the 
decision had underscored Amien's stature as a rational and responsible politician. See 'Amien Rais: Cegah 
Jatuhnya Korban Sia-Sia', Surabaya Post 20 May 1998. 
125 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Witanto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
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"Habibie knew that Soeharto had told the gathering of Muslim leaders on the day 
before that if he had to go immediately, Habibie would be president. Then he asked: 
'Do you really want that?' Habibie was very upset and demanded an apology from 
Soeharto, but that never came."126 
After the Minister of Religious Affairs, . Quraish Shihab, had made several unsuccessful attempts 
to talk Nurcholish into joining the President's refonn team, Soeharto dropped first hints to his 
aides about a possible resignation. The desertion of key loyalists and the collapse of his reform 
ideas left Soeharto trapped in a situation where only the military could keep him in power. 
Soeharto knew, however, that the power constellation had irreversibly shifted to his disadvantage, 
and that military intervention was unlikely to prolong his rule, let alone restore the unchallenged 
authority he was used to exercise. When Wiranto suggested that the armed forces were not 
supportive of a military crackdown, Soeharto immediately concurred and asked his inner circle to 
prepare for the transfer of power to Habibie. In acknowledgement of the central role played by his 
. main opponent, Soeharto sent a personal message to Amien, informing him of his imminent 
resignation and asking him to refrain from further protests. 127 · 
Soeharto's departure sparked markedly different reactions in the various factions of Indonesia's 
Muslim community. While Amien was undoubtedly the central figure in the movement that 
brought the regime down, he was not completely satisfied with the outcome. Habibie's 
replacement of Soeharto constituted the very intra-systemic solution that Amien feared might put 
his credibility at stake. Habibie's presidency certainly offered rewards for the modernist Muslim 
constituency, but Amien suspected that the entrenched New Order structures had a better chance 
of surviving under Soeharto's handpicked former deputy than they would have had after a 
revolutionary disintegration of the regime. 128 As Amien came to terms with the compromise 
resulting from his struggle, his friends from ICMI were electrified by the opportunities the new 
constellation provided. Only days after Soeharto had used Habibie to fend off demands for his 
resignation, ICMI functionaries were now sitting until the early morning hours to draft Habibie's 
· first speech a5 new President and collect names for his cabinet. The Islamist groups around DDII 
and KISDI, having failed to maintain the Soeharto presidency, directed their pro-regime activism 
now towards Habibie. Within hours, they mobilised thousands of supporters and led them to the 
parliament, fearing that the student movement might reject the political compromise and seek its 
cancellation. The confrontation between student protesters and pro-regime demonstrators at the 
126 Interview with Z.A. Maulani, Habibie's Chief of Staff, Jakarta 5 June 1998. 
127 Interview with Yusril lh,za Mahendra, Jakarta 25 August 1998. 
128 Interview with Amien Rais, Surabaya 15May1999. 
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parliament complex exposed Habibie's vulnerable legitimacy, anticipating an influential political 
pattern for the remainder of the latter's term in office. Nahdlatul Ulama, for its part, expressed 
opposition to the sudden transfer of presidential authority to Habibie. Some of Abdurrahman's 
fiercest opponents were now likely to exert a dominating influence over government policies, 
blocking the few gates of political access for traditionalist politicians that the Soeharto 
administration had opened in exchange for contributions to the maintenance of the regime. In 
short, Soeharto's downfall had done little to overcome the divisions within Indonesfa's Muslim 
community, but had rather shaped the preconditions for the intense political conflicts of the post-
New Order era. 
CONCLUSION: CIVILIAN. DISUNITY, POPULAR PROTEST AND THE END OF 
MILITARY-'BACKED AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner maintained that militaries or authoritarian figures supported 
by them are able to seize power and sustain it over long periods of time when 'civilian politicians 
are weak and divided.' 129 Indonesia's New Order has been an obvious example of this linkage 
between the level of democratic unity among ciVilian forces and the likelihood and duration of 
military intervention in politics. Cleavages i!1 the civilian political sphere, and particularly within 
the Muslim community, allowed Soeharto to seize, expand and sustain authoritarian rule for more 
than three decades. This conclusion lias led some analysts to explain Soeharto's downfall with the 
reverse argument: that his demise was due to the sudden unification of civilian oppositional 
forces against him. Robert Hefner, for example, argued that 'for the first time, that opposition 
·now united tinder Wahid's NU, Megawati's nationalists and the reform-minded modernists 
around Rais.' 130 The discussion in this chapter ha8 shown, however, that no such coalition · 
e:Xisted, and that the leaders of key socio-political organisations continued their long-standing 
religio-political disputes throughout the crisis. Some of them appeared prepared to engage with 
· the regime and secure its survival at various junctures of the evolving crisis, while others simply . 
isolated themselves from the popular protest engulfmg the New Order state. That they finally 
agreed that Soeharto had to resign had to do less. with a genuine political consensus between 
Indonesia's main societal groups, but with the fact that the uncontrollable force of the student 
movement, combined ·with ·Widespread social unrest, had driven the regime to the brink of 
129 Diamond and Plattner 1996: xx.iv. 
130 Hefuer 2000: 199. 
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collapse. The demands for Soeharto's departure were, in most cases, post-factum endorsements of 
the inevitable. 
The theory of a united opposition causing Soeharto's fall has been challenged by several 
authors stressing the non-involvement of major religio-political forces in the movement against 
the regime. Andree Feillard conceded that 'Nahdlatul Ulama was not a decisive factor in the 1998 
political change', blaming the fact that Abdurrahman was 'quasi..,absent' during the crisis as he 
was 'laying in bed during most of this crucial time.' 131 Ken Young concurred that Abdurrahman's 
stroke had such· an impact that 'he and NU have not been at the forefront of the movement for 
change.' 132 These assessments, while contradicting the assumption of a united front against 
Soeharto, still do not capture the systematic unwillingness of key religio-political leaders to join 
forces with their rivals against the regime. Abdurrahman's inclination to favor cooperation with 
the regime over the agenda for democratic change predated his stroke, and was pursued 
consistently until the very end of Soeharto' s government. His endorsement of Golkar in the 1997 
elections, the attacks on Amien Rais' candidacy, the public denunciation of plans to unite the 
opposition and his calls to leave the succession to Soeharto were perfectly compatible with the 
post-stroke criticism of the student movement and his lobbying for a negotiated settlement with 
Soeharto. In fact, many NU leaders acknowledged in private that a healthy Abdurrahman would 
probably have put even more effort into opposing the popular movement for Soeharto's 
resignation than the ill chairman eventually did. 133 His political stance was defined by long-term 
considerations of strategy, religio-ideological convictions, constituency interests and personal 
ambition that were largely immune to the effects of his medical condition. The NU Central 
Board, on the other hand, shared many of Abdurrahman's sentiments, but felt overwhelmed by 
the force of popular protests and finally withdrew its support for Soeharto when his position had 
become indefensible. 
Abdurrahman's fears that his support for a cross-constituency coalition.against Soeharto would 
open the door for the forces of political Islam to seize power turned him into one of the largest 
obstacles to a united opposition against the struggling New Order government. He was by no 
means the only key leader, however, who harboured deep suspicions about his religio..:political 
rivals and thus refused to forge an anti-regime alliance. Megawati Soekamoputri, the leader of the 
secular-nationalist segment of Indonesian politics, was equally reluctant to align herself with 
131 Andree Feillard, 'Indonesian Traditionalist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy (1999-2001)', 
Archipel 64, 2002: 118. . 
132 Ken Young, 'The Crisis: Contexts and Prospects', in: Geoff Forrester and Ron May (editors), 11ze Fall 
of Soeharto, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst 1999: 120. · 
133 Confidential interview with a NU Deputy Chairman, Jakarta 27 May 1998. 
178 
modernist Muslim leaders and the populist force of the student movement. She too had concerns 
about the possible rise of Islam as a political factor, and she was not prepared to expose her 
constituency to the risk of retaliation by the embattled Soeharto regime. Accordingly, she was 
hardly heard of throughout the crisis, except for a half-hearted declaration in January 1998 that 
she was prepared to accept the presidency if it was offered to her. Arni en Rais, for his part,. saw 
himself confronted with accusations that he temporarily suspended his opposition towards 
Soeharto because Habibie · had promised him increased regime participation for modernist 
Muslims. He also had little confidence in Abdurrahman's reliability and Megawati's political 
skills, opting to link up with the student movement and critical intellectuals instead. In contrast to 
Abdurrahman, Arnien immediately understood the significance of the student protest. He was 
convinced that it would not just 'fade away'· like its .197 4 and 1978 predecessors, but that it was · 
to become.the decisive political force in the crisis. Unlike Megawati, Arnien was prepared to put 
his personal safety and that of his followers at risk, earning him the respect of the students who 
subsequently allowed him to use their movement as his political vehicle. Established as informal. 
leader of the popular protest, Ami en extracted himself from last-minute efforts to form a coalition 
with Megawati and Abdurrahman. ICMI, finally, only supported a broad-based elite coalition 
against Soeharto when it felt excluded from the regime, but turned to promote an intra-systemic 
transfer of power when its leader became the main beneficiary of such a solution. 
The fact that it was. the anarchic force of popular protest rather than a coalition of oppositional 
groups that caused the regime to collapse had a profound impact on the character of regime 
change and the political structures of the post-'authoritarian era. When the protest movement 
succeeded in re111oving Soeharto from office, the most important societal forces were unprepared 
and too fragmented to take his place. The resulting power vacuum was filled by moderate 
· elements in the military who negotiated an orderly transfer of authority within the constitutional 
framework of the regime. Instead of a non-regime alliance of societal leaders, it was Soeharto' s 
deputy who was put in charge of the first 18 months of the post-authoritarian period. Under his 
tutelage, patronage networks and power structures of the New Order state, including those 
associated with the armed forces,· managed to extend their influence into the new polity. The 
continuity of authoritarian structures and forces in the post-Soeharto state was certain to 
. complicate and delay the process of democratic consolidation, with the area of civil-military 
reforms particularly vulnerable to pressure from residual powers of the old regime. In addition, 
many of the religio-political cleavages that marked the pattern of elite politics during Soeharto's 
ran· were destined to remain influential under the post-authoritarian arena, with serious 
consequences for the prospects of democratic change. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ADAPTING TO DEMOCRACY: 
THE ARMED FORCES IN THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN POLITY 
Six years into Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition, politicians and analysts remain deeply 
· divided over the question of just how far the efforts of establishing democratic control over the 
armed forces have progressed since 1998. The assessments range from Megawati's claim during 
the 2004 presidential campaign that democratic civilian supremacy had been firmly anchored 
during her rule to the reports of human rights groups and activists that the armed force_s had in 
fact cons~lidated their political powers. 1 Writing in 2003, William Liddle trjed to weigh the 
arguments put forward by the various camps. On the one hand, he a8serted, the armed forces 'did 
not attempt to prevent then Vice.,.President B.J. Habibie, a civilian disliked by the military from 
becoming president.' They also refrained from undennining the 'project to democratize Indonesia 
by holditig free parliamentary elections, the first since 1955.' fu addition, the military 'formally 
rescinded its twin-functions· doctrine.' Despite all these positive indicators, Liddle concluded that 
there is 'a slowly dawning recognition that nothing fundamental has in fact changed since 1998.' 
The armed forces, he maintained, 'continue to hold a self-image and possess resources that 
predispose and enable them to intervene in national political life in a manner and at.a time of their 
own choosing. '2 Even within intellectual circles of the armed forces, there was acknowledgement 
. . - . . 
· that 'while the post-New Order civilian governinents ( ... ) managed to reduce some of the 
institutional privileges of the military, this reduction did not result in a significant deciine ill the 
political powers of the armed forces.' 3 
The explanation for these contrasting characterisations of Indonesia's civil-military transition is 
partially rooted in the way the 1998 __ regime change occurred. Chapter 3 demonstrated that 
·moderate military officers succeeded in neg<?tiating the terms of regime change, which secured a 
central place for th~ armed forces in the power constellation of the new polity. Chapter 4, for its 
: . . . 
part, showed how the inability of non-regime forces to assume government allowed i.inportant 
1 East Timor Action Network/US, 'Indonesian Activists Urg~ U.S. Congress To Blo~k Militazy Training', 
Press Release, 7 October 2002. 
2 :R.. William Liddle, 'Indonesia's Army Remains a Closed Corporate Group', Jakarta Post 3 June 2003. 
3 Arif Yulianto, Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba difengah Pusaran Demokraii, Rajawali 
Pers, Jakarta. 2002: 612. Arif Yulianto, the author of the study, was a staff officer at Air Force 
Headquarters. 
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structures of the New Order to survive Soeharto's fall. The intra-systemic transfer of power 
shaped the preconditions for the post-authoritarian transition and caused many of its problems, 
but other factors appear to be important as well. The success of civil-military reforms depends on 
a number of variables, including the quality of civilian governance, the appropriate selection of 
reform targets and a supportive international environment. This chapter will discuss the 
developm:ent of civil-military relations under three post-Soeharto governments and evaluate the 
reasons for their successes and failures. In an additional section, it focuses on the post-Soeharto 
career of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, exemplifying the gradual assimilation of military officers 
to the conditions of democratic political competition. The final section presents a comparative 
application of the two-generation model of military reform developed by Cottey, Edmunds and 
Forster to the case of Indonesia. Reviewing the material presented so far, the chapter will argue 
that Indonesia's armed forces succeeded in preserving their fundamental interests by adapting 
effectively to the framework of the democratic polity, indicating that institutional change was 
incomplete and second-generation reforms could not even begin. 
I. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: MILITARY REFORM UNDER THE HABIBIE 
GOVERNMENT, 1998-1999. 
The ambivalent character of regime change, marked simultaneously by reformative and 
conservative features, had a profound impact on the development of the post-authoritarian polity. 
The new political system exposed sharp breaks with the authoritarian past but also strong lines of 
continuity. It was this tension between radical change and the survival of parts of the old regime 
that nurtured the evolution of post-Soeharto civil-military relations. 
The reformative aspects of the change in government led to considerable confusion within the 
armed forces. Habibie, under strong societal pressure to demonstrate his reformist credentials, 
launched a bold political reform program within days of assuming office. He decided to lift the 
limitations on establishing new political parties, allowed unrestricted freedom of the press and 
promised free and fair elections for the near future.4 Although observers like Horowitz believed 
that 'Indonesian society is expecting· - and is certainly ready for - a more complete 
democratization,' the surprisingly swift liberalisation of the political system had serious 
4 R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia's Democratic Opening', Government and Opposition 34:1, Winter 1999: 
11 l. 
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consequences for the military and its top brass.5 The press began to publish articles on past 
human rights abuses committed by the security forces, leading to a widespread sense that the 
political invulnerability of the military had come to an end. Political parties of all colours and 
ideologies sprang up between June and August 1998, colliding with the traditional military 
paradigm of societal control and its obsession with the perceived dangers of political pluralism. 
The new atmosphere Of open political competition, which allowed all politico-ideological groups 
except for the communists to organise and participate in the struggle for power in the post-
Soeharto-polity, disturbed many within the officer corps and left them in doubt about their role, . 
function and careers. The reforms initiated by Habibie were designed to empower civilian groups 
and entrench them in the executive and legislative institutions of the state, and were likely to lead 
in the long term to the marginalisation of the armed forces from political life. In terms of internal 
military organisation, on the other hand, Habibie ordered the removal of the most prominent 
hardline officers from their commands. Prabowo and Muchdi were first dismissed and later 
discharged from active service after being found guilty of involvement in the kidnapping of anti-. 
government activists. 
The elements· of rapid change were balanced, however, by the strong lines of continuity that 
extended from the New Order into the new democratic polity. The government that took over 
from Soeharto's last cabinet in May 1998 consisted largely of politicians and bureaucrats 
produced by the old regime. The legislature, established after the 1997 elections, remained in 
place until fresh polls could be held and a new parliament inaugurated. Thus the institutional 
structures of the immediate post-Soeharto administration excluded those groups that had been in 
open opposition to the New Order. In the armed forces, Habibie opted to leave the majority of 
Soeharto's top generals in their positions. The reasons for this decision were manifold. Most 
importantly, there was a widely held view in Habibie's circle and much of the political elite that 
the removal of the military hardliners was sufficient to satisfy initial public demands for change 
in the armed forces.6 Personally, Habibie thought that Wiranto had to be rewarded for the orderly 
transition of presidential power and, as Harold Crouch pointed out, both men had a joint interest 
in preventing investigations into the benefits they had received under authoritarian rule. 7 
Consequently, Wiranto held on to his control over the armed forces and the Department of 
Defence and ~ecurity, and many of his associates retained their commands or were promoted to 
5 Donald L. Horowitz, 'The Draft Laws on Indonesian Political Parties, Elections, and Legislative Bodies: 
An Analysis', in: R. William Liddle (editor), Crafting Indonesian Democracy, Mizan, Bandung 2001: 14 7. 
6 Interview with Z.A. Maulani, Jakarta 5 June l 998. 
7 Harold Crouch, 'Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations Since May 1998 ', in Arief Budiman, 
Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (editors), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash Asia 
·Institute, Clayton 1999: 134. · 
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higher offices. Even in the marginalisation of the most prominent hardliners from the armed 
forces, the residual powers of their elite relationships proved sufficiently strong to facilitate both 
their escape from legal consequences and their quest for alternative careers. Prabowo went on to 
build a successful business empire and, in 2003, launched a political comeback in the Golkar 
party. Muchdi, for his part, rose to become the Deputy Head of BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, 
National Intelligence Agency) under the Megawati govemment. In addition, most oftheit military 
associates, such as Syafrie Syamsuddin and Zacky Anwar Makarim, continued their service 
within the armed forces and were given influential posts and assignments. 8 
. The combination of change and continuity was reflected in the political attitudes of the military 
top brass towards the new polity. There was a strong sense of satisfaction within Wiranto's group 
over its success in negotiating Soeharto's resignation and assuming controi over the post-New 
Order armed forces.9 The military elite had avoided the example of countries like South Korea 
that embarked on their post-authoritarian reform of civil-military relations by replacing large 
sections of their armed forces leadership. 10 In contrast, the composition of Indonesia's top brass 
experienced only marginal changes, allowing senior officers attached to the old regime to defend 
their personal interests against demands for fundamental reform. The retention of their old 
positions was offset, however, by radical changes in the political system. The idea of autonomous 
parties, a critical press and unrestricted political competition clashed with core elements of 
military ideology incubated during forty years of authoritarian rule. Comments made by senior 
officers on the character of Habibie's political reforms reflected this collision. Agum Gumelar, 
for example, stated that 
"now that the New Order is gone, we should think about why we had it. We had it 
because liberal democracy had failed. We had it because economic growth needs 
stability. We had it because many Indonesians are politically immature. ( ... )Let's 
not pull down all the fences we have erected to protect us. There was actually a· 
reason why we had erected them."11 
In the same vein, Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono warned that 'we shouldn't suddenly have 26, 34, 
and so forth, political parties, because we have had experiences in the past.' 12 Wiranto, for his 
part, spoke of the need to limit the scope of the reform efforts, and he defined those liinits with 
8 Syafrie, despite losing his post as Commander of the Jakarta Garrison, later became spokesman of the 
armed forces. Zacky, who was replaced as head of BIA in January 1999, subsequently received several 
important tasks in sensitive areas, most notably in Aceh and East Timor. 
9 Wiranto 2003: 93-97. 
10 Jun 2001: 130. 
11 Interview with Agum Gumelar, Jakarta 9June1998. 
12 'RefonnasiABRI Batasi Masa Jabatan Presiden', Republika 26May1998. 
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the political terminology of the New Order: 'Pancasila, the Constitution, nationalism and unity.' 13 
Labeled as moderates in the late New Order for their implicit endorsement of Soeharto's removal, 
key officers around Wiranto quickly found themselves portrayed as hardliners in the new 
democratic polity. 
Controlling the Armed Forces: 'Persuasion' and Common Interests 
In addition to their reservations vis-a-vis the new political system, the armed forces also had to 
come to terms with a civilian president who tried to enlist senior generals to support his own 
political and personal agenda. In general terms, Habibie had to _convince the military to refrain 
from sabotaging democratic reforms and, by implication, underminirig the credibility of his rule. 
Adi Sasono, now Minister for Cooperatives and Small Enterprises, frequently discussed this issue 
with Habibie: 
''The probiem is that we have the old military leaderShip in a new political system. 
Of course we are afraid · that Wiranto and his · clique will try to express their 
· disagreement with Pak Habibie's reform by trying to undermine him. We have to 
find ways to anticipate that."14 
Besides aiming to reduce the. risk of military intervention in the process of democratic 
consolidation, Habibie a}so sought to enforce presidential authority over the armed forces in order 
to compensate for his political vulnerability. Habibie enjoyed little ·support from key societal 
forces and the newly emerging political parties, leaving the military as one of his major sources 
of power. Using his authority over military appointments as an instrument of 'persuasion', 
Habibie convinced senior officers to assist him in consolidating his political position and in 
fending off challenges from opponents. There were three major events in which Habibie evoked 
his supremacy over the military to improve his political standing. To begin with, Habibie forced 
Wiranfo. on 23 May 1998 to dismiss the newly appointed Johnny Lumintang as Commander of 
Kostrad. Some of Habibie's advisers had warned that a Christian in such a crucial military post 
could seriously undermine Habibie's popularity in the Muslim community.15 Then, when Golkar 
13 'Panglima ABRI: Kegiatan Politik Tanpa Batas Ganggu Reformasi', Republika .4 June 1998; and Mabes 
ABRI, 'ABRl dan Reformasi. Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Reformasi Menuju Pencapaian Cita-
Cita Nasional', Jakarta, June 1998. 
14 Interview with Adi Sasono, Jakarta 11 June 1998. 
15 Lumintang had replaced Prabowo after the latter's dismissal on 22 May, but held the post only for 
several hours. Wiranto's official explanation was that Lumintang had been installed as caretaker for 
Djamari Chaniago, the eventual Commander, but both Lumintang and Djamari were surprised by the 
abrupt change. Lumintang had been actively coordinating the Kostrad troops when he was informed of his 
removal. In an interview, her referred to the length of his term as a 'record' in Indonesian military history. 
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held its congress in July 1998 to elect a new chairman, Habibie demanded that the military 
support the candidacy of his associate Akbar Tandjung. 16 Akbar's rival for the post was former 
ABRl Commander Edi Sudradjat, a declared Habibie opponent and keen to end the latter's 
presidency as soon as possible. Edi was popular within the ranks, but Habibie's intervention with · 
Wiranto secured Akbar's election. Finally, Habibie engaged the armed forces into efforts by his 
associates to mobilise paid crowds armed with bamboo sticks in defence of a special· MPR 
session in November 1998 designed to legitimate Habibie's presidency and his political 
program.11 
The support of the military leadership for Habibie's political agenda was not only motivated by 
the effective enforcement of presidential authority, however. There was a growing awareness on 
both sides that they had common interests on a variety of issues, largely relating to the protection 
of their residual powers inherited from the New Order regime. Consequently, Habibie granted a 
number of important concessions to the anned forces in exchange for supporting his rule. Most 
significantly, Habibie left the specifics of military reform to Wiranto and his advisers. 18 This 
. crucial concession put the armed _forces in charge of defining and executing its own reform 
agenda .. With this, the civilian government su~endered authority over one of the most crucial 
areas of structural reform. As one observer said, 
"Imagine you have a bankrupt company run into the ground by a bunch of corrupt 
managers. Then, as the owner, you ask the same managers to draft a blueprint for 
making the company profitable again. That's what Habibie did with the military."19 
Thus in the first 18 months of Indonesia's democratic transition, there were no executive orders 
by civilian authorities to the military elite as to how to revise its command system, doctrine and 
political mindset. In fact, as David Bourcbier pointed out, the military of the Habibie period had · 
Djamari, for his part, was woken up at one o'clock in the morning to learn of his appointment. Interview 
with Let.Gen. Johnny Lumintang, Jakarta 29 July 1999; and Let.Gen. Djamari Chaniago, Jakarta 11 
November 1998. 
16 Wiranto's influence on Golkar's regional boards was significant as many of their chairmen were retired 
military officers. 
17 According to an officer deeply involved in the operation, Wiranto described the mobilisation of the pro-
government mob as 'Habibie's order'. The mob was supposed to confront the anti-Habibie protesters, 
mostly students. On the last day of the MPR session, security forces killed several students demonstrating 
against Habibie at the Semanggi interchange close to the MPR building. The protesters had been 
particularly outraged by a clause passed by the Assembly that guaranteed continued parliamentary 
representation to the armed forces. Kivlan Zen, Konflik dan Integrasi TNI-AD, Institute for Policy Studies, 
Jakarta 2004: 95. 
18 Habibie asked the public on 23 June to 'give ABRI time' to handle its 'internal problems', suggesting 
that the reform of the armed forces was an internal military matter rather than a policy issue for the civilian 
government. See 'Pangab: ABRI Harus Mereformasi Diri', Kompas 24 June 1998 
19 Interview with Kusnanto Anggoro, Jakarta 25 June 1999. 
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arguably 'more control over its own affairs than it had under Soeharto.'20 Wir~nto, in his double 
function as Minister of Defence and Security and Armed Forces Commander, represented the 
civilian government vis-a-vis the very military whose institutional interests he was determined to 
· defend. The military' s power to define its own reform process contrasted sharply with the 
emphasis Cottey, Edmunds and Forster put on the importance ofselecting the right reform targets 
when launching institutional changes to the defence sector. If allowed to set reform agendas for 
themselves, militaries are likely to address a large number of institutional areas that are of 
secondary importance to their interests in order to cover for the omission of more important 
issues. This omission of primary institutional targets from the reform agenda, in tum, is certain to 
cause long-term damage to the goal of establishing democratic control over the armed forces. As 
it would tum out, that was precisely what occurred in Indonesia. 
Designing Self-reform: Wiranto and the 'New Paradigm' 
The armed forces made extensive use of the authority to select their own reform targets by 
announcing. a number of internal reforms between July and November 1998 that produced 
. relevant institutional changes but protected the military's primary source of power. Wiranto 
proclaimed in July that the military was prepared to follow a 'New Paradigm'. This new concept, 
however, was in content and wording identical with the reform ideas formulated by moderate 
officers in 1996 and 1997.21 Like the drafts circulating at that time, Wiranto's post-Soeharto 
paradigm consisted of four points: first, the military was content not to be in the forefront of all 
· national affairs; second; the previous approach of occupying was changed into influencing; third, 
this influence was to be exerted indirectly rather than directly; and fourth, the armed forces 
acknowledged the necessity for role-sharing with other national forces.22 The reuse of ideas 
developed in the context of the late New Order to address the challenges of the post-authoritarian 
transition led the rapid reformers in Wiranto' s circle to grumble in protest: 
"The new paradigm wasn't new at all. It was the same concept that we had written 
up earlier in preparation for the time when Soeharto would allow limited reforms. 
Now he had fallen, with a big bang, and all we could come up with was to take that 
old paper out of the drawer. Pretty saddening, actually. But hey, it was a start - they 
said."23 · 
20 David Bourchier, 'Habibie's Interregnum: Reformasi, · Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle for 
.Power', in: Chris Manning and Pieter van Diermen (editors), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of 
Reformasiand Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2000: 28. 
21 Ronna 2003: 164-165. 
22 'Pangab: ABRl Kembangkan Empat Paradigma Peran Sosial Politik Barn', Republika 18 July 1998. 
23 Interview with Agus Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta 12 November 1998. 
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Furthennore, the military gradually disposed of its Dual Function, changing its name into 
'combined function' (peran terpadu) before declaring it officially terminated in 2000.24 The 
doctrinal change was- accompanied by several measures designed to underline -the military's 
determination to extract itself from active politics. fu November, a new policy was implemented 
that no longer allowed active officers to hold civilian positions in the bureaucracy. fu January 
1999, the armed forces accepted a reduction of its legislative representation to 38 delegates in 
national parliament (down from 75) and 10 percent of the seats in local legislatures. Wiranto also 
initiated the separation of the police from the military, which had been united under the 
institutional roof of Armed Forces Headquarters since 1962. This split allowed Wiranto to rename 
ABRI as TNI, the term used for the armed forces during the glory days of the revolution. rn 
addition, the armed forces cut their formal ties with Golkar and pledged neutrality in the 
parliamentary elections _scheduled for June-1999 .25 
Wiranto's efforts marked the early phase of what Cottey, Edmunds and Forster have called the 
'first generation' of civil-military reforms. fu this phase of the post-authoritarian transition, the 
institutions of the old regime are reviewed, disbanded and replaced by new bodies reflecting the 
changed political conditions under the democratic polity. Successful completion of first-
generation reforms is dependent on the accurate identification and substantial restructuring of 
those power foundations that enabled militaries to function as pillars of authoritarian rule. fu 
Indonesia, the character and scope of reforms proposed by the armed forces suggested that the 
problem of military intervention in politics was created by and limited to the participation of 
senior officers in political institutions. Thus the solution, the armed forces concluded, lay in 
simply extracting the military from the political bodies it had penetrated; the macro-structures of 
military organisation, on the other hand, were not to be affected: 
"The main target of our reform program was to get out of politjcs. Militaries 
should not be involved in active politics. We left the government, disbanded our 
socio-political branches- and gradually reduced our presence in the legislatures. 
( ... ) The Dual Function was over once we implemented thqse steps. The stnicture 
of our military itself has nothing to do with that. There is nothing wrong with that 
structure. It is needed for defence purposes."26 
24 'ABRI Lakukan Redefinisi atas Doktrin Dwifungsi', Media Indonesia 23 September 1998; 'Dwifungsi 
ABRI Dihapus, Diganti "Peran ABRI"', Republika 23 September 1998; 'Dwifungsi tak Berkesudahan', 
Media Indonesia 27 September 1998; and 'Panglima 1NI Pada Rapim TNI: Tinggalkan Sospol, 
Konsentrasi Pada Pertahanan', Kompas 20 April 2000. 
25 'Military Chiefs Told to Stay Distant from Parties'~ Jakarta Post 17 October 1998. 
26 Interview with Johnny Lumintang, Jakarta 29 July 1999. 
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The exclusion of active personnel from government and the gradual reduction of its 
representation in the legislature were important steps in the formal depoliticisation of the armed 
forces. They led to a widespread sense of uncertainty and concern within an officer corps that for 
decades had viewed high-profile bureaucratic careers as part of its guaranteed professional 
benefits.27 But the heavy emphasis on terminating military engagement in civilian institutions also, 
distracted the attention of the public and political elite from other, more consequential areas of 
. reform. Most' importantly, the territorial command strueture, the backbone of military presence in 
socio-political life in the regions, was left untouched for the entirety ofHabibie's interregnum. 
The institutional and doctrinal dismantling of the Dual Function masked the fact that the 
political role of the armed forces had been the result .of, rather than the reason for, the 
entrenchment of the military in Indonesia's society. The military had been granted direct 
participation in government in the Iate 1950s in acknowledgement of its capacity to stabilise (or 
destabilise) ·civilian governments. This capacity, in turn, was based on the military's territorial 
presence; its autonomy from central funding sources and mediation in conflicts between political 
. parties and other societal forces. The military. reform measures initiated under the Habibie 
government, on the other hand, scrapped the Dual Function without addressing the structural 
causes t~t had produced it. In the same vein, the outpouring of societal criticism of the military' s 
violent past cornered the armed forces and persuaded them to presen,t a reformed image, but it did 
. not cut to the core of TNI's institutional interests. In fact, many observers cited the trenchant 
public critiques of the military as the main· evidence for the diminished powers of the armed 
forces. Bourchier, for example, argued in 1999 that 'ABRI's public disgracing and the graphic 
exposure of systematic human rights vioiations in the media seemed to signal a significant shift in 
the constellation of power.'28 Such assessments, however, overlooked the entrenched nature of 
the military's structure that enabled it, in spite of continuing institutional refqrm and sharp 
societal scrutiny of its history, to adjust effectively to the changed political context of the post-
authoritarian era. The increasing levels of competition . between civilian groups offered it 
. . . . 
· . opportunities of political mediation; and many of the structural refonns initiated by the Habibie 
government worked in its favor. The decentralisation laws of 1999, for example, prepared the 
scerie for a substantial transfer of political authority· and financial resources into the regions, . 
27 In July 1998, there were 6,899 active officers seconded to civilian posts in the government bureaucracy. 
· If retired members of the armed forces were added, the total number was 12,446. Ikrar Nusa Bakti et.al, 
Tentara Yang Gelisah: Hasil Penelitian Yipika tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gerakan Reformasi, Mizan, 
Bandung 1999: 143. · 
28 D.l\vid Bourchier; 'Skeletons, Vigilantes and the Armed Forces' Fall from Grace', in: Arief Budiman, 
Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (editors), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash 
Asia Institute, Clayton 1999: 166. 
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where the armed forces had a strong presence through their network of territorial units. With 
political parties struggling to establish a presence at the grassroots, and legislatures and 
bureaucracies trying to cope with their new roles, the military stood out as the only institution 
with a deeply rooted, functioning infrastructure.29 
Adapting to Democracy: TNI and the 1999 Elections 
The adaptation of the military to the political system of the post-Soeharto era was accelerated by · 
growing intra-elite tensions surrounding the· parliamentary and presidential elections in June and 
. . 
October 1999, The impact of this struggle for political hegemony was reflected in the changing 
relationship between the armed forces and the President in the second half of Habibie's term. In 
the early period of his government, Habibie was able to rein in the military elite by applying a 
combination· of 'persuasion' and compromise. The electoral process, however, substantially 
weakened Habibie's position and strengthened that of the armed forces. Habibie's Golkar party 
came only second in the parliamentary elections in June 1999, in which TNI had remained neutral 
both in rhetoric and in practice. The party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, PDI-Perjuangan (PDI-
Struggle), finished first with 33.7 percent of the votes, turning Megawati into the front-runner for 
·the election of the president by the MPR in October. Furthermore, a number of political and· 
financial scandals crippled the Habibie government throughout 1999, motivating even Golkar to 
consider other presidential candidates. Deserted by large segments of civil society and the 
political elite, Habibie's hopes for a second term rested on Wiranto's readiness to throw the full 
weight of the military behind the presidential campaign of the embattled incumbent. Wiranto, 
however, was.in contact with other contenders as well, particularly with Megawati, but also with 
Abdurrahman Wahid, who was supported by a coalition of Muslim parties. Only one year after 
the end· of authoritarian rule, the actors of the new democratic polity were lobbying the armed 
forces for their political support. 
29 The strength ofTNI's territorial network has motivated some observers to not only predict, butin fact 
demand a continued role of the armed forces in politics, Patrick Walters, for example, argued that the 
. 'military must continue to play an active role "in national politics' as it 'remains the only truly national 
institution in Indonesia with a cohesive and disciplined network that stretches down to the village level'. 
Civilian institutio~s, Walters argued, were too weak to manage the transition. It was, of course, the 
.. territorial command structure that obstructed the establishment of strong civilian institutions in the regions, 
·and the demand for its maintenance was certain to perpetuate the problem rather than solve it. Patrick 
Walters, 'The. Indonesian Armed Forces ·in the Post-Soeharto Era', ·in: Geoff Forrester (editor), Post-
Soeharto Indonesia: Chaos or Renewal?~ Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 1999: 59-60. 
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The competition for the leadership of the first democratic government since the late 1950s 
ended with Habibie's defeat and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia's fourth 
president in October 1999. Sensing that Habibie's chances were minimal, Wiranto had earlier 
publicly declined his offer to run as his vice-presidential candidate.30 The armed forces chief had 
received assurances from Abdurrahman that he would play a prominent role in the latter's. 
government; even the possibility of a Wiranto vice-presidency was discussed. Equally important 
were Abdurrahman's guarantees that the military's interests would be 'protected' if he won the 
election.31 · After· intense last minute lobbying, the armed· forces leadership instructed its 
representatives to vote for Abdurnihman, who subsequently beat Megawati by a margin of 373 to 
313.32 Wiranto's hopes for the vice-presidency were dashed, however, when Abdurrahman · 
·decided to support Megawati for the post. The disappointed TNI leader was· compensated with a 
key cabinet seat, with Susilo and Agum. also obtaining ministerial positions. The inclusion of 
prominent military figures in the post-Habibie government pointed to the political transformation 
of the armed forces in the first 18 nionths of the democratic system. From the main pillar of 
Soeharto's regime, with the clearly defined and enforced agenda of prolonging the rule of the 
incumbent, the armed forces had grown into an entity with reduced institUtional privileges, but 
expanded political flexibility, internal autonomy and informal influence on the outcome of inter-
elite competition. Abdurrahman admitted as much before securing his victory: 
"You still can't beoome President in Indonesia without the military. They're out of 
the bureaucracy, and all of that, but that's nonsense. Nonsense! They're still strong, 
and Wiranto will support me to become President."33 
Abdurrahman's analysis reflected pride in his ability to use military support in outplaying his 
civilian opponents and· assuming power, but it would also turn into· a self-fulfilling prophecy 
affecting his OWn term in office. The events of the following two years would demonstrate that in 
30 'Wiranto Tarik Diri Dari Calon W apres', Media Indonesia 19 October 1999. 
31 Wiranto had initially favored Megawati for the presidency, but had received no concrete offers as far as 
possible concessions were concerned. Instead, senior PDI-P officials declared publicly that Megawati was 
unlikely to invite Wiranto to forril. a coalition, given the latter's unfavoral>le reputation with foreign 
governments. In resi>onse to the negative PDI-P attitude, Wiranto's assistants sponsored an organisation 
·named 'Perkasa' to call for an Abdurrahman-Wiranto leadership team. ·'PDI Perjuangan ''Unlikely to Pick 
Wiranto as Partner'", jakarta fost 18 October 1999; interview with Subagio Anam, Member of Parliament 
for PDI-P, Jakarta 5 October 1999; and Perkasa, 'Rakyat Perintahkan Dwi Tunggal GQs Dur-Wiranto 
Selamatkan Bangsa Indonesia', Jakarta 19 October 1999. 
32 It remains unclear if the 38 members of the military faction in the MPR voted en bloc for Abdurrahman 
or whether the vote was split. Traditionally, the military faction in the legislature voted according to the 
instruction of Armed Forces Headquarters, but the secret ballot may have allowed some members to vote 
for Megawati. Based on the calculations of the voting behaviour of other factions, however, it seems likely 
that at least a majority of military members opted for Abdurrahman. 
33
· Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 18October1999. 
191 
addition to obtaining military support to gain the presidency, it was equally essential for the 
incumbent to maintain that support if he wanted to stay in power. 
The early phase of 'first-generation reforms' initiated during Habibie's interregnum had 
apparently changed the way the armed forces engaged in politics, but had produced rather mixed 
results as far establishing democratic civilian control over the military was concerned. Besides the 
continued entanglement of the armed forces in the political competition between civilian actors, 
the main reason for the slow progress in the civil-military transition was the persistence of TNI's 
primary power base despite ongoing institutional reforms. The territorial coll1Il13.nd system had 
been excluded from the reform agenda, allowing the armed forces to continue the practice of 
. military self-financing. Largely independent from budget allocations provided by the state, the 
military was still able to define its own operational· and strategic agenda in spite of cuts to its 
political privileges. In addition, Richard Gunther argued that TNI's continued representation in 
parliament, albeit reduced, endowed 'the military with "reserve powers" that might be invoked to . 
frustrate a democratic mandate. '34 The most striking evidence for the success of the armed forces 
in avoiding subordination to civilian control was its independent political operation in East 
Timor, where a referendum was to decide the future status of the territory occupied by Indonesia 
sincel975. 
II. CIVILIAN DECISIONS AND TERRITORIAL POWER: TNI'S DEBACLE IN EAST 
TIM OR 
The attitude of the armed forces vis-a-vis Habibie's decision in January 1999 to allow the East 
Timorese to decide their future status mirrored accurately the gap between institutional reform 
and the resistance of military power structures in the regions. Officially, Wiranto supported 
Habibie's plan to allow the territory to separate from Indonesia if a final offer of special 
autonomy was rejected by the majority of East Timorese in a 'popular consultation'. In a cabinet 
meeting on 27 January, Wirartto only insisted on three conditions: first, that the policy of 
. intervening in East Timor in 197 5 should not be repudiated; second, that the conduct of military 
operations in the province since then should not be criticised; and third, that the remains of 
Indonesian soldiers in the territory should be respected and returned to Indonesia if Jakarta lost 
34 Richard Gunther,· 'Opening a Dialog~e on Institutional Choice in Indonesia:· Presidential, Parliamentary 
and Semipresidential Systems\ in: R. William Liddle (editor), Crafting Indonesian Democracy, Mizan, 
Bandung 2001: 151. 
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the vote. On the ground, however, the armed forces launched a massive intelligence operation to 
intimidate East Timorese into voting for Indonesia's offer. 
The reason for Wiranto's endorsement of the ballot in cabinet has beeri subject to debate 
between analysts. There was widespread opposition· in the army mainstream to the referendum. 
Many within the senior military. leadership had fought in East Timor at several stages of their 
career, and they were well aware of the crucial importance of the territory for TNI's self-
perception as the guarantor of Indonesia's territorial integrity. These sentiments within the officer 
corps led Kevin O'Rourke to believe that 'Wiranto adamantly opposed Habibie's ballot offer', 35 
i11 spite of cabinet records pointing to the contrary. Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, on the 
other hand, noted that Wiranto's endorsement was all the more surprising as 'it is urilikely that 
Habibie could have overcome concerted opposition' to his decision.36 It seems that Wiranto's 
move was motivated by a combination of factors. To begin with, his relationship with Habibie 
was still in transition. Habibie's authority over the armed forces declined only when his chances 
of winning a second term began to falter amidst intense electoral competition from around March 
1999. Thus when the East Timar decision was made in January, Wiranto did not feel sufficiently · 
strong to oppose it without risking dismissal. In addition, Wiranto apparently believed that the· 
undiminished military powers of territorial control would be able to deliver victory for both 
Indonesia and the armed forces: 
"Of course we wanted East Timor to remain part of Indonesia. We loved East Timor. 
And despite all the difficulties, people there appreciated the efforts of the 
government and the military in promoting economic growth in the province. ( ... ) We 
as military officers had a special relationship with East Timor. We were closest to 
the people, even in the reform era (zaman reformasi). Arid although we were 
determined to do our job professionally and neutrally, our hearts were. confident that 
the people of East Timor would embrace Indonesia."37 
Against this background, the prospect of a popular poll presented itself as an opportunity to settle 
the East Timor issue once and for all. As Greenlees and Garran explained, the· 'attraction of an act 
of self-determination might have been to finally prove the legitimacy of Indonesia's claims to 
popular assent to its rule.' 38 At the same time, victory for Indonesia would have demonstrated the 
indispensability.of TNI's territorial machinery for every civilian government, regardless of the 
outcome of the 1999 presidential election. 
35 O'Rourke 2002: 256. . 
3
·
6 Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom, 
Allen&Unwin, Crows Nest 2002: 101. 
37 Interview with Wiranto, Jakarta 13 October 2000. 
38 Greenless and Garran 2002: lOL 
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'Culture of Violence': TNI and the Militias 
In reaching his decision, Wiranto had relied on reports· from his assistants that conventional 
military methods of mass control and elite manipulation were certain to decide the ballot in 
favour of Indonesia. These assessments discounted the potential impact of diplomatic scrutiny 
and media reports on the credibility of the poll and ignored the wide-ranging political change that 
had occurred since Soeharto's fall. Robert Cribb pointed to the deep entrenchment of the officer 
corps in traditional paradigms of military doctrine and dominance to explain 'why the army 
should have been so blind to the counter-productive effects of its violence' .39 One of Wiranto's 
closest associates concurred that 
"East Timor was military territory. We had our people at every comer. People 
couldn't even cough withoµt us knowing. We had spies in every pro-independence 
group. We lmew everything, the central government lmew nothing. There was no 
doubt that we could win this referendum or whatever they called it. Without the 
tnaniP.ulation by the UN, we would have won.',,ro 
It appears that Wiranto's trust in the capacity of his apparatus was so high that no concrete 
instructions were issued to ensure proper implementation of TNI policies on the ground. In this, 
Wiranto followed the example of Soeharto, who rarely explained in detail how he wanted to see. 
his orders executed, but left it to the internal mechanism of the system he had created to produce 
the expected outcome. Geoffrey Robinson has called this 'deeply embedded system of 
knowledge, discourse, norms,· and behaviour within the TNI ( ... ) a culture of violence.' This 
system 'entails an alrilost reflexive, though constantly changing, understanding of ·a certain 
language, technology, and repertoire of violence and terror', and 'arguably means that no explicit 
order or plan was necessary in order to trigger the actions that were observed. '41 It was this non-
institutional organism through which orders were conveyed and interpreted that blurred the lines 
of responsibility and made it impossible to identify the origin ofTNI's plan for East Timor. The 
search for a 'smoking gun', Robinson concluded, is therefore ':fruitless'. 
Despite its obscure origins, the pattern of TNI behaviour in East Timor that emerged soon after 
the announcement of Habibie's offer was of remarkable coherence and consistency. TNI officers 
39 Robert Cribb, 'From Total People's Defence to Massacre. Explaining Indonesian Military Violence in 
East Timor', in: Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (editors), Roots of Violence in Indonesia, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2002: 240. 
4° Confidential Interview, Jakarta 17 May 2000. 
41 Geoffrey Robinson, 'The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun: Tracing the Origins of Violence in East 
· Timor, in: Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (editors), Roots of Violence in Indonesia, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2002: 273-74. 
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on the ground began in December 1998, when Habibie's plan was not yet public but already 
internally discussed, to mobilise and expand their network of civilian militias that had assisted the 
military in previous guerilla and. intelligence operations. These militias were built up, financed, 
equipped and directed by local military leaders, and were now tasked with campaigning for the 
pro-:integrationist cause and intimidating the supporters of independence. The militias clashed 
with pro-independence groups as early as February 1999, and soon launched a program of 
systematic terror against prominent opponents of Jakarta's rule.42 At the same time, TNI 
portrayed itself as a neutral mediator between the conflicting parties, appealing for calm and 
peaceful negotiations. In a brochure produced and distributed by Wiranto in 2000, TNI's role in 
East Timar was explained as that of a neutral referee executing the decisions of the civilian 
government: 
"On the one hand, TNI had to face the facts and see the horizontal conflict between 
the two fighting factions and on the other hand, TNI had to provide full support and 
backing to the political decisions of the central government by placing itself in a 
position of complete neutrality. ( ... ) TNI was now fully impartial and did not take 
sides with either of the fighting groups whatsoever."43 
The reality was, of course,. strikingly different. The Task Force to Oversee the Popular 
Consultation in East Timar, set up by Wiranto and headed by former Prabowo ally Zacky Anwar 
· Makarim, was the major institutional mechanism through which the military controlled the 
militias. Douglas Kammen maintained that 'by using controlled violence and terror, the Task 
Force and military personnel on the ground in East Timar hoped both to intimidate East Timorese 
into voting in favor of broad autonomy and to scare others away from the polls. '44 Robinson 
concurred that 'despite efforts to conceal it ( ... ), the direct link between the TNI and the militias 
remained clear.'45 
42 As early as February Army Chief of Staff Subagyo had insisted that the military would not engineer a 
civil war in East Timor to legitimise the continued integration of the territory. The mobilisation of loyalist 
elements against pro-independence groups, however, indicated exactly that. See 'ABRI Takkan Rekayasa 
Perang Saudara di Tiintim', Kompas 9February1999. 
43 Wiranto, 'Strive for Peace in East Timor: The Events in East Timor Prior to and Post August 30, 1999 
Popular Consultation Period,' no place, no date: 7. · 
. 
44 Douglas Kammen, 'The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries and the Final 
Solution in East Timor', in: Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (editor), Violence and the State in Suharto's 
Indonesia, Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 2001: 186. 
45 Robinson 2002: 266. . 
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Escalation and Insubordination: Indonesia's Exit from East Timor 
Despite its continued optimism that military intelligence operations would be able to 'pull off a 
favourable result at the referendum, the armed forces leadership began in June to prepare for a 
possible rejection of the autonomy package. The discussed options ranged from using the militias 
to reject the outcome of the ballot to the partitioning of East Timor (with the Western districts to 
remain with Indonesia) and a large-scale relocation of pro-integration refugees to West Timor.46 
It was these emergency plans, more than anything else, that exposed the blatant disconnect 
between the policy directives given by civilian authorities ill Jakarta and their translation by 
military officers on the ground. It is likely that Habibie raised little objections to military efforts 
to win the ballot for Indonesia, but in contrast to the armed forces elite, he was prepared to let 
East Timar go in an orderly fashion if it rejected the autonomy offer. In fact, many within 
Habibie's circle of advisers had anticipated that East Timor's peaceful separation would not only 
result in the disposal of a domestic trouble spot, but also in rising international sympathy for 
Indonesia and its President. Instead, military officers continued to contemplate ways of 
overturning a possibly negative result. Kammen asserted that the plans made by these officers 'lie 
at the root of the post-referendum events. '47 
The massive destruction inflicted by militias on East Timor's infrastructure and population after 
the clear rejection of the special autonomy package in September 1999 was a consistent extension 
of the logic of violence that Robinson described as an inherent feature of 1NI' s thinking and 
operational behavior. It also. suggested that one and a half years of institutional military reforms 
had led to only marginal change in the way the armed forces functioned. Despite its formal 
repositioning as an apolitical defence force, it appeared that the military, or at least influential 
elements within it, had decided to circumvent the civilian government's instructions, engineer a 
vote that was in its institutional interests and allow the militias to go an a rampage when that goal 
was not achieved. As a result, Indonesia suffered a major international embarrassment when it 
had planned to score a diplomatic victory, and the President who was widely believed to have 
eyed the Nobel Peace Prize was . voted out of office one month after Australia and the United 
46 East Timor District Commander Col. Noer Muis said a few days before the referendum that 'the security 
authorities would face a big problem if pro-independence forces won ( ... ) a8 it would certainly incite harsh 
reactions from their opponents.' The military, according to Noer, had also made preparations to 'evacuate 
people by air, sea and land.' Atambua in West Timor was chosen as a 'safe gate out of the territory'. Noer 
added that 'security personnel will be the last to leave the territory.' See 'Military Ready for "Civil War" in 
· East Timor', Jakarta Post 26 August 1999. · 
47 Kammen2001: 186. 
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Nations moved into East Timor.48 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie's spokesperson, made no secret 
of her view on TNI' s insubordination: 
"If you ask whether TNl's behavior can be classified as insubordination towards the 
civilian government, l advise you to look at Habibie's instructions to· Wiranto and 
other military leaders. There is nothing said about a militia build-up, nothing said 
about supporting one side in the ballot, nothing sai!i about destruction if we lose. All 
. it said was stay neutral, contain violence, and make sure that the ballot proceeds 
·peacefully. Now look at the outcome of this. Does that look like Habibie's 
instructions were implementedT49 
The events in East Timor pointed not only to the ineffectiveness of the 'first generation' of 
· military reforms, however. They also served as a painful reminder to the officer corps that in an 
environment of increased public scrutiny, conventional intelligence operations had ceased to be 
effective tools for intervening in political affairs. The military's adaptation t.o post-authoritarian 
politics had rested upon its ability to use the new democratic polity for its purposes; the operation 
in East Timor, in contrast, was driven by the false assumption that the referendum could be won 
with traditional New Order instruments of intimidation and political manipulation; fu many ways, . 
the failure to orchestrate the East Timor ballot in fudonesia's favor marked the end of a 
· transitional period that had seen many New Order practices simply extending into the democratic 
polity. The East Timor debacle and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as Habibie's successor in 
October 1999 symbolised the beginning of a new phase in post-authoritarian politics in which 
these practices were no longer applied in their traditional forins, but needed to be adapted to the 
. nonns and rules of democratic competition . 
. III. REFORM AND FAILURE: THE ARMED FORCES UNDER THE ABDURRAHMAN 
PRESIDENCY, 1999-2001 
The ascension of Abdurrahman Wahid to · the presidency offered improved prospects for 
democratic consolidation in general and accelerated civil-military reforms in particular. The 
establishment of the first democratically elected executive since 1955 removed large segments of 
the former New Order elite from government, and the participation of most political parties in the 
. cabinet appeared to provide the very 'unity of democratic purpose among civilian elites' that 
Diamond and Plattner viewed as a precondition for successful military refomi in democratic 
48 'Ingin Nobel, Dapat Penjahat Perang', Siar 2 October 1999; 'Habibie Falls Into East Timar Quagmire', 
Asia Times 10 September 1999. . · 
49 Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta 18 October 1999. 
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transitions.50 In addition, the armed forces had just suffered a humiliating defeat in East Timar, 
leading to increased external pressure on Indonesia to reform its military structures. Abdurrahman 
Wahid, for his part, was widely viewed as a democratic reformer, despite his controversial role in 
late New Order politics. Kammen and Chandra noted that Abdurrahman's 'strong Islamic 
credentials, political savvy, and wit were expected to tame the military beast. ' 51 The new 
President took office with a sound understanding of the depth of military intervention in 
Indonesian politics, and he lost no time in dismantling the network on which it was based. 
Starting with his immediate personal surroundings~ he sought to marginalise armed forces officers 
in the palace bureaucracy.52 His secretary Ratih Hardjono recalled how she removed military 
tapping devices from the presidential residence and office: 
"I couldn't believe it. There were bugs hanging from the wall, literally in our faces. I 
called in Pak Wiranto and said: 'Do you really have to do it that openly?' Wiranto 
appeared embarrassed, and it stopped from thereon."53 
In the first months of his administration, Abdurrahman 'took a series of measures to exert civilian 
control over the military and rein in the Army.' 54 He appointed Admiral Widodo, a navy officer, 
as . TNI Commander, drawing from the service that, according to Eric Heginbotham, was 
'significantly more sympathetic to liberal political and economic positions' than the army.55 
Compensating key army officers like Wiranto, Susilo and Agum with cabinet posts carrying 
considerable patronage potential, Abdurrahman removed them from command positions and 
effectively ended their military careers. He also appointed a widely respected civilian academic as 
Minister of Defence (the first since the early 1950s), disbanded a military-coordinated security 
agency notorious for its political surveillance activities, and abolished the socio-political offices 
at the Ministry of the Interior, a traditional military stronghold. Abdurrahman, it appeared, was 
determined to catalyse a radical process of military reform and enforce civilian supremacy over 
the political sphere. 
50 Diamond and Plattner 1996: xxiv. · 
51 Siddarth Chandra and Douglas Kammen, 'Generating Reforms and Refmming Generations: Military 
Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition', World Politics 55:1, October 2002: 103. 
52 An edict of. 1 December 1999 deprived the President's four adjutants of the right to monitor 
· Abdurrahman's visitors and outgoing correspondence. In addition, the number of senior military officers in 
the President's office was reduced from 35 to 15. John McBeth, 'Wahid's Coming Clash', Far Eastern 
Economic Review 3 February 2000. 
53 Interview with Ratih Harjono, Jakarta 28 January 2003. 
54 The Editors, 'Changes in Civil-Military Relations since the Fall of Soeharto', in: Indonesia 70, October 
2000: 126. 
55 Eric Heginbotham, 'The Fall and Rlse of Navies in East Asia: Military Organizations, Domestic Politics, 
and Grand Strategy', International Security 27 :2, Fall 2002: 121-122. 
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Replacing Figures and Structures: Abdurrahman's Radical Reform Initiative 
The replacement of several army generals who had risen to prominence under Soeharto's rule 
aimed at the very break with the New Order military that Habibie had not achieved. Abdurrahman 
had identified Wiranto as the major obstacle to further military reform and consequently moved 
to destroy the latter's patronage network spread throughout the TNI hierarchy. In this context, he 
·asked his personal confidant Matori Abdul Djalil, the chairman· of the NU-affiliated PKB, to 
come up with a list of military officers who could be expected to take the lead in revamping 
TNI's institutional structures.56 Topping the list was Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, the leader 
of the rapid military reformers during the final years of Soeharto's rule. He was dissatisfied with 
Wiranto' s slow pace of internal reform, exposing the fissures within the moderate military faction 
thathad defeated the New Order hardliners and assumed leadership of the post-1998 military. In a 
. last-minute reshuffle before joining the cabinet as Coordinating Minister for Political and . 
Security Affairs, Wiranto had sent Wirahadikusumah off to Makassar as regional Commander of 
Sulawesi.57 Abdurrahman decided in January to bring him back to Jakarta and groom him as the 
future leader of the armed forces: 
"He is exactly the right person to lead TNI into the future. He understands the issues, 
he knows what has to be done. I'll make him Army Chief of Staff soon, and then he 
can take over as TNI Commander later on."58 
Abdurrahman forced Wiranto to resign from cabinet in February 2000, citing the result of an 
official enquiry into the violence in East Timor, which identified Wiranto as ultimately 
responsible, as the main reason. Shortly afterwards, in early March, he appointed 
Wirahadikusumah to head Kostrad, replacing close Wiranto associate Let.Gen. Djadja Suparman. 
Several other officers with strong ties to Wirahadikusumah and his reformist agenda were rushed 
into crucial positions, among them Saurip Kadi as Assistant for Territorial Affairs at Army 
Headquarters. The President was about to take the same path as Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui who in 
the early 1990s had disposed of General Hau Pei-tsun, the country's military strongman, after· 
56 Interview with Matori Abdul Dj alil, Jakarta ·28 February 2000. 
57 Shortly before the reshuffle, Wirahadikusumah had demanded the removal of 'status quo' officers from 
the ranks, apparently believing that Widodo would be in charge of new appointments. Instead, Wiranto 
signed the reshuffle orders on his last day in office. 'Asrenum Panglima TNI: Bersihkan TNI dari 
Pemimpin Status Quo', Republika 24 October 1999; and interview with Gen. (ret) Wiranto, Jakarta 13 
October 2000; and Maj.Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Makassar 23 February 2000. 
58 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 2 March 2000. . 
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long and difficult conflicts between the civilian executive and the leadership of the armed 
forces.59 
The most important indication of Abdurrahman's seriousness in pushing the reform of the 
armed forces forward was his encouragement of debates on the future of the territorial command 
structure. The command. system, with its fund-raising capacities and opportunities of political 
intervention, was at the core of TNI's institutional interests, and had survived the post-
authoritarian transition almost unchanged. Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono estimated that 
· 'over 70 percent of our defence spending are accrued from off-budget sources' at the national and 
local levels.60 Thus the vast majority of officers wanted to maintain the territorial concept and the 
benefits attached to it, with only· a small .number recommending its reform.61 It was Agus 
Wirahadikusumah's trenchant criticism of the system - most eloquently presented at a 
parliamentary hearing in December 1999 - that had caught Abdurrahman's attention and made 
him the President's choice to lead the military into a new phase of reforms. In 
Wirahadikusumah's view, the lower levels of the command structure were leftovers of the 
authoritarian past and therefore completely disposable: 
"Why do we need a territorial unit in Wonosobo? Will the enemy attack us there? 
No, we have those units because lazy, inflexible officers have become complacent 
playing politics, making money and retire on a nice civilian post out there. That has 
nothing to do with defence.'.62 
The speed with which TNI Headquarters adopted the reform rhetoric appeared to confirm 
Abdurrahman's strategy of rapid and extensive change. In April 2000, a TNI leadership meeting 
endorsed Saurip K.adi's proposal for a pilot project aimed at the partial disbandment of the two 
lowest levels of the command system in selected urban areas. The project was designed as a 
starting point for a much larger effort, namely the gradual dismantling of the territorial structure 
59 Chih-cheng Lo, 'Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges•; in: Mutiah Alagappa (editor), Coercion and 
Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
2001: 156 . 
. 
60 Juwono Sudarsono, 'The Military and Indonesia's Democratic Prospects', Transcript of Remarks at The 
United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO) Open Forum, Washington DC, 11 April 2000. 
61 Aribowo, 'Koter dan Kepentiiigan TNI (AD) di Daerah', in: Muhamad Asfar (editor), Wacana 
Penghapusan Koter: Pengembalian Fungsi Teritorial dari TN/ ke Pemerintah Daerah, Pusat Studi 
Demokrasi dan HAM, Surabaya 2003: 117. Officers on the ground feared that the reform of the territorial 
structure could seriously affect their income opportunities and that of their soldiers: 'Those who talk about 
abolishing the territorial commands, have they ever thought about what our soldiers should live on? And 
how TNl as an institution can survive?' Interview with Let.Col. Haryata, Commander of District Command 
1008, Banjarmasin 15 November 2000. · 
62 Interview with Agus Wirahadikusumah, Makassar 23 February 2000. 
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from the Korem level downwards.63 Wirahadikusumah had already begun in February to 
. : cooperate with several universities and think tanks on the development of such plans, and the 
official 1NI endorsement seemed to clear the .;ay for the most substantial reform of the armed 
forces since the late 1950s. Abdurrahman's biographer concluded, rather prematurely, that the 
President had 'tamed' the military, calling it one of his 'greatest successes. '64 
Radical Reform, Radical Fragmentation: Military Factionalism under Abdurrahman 
The unprecedented depth and scope of the reform effort triggered the most extensive 
fragmentation of the military elite since May 1998. After. negotiating- Soeharto's orderly 
departure, the moderate faction under Wiranto had been relatively homogeneous during Habibie's 
interregnum. The increased pressure for structural change in the armed forces generated by the 
new government, however, brought the differences between the various moderate sub-groups into 
the open. The split was so severe that the previous sub-groups emerged as distinct and 
antagonistic factions. Wirahadikusumah led the faction . of rapid reformers who, according to 
Bourchier and Hadiz, were 'in favor of much more sweeping reforins than his commanding 
officers were prepared to countenance' .65 Its goal was to accelerate the assimilation of military 
structures and norms to ·the conditions of the new democratic polity. To achieve this, . 
Wirahadikusumah aimed to interact with politicians and state institutions, create a favorable 
. public image in the media, and develop ties with civil society groups: 
"This is a new era. In the past, an officer had to suck up to Soeharto to get promoted 
and have influence. Now it is much more complicated. You have to play your cards 
right. The politicians must like you, the media must like you, only .then you're a 
winner. They call me the multi-media officer. Let them do that, I don't care."66 
Chandra and Kammen noted that the faction led by Wirahadikusumah consisted almost · 
exclusively of members of the. military academy class that graduated in 1973.67 They maintained 
that the large size of the 1973 class and its entanglement in an unsupportive promotion pattern 
63 The project aimed at the withdrawal of 33,000 personnel from the community level (babinsa). They were 
to be concentrated at the district commands (kodim), where they would have received training as members 
of regional defence units. As a result, 3,309 local commands (koramil) were also to be dissolved. Saurip's 
·end goal was the establishment of multi-service bases with rapid deployment facilities. Satirip Kadi, TNI-
AD: Dahulu, Sekarang, dan Masa Depan; Grafiti, Jakarta 2000: 79. · 
64 Barton 2002: 384. · 
65 David. Borchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (editors), Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader, 
RoutledgeCourzon, London and New York 2003: 280. 
66 Interview with Agus Wira.hadikusumah, Makassar 23 February 2000. 
67 Chandra and Kammen 2002: 114. 
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had significantly reduced the career prospects of its members. The reformist attitude of 1973 
officers was, in this view, a logical attempt to break the monopolisation of top positions by the 
1970 and 1971 classes. This explanation is questionable for a number of reasons. First, the 
reformist attitudes of Wirahadik:usumah and some of his associates could be traced back at least 
to the 1980s, well·before the reshuffle cycles of 2000 became apparent.68 Second, many rapid 
reformers in the 1973 class, includ_ing Wirahadikusumah, ·were on track for promotions to senior 
positiOns when the split within the ranks occurred. Third; some prominent graduates of 1973 did 
not belong to the group of rapid reformers, like Susilo and Ryamizard, who both were members 
of different factions. Fourth, Chandra and Kammen's excessive emphasis on the technical aspects 
of promotion patterns ignores the political and personal attitudes of senior officers that reflect 
individual family backgrounds, socio-economic conditions and intellectual development. It 
appears that the latter combination of f~tors played a much larger role in determining conceptual 
positions than the inconelusive reference.to reshuffle pattems.69 
The second faction comprised reluctant reformers previously led. by Wiianto. Under 
Abdurrahman, they felt marginalised by the removal of their patron from both the military 
leadership and cabinet. Accusing the rapid reformers of sacrificing TNI's institutional interests to 
promote their own careers, the reluctant reformers were · opposed to what they saw as 
Wirahadikusumah's excessive proposals for radical change in the armed forces. After Wiranto's 
dismissal, Djadja Supannan emerged as the informal leader of this faction. He had not only lost 
his Kostrad command to Wirahadikusumah, but was also the target of corruption charges initiated 
. and publicised by his successor. Djadja felt that his reputation and career had been destroyed, and 
his personal resentment ofWirahadikusumah culminated.in his challenge to the latter for a duel: 
68 According to Chandra and Kammen, particular class~s tend to monopolise key posts at specific periods 
of time. These reshuffle and monopolisation patterns are difficult to predict beforehand, however. In the 
case of the 1970 and 1971 classes, for example, Chandra and K.ammen concede that 'the monopolization by 
these classes was speCific to the period oflndonesia's transition from authoritarian rule and the early phase 
of the democratic con8olidation' between 1998 and 2000. This means that the allegedly unfavorable career 
prospects for the 1973 class only became apparent at a time when m311y of its members had already 
developed public profiles as gradual and rapid reformers. Consequently, the structural promotion pattern of 
2000 cannot be cited as a decisive factor in forming their attitudes toward reform. Chandra and Kammen: 
Ill. 
69 It is eVident, for example, that many of the reformist officers served longer than their colleagues in 
positions at TNI's educational institutibns. Many members of the Wirahadikusumah faction had been 
lecturers in the staff and cotnmand schools of the armed forces in Bandung in the 1980s and 1990s. They 
were also much more likely to be recipients of international military training than officers who opposed 
reform. Ronna 2003: 77. 
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"My life was ruined. My career was ruined. I decided that I wanted to solve this 
issue with honour, between men, between military officers. I called in my family to 
inform them of my decision. Unfortunately, Agus did not react to my challenge."70 
In accordance with their argument on the 1973 class, Chandra and Kammen asserted that the 
opponents of accelerated reform originated largely from the 1970 and 1971 classes which had 
· occupied the majority of command posts in the period leading up to Abdurrahman's ascension to 
power.71 Their rejection of reform, Chandra and Kammen argued, was an instrument for. 
excluding the 1973. class from further rising through the ranks. Once more, this argument has 
several loopholes. Tyasno Sudarto, Army Chief of Staff and a 1970 graduate, initially supported 
Wirahadikusumah's calls for reform in the. hope that this support might improve his political 
standing. This shows that opposition to reform was not an inevitable choice for the 1970 and 
1971 classes, but that it could in fact obstruct their careers. On the other hand, some of the most 
vocal members of the anti-reform group were graduates from the classes of 1972 and 1973, like 
Djadja, Bibit Waluyo and Ryamizard. Opposition to reform, therefore, appeared to have been 
rooted in much more specific circumstances than attachment to a certain class. 
The resentment ofWirahadikusumah and his reform proposals aligned Djadja and his associates 
with the third faction in the armed forces, the gradual reformers. After Susilo joined the cabinet, 
the most prominent officer in this group was Agus Widjojo, the new Chief of Staff of Territorial 
Affairs.72 Widojo and Wirahadikusumah had been close associates in the 1980s and most of the 
1990s, but their relationship had disintegrated with the latter's rapid ascent under Abdurrahman. 
Widjojo believed that reform had to proceed at a faster pace than envisaged by Wiranto but not as 
. rapid and less radical than that .driven by Wirahadikusumah. In the short term, however, he 
viewed Wirahadikusumah's populism as a more immediate threat to the coherence and dignity of 
the anned forces: 
"Wirahadikusumah is prepared to sell TNI for a headline. He's very smart in 
portraying himself in the media. But what's the content? Zero."73 
Widjojo and his office refused to cooperate with the army's pilot project to disband segments of 
the territorial command structure and began to develop counter-proposals instead.74 Widjojo was 
70 Interview with Djadja Suparman, Bandung 15 January 2002. 
71 Chandra and Kammen 2002: 141. 
72 The office of the Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs had been renamed in November 1998, 
becoming Chief of Staff of Territorial Affairs. Susilo had held the position until his appointment to the 
Abdurrahman cabinet in October 1999. 
73 Interview with Agus Widjojo, Jakarta 5 March 2000. 
74 Djoko Mulono, Widjojo's Assistant for Territorial Affairs, denied Saurip the authority to run the pilot 
project in territorial units. He maintained that Saurip's office was only responsible for technical planning 
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not, however, 'vehemently opposed to the liquidation' of territorial units, as some observers 
assumed.75 His plan envisioned that territorial tasks previously carried out by the armed forces be 
handed over to provincial administrations within a timeframe of up to twenty years, accompanied 
by the gradual dismantling of the lower levels of the command structure. 76 This gradual approach, 
Widjojo argued, would allow for institutional adjustments and avoid uncertainty within the 
officer corps over possible consequences for individual careers. 
Subversion or Disintegration? The 'Sudden Death' of Reform 
The broad power base of the ruling coalition, the replacement of senior commanders affiliated 
with the old regime and the launch of radical reform initiatives appeared to provide a solid 
foundation for efforts to accelerate the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. 
Yet the reform drive began to stagnate only months after it had begun, and many of the initial 
plans and projects never materialised. Agus Wirahadikusumah and his associates were removed 
from their positions by August 2000, the pilot project to disband parts of the territorial command 
system was abandoned, and opponents of reform regained control over key posts in the armed 
forces. In the academic debate on the reasons for this abrupt termination of radical military 
refomi, two divergent sets of propositions have been put forward. Damien Kingsbury, on the one 
hand, argued that the armed forces sabotaged Abdurrahman's reform projects, working behind the 
scenes to orchestrate his downfall.77 Authors like Jun Ronna, on the other hand, focused more on 
the political blunders of the President that put him 'in a position in which he was forced to make 
concessions to ensure theloyalty of the military, or at least to avert a show of defiance.'78 
There is· no doubt that the mainstream of the armed forces opposed the radical reform measures 
introduced in the early phase of Abdurrahman' s rule and that it used every opportunity to halt and 
overturn them. Kiki Syahnakri, then Deputy Army Chief of Staff, admitted that the military 
rejected Abdurrahman's 'tendency and attitude to break into technical military areas', violating 
. and supply, while TNI Headquarters held the right to determine long-term policies. Interview with 
Maj .Gen. Djoko Mulono, Jakarta 30 November 2000. 
75 Atmadji Sumarkidjo, 'The Rise and Fall of the Generals', in: Grayson J. Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith 
(editors), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2001: 
143. . 
76 Marcus Mietzner, 'Business as Usual? The Indonesian Armed Forces and Local Politics in the Post-
Soeharto Era', in: Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (editors), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
Decentralisation & Democratisation, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2003: 245-258. 
77 Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New 
York2003. 
73 Ronna 2003: 184. 
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'mechanisms and strict procedures'.79 It was the President himself, however, who created the 
political context in which such opposition proved effective. In his study on the period, Malik 
Haramain pointed to. the 'conflict between the President and Parliament that provided TNI with 
the opportunity and self-confidence to show open opposition and insubordination to the 
President. '8° From virtually the first week in office, Abdurrahman began to dismantle the civilian 
support netWork that-had voted him into office. Between November 1999 and May 2000, he fired · 
ministers from Golkar, PDI-P and PPP, the l~gest parties in Parliament, and replaced them with 
personal loyalists. hi addition, Abdurrahman intervened in legal proceedings and the . internal 
. affairs of state enterprises, apparently .in order to promote the political and economic interests of 
his major financial patrons. Moreover, the President appeared increasingly erratic, threatening to 
arrest his political adversaries and producing headlines With controversial statements and policies 
on an almost daily basis. Gradually excluded frorri power and disillusioned with the President's 
leadership, the parties that had secured Abdurrahman's election began to unite against him.81 By 
mid-2000, the majority of the political elite had come to the conclusion that he had to go. 
The erosion of Abdurrahman's civilian supp<>rt base removed one of the major preconditions 
for the successful implementation of radical rriilitary reform. The further the alienation between 
the President and key political parties and orgfiliisations progressed, the more conservative 
elements. in the military elite felt encouraged to oppose structural reform of the armed forces. In 
. the lead-up to the annual session of the MPR in August 2000, during which Abdurrahman had to 
account for his first ten months in office, the President withdrew his support for AgQS 
Wirahadikusumah and the reform ideas he represented. The move was designed to secure 
political backing from the armed forces mainstream, compensating for the. dramatic loss of 
support from civilian groups · in and outside the legislature. During the MPR session, 
Abdurrahman agreed to delegate responsibility for internal TNI affairs to his deputy Megawati 
Soekarnoputri. Megawati had been in contact with conservative elements in the top brass for 
. . . . -
some. time; largely in order to express frustration over her . own isolation from government 
business. Using a rare chance to. display her potential illfluence, she had joined forces With 
conservative officers in June and demanded the dismissal of Bondan Gunawan, Abdurrahman's 
State Secretary and a close civilian ally of Wirahadikusumah.. 82 Shortly before the MPR session 
7~ Kiki Syahnalqi.; 'Gus Dur versus Militer: Dikotomi S~u atau Riil?', Paper Presented at the book launch · 
of 'Gus Dur versus Militer', Jakarta 10 March 2003. · 
80 Malik Haramain, Gus Dur, Militer dan Politik, LkiS, Yogyakarta 2004: 339. 
81 Marcus Mietzner, 'Personal Triumph and Political Turmoil: Abdurrahman and Indonesia's Struggle for 
Reform', in: Damien Kingsbury (editor), The Presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid: An Asse8sment after the 
First Year, Monash Asia Institute, Annual Lecture Series No. 23, Clayton 2001: 15-32. 
82 Bondan .Gunawan had been close to Abdurrahman since their membership in the Democracy Forum in 
the early 1990s. As State Secretary, he continued his. sharp criticism of the military. In ·April 2000, he 
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commenced, Wirahadik:usumah himself was relieved of his Kostrad command and assigned to a 
desk job at TNI Headquarters. Evidently, the opponents of accelerated reform in the armed forces 
had successfully used the conflict betWeen the presidency and the legislature to pursue their 
illterests, and the initial rapid pace of military reform quickly lost momentum as a result. 
The political events surrounding the 2000 MPR session suggest that it was the President's rapid 
loss of civilian support, rather than subversion by the armed forces, that caused the sudden 
stagnation in military reform. William Case asserted that Abdurrahman needed 'to avoid 
antagonizing the har-d-liners' in the armed forces 'if Indonesia's new democracy was. to persist. ' 83 
It is almost certain, however, that sufficient levels of backing in the legislature would have. 
allowed Abdurrahman to isolate conservative officers effectively and continue with the rapid 
reform ofTNI. None of the major political gioups had serious objections to the presidential goal 
of subordinating the armed forces to civilian rule, but. they disagreed with him over almost every 
other policy issue. They felt that Abdurrahman had unilaterally dissolved the coalition that had 
paved his way to power and had therefore lost the legitimacy to· govern. As one senior 
parliamentarian put it: 
"Gus Dur's reform of the militaiy ~s fine. We could all support him in that. But how 
can we allow him to monopolise political power, humiliate parliament, ridicule 
political parties, place his cronies in state enterprises and talk nonsense almost every 
day?"84 
The armed forces, it appeared, were only in a position to oppose presidential authority when 
political circumstances allowed them to do so. In the months of February and March 2000, when 
the scope of Abdurrahman's political decline was still unclear, the armed forces leadership felt 
institutionally obliged to comply with his· instructions. Only several months later, after the 
implications of the President's isolation from the political elite were fully evident, did the military 
·elite grab the oppartunity to launch effective attacks on his reform policies. 
contended that 'TNI is not prepared to see its political role reduced to defence tasks, and this is 
. understandable, considering the privileges they have enjoyed so far.' See Bondan Gunawan, 'Reformasi 
TNl dalam Kabinet Gus Dur', Paper Presented at the Halqah Nasional 'Hubungan Ulama-Tentara untuk 
IndonesiaBaru';Malang 17 April 2000. 
83 Case 2002: 73. 
84 Interview with Djoko Susilo, Member of Parliament representing PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, 
National Mandate Party), the party led by Amien Rais, Jakarta 10 August 2000. 
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From Reformer to Dictator? Abdurrahman, Parliament and TNI 
The realisation that· his survival in the MPR depended on concessions to officers opposed to 
further military reform did little to convince Abdurrahman that he.had to strengthen his civilian 
. support base. On the contrary, after the session was over, he apparently felt that his independence 
from the legislature and the political elite was greater than ever. He reshuffied his cabinet once 
again without consulting Megawati, rushing in inore personal loyalists and cutting the remrumng 
ties to the political establishment. Among the dismissed cabinet members was Defence Minister 
Juwono Sudarsono, who despite a mild stroke had effectively worked on enhancing civilian 
expertise and authority within his department. His poor health was cited as the official reason for 
his replacement, but the minister suspected a more politically motivated background: 
"I think I fell out of grace because I insisted on a strictly institutional relationship 
with the President. I felt obliged to report issues related to my department and 
receive policy instructions if necessary. This relationship, however, became more 
and more blurred, with Gus Dur calling in ministers at any hour of the day to discuss 
political affairs, mostly related to his struggle with his opponents. I made it very 
clear that I did not view it as proper for the Minister ofDefence to participate in after 
office-hours discussions on matters not concerning his immediate authority."85 
Abdurrahman appointed Mahfud MD ·to replace Juwono. A professor of constitutional law, 
Mahfud had attraeted Abdurrahman's attention by publicly defending the President's claim to 
political supremacy over Parliament . Mahfud himself did not believe that . he possessed the 
necessary qualifications for the job, and accepted the nominatiOn only when· Abdurrahman 
declined to review it.86 Mahfud's appointment signalled a shift in Abdurrahman's policy towar_ds 
the military - from aiming to radically reform it at the beginning of his term to, engineering its 
support in the escalating conflict between him and the political elite. 
Abdurrahman's misperception that the MPR session.and the cabinet reshuffle had consolidated · 
his grip on power encouraged him to seek the reappointment of rapid reformers to senior 
positions in the military. Dissatisfied with the lack of support in the officer corp~, Abdurrahman 
planned in October to dismiss the Anny Chief of Staff, Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, and to replace him 
with Wirahadikusumah. In many wa}'s, Tyasno's decline personified the rapidly disintegrating 
relationship between the President and the armed forces. Despite belonging to the faction of 
· reluctant reformers, Tyasno had endorsed WirahadikUsumah's reform agenda as. an inevitable 
85 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta 7 February 2002. 
86 Mahfud had received hints from the palace that he could expect the education portfolio, but was surprised 
. to hear thathe was appointed Minister of Defence. 'Unitall Pangkat di Militer Pun Saya Tak Tahu', Tajuk 
31 August 2000. · 
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process that enjoyed strong support from the President and large sections of the political elite. 
After August 2000, however, Tyasno tried to dissociate himself from the rapid reformers and 
approach their opponents. His tactical shift not only attracted accusations of opportunism from 
fellow officers, but it also highlighted the reality that presidential protection was gradlially losing 
its importance for consolidating or promoting military careers.87 Instead, it became crucial to gain 
the support of the majority of senior army officers~ most of whom were members of the faction of 
reluctant reformers. Consequently, Tyasno mobilised a large number of his colleagues to convene 
. in Bandung in early October to oppose his planned replacement. The meeting decided to reject 
Wirahadikusumah's potential promotion and appeal to Megawati for support. Her disenchantment 
with the August cabinet reshuffle was sufficiently deep for her to confront the President on an 
issue that he had officially delegated to her, and she succeeded in preventing Wirahadikusumah's 
appointment.88 Tyasno, however~ was unable to secure his own political survival. In his place, the 
armed forces leadership pushed for the nomination of Endriartono Sutarto as Army Chief of Staff. 
Ultimately, Abdurrahman's plan of reinstalling rapid reformers in the military top bra.Ss had 
resulted in the army coming under the control of a staunch opponent of Wirahadikusumah and his 
policies. 
Isolated from the political elite and powerless to rein in the armed forces, Abdurrahman 
. resorted to increasingly irrational threats· against his opponents. When Parliament issued a 
· memorandum in February 2001 to initiate a process aimed at his impeachment, the President 
threatened to 'freeze' the legislature, declare a state of emergency and use the security forces to 
. execute his orders. Endriartono, however, indicated that the military would not. carry out such 
instructions.89 Unintentionally, Abdurrahman had provided the armed forces with the unique· 
opportunity of portraying themselves as having . completed the self~transformation from 
Soeharto's repressive tool to .a democratically aware arid responsible defence force. TNI leaders 
maintained that their opposition to the emergency decrees proved their 'consistency in 
implementing TNI's New Paradigm ( ... ), its neutrality and non-involvement in practical and 
87 Confidential interview with a three-star general, Jakarta 10 September 2000. This general reported that 
Tyasno was nicknamed the 'rubber general' in TNI Headquarters, alluding to his perceived political 
fle:ic.ibility. There was particular resentment within the officer corps over a brochure distributed by Tyasno · 
among the political elite. Instead of presenting TNI's refonn agenda, it included Tyasno's personal views, 
biography and family stories. Tyasno Sudarto, 'Tekad Moral Jenderal Tyasno Sudarto - Kembali Diterima', 
Y ogyakarta 2000. . . 
88 Salim Said, 'Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid dan TNI: Bulan Madu yang Singkat', in: Salim Said, Militer 
Indonesia dan Politik: Iiulu, Kini dan Telak, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta 2001: 351. 
89 Michael S. Malley, 'Indonesia in 2001: Restoring StabilitY in Jakarta', in: Asian Survey 42:1, 
January/February 2002: 132. 
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partisan politics and its refusal to be used as an instrument of power. '90 Military opposition 
towards Abdurrahman, previously widely described as defiance vis-a-vis civilian supremacy, now 
gained recognition as an act protecting democratically legitimised institutions of the state. 
Abdurrahinan's associates were puzzled by the sudden change in public perceptions of the 
President: 
''Yesterday they celebrated him as a radical military reformer. Now they say he's 
worse than Soeharto, demanding that the military dissolve Parliament and so on. ( ... ) 
The military opposes Gus Dur because they don't want civilian rule. But now it's 
them who call Gus Dur authoritarian, a dictator, etc. It's amazing."91 
Once again, high levels of political conflict among the civilian elite had allowed the anned forces 
to depict themselves as an apolitical institution above partisan interests, a mediator between 
divided parties and a defender oflla.tional (and now even democratic) interests.92 In addition, TNi 
saw its traditional notions of civilian i.ilcompetence and adventurism confumed, providing it with 
welcome arguments to establish normative limits to civilian control over the niilitary. Only one 
· year after Abdurrahnian had embarked on the most courageous military reform program since the 
i950s, both the President and his opponents were lobbying the armed forces to side with them in 
their struggle for political hegemony.· This fact was at odds with the proposition developed by 
Rabasa and Haseman that it was the military that suffered most from conflicts within the civilian 
elite.93 For1NI, it appeared, intra-civilian fragmentation offered the potential for gaining wide-
i:anging political concessions from both sides. In the words of one Australian observer, the 
military warmed up to the idea 'that the longer the turmoil continues, the more Indonesians may 
come to see it as the last hope for stability. '94 
90 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 'Implementasi Paradiiroa Baru TNI Dalam Berbagai Keadaan 
Mutakhir,' Jakarta 2001: 57. . · 
91 Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, Jakarta 6 June 2001. 
92 The political crisis of 2001 caused a· significant increase in the popularity of the armed forces, as 
reflected in opinion polls of that period. Between September 2000 and October 2001, the: percentage of 
respondents who had a favourable opinion of TNI rose from 28 to 58 percent, while those who had an 
unfavourable View declined from 61 to 31 percent. Salomo Simanungkalit, Indonesia dalam·Krisis, 1997-
2002, Penerbit Buku Kompas, Jakarta 2002: 291. · 
93 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and 
Power, RAND, Santa Monica 2002: xiv. 
94 Paul Dibb, 'Indonesia~ The Key to South•-East Asia's Security', Internationa!Ajfairs 27:4, October 2001;. 
839. . . . . 
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The Crisis Escalates: The Threat of Emergency Rule and Abdurrahman's Fall 
Abdurrahman's attempt to use the security forces in his fight with the opposition not only 
damaged his reputation as : a democratic reformer, but also catalysed the impeachment 
proceedings against him. In May 2001, the DPR issued a second memorandum against the 
President, fulfilling . the formal conditions for a special session of .the MPR to decide on 
Abdurrahman's impeachment should the latter not respond satisfactorily to Parliament. 
Subsequently, the President stepped up his preparations for the declaration· of a ·state of 
emergency and the dissolution of the legislature. Faced with an unsympathetic military 
mainstream, however, Abdurrahman turned to the Police for support. In June, he tried to install 
Chaeruddin Ismail as Chief of Police, replacing Gen. Bimantoro, who was knoWn. to be close to 
Megawati. According to an MPR decree passed in 2000, the President had to seek the approval of 
. Parliament before appointing or dismissing a Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Police; 
Abdurrahman therefore opted to 'suspend' Bimantoro an<! appoint Chaeruddin as Deputy Chief 
with full executive powers. Bimantoro refused to leave office, however, and the constitutional 
conflict between the presidential office and Parliament over the issue further aggravated political 
tensions. When· Abdurrahman threatened to bring thousands of fanatical·· supporters from his 
stronghold in East Java into Jakarta to defend him, the President lost his last ally: Megawati. On 
18 July, she met with leading figures of the opposition and declared that a special session of the 
MPR was 'unavoidable'. According to one of her closest advisers, the move to desert 
Abdurrahman had been one of the most difficult decisions in her political life: 
''Thu Mega was prepared to swallow a lot She swallowed the defeat and treachery of 
1999; she endured the empty promises and violated agreements about her role in 
government; she even remained silent on the public humiliations and jokes Gus Dur 
made about her; but when he took the country on a dangerous path of constitUtional 
conflict, threats of mass violence and abolition of democratic institutions, a line had 
been crossed."95 
Cornered by his Vice-president, Abdurrahman named Chaeruddin as Chief of Police and asked 
his staff to draft a decree for the declaration of a state of emergency. Chaeruddin's appointment 
was an open vioiation of existing constitutional· requirements, and provided the DPR with the 
legal trigger to convene a special session of the MPR. The Assembly was opened on 2 l July and 
95 Interview with Cornelis Lay, Honolulu 3 October 2001. 
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began hearing the impeachment charges. There was little doubt that the MPR would ultimately 
dismiss the President and install his deputy to serve out the remainder of his term. 
The President's last chance for political survival rested with individual officers in the security 
forces potentially willing to carry out his orders.96 Chaeruddin was one such officer, but he was 
effectively sidelined byBimantoro and was never endorsed by the vast majority of the police top 
brass. On the military side; Abdurrahman offered the post of Commander-in-Chief to Lt.Gen. 
Johnny Lumintang.97 Lumintang's frequent visits to the palace caused speculation within the 
ranks that he was considering the offer, but he ultimately refused. The other officer who .was · 
mistakenly seen as siding with Abdurrahman was Lt.Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, the Commander 
of Kostrad. On 22 July, his troops paraded in front of the palace, leading the President to believe 
that he had won an important military ally. Consequently, Abdurrahman associates made the 
rounds to other senior military officers, aiming to convince them that the political· constellation 
was shifting in their favor. They even visited one of Abdurrahman's most trenchant military 
critics, Djadja Suparman: 
"Muhaminin Iskandar came and asked for forgiveness for pa5t misund~rstandings. I 
said 'No, problem, I know what you're up to.' Then he said Ryamizard was on their 
side, and that the military should support Gus Dur against Parliament. I immediately 
called Ryamizard and told him ·what Muhaiinin had said. Ryamizard just laughed, 
and insisted the opposite was true: he was there to warn Gus Dur not to go too far."98 
Ryamizard's clarification exposed the President's isolation from the security forces that were 
formally under his command. By violating the constitution himself, Abdtirrahman offered both 
the police and the armed forces strong arguments to defy his instructions and ignore his 
institutional authority. As Liddle put it, 'the generals rejected Gus Dur's last-ditch attempt to save 
himself by staging a Sukarno-style coup against the MPR'99 On 23 July; the military and police 
faction in the MPR voted with most of the other parties to oust Abdurrahman from. office and 
appoint Megawati as his successor. 
96 Abdurrahman's own security ministers advised him against declaring a state of emergency. In early June, 
the Presidenthad dismissed Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and 
Security Affairs for failing to support his emergency plans. Abdurrahman appointed Agum Gumelar to 
replace Susilo, but the new minister offered the same advice. For this, Abdurrahman called him a 
. 'transvestite' and 'coward'. Retno Kustiati · and Fenty Effendi, Agum · Gµmelar ~ Jenderal Bersenjata 
· Nurani, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta 2004: 208, · 
97 Abdurrahman apparently intended to use the 'Chaeruddin model' to elevate Lumintang to the position of · 
Commander-in-Chief. Lumintang was to be appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief ;first, a post that 
.Abdurrahman had abolished before. Subsequently, the suspension of Parliament would have opened the 
·way: for Lumintang to take up the top post without consent by the legislature . 
. 
98 Interview with Djadja Suparman; Bandung 15 January 2002. . 
99 R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia's Army Remains a Closed Corporate Oroup', Jakarta Post 3 June 2003. 
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The fall of Abdurrahman brought one of the most chaotic periods of Indonesia's post-
authoritarian transition to an end. Launched -with promises of sweeping political change, 
Abdurrahman's presidency collapsed under massive conflicts within the elite and left highly 
mixed legacies for democratic consolidation in general and civil-military relations in particular. 
On the one hand, it witnessed some of the most innovative policy initiatives ever presented by an 
Indonesian executive, -including offers of fresh negotiations with the separatist movements in 
Aceh and Papua and wide-ranging reform of the armed forces; On the other hand, the President 
instituted authoritarian patterns of political interaction and promoted economic favoritism that 
channeled resources to his closest assdciates and constituencies. This ambivalence remained even 
in the highly charged atmosphere of his final months in office: while he tried to use the armed 
forces against his opponents, and offered political concessions to them in the process, small steps 
toward the institutional reform of the military continued. There were two main initiatives in this 
regard First, the passing of two MPR decrees in 2000 that defined the task of the military as 
being exclusively focused on_ defence, while internal security was to be handled by the Police. 
The same decrees also finalised the-departure dates ofTNI from Parliament for 2004 and from the 
MPR for 2009 'at the latest'.100 Second, Abdurrahman encouraged intensive civil society 
participation in the drafting of a new State Defence Bill, designed to replace the web of New 
Order laws that had legitimised the military's political role.101 Such levels of civil society 
engagement in deliberating defence legislation are typiCally found in post-authoritarian states that 
have already begun the second generation of civil-military reforms. That it was achieved in 
Abdurrahman's Indonesia provided, in the words of his Defence Minister Mahfud MD, 'a 
glimpse of what could have been if Gus Dur had not created such a mess.' 102 
IV. CONFLICT; NATIONALISM AND THE WAR AGAINST TERROR: TNI UNDER 
THE MEGAWATI PRESIDENCY, 2001-2004 
The failed Abdurrahman pr<?sidency exposed t~o major realities of civil-military relations in 
Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition: first, the political influence of the armed forces rose and 
fell proportionately to the level of conflict within the civilian elite. Backed by a large coalition of 
political parties, Abdurralunan was able to launch an ambitious military reform program at the 
100 The 1999 session of the MPR had already decided to exclude TNI from the DPR and local legislatures, 
but had granted the military continued representation in the MPR in exchange for dropping its opposition to-
leaving Parliament. 
101 Tim Propatria, Refonnasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia, Propatria, Jakarta 2004. 
102 Interview with Mahfud MD, Yogyakarta 15 September 2001. 
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beginning of his term. As the alliance fell apart, so did the prospect of substantially reforming the 
armed forces. Rizal Sukma and Edi Prasetyono concluded that it was this 'protracted tension and 
competition among civilian political forces and elites' that compromised the 'bargaining position 
of the civilians' vis-a-vis TNI. 103 A LIPI study on Abdurrahman's rule concurred that 'although 
. there was a formal commitment to ending military engagement in politics, the requirements of 
real politics forced civilian politicians to be pragmatic and seek support from TNI ( ... ) to 
confront their political opponents.' 104 Second, the central role of the military in the struggle over 
Abdurrahman's presidency revealed the limitations of the first generation of military reforms. 
The top brass was able to exert significant political influence despite the ongoing institutional 
depoliticisation of the armed forces, indicating that their powers rested more on their traditional 
security function than on the number of cabinet or parliamentary seats that they held. For the 
military elite, this circumstance provided evidence that its interests were perfectly compatible 
with the structures and dynamics of the democratic polity. No government could afford to 
alienate the armed forces, and oppositional groups regularly approached military leaders to pull 
them over to their side. Whatever the outcome of political conflicts was, the armed forces were 
certain to profit from them. 
Complex Legacy or 'Mascot'? Megawati's Concessions to TNI 
Many observers of Indonesian military politics have discounted the legacy of the Abdurrahman 
period when explaining.the nature of civil-military relations under the presidency of Megawati 
Soekarnoputri. Instead, they have referred to Megawati's ideological disposition as the main 
factor behind the political consolidation of the armed forces after 2001. In their view, Megawati's 
political conservatism, her preoccupation with the territorial integrity of the state and her 
indifference to intellectual ·discussions on human rights and individual freedoms made her a 
natural ally for conservative military officers. Sidney Jones even referred to Megawati as a 'sort 
ofa mascot' of the armed forces. 105 Thus ·Megawati's ascension to power in July 2001 was seen 
as a watershed in civil-military relations, marking the return of the armed forces into the political 
arena and the end of military reforms. Despite Megawati' s ideological and political affinity to the 
officer corps, however, her worldview alone is insufficient to explain the stagnation, and partial 
103 Rizal Sukma and Edi Prasetyono, 'Security Sector Reform in Indonesia: The Military and the Police', A 
Study Report Prepared for the Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
Clingendael, October 2002: 25. 
104 Dewi Fortuna Anwar et.al., 'Gus Dur versus Militer: Studi Tentang Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Era 
Transisi, Gramedia and Pusat Penelitian Politik- Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan, Jakarta 2002: 213. 
105 'U.S. Warned Against Full Embrace ofMegawati', Inter Press Service, 25 July 2001. 
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regression, in military reform efforts. This section will argue that it was mainly a combination of 
structural factors, both domestic and international, that changed the civil-military equation under 
Megawati's rule in favour of the armed forces. The origins of some of these factors lay in the 
political patterns of the pre-Megawati polity, while others reflected broader societal and even 
global change. 
The first important factor behind the shifting civil-military relationship in the post-
Abdurrahman period were the concessions that Megawati granted to TNI in order· to anticipate 
possible challenges to her rule. fu extending more privileges to the armed forces, she continued 
and accelerated a trend started under the previous government. Abdurrahman had begun to give 
concessions to the military elite since mid.:2000, terminating the reform of the territorial 
command structure, removing controversial officers, reversing his liberal positions on separatism 
·and ordering security crack downs in Aceh and Papua.106 Megawati, anxious to secure military 
·support in case the political elite deserted her, expanded these concessions to include greater 
institutional autonomy and increased influence on security affairs. fu a wide-ranging reshuffling 
of the top brass in 2002, the post of Commander-in-Chief was returned to the army and taken 
over by Endriartono. Megawati also supported the promotion of Ryamizard Ryacudu to the 
position of Army _Chief of Staff. Ryamizard was known for his conservative ideological views 
· and his opposition to further military reform, making him politically controversial but popular 
with the army mainstream. As Minister of Defence, Megawati appointed Matori Abdul Djalil, 
who had just lost the chairmanship ofPKB over his involvement in Abdurrahman's impeachment 
and was therefore without any significant political support base. Deprived of his patronage 
network and lacking knowledge of the conceptual and technical aspects of military affairs, Matori 
sought to compensate for his deficiencies by driving a course of accommodation towards the 
· military elite.107 fu August 2003, after two ineffective years as minister, Matori suffered a stroke, 
and Megawati did not fill the position before the expiry of her term in October 2004. Megawati's 
disengagement from details of military management, combined with the vacancy iri the Ministry 
of Defence, left the military largely in control ofits internal affairs throughout Megawati's rule. 
106 Jacques Bertrand argued that in Aceh, Abdurrahman 'adopted th~ more repressive approach favored by 
the aimed forces' after his reconciliatory strategy had failed to produce results; His shift was, however, less 
a consequence of the situation in Aceh than of his rapidly declining political fortunes in Jakarta. Jacques 
Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004: 
181. 
107 'Sebagai Menhan, Matori akan Menjembatani Dikotomi Sipil-Militer', Kompas 9 August 2001. 
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Return of the Security Approach:. Ideological Shifts in the Elite 
Megawati's concessions to the armed forces coincided with significant shifts in the ideological 
and political disposition of large segments of the civilian elite from the second half of 2001 
onwards. hnpatient with communal conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi and the expanding 
influence of separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, the Jakarta-based elite in both the 
executive and the legislature adopted an increa8ingly nationalist and security-focused rhetoric that 
had significant similarities to that promoted by the New Order.108 Key politicians viewed the 
'soft' approach of the Habibie. and Abdurrahman governments toward separatist groups as a 
massive blunder, and were eager to address the problems militarily. They also believed that the 
· ongoing carnage in Ainbon and Poso could only be ended by swift and harsh interventions by the · 
security forces. This renewed prioritisation of territorial integrity and repressive methods of 
conflict resolution favored the armed forces in several ways. It restored the military's claim to a 
domestic security role and returned ·the armed forces to the centre of policy making in areas 
affected by separatist movements.109 Even foreigU observers agreed with·. the rationale that 
'nationwide domestic disorder raise(s) the question of whether there is an appropriate domestic 
security role for TNI.' 110 The change in civilian elite attitudes also confirmed and legitimised 
TNI' s new emphasis on the concept of 'NKRI' (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia) as its lliain ideological guideline, overshadowing Pancasila. 
Most i~ortantly, however; it motivated political decision-makers to slow down or even halt 
ongoing processes of military reform; fearing that any further experiments would reduce the· 
ability of the ani1ed forces to crack doWil effectively on separatist rebels. As one member of 
Commission I on Defence and Security in Parliament explained: 
"Now is not the time to experiment with military reform. Now is the time to support 
our military in their fight against separatists, in their fight to safeguard the territorial 
integrity of Indonesia. ( ... ) l'ni sure there will be a time to resume reform in the 
future."111 · 
108 Richard Chauvel and Ilcrar NusaBhakti, 'The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies', Policy 
Studies 5, East-West Center, Washington 2004: 52. . . 
109 Harold Crouch, 'Political Update 2002: Megawati's Holding Operation', in: Edward Aspinall and Greg 
Fealy (editors), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation & Democratisation, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2003: 20. . 
110 Donald Weatherbee, 'Indonesia: Political Drift and State Decay', Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1, 
Spring 2002: 28. . . 
111 Interview With Happy Bone Zulkarnaen, Jakarta 30 March 2002. 
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In fact, the majority of the civilian elite appeared even more inclined to resort to traditional 
military paradigms of violent conflict resolution than Megawati. Throughout 2002 and early 
2003, Megawati allowed her Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, to seek a peaceful settlement of the Aceh problem through negotiations 
mediated by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre.112 The efforts resulted in a cessation of 
hostilities agreement in December 2002, but most civilian politicians and the armed forces 
remained reluctant to endorse it. The military was widely suspected of sabotaging the peace deal 
by engineering attacks on monitor8 of the cease..:fire, and. in May 2003 the agreement collapsed. 
Unanimously supported by Parliament and the vast majority of the public, Megawati declared 
martial law and launched one of the largest military campaigns in Indonesian history. 
The military operation in Aceh provided important insights into the state of civil-military 
. ·relations in Indonesia five years after Soeharto's fall. The civilian government left the definition 
of the strategic goal~ of the campaign and their implementation largely to the armed forces, and .. 
· with no effective Minister of Defence since August 2003, executive oversight of the operations 
was scant. Parliament limited its control· function to infrequent meetings with the top brass, 
. expressing gratitude for the military' s service in the war zone. Returning from a visit to Aceh, one 
of the deputy speakers of Parliament, Soetardjo Soerjoguritno, was convinced that the military 
was doing well because 'there are many more red and. white flags now in Aceh than before the 
campaign;' 113 Consequently, Parliament granted most of the financial requests made by the armed 
forces without demanding detailed explanations for particular budget items.114 Senior officials in 
the Supreme Auditing Board threw up their hands in despair: 
"What can we do? We told Parliament that TNI's reports are incomplete and 
questionable; but they are not following up on that." In fact; they have violated our 
recommendation not to gr.int new funds before the previous ones were accounted 
for."115 
While executive and legislative control· of the military operations was weak, societal oversight 
was limited to a few critical civil society organisations. Media coverage was. largely restricted to 
quoting official military sources. It was thus impossible for civilian control authorities and the 
public to verify military data related to the campaign, including the number and classification of 
. . . 
112 Konrad Huber, 'The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation', 
Policy Studies 10, East-West Center, Washington 2004. 
113 "Darurat Militer Tak Menyimpang', Sriwijaya Post 31July2003. 
114 'US$291 Million in Military Emergency Funds Missing', Acehkita September 2004. 
115 Interview with senior official, Supreme Auditing Board, Jakarta 7 February 2004. 
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victims. 116 At the local level, the military established an emergency administration that quickly 
accused the civilian bureaucracy of corruption and ineptitude. In addition, vacant civilian posts in 
local government were filled with army officers imported from TNI's vast territorial network, 
allowing the armed forces to illustrate the continued importance of their command system. In 
short, the campaign in Aceh exposed the failure of the institutional control framework set up 
. . 
during· the first generation of military reforms, and revealed how distant Indonesia was from 
entering the second . generation of change typically aimed at creating workable systems of 
democratic control. 
Opportunity or Danger? TNI and the War on Terror 
. The concessions to the armed forces after the constitutional crisis of 2001 and the renaissance of 
militaristic paradigms of conflict resolution provided two important factors for the political 
consoiidation of the armed forces under the Megawati presidency. The changed international and 
dom~stic se~urity environment after September 11th supplied a third crucial element. Since the 
1990s, Indonesia's armed forces had been isolated by the United States and most of its Western 
· allies for failure to address serious human rights violations . committed by TNI officers, 
particularly in East Timor. Congress had prohibited the US government from establishing full 
military-to-military ties with Indonesia, requiting TNI to meet certain .reform benchmarks 
beforehand. The prospect of international rehabilitation and renewed access to modem military 
·equipment had since then fonned a secondary, but significant, incentive for the anned forces to 
pursue internal reforms .. Prior to Sep~ember 11th' senior officers had asked the US embassy in 
Jakarta to. assist in their efforts to lift existin~ restrictions by issuing a statement that would 
acknowledge the success of military reform steps implemented so far. 117 Their request had been. 
. . 
turned do'\.vn, but the attacks on New York and Washington changed the strategic priorities of the 
United States cmnpletely. · Its focus. was now on the creation of a global network of effective 
counter-terrorism forces to gather intelligence and carry out arrests, replacing what Catharin 
Dalpino called the 'free-floating post.;;Cold War idealism' behind 'American support for 
116 It has been an apparent standard practice within the military to declare almost all victims killed by its 
troops as supporters of the rebellious Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Human rights 
groups have. raised a number of cases, however, in which the victims seemed to have been non-combatants. 
The discrepancy between the number of GAM members claimed to have been killed by TNI. and the 
number of weapons seized from them suggests that at least some unarmed civilians were among the dead. 
By November 2003, TNl claimed to have killed 1,106 members of GAM, but had recovered only 488 of 
their fire3.11JlS. '1106 Anggota GAM Tewas Selama Darurat Militer', 19 November 2003; 'Civilians in the · 
Middle', Acehkita September 2004. 
117 Interview with senior US defence official, Jakarta 28August 2001. 
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Indonesia's democratization process' .118 Anthony Smith argued that it was this new interest in 
establishing counter-terrorism: cooperation with Indonesia's military that provided 'the main 
impetus to find a way to partially restore military-to-military ties.' 119 . Thus after September 11th, 
US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell rushed to certify 
that TNI had achieved satisfactory levels of success in its reform process, expecting that Congress 
would subsequently lift its restrictions. 120 International pressure to reform, a crucial element of 
civil-military transitions according to Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, was fading. 
The Indonesian armed forces quickly grasped that the political fallout of the global war on 
terror carried, in Donald Emmerson's words, 'more opportunity than danger' .121 Senior officers 
instinctively understood that the United States and its allies needed strategic partriers in their fight 
agajnst terrorist networks, and that this new geopolitical constellation was likely to end TNI's 
international isolation: 
"I. admit that after East Timor we faced difficulties with our international reputation, 
and especially the US was reluctant to engage with us.( ... ) The common interest of 
confronting the threat of terror creates completely new opportunities of cooperation, 
and makes the US understand that TNI can be an important partner in their 
efforts."122 
· The increased focus on counter-terrorism not only reduced the international incentive for further 
reforming TNI, but soon turned into an important and independent element of domestic politics . 
. The Bali bombings in October 2002, which killed more than 200 people and delivered negative 
headlines for Indonesia around the world, lifted the war against terror from an issue of largely 
diplomatic significance to an urgent political priority for Megawati's government. The Indonesian 
authorities reacted with a major crackdown on terrorist networks in the country, passed new anti-
terrorism laws and supported harsh and at times extra-judicial measures against suspects.123 
Again, the armed . forces soon took advantage of the new situation. Army Chief of Staff 
m Catharin E. Dalpino, 'Indonesia's Democratic Difficulty: The Center Will Not Hold', The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 9:1, Spring2002: 93. . 
119 Anthony L. Smith, 'U.S.-Indonesia Relations: Searching for Cooperation in the War Against Terrorism', 
in: Asia-Pacific Center for Securiry Studies 2:2, May 2003: 3; and Anthony L. Smith, 'Indonesia: Reluctant 
Partner', Asian Affairs 30:2, Summer 2003: 142-150. 
120 'Powell Desak Pemulihan Hubungan Militer AS Dengan RI', Detik.cotn 1 May 2002; 'Rumsfeld 
Berharap Hubungan Militer AS-RI Terjalin Kembali', Detik.com 2 May 2002. 
121 Donald K. Emmerson, 'Whose Eleventh? Indonesia and America since 11 September', The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 9:1, Spring 2002: 122. 
122 Interview with Maj.Gen. Sudradjat, Director~General for Strategic Defence Planning at the Department 
of Defence, Jakarta 25 September 2001. . 
123 Police offers were widely criticised for carrying out arrests without proper documents and without 
notifying family members of the suspects' whereabouts. See 'DPR Minta Penjelasan Kapolri Soal Isu 
Penangkapan Aktivis Islam', Kompas 16 September2003. 
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Ryamizard Ryacudu suggested that in response to the terrorist crisis, the government should 
'revive' and expand the intelligence gathering capabilities of the territorial commands. 124· His 
proposal was well received. Following the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 
September 2004, Megawati decided to include the military in counter-terrorism units previously 
made up exclusively of police officers. 125 
Consolidation and Benefits: Military Reform No, Electoral Competition Yes 
The increased strategic value of the armed forces, boosted by their mediation in intra-civilian 
conflict, their dominance in fighting separatist movements and their new role in the war against 
terror, translated into direct political benefits for the officer corps. Internally, the armed forces 
were now in a position to dispense with much of the reform rhetoric it had adopted since 1998. 
Accordingly, opponents of accelerated reform, representing the army mainstream, moved to 
marginalise the group of gradual reformers under Agus Widjojo from the centre of decision-
making. Throughout 2001, the Chief of Staff of Territorial Affairs had developed his ideas on 
reforming the territorial command structure into a detailed policy paper.126 Circulating widely in 
September. 2001, the paper led to open protest by officers who wanted to maintain the territorial 
system. In November 2001, Widjojo's office was disbanded, and he was shifted to the less 
significant post of Deputy Chair of the MPR. His removal marked the end of the internal military 
discourse on revamping the territorial command system and left the armed forces without 
influential proponents of reform. Externally, the consolidation of the armed forces was mirrored 
in their increased popularity both within the civilian elite and among the wider public. Polls 
showed that many Indonesians now favored a president with a military background, reversing the 
trend of the early post-authoritarian period that had pointed to deep suspicions of officers in top 
political posts. 127 In practice, the improved image of the armed forces led to gains for the military 
124 'KSAD: Intelijen Militer Harus di Depan', Suara Merdeka 20 August 2003. Ryamizard mentioned 
Israel as an example for effective counter-terrorism efforts based on territorial control. 
125 'Govt Sets Up Antiterror Task Force', Jakarta Post 16 September2004. 
· 126 Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 'Penyelenggaraan Fungsi Teritorial Sebagai Fungsi 
Pemerintahan,' Jakarta, October 2001; 'TNI Tak lngin Lagi Tangani Fungsi Teritorial', Kompas 22 August 
2001; 'Fungsi Teritorial Militer Sebagai Fungsi Pemerintahan', Kompas 23 August 2001; Markas Besar 
· Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 'Ceremah Kepala Staf Teritorial TNI Pada Workshop Pusat Studi Demokrasi 
dan HAM tentang: Penyelenggaraan Fungsi Teritorial Sebagai Fungsi Pemerintahan', Surabaya 14 
November 2001. 
127 By June 2004, 45 percent of the electorate thought that an active or former general was best qualified for 
the presidency, as opposed to 14 percent who favoured a religious leader and 9 percent who wanted a 
human rights activist as president. Only 8 percent of respondents believed a professional politician should 
become president. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 'Results from Wave XIII Tracking 
Surveys', 23 June 2004. 
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in the two most disputed political arenas of the Megawati polity: the struggle for executive 
positions in the regions and the preparations for the 2004 elections. 
· The election of new governors throughout Indonesia in 2002 and 2003 exposed the success of 
the armed forces in preserving their political powers despite a series of institutional reforms 
aimed at their depoliticisation. In 1999, new bills on regional parliaments had been passed, 
. . 
allowing the legislatures to elect governors and bupatis without interference by the central 
government. This was widely expected to discontinue the traditional grip of the armed forces on 
key governorships in Java and other crucial provinces. Michael Malley noted that 'the full impact 
of decentralisation is likely to be realised over the course of 2003 as the terms of governors 
· appointed during the waning days of the Soeharto regime finally expire.' 128 The conflict between 
political parties over these crucial positions was so intense, however, that many of them decided . 
to back the incumbent or nominate other retired military officers to replace them. Jakarta 
governor Let.Gen. (ret) Sutiyoso, nominated by PDI-P, was re-elected in 2002. Let.Gen. (ret) 
Mardiyanto, governor of Central Java, won a second term in 2003, defeating another retired 
military officer hacked by PAN. Let.Gen . .(ret) Imam Utomo of East Java also secured his re~ 
election in 2003, beating a former general supported by PKB patron Abdurrahman Wahid.129 In 
West Java, a retired officer lost against a Golkar bureaucrat who happened to be a central figure 
in FKPPI (Forum Komunik:asi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia, Communication Forum of 
Sons and Daughters of Indonesian Veterans). 130 In Maluku, a former regional Commander was 
elected as the new governor of the conflict-ridden province. The brother of Gen. Ryamizard 
Ryacudu became vice-governor in the· highly contested gubernatorial elections of Lampung, and 
retired generals defe~ded their governorships in East Kalimantan and North Sumatra. Explaining 
this phenomenon, Crouch argued that political elites calculated that 'it is better to re-endorse a 
military officer( ... ) than to risk the election of governors from rival parties. ' 131 
128
· Michael Malley, 'New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Democratic Deeentralisation', m: 
Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (editors), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: D?c.enttalisation & 
Democratisation, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2003: 111. 
129 'Enam Jenderal Berebut Jabatan Gubernur Jatim', Kompas 8 June 2003. 
130 'Danny Dipercaya Jadi Gubernur Jabar', Suara Karya 23 May 2003. 
131 Harold Crouch, 'Professionalism in Southeast Asian Militaries: Indonesia', Unpublished Paper. 
Megawati had a4ditional reasons to support the re-election of incumbent governors. After 1999, PDI-P had 
suffered a series of embarrassing defeats -in gubernatorial and bupati elections, with its official candidates 
typically beaten by local· power brokers supported by other parties and renegade factions within PDI-P. 
After 2002, Megawati appeared to have given up on nominating PDI-P officials for important posts in local 
government, and instead backed powerful incumbents for a second term. This reduced the risk of more 
defeats, and appeared to secure the support of victorious candidates for Megawati's re-election bid in 2004. 
This particular element of Megawati 's motivation is insufficient to explain, however, why other key parties 
nominated military figures as candidates as well. Support for retired military officers came from the whole 
range of the political spectrum, pointing to the more general electoral pattern outlined above. 
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The prominence and successes of retired officers in regional elections prepared the scene for the 
. substantial engagement of former military leaders in the national polls of 2004. The presidential 
nominations of several New Order military figures demonstrated once again how the armed 
forces as an institution as well as their individual protagonists were able to offset the impact of 
structural reform by adjusting rapidly to the new democratic conditions. In August 2002, the 
MPR had passed the last of a series of constitutional amendments, paving the way for direct 
presidential elections and removing the military from the Assembly. TNI Headquarters initially · · 
opposed the abolition of the electoral powers of the MPR, which in the past had allowed the 
. . . -
armed forces to participate in backroom deals that decided the composition of the· national 
leadership. It quickly· became clear, . however, that the new .electoral mechanism did not 
necessarily disadvantage the armed forces and their personnel as senior retired officers began to 
position themselves to run for the presidency. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono supported the 
foundation of the Democratic Party in September 2002, widely seen as the unofficial lalinch of 
.his presidential campaign. Wiranto and Prabowo competed for the nomination of the Golkar . 
party, while Amien Rais approached several officers to become his vice-presidential candidate, 
among them Endriartono.132 Iiamzah Haz, chairman of PPP, recruited Agum Gumelar as his 
running mate. While retired Jnilitary officers largely pursued their individual ambitions and thus 
did not directly represent the· institutional interests of the armed forces, they were unlikely to 
· · substantially hurt the organisation that had propelled them into national prominence. As one 
Indonesian commentator put it, 'it has always been debated whether a retired military or police 
officer is considered a civilian or military man.' But, he concluded, 'it is difficult to believe that a 
retired military or police officer has no emotional links or organizational loyalty to their previous 
institutions.' 133 In addition, the courting of active military leaders by civilian politicians suggested 
that any elected president, whether former military or civilian, would seek the· support of the 
· armed forces and protect their fundamental interests in return. 
The campaign for the 2004 presidential elections highlighted the decline of the societal 
resentment of military engagement in politics that had been a prominent feature of the early phase. 
of the post-authoritarian transition. Student groups and critical civil society organisations 
demonstrated against retired military officers participating in the elections, but unlike in 1998, 
their protest did not reflect general trends and sentiments in the larger population. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, who in 2001 had concluded that 'Indonesians are not ready yet for a 
132 'Wiranto Diusulkan, Prabowo Cari Infonnasi', Suara Pembaruan 16 July 2003; 'Amien Rais Akui 
Pemah Bertemu Agum clan Sutarto', Koran Tempo 15 April 2004. 
m Imanuddin Razak, 'Retired Officers in Cabinet: Assets or Liabilities?', Jakarta Post 28 October 2004. 
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former general to become their leader', emerged as the front-runner in the presidential race.134 He 
eliminated Wiranto, Amien Rais and Hamzah in the first round of elections in July 2004 and set 
up a showdown with Megawati in September. Megawati, trailing her opponent by an average of 
30 percentage points in opinion polls, tried to tap into a largely eroded anti-military sentiment by 
allowing her campaign team to refer to Susilo as 'General Yudhoyono' .135 Presented by her 
supporters as the candidate of civilian supremacy fighting against a possible resurgence in 
military power, Megawati appeared at odds not only with her previous image as a political 
'mascot' of the armed forces, but also with the indifference of the electorate toward the civilian-
military dichotomy'. Megawati had simply lost much of the trust that voters had put in her in 
1999, having established a reputation for being aloof, inactive, intellectually and technically 
incapable and out of touch with the concerns of a socially and economically troubled populace. 
The issue of civilian control of the armed forces was of negligible importance for most voters 
who sought a change in government to improve the political and economic conditions of their 
daily lives. Consequently, Susilo trounced Megawati in the second round of the elections with a 
margin of 61 to 39 percent, completing the successful adaptationof military leaders to the post-
Soeharto polity. The trauma of the New Order, while still generating sufficient societal support 
for the democratic system, began to fade amidst more immediate priorities of political stability 
and economic recovery. 
V. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND 1\1ILITARY POLITICS IN POST-
SOEHARTO INDONESIA: A CASE STUDY 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono:s military and political career under three post-Soeharto 
governments and his ultimate rise to the presidency are reflections of structural developments in 
. Indonesian military politics since Soeharto's fall. They mirror the gradual and sophisticated 
adaptation of the armed forces to the new political framework, ranging from the disorientation of 
the early phase of the post-authoritarian transition to the successful use of democratic competition 
for the benefit of the military and its individual officers. A short analysis of Susilo's career after 
1998 can therefore help to illustrate the major arguments outlined in this chapter so far. 
In the late New Order, Susilo had managed to build a reformist image in the officer corps and 
the political elite without drawing Soeharto's anger. Earlier than Wiranto, Susilo had feared 
serious consequences for the armed forces if Soeharto continued. to deny political reforms or 
134 Derwin Pereira. 'A General and an Intellecttial', The Straits Times 21October2004. 
135 'Hasyim: "Sa ya Tahu Mega itu Lemah'", Gatra 30 July 2004. 
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. sought to stay in office indefinitely. He played a significant role in convincing the military 
leadership under Wiranto that it had to let go of Soeharto if it wanted to play a role in post-New 
Order politics, ·and he negotiated with civilian leaders over the tenns for the President's 
·resignation. Susilo's progressive attitude in the final months of the New Order could not hide the 
fact, however, that he te>o was ill prepared for the almost complete liberalisation of the political 
system introduced by. the Habibie government .. Despite· his rejection of the excesses of 
authoritarianism, he shared many ()f the traditional military sentiments against democratic 
practices and rules. fu the early Habibie period, he recoinmended limitations on the nwnber of 
political parties and proposed regulations restricting their religio-ideological orientations. His 
suggestions were ignored by the government, however, leading to considerable confusion in the 
·officer corps and increased pressure on the armed forces to assimilate more quickly to the 
conditions of the . democratic polity. Srisilo, who competed with other senior officers for a . 
·· promotion to the position of Army Chief of Staff, built relationships with key figures in the 
government as well as leaders of larger parties participating in the 1999 elections. For example, 
he cultivated special ties with Adi Sasono, who as . Minister of Cooperatives · and Small 
Enterprises ran a multi-million dollar credit scheme widely viewed as an effort to either support·· 
Flabibie's re-election or his own rise to power.136 Adi Sasono, however, fell out with Habibie 
shortly before the parliamentary elections and was lost to Susilo as a potential civilian ally in the 
government. 
The circumstances of Susilo' s appointment to the first Abdurrahman cabinet in October 1999 
exposed the uncertainties and inconsistencies of TNI's transitional process. Susilo initially 
rejected the post of Minister of Energy and Mining and expressed his preference to remain in 
active military service: Only after Abdurrahman insisted did he accept his nomination. With 
societal resentment of military officers in po~itics still high, the prospects of a retired general in 
civilian-dominated democratic politics were rather unpredictable. fu contrast, the continuation of 
his military service would have almost certainly led him to the top post in ·the army and 
subsequently the armed.forces; Susilo has often spoken in bitterness about his aborted military 
career, and his actions after the appointment provide evidence for his inner confusion. Although 
. he himself had drafted the regulation that military officers had to retire when taking up civilian 
posts, Susilo now postponed his own retirement for almost a year. fustinctively sensing the 
instability of the Abdurrahman government, S~ilo apparently tried to keep the. door open for a 
possible return to active service .. He also resisted Abdurrahman's courtship to become a leading 
· figure in his party, PKB.137lt was only in August 2000 that Susilo began to warm to the idea of a 
136 Confidential interview with a three-star general, Bandung 19May1999. 
137 Interview with Cholil Bisri, Member of Parliament for PKB, Su~baya 25 July 2000. 
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political career without finishing the military path he felt destined for. The political climate was 
changing, societal objections towards military figures in civilian posts was waning, and 
Abdurrahman offered him a ministry in which he gained nominal supervision of Indonesia's 
securify forces. Susilo's appointment as Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security 
Affairs marked his ultimate entry into civilian elite politics, including the risks and complications 
associated with it 
In his new post, Susilo was drawn into the intense elite negotiations s\Jrrounding the confliCt 
between Abdurrahman and the legislature. Like the armed forces as an it;lstitution, Susilo went 
. through an extremely unstable period of political infighting but finally managed to emerge as one 
of its beneficiaries. The chaos of the Abdurrahman presidency eroded the public image of civilian 
politics and led to a surge in the popularity of the armed forces and retired officers in political 
·positions. Abdurrahman's dismissal of Susilo in June 2001 only helped to cement the impression 
of failed civilian leadership and allowed the former general to portray himself as a victim of 
degenerate elite politics. 138 Thus the fierce conflict between key civilian figures not only boosted 
the poll ratings for Susilo and engagement of military leaders in politics, but it also delivered a 
welcome theme for his further political career. The critique of elite-oriented and unaccountable 
party leaders developed into Susilo's leitmotif as he planned his political future. It also helped 
him to explain and digest his failed candidacy for the vacant position of vice-president after 
Megawati's a8cent to power in.July 2001: 
"SBY accepted his defeat without complaint. He even learnt a lesson from Senayan 
(the legislature, M.M.). The political process in the MPR sometimes does not mirror 
the reality outside of the MPR building. SBY who was favoured by a number of 
polls could not win the competition in the building of the people's representatives. 
That was a lesson he did not have to regret. It was precisely this defeat that bolstered 
his understanding of the games in the Assembly. ( ... ) Party leaders still determined 
the voice of the party. That was legitimate, but not an ideal democracy."139 
The experiences collected during the Abdurrahman period encouraged Susilo to take the final 
step in his adaptation to post-authoritarian politics. Formerly a supporter of indirect and regulated 
mechanisms of democratic competition, he now believed that only a strong public mandate could 
break the deadlock within the political elite. Susilo, and later on the armed forces as a whole, 
therefore gave up their opposition to direct presidential elections. After the MPR determined in 
138 Susilo sponsored the publication of a book that explained the reasons for his dismissal, indicating that he 
saw his departure from the faltering Abdurrahman government not as the end of his political career but 
rather as the beginning of a new mission. Mustafa Kurdi and A. Y ani Wahid, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
Dalam 5 Hari Mandat Maklumat, Aksara Kumia, Jakarta 2003. · 
139 Usamah llisyam, SBY: Sang Demokrat, Dharmapena, Jakarta 2004: 451. 
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August 2002 that the next president would be elected directly by the people, Susilo and other 
retired officers began to prepare their candidacies. 
Despite the new focus on direet polls, elite politics remained an important instrument for SU.silo 
to build support networks for the upcoming campaign and tap into the resources attached to 
public office. Thus he accepted his reappointment to cabinet by Megawati, allowing him to 
maintain his presence in the media and elite negotiations. In fact, his cabinet seat was of such 
importance to Susilo's campaign preparations that for a long time he refused to confirm his 
candidacy publicly. He.even deniedthat he was behind the formation of the Democratic Party in 
September 2002 although his wife was installed as deputy chairperson. The contmued use .of·· 
governffient facilities on the. one hand and the quie~ build-up of his electoral campaign on the 
other put Susilo into open confrontation with Megawati who stood for re-election herself. She 
. . 
began to isolate Susilo from government business, deli~ering him the opportunity to stage a 
publicity-rich resignation from cabinet in February 2004. The public perception that Susilo had 
once again fallen victim to brutal elite politicking contributed to the unexpected success of the 
Democratic Party at the parliamentary polls inApril. 140 The party's 7 percent of the votes took it 
above the threshold required to make a presidential nomination, increasing Susilo's self-
confidence and giving him greater leverage over the selection of his advisory team: he included a 
large number of retired military officers whom he trusted completely and who had developed an . 
understanding of his political thinking in years of joint service. After his victory, Susilo appointed 
several of them to key government posts. Together, they had lived through the ups and downs of 
the military's transition from a pillar of aµthoritarian rule to a mediator and participant in 
democrat1c politics. After six-and-a.,.half difficult years, one· from their rariks had gained the 
. . . 
. presidency; swept to power by the very democratic reforms introduced to end military dominance 
over the political system. 
VI. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: THE STAGNATION OF FIRST GENERATION 
REFORMS IN INDONESIA'S CIVIL-MILITARY TRANSITION 
The two-generation model of civil-military reforms developed by Cottey, Edmunds· and Forster · 
provides an analytical platform for assessing the progress ·particular states have made in 
establishing democratic control over post-authoritai:ian militaries. Based on a number of 
.
140 Susilo's advisers admitted that 'the dramatisation of the events' surrounding his resignation 'was the 
work of our team'. Rachmat Witoelar, his leading campaign manager, described the decision to leave 
cabinet as 'Susilo 's Sarajevo'. 'Arsitek Politik Kampanye SBY, Tempo 19 September 2004. · 
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qualitative indicators, Cottey et.al evaluated the steps a group of countries has taken to achieve 
structural military reform. This evaluation, in turn~ allowed for the location of these states on the 
scale of civil-military transitions. The highest level of progress was reached by those states that 
had completed the first-generation reforms but experienced problems in implementing the second. 
At the bottom of the scale, several states had not even started seriou8 efforts to address first-
generation issues. 
Applying the model to Indonesia, reform appears to have stagnated half way through the first-
generation reforms, with successes in institutional change largely neutralised by the preservatiOn 
of underlying social and political structures. If separated from the socio-political context of their 
implementation, many of the institutional and procedural changes looked impressive~ The 
electoral reforms carried out under the Habibie government meant that the executive and 
legislative institutions overseeing the armed forces were democratically legitimised. Parliament 
was formally empowered to exercise control functions vis-a-vis the military, ranging from budget 
allocation to defence planning. The Department of Defence was led by a civilian for the first time 
since the 1950s, and the new State Defence Act hand~d it wide-ranging authority over the 
strategic and logistical ~pects of military management. Assembly Decrees defined the role of the 
armed. forces as being focused on defence, while the Police was separated from the military and 
charged with maintaining internal security. Human rights courts were established in 2000 to put 
security officers on trial for gross violations. There were even some 'leaps' into second., 
generation reforms: the participation of civil society groups in drafting the State Defence Bill in 
2001 hinted at the development of what Cottey et.al called a 'civilian defence community', an 
indicator of a state already at a very late stage of successful transition. 
The obvious successes of the first-generation reforms were offset by Indonesia's failure to 
remove what was widely identified as the main obstacle to effective and sustainable military 
reform: the army's territorial command structure. The persistence of this ·command system 
. . 
allowed the practice ofmilitary self-financing to remain operational, with serious implications for 
the political and legal accountability of the armed forces vis-a-vis the newly established civilian 
control bodies. Consequently, the oversight exercised by both Parliament and the Department of 
Defence was of a highly theoretical nature. For example, paragraph 25 of the. State Defence Act, 
which stipulated that the armed forces had to be funded exclusively by the central state budget, 
was never - and indeed could not be - enforced. The armed forces continued to raise large parts 
of their effective expenditure through its territorial network, enabling it to remain financially 
largely independent from the state. The failure to tackle the single most important item on the 
first...,generation reform agenda was aggravated by other problems typical of· civil-military 
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transitions. Civilian defence officials lacked the expertise and political clout to professionally 
review strategic, technical and operational questions of military management and present 
alternative ideas. ill addition, the continued political relevance of the military discouraged civilian 
politicians from seeking to exercise their control function properly. illstead, they sought the 
support of the armed forces to settle conflicts within the civilian elite. At the same time, human 
rights courts acquitted almost all officers indicted for violations in East Timor and the 1984 
massacre of Tanjung Priok, extending what Robert Cribb called the 'triumphalist culture of 
impunity.' 141 The institutions produced by the first generation of reforms, while equipped with 
formal authority and legal instruments, proved toothless when confronted with the entrenched 
network of political relationships cultivated by the armed forces. 
ill order to explain the different stages of progress that states have reached in their civil-military 
transitions, Cottey et.al. introduced five explanatory propositions. If applied to the case of 
Indonesia, they help to illustrate the mixed results of its military reform process. First, the loyalty 
of the post-authoritarian.top brass toward the old regime was considerably higher than in other 
countries where military-backed regimes fell. The composition of the armed forces in the first 18 
months of the democratic polity reflected appointments and promotions Soeharto had made in his 
last years of office, causing a strong inclination for senior officers to protect the residual interests 
of the fallen regime. Second, illdonesia's post-Soeharto elite has largely accepted democracy as 
the most viable political system, providing the country with a better chance of achieving progress 
in civil-military relations than other states in which the foundations of government remain widely 
disputed. However, the level of conflict within the elite over the rules and nonns of democratic 
interaction has been so high that the general agreement on the basics of state organisation did not 
succeed in accelerating the reform of the armed forces. Third, the post-September 11th security 
environment reduced the international pressure· on TNI to reform by rehabilitating the armed 
forces as an important ally in the war against terror. Fourth, the failure to include the territorial · 
command structure in the program of institutional reform increased, in Cottey. et.al's words, the 
'vulnerability of civil-military relations to the vagaries of domestic political change' .142 Fifth and 
finally, the specific 'military culture' in Indonesia, nurtured by decades of self-financing, 
operational autonomy and legal impunity, proved unsupportive of fundamental changes to the 
foundations of the armed forces. 
141 Cribb 2002: 239. 
142 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, 'Soldiers, Politics and Defence: Some fuitial 
Conclusions on the Democratisation of Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Central and Eastern 
Europe', Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Project, Unpublished Paper, 2000: 3. 
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The mixed results of its efforts to establish democratic control over the armed forces grants 
Indonesia a medium ranking in the field of states at comparable stages of their post-authoritarian 
transitions. Indonesia has fared better than a large number of Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries researched by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster. Some of them have not even begun with 
their first generation of civil-military reforms, like Turkmenistan and Belarus. Indonesia has also 
achieved more stable results than states that addressed both first and second-generation reforms, 
but saw their reform processes collapse due to the weakness of the state. Such countries include 
Armenia, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan. Among the countries studied by Cottey 
· et.al., Russia and the Ukraine are the most similar to Indonesia as far as their current state of 
civil-military relations is concerned. In those states, problems with the first generation of reforms 
persist, and the armed forces remain a highly politicised and privileged institution despite formal 
changes to their organisational framework. Indonesia lags behind states, however, that have seen 
successful first and second-generation reforms while continuing to experience sporadic problems 
in the process. Cottey et. al. identified eleven countries belonging to this group, including 
Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Despite its illustrative strength, however, the 
scheme developed by Cottey et al. remains fragmentary. It has been argued throughout this study 
that the model needs to add the character of regime change and the level of conflict in the civilian 
political sphere as major factors determining the fate of civil-military reforms in post-
authoritarian states. Thus the final chapter of this study will discuss the struggle between major 
civilian forces for hegemony over the post-Soeharto polity, and as in previous parts of the thesis, 
the analysis will focus on fissures within the Muslim community as one of the most significant 
sources of intra-civilian conflict. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NEW ERA, OLD DIVISIONS: MUSLIM GROUPS AND THE FIGHT 
FOR POLITICAL HEGEMONY 
The discussion so fat has pointed to divisions within the civilian elite as a major factor in limiting 
_the pace and quality of military reform in Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition. The 
fragmentation among .non-regime forces· in the final days of Soeharto's government allowed 
residual elements of the New Order to assume the leadership of the first post-authoritarian 
government and define its reform agenda. Ai; a result, the aimed forces were granted authority to 
formulate and implement their own measures of institutional change. Once a democratically 
·legitimised executive was installed in late 1999, the intensity of conflict between its various 
- . -
components paralysed government for -almost two years and facilitated the emergence of the 
armed forces as a mediator and participant in the political competition. This chapter will discuss 
in more -detail the causes of intra-civilian conflict in the post-Soeharto polity. as well as its 
consequences for the development of civil-military relations. Ai; in previous chapters, the 
divisions within the Muslim community will serve as a case study to illustrate the character of 
intra-civilian conflict as a whole. In this respect, the chapter will focus on three main periods 
during which conflicts between and within key Islamic groups had a major _impact on the 
evolution of post-authoritarian politics: first, the proliferation of Islamic parties in 1998 and its 
role in shaping the political landscape under the Habibie interregnum; second, the disputes 
-between main M-USlim constituencies over the failed Abdurrahman presidency; and- third, the 
-alliances· between Islamic figures and retired military officers in the 2004 presidential elections. 
The chapter will argue that traditional differences ~etween Muslim factions extended from the 
authoritarian regime into the post-authoritarian era and contributed to the weakness of the civilian 
political sphere. In an additional section, the impact of post-Soeharto extremist Islam on the 
position of the armed forces vis-a-vis the civilian government will be contrasted with the 
influence of radical Islamist groups on the role of the military in pre-1998 regimes. 
I. NEW START, OLD DIVISIONS: THE FORMATION OF ISLAMIC PARTIES IN THE 
-POST-SOEHARTO ERA 
The abrupt liberalisation of the political system, announced only days after Soeharto's fall, came 
as a surprise to the majority of Indonesia's societal -leaders. The socio-political elite of the 
229 
emerging post-authoritarian polity had not witnessed free competition between parties since the 
late 1950s, making most of its members novices in democratic interaction. For decades, they had . 
organised their political activities within the limits set by tight regulations of authoritarian 
control, joining parties approved by the government or using their informal prestige to participate 
in elite negotiations. The longevity of the New Order had discouraged them from contemplating 
the formation of political parties that would suit their interests and ideological disposition in a 
democratic Indonesia Even the growing demands for accelerated democratisation and more 
individual right8 in the late Soeharto era, while envisioning a less regulated ·society, did .not define · 
complete freedom to found political parties as a realistic goal. Thus when Habibie lifted virtually 
all restrictions on· establishing parties and promised to hold open and fair elections, many key 
figures were unprepared for the sudden task of creating new vehi~les for ~eir political careers .. 
The confusion was particularly evident in the Muslim community. Islamic leaders had to face 
three major decisions. To begin with, they had to make up their minds whether entering party 
politics was a viable option for them and their respective organisations. In all major Muslim 
groups, there was strong support for continuing the prioritisation of social and religious activities 
adopted in the 1970s and 1980s. The departure of key Muslim organisations from formal politics 
. during the New Order had left a deep impression on many religio-societal leaders, and some of 
them doubted that returning to it would bring benefits for their cause. The second issue Mlislim 
figures faced was to determine the role Islamic ideology would play in formulating their post-
Soeharto platforms. The New Order had outlawed the use .of Islam as the ideological basis for 
political or societal organisations, promoting the religiously neutral Pancasila instead. The state 
ideology, while commonly viewed as a relic of authoritarian indoctrination, . was. so deeply 
entrenched in the political discourse that even Islamic activists found it difficult to abandon. In 
addition, there was a residual fear that the new democratic polity might not last long, and that a 
possible military take-over could result in the purge of those Islamic leaders who replaced 
Pancasila as their ideological guideline. Thus the debate that ensued within the Muslim 
community saw one faction arguing for an unrestricted use of Islam as a basis for engagement in 
.democratic politics, while the other camp favored the partial retention of Pancasila. Finally, 
Muslim leaders also had to decide to what extent they were prepared to seek. cooperation with 
rival camps within the umat on the one hand, and other political forces on the other. The demands 
for an all~Islalnic party were strong, but many leaders ·were inclined to found parties that 
represented the interests of their particular constituency only. Again others thought about joining 
forces with nationalist groups to. establish cross-religious parties that would break long-standing 
constituency boundaries. 
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The decisions that Muslim leaders made for themselves and their various constituencies had a 
profound impact on the evolving post-authoritarian polity. The strategies that were pursued 
·differed immensely, but a general pattern of post-Soeharto Islamic politics quickly emerged. All 
. major Islamic groups decided that they had to engage in party politics, whether in a direct or 
indirect manner. Some of them chose to use Islam as their ideological foundation, others 
increased the emphasis on their Islamic identity but retained Pancasila as an over-arching 
principle. Most importantly, however, almost all key Muslim leaders opted to establish separate 
parties that appealed to their core constituencies rather than to an electorate spanning religious 
and ideological boundaries. Even those who declared their parties as ideologically open continued . 
to rely on their .respective communities as primary. sources of power, Consequently, a large 
nQmber of Islamic parties was established that served the interests of specific Muslim groups as 
well as the individual career plans of their leaders. The ideological and political fragmentation · 
within the Muslim commtinity, whfoh had stretched from the colonial period to the final days of 
the New Order, was about to extend into the new political system. These intra-Islamic rivalries 
added to other traditional cleavages that divided the civilian sphere along the entire political 
spectrum, weakening civilian leadership and creating substantial obstacles to the establishment of 
democratic control over the military. 
Islam, Pluralism and Constituency Interests: Muslim Parties after 1998 
The debate about the character and mechanism of political engagement in the post-authoritarian 
transition caused serious conflicts within the various Muslim groups. In Nahdlatul Ulama, 
.internal disputes led to the formation of several parties that all claimed to represent the interests 
of the NU community. Initially, NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid had rejected calls for the 
creation of an NU-based party, declaring his intention to defend the formal non-partisanship to 
which his organisation had adhered since 1984.1 The pressure from prominent kiai iti Central ·and 
East Java for a political party exclusively focused on NU's institutional interests was so strong, 
however, that Abdurrahman had to change his stance. By late June 1998, the process of defining 
the platform and structures of an NU-based party was under way.2 This decision ruled out two. 
other possible formats of NU's participation in post-Soeharto politics: rejoining PPP, of which 
NU had been a component until 1984, and the transformation of NU itself into a political party. In 
1 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 26 May 1998. . 
2 Panitia Deklarasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Menyambut Deklarasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta 
1998: 13. 
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tenns of its religio-political orientation, Abdurrahman insisted that the new party refrain from 
portraying itself as explicitly Islamic but endorse Pancasila and nationalist-secular principles 
instead. 3 This choice was expressed in the name chosen for the party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
(PKB, National Awakening Party), which also indicated Abdurrahman's preferences as faras 
cooperation with other political forces was concemed.4 Building on his relationships with secuta:r-
nationalist groups and figures, he refused to integrate the NU constituency into the Islamic 
· segment of Indonesian politics: Nevertheless, he was determined to enter upcoming elite 
negotiations backed up by an autonomous political power base rooted in his core constituency. 
The secular-nationalist definition of PKB triggered fierce opposition from those elements 
. within the traditionalist community that demanded a clearer Islamic image for the NU-based 
. . 
party. Senior kiai objected to Abdurrahman's choice of Matori Abdul Djalil as party chairman, 
. . . 
referring to his lack of religious credentials and frequent interaction with non,-Muslim 
politiciaris.5 The NU chairman was able to deflect such criticism, however, by granting numerous 
concessions to the kiai. The organisational structures of PKB were designed to mirror those of 
NU, with a religious advisory board exercising supreme authority over the political leadership of 
the party.6 In addition, prominent NU kiai obtained key positions in the central board, ensuring 
them of sufficient influence to protect the religious identity of PKB. Ma'ruf Amin, the chair of 
PKB's advisory board, was satisfied that despite Abdurrahman's formal endorsement of 
·nationalist-secular values, the party remained primarily a vehicle to represent the social, religious 
and political interests of NU: 
"Let Gus Dur talk about nationalism. He is the paramount politician, he has to tlnnk 
strategically. But the reality is here on the ground. Look at the party. The leaders are 
NU; the structures are NU, the procedures are NU, even the jokes are NU. There is 
no doubt thatthis is an NU party."7 
3 Choirul Anam, 2. Tahun PKB Jawa Timur, DPW PKB JawaTimur, Surabaya 2000: 14. 
4 Abdurrahman explained that 'Kebangkitan Bangsa' was derived from 'Nahdlatul Ulama' (lit. 'Revival of 
the Religious Scholars'). The important difference in this respect, however, was the replacement of ulama 
by bangsa (nation). · · 
5 Interview With Rozy Munir, Deputy Chairman of the NU Central Board, Jakarta 22 July 1998; Musthafa 
Zuhad Mughni~ Deputy Chairman of the NU Central Board, Jakarta 23 July 1998; Muchith Muzadi, senior 
kiai and one of the five members of the PKB founding committee, Jakarta 22July1998; see also Asmawi, 
PKB: Jendela Politik Gus Dur, Titian Ilahi PressYogyakarta 1999: 71. 
. 
6 Effendy Choirie, PKB - Politik Jalan TengahNU: Eksperimentasi Pemikiran Islam Inklusif dan Gerakan 
Kebangsaan Pasca Kembali ke Khittah 1926, Pustaka Ciganjur, Jakarta 2002: 221. · 
1 Interview with Ma'ruf Amin, Jakarta 23 July 1998. In a series ofletterS sent by the NU Central Board to 
its branches, the organisation left no doubt that PKB was its political ann. In a letter dated 22 June, the 
Central Board reminded its officials that the new party was designed to 'pool the political aspirations of 
Nahdlatul U1ama members.' On 24 July, NU called on its. followers to 'support and take care of Partai 
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. Not all kiai and NU-affiliated activists could accept this dualism that combined a secular political 
outlook with Islamic nonns and values. Some supporters of more scripturalist interpretation~ of 
Islam, who had opposed Abdun;ahman's leader8hip throughout the 1980s and 1990s, decided to 
form NU-based parties with Islam as t}ieir sole ideological foundation. Estranged relatives of 
Abdurrahman founded PKU (Partai Kebangkitan Umat, Party of the Awakening Umat), while the 
influential NU cleric Syukron Makmini formed the PNU (Partai Nahdlatul Umat, Revival of the 
. Umat Party).8 In addition to these new creations, many NU politicians and officials decided to 
remain in the parties they belonged to under the New Order, particularly PPP and Golkar. Given 
this fractured character of NU' s post-Soeharto engagement in politics,. Suzaina Kadir concluded 
that 'the inherent inability of the NU to act as an independent political force continues to weaken 
·its overall bargaining position at the national level. ' 9 
Muhammadiyah, NU's largest modernist counterpart, went through an equally intense 
discussion over the format.of its engagement in the new democratic polity. Its leader, Amien 
· · Rais, was determined to enter formal politics, but he was. aware that turning Muhammadiyah into 
a political party was not an option. The organisation had withdrawn from party politics in the late 
. . 
1950s, and the majority of its functionaries believed that reentering it carried significant risks (or 
Muhammadiyah's network of educational and social institutions . .Amie11 therefore decided to.quit 
as Muhammadiyah's leader and establish a political career outside of the organisation.10 His 
search for a party that fitted his strategic and ideological needs was tortuous, however, and caused 
tensions with potential political partners.. Initially, Amien negotiated with ultra-modernist 
.activists about a possible revival ofMasyumi, but after no· agreement was reached, he conimitted 
Kebangkitm Bangsa as the only party owned by Nahdlatul Ulama citizens.' Surat Tuga:s No. 
925/A.II.03/6/1998, 22 June 1998 and Keputusan Rapat Pleno PBNU ke-N, 24 July 1998. 
8 Abu Hasan, Abdurrahman's challenger at the 1994 congress, added another NU-based party by 
establishing SUNI (Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia, Solidarity of the National Indonesian Union). 
·Abu's motivations appeared to be more personal than ideological, Wjth SUN! endorsing Pancasila as well. 
Abdurrahman referred to PKU, PNU and SUNI summarily as the 'chicken shit' of NU, while PKB was its 
egg. 'Koalisi Tahi Ayam Merebut Suara NU', Aula 21 :5, 1999; and Marcus Mietzner, 'Nationalism and 
Islamic Politics: Political Islam in the Post-Soeharto Era', tn: Arief Buqiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien 
Kingsbury (editors), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton 1999.: 
173-200. . . 
9 Suzaina Kadir, 'Contested Visions of State and Society in Jndon~ian istam: The Nahdlatul Ulam~ in 
Persepective', in: Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen{editors), Indonesia in Tra1zsition: Social Aspects 
of Reforniasi and Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2000: 320. 
10 Before his resignation, Amien had considered staying on as;Muharnriladiyah chairman and had asked his 
long-time associate Syafii Maarif to establish a Muhammadiyah~affiliated party. Ultimately, however, it 
· was Amien who formed the party, and Syafi'i who took over as Muhammadiyah leader. Sutipyo R. and 
Asmawi, PAN: Titian Amien Rais Menuju lstana, Titian Ilahi Press, Yogyakarta 1999: 116. 
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himself to taking over PPP from its discredited New Order leadership. Some of his associates 
from the anti-Soeharto forum MAR, which included secular-minded Muslims and Christians, 
convinced him, however, that chairing an exclusively Islamic party reduced his chances of 
. building a broad support base for his expected presidential bid. Accordingly, Amien pulled out of 
the arrangement with PPP, and in August 1998 formed the pluralist Partai Amanat Nasional 
(PAN, National Mandate Party). While presenting itself as open to all religious and ideological 
groups, PAN's leadership was recruited largely from Muhammadiyah. This was particularly true 
of the regional boards. The dominance of Muhammadiyah leaders not only created conflicts 
between the majority of modernist party functionaries and the tiny minority of pluralists, but also 
affected PAN's external image. As one Indonesian observer commented, PAN was caught in a 
dilemma: for non-Muslim constituencies, the strong Islamic character of the party's regional 
boards was a drawback; Muhammadiyah's modernist core community, on the other hand, was 
concerned about the influence of pluralist elements on the policies of the party. 11 
The establishment of a pluralist party by Indonesia's most popular modernist figure caused 
disappointment and counter-reactions from Muslim groups who had expected him to unite and 
lead the Islamic community through the democratic transition. Ultra-modernist activists :from 
Dewan Dakwah and KISDI, who had offered Amien the leadership of a Masyumi-style party, felt 
a deep sense of betrayal over his choice of the pluralist option.12 The man chosen to lead the party 
in A.mien's stead, Yusril lhza Mahendra, left no doubt that the fonner's decision would have 
severe consequences for the cooperation of Islamic groups in the post-Soeharto polity: 
"We thought we had Amien's word. We were already talking about a name for the 
party and who should be in it. Suddenly we read in the papers that he talked to PPP 
and, finally, founded his own ~arty. That was very bad behaviour. We will certainly 
remember that for the future."1 
Yusril's party was named Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Moon Party), a reference to 
Masyumi's symbol. Party officials aimed to portray Yusril as a 'young Natsir', hoping to evoke 
11 Abd. RohimGhazali, 'Dilema Hubungan PAN-Muhammadiyah', in: Abdul Mu'nim D.Z. (editor), Islam 
di Tengah Arus Transisi, Penerbit Kompas, Jakarta 2000: 188. 
12 An anti-Amien Rais booklet published in late 1998 summarised the bitterness of many ultra-modernists 
vis-a-vis the Muhammadiyah chair and his new party: 'If we were to follow Amien Rais' thinking (non-
sectarian and non-discriminating), and the electoral system is a proportional one ( ... ), then Mtislim voters 
will engage in an act of gambling in voting for their leader. It may well ~e that their choice falls on Amien 
Rais who is Muslim, the Christian figure Albert Hasibuan, the Christian activist Pius Lustrilanang, or the 
priest Th. Sumartana. This means, if not . haram (outlawed), PAN can be considered syubhat or 
questionable.' The last three names referred to non-Muslim members of PAN. H. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, 
Kekeliruan Logika Amien Rais, Darul Falah, Jakarta 1998: 15. 
13 Interview with Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Jakarta 25 August 1998. 
234 
the main elements of Masyumi's political profile in the early 1950s: strict adherence to Islamic 
values on the one hand, but intellectual modernity and professionalism on the other. 14 In addition 
to Bulan Bintang, a number of other modernist parties sprang up, but most of them failed to grow . 
. The only exception was Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party), which according to Elizabeth Fuller 
Collins. 'marked the split between the younger generation of leaders' and older modernist figures 
in Bulan Bintang.15 The Justice Party consisted largely of Muslim activists recruited from a wide 
network of Islamic campuses. KAMM! (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa ·Muslim Indonesia, 
Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), a student organisation that had supported Arnien in 
· the protest movement against Soeharto, was its main component. KAMMI leaders had apparently 
hoped to join a political party led by Arniert, but the latter's decision to pursue a pluralist strategy 
· convinced them to form PK instead. 16 Espousing a puritan view on Islamic culture and politics, 
· PK presented itself as a bridge between traditionalist and modernist versions of the faith. 
Coalitions, Conflicts and the Quest for Unity: The 1999 Elections 
The political fragmentation of the Muslim community in the early stages of the post-authoritarian 
transition reflected deeply rooted historical sentiments on the one hand and specific 
characteristics of the 1998 regime change on the other. Historically; the experiences of all-Islamic 
organisations has been largely negative, predisposing Muslim politicians to opt for parties 
representing their various core constituencies only. The break-up of Masyumi in the 1950s had 
left bitter memories in both the traditionalist and modernist communities, and the conflicts within 
PPP throughout the New Order had served to confirm their prejudices. Besides the deterrent 
effect of previously failed all-Islamic experiments, the nature of the 1998 regime change supplied 
the second major reason for the proliferation of Muslim parties after Soeharto's fall. In declining 
.. dictatorial regimes, societal opposition to government repression typically serves as a catalyst for 
the creation of non-regime coalitions that have the potential to erode long-standing constituency 
boundaries. Linz and Stepan · pointed out that frequently such coalitions remove the non-
democratic regime from power and form a transitional govemment,17 providing diverse societal 
elites with an institutional platform for political cooperation. As explained in chapter 4 of this 
14 Abd. Rohim Ghazali, Yusril Ihz<i Mahendra - Sosok Politisi Muda Muslim: Pandangan dan Harapan 
tentang Indonesia Masa Depan, RajaGrafindo Persada, Jakarta 1999:· 5. 
15 Elisabeth Fuller Collins, 'Dakwah and Democracy: The Significance of Partai Keadilan and Hizbut 
Tharir', Unpublished Paper, 2003: 12. 
16 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, 
Penerbit Teraju, Bandung 2002: 196, 284. · 
17 Linz and Stepan 1996: 71 
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study, however, no such coalition existed in Indonesia as Muslim and other societal forces 
expressed highly divergent attitudes towards the falling Soeharto regime. Consequently, the 
.. regime was brought down not by effective elite opposition, but by large-scale popular protest. 
The experience of dictatorial rule did not, in Harold A. Trinkunas' words, 'establish the basis for 
a broad civilian' coalition among different constituencies, with most of them forming parties as 
·distinct interest groups and therefore producing 'narrow opportunify structures' . for further 
democratisation. 18 Even PAN, as the only major party born out of an oppositional forum, did not 
succeed in bringing key leaders together, but rather assembled less prominent community figures 
in support of the presidential aspirations of Amien Rais. 
Processes of political fragmentation not only occurred in the Muslim community, however. The 
secular-nationalist segment of Indonesian politics was affected as well, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Megawati Soekarnoputri's party, which renamed itself into PDI-P in early 1999, was able to 
absorb the majority of nationalist groups and currents, but numerous splinter parties with secular 
. profiles were founded to represent particular ideological viewpoints or social classes. In addition, 
· Golkar continued to appeal to secular and non-Muslim groups concerned over the possible rise of 
Islamic politics (while presenting itself as a party with strong Islamic credentials in areas with 
devout Muslim populations). This competition for audiences with similar socio-political 
backgrounds encouraged parties to prioritise confronting rivals from within their own 
constituency. Thus the general elections held in June 1999 were accompanied by violent conflict 
particularly among Muslim parties on the one hand and secular-nationalist groups on the other, 
but rarely between them. PDI-P supporters frequently clashed with Golkar campaigners, PPP 
members were involved in street battles with PAN, and PKB faced fierce opposition from NU 
politicians who had decided to remain in PPP.19 The latter rivalry cost four people their lives 
· when the two sides clashed in Jepara .in April 1999.20 This .conflict revealed the intensity of the 
differen<;es within the umat, with PPP-affiliated clerics denouncing PKB leader Abdurrahman 
Wahid as a 'blind infidel' and PKB campaigners warning that PPP intended to turn Indonesia into 
. an Islamic state.21 
111 Harold A. Trinkunas, 'Crafting Civilian Control in Argentlna and Venezuela', in: David Pion-B~lin 
(editor), Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill arid London 2001: 166. 
19 Marcus Mietzner, 'Nahdlatul Ulania and the 1999 General Election in Indonesia', in: Susan Blackbum 
(editor), Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, Monash Asia Institute, Annual Lecture Series No. 22, 
Clayton 1999: 73-86. 
20 Interview with M1,1hammad Rois, Deputy Chairman of the PKB Jepara branch, Jepara 29May1999. 
· 
21 Interviews with Abdullah Astofa, Chairman of the PPP Tegal branch, Tegal 28 May 1999; Mahmud 
Mazkur, Chairman of the PPP Pekalongan branch, Pekalongan 28 May 1999; Faris Sulchaq Basori, 
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The result of the parliamentary elections in June 1999 extended the fractures of Indonesia's 
political society into its formal institutions. PDI-P emerged as the largest party with 33.7 percent, 
followed by Golkar with 22.4 and PKB with 12.6 percent of the votes. PPP came in fourth with 
10.7 percent, PAN finished fifth with 7.1 percent, ahead of Bulan Bintang and PK with L9 and 
one 1.4 percent respectively. Altogether, 21 out of 48 parties that contested the election gained 
seats in Parliament. In terms of ideological affiliation, 28 secular-nationalist parties gained 62.5 
percent of the vote, while 20 Muslim-based parties (including PKB and PAN) received 37.5 
percent.. Compared to. the 1955 elections, the percentage of Islamic votes had dropped by 6 
percent, and if PAN and PKB were excluded from the pool of Muslim parties, the loss was 25. 7 
percent.22 This result sparked heated debates within the Muslim coinmunity over the causes and 
consequences of this 'defeat'. Many observers pointed out that the deep and often violent 
divisions between Islrutµc parties had driven Muslim voters to more.solid and 'moderate' options, 
particularly Golkar. The conflicts among Muslim parties had made it impossible for their leaders 
to present a coherent concept of political Islam that could have attracted voters outside of their 
narrowly defined constituencies. Bahtiar Effendy argued that 'in so far they are diverse and 
unable to· express and. articulate the idea of political Islam in the light of public interests, then it 
.. will be difficult for Islamic political parties to be a dominant force on hidonesia's political 
stage. ' 23 Accordingly, several Muslim intellectuals and politicians proposed the formation of an 
'Islamic faction' in the upcoming parliament. Azyumardi Azra asserted that such an· alliance · 
would constitute a 'break-through to overcome the acute fragmentation in the leadership of 
political Islam. '24 The timing for such an initiative seemed well chosen, with presidential 
elections approaching and the inconclusive outcome. of the June polls throwing the race wide 
open. 
Chairman of the PKB Brebes branch, Brebes 28 May 1999; M. Mokhtar Noer Jaya, Chairman of the PKB 
South Sulawesi chapter, Makassar3May 1999; andMatori Abdul Djalil, Jakarta 10 and22July1999 .. 
22 Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Singapore 
2002: 106. 
23 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2003: 
217. . 
24 Azyumardi Azra, 'Fraksi Islam', in: Hamid Basyaib and Hamid Abidin (edito:rs), Mengapa Partai Islam 
Kalah? Perjalanan Politik Islam dari Pra-Pemilu '99 Sampai Pemilihan Presiden, AlvaBet, Jakarta 1999: 
307. . 
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II. COALITION AND COLLAPSE: INTRA-ISLAMIC CONFLICT UNDER THE 
ABDURRAHMAN PRESIDENCY, 1999-2001 
The election of a new president scheduled for October 1999 was expected to complete· the :first 
phase of Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition. The new head of state was to be elected by the 
MPR, which consisted of members of Parliament, regional representatives and functional groups. 
The indirect electoral mechanism, despite occasional criticism of its democratic deficiencies, 
facilitated what neither authoritarian pressure nor the freedom to found political parties had . 
produced: the necessity of forming broad-based coalitions among key civilian forces to replace 
the incUmbent government and assUme executive responsibility. In this context, the negotiation 
process among major political parties provided opportunities for eroding the constituency borders 
so evident during the parliamentary elections. fuitially, however, it appeared as if the coalition-
bullding efforts would create alliances along the traditional ideological and political demarcation 
· lines. PKB seemed prepared to support the. presidential candidacy of Megawati, together With a 
n'umber of smaller nationalist parties, the armed forces and Golkar elements dissatisfied With 
Habibie's leadership.25 On the other side of the political spectrUm, most modernist parties pledged 
to prevent Megawati' s rise to the presidency for a number of reasons, ranging from her gender to 
her secular political attitude.26 They were leaning towards Habibie, but were reluctant to endorse 
him openly for fear of being labeled as forces supporting the political status quo. Despite her 
obvious advantages, however, Megawati failed to enter formal agreements With her potential 
coalition partners. Believing that the parliamentary polls had delivered her an exclusive claim to 
the presidency, she offered no concrete inducements to the parties expected to vote her into 
. office. Abdurrahm.an, returning from a meeting With Megawati during which he hcµt hoped to 
. secure detailed promises of cabinet appointments in exchange for PKB 's support, felt so alienated 
by Megawati's non-committal attitude that he decided on the spot to 'evaluate alternative options. 
for his party. ' 27 
. 
25 Maulidin, 'Peta Koalisi PKB,' in: Munid Huda Muhammad (editor), Pro-Kontra Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, Fatina Press, Jakarta 1998: 28. 
26 Bernhard Platzdasch argued that the modernist parties were less concerned with Megawati's gender than 
· their traditionalist counterparts, and opposed her nomination largely for political reasons. It is true that 
many intellectuals in modernist parties rejected the notion of political gender discrimination, but in their 
own party structures, some parties like Partai Keadilan practiced strict separation between the sexes as far 
as office facilities and norms of interaction where concerned. Bernhard Platzdasch, 'Islamic Reaction to a 
Female President', in: Chris Manning and Peter van Diennen (editors), Indonesia in Transition: Social 
Aspects of Reforniasi and Crisis, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2000: 346; Bambang 
Parianom and Dondy Ariesdanto (editors), Megawati & Islam: Polemik Gender dalam Persaingan Politik, 
Antar Surya Jaya bersama LSK, Surabaya 1999; and interview with Nur Mahmudi Ismail, President of 
Paitai Keadilan, Jakarta 26 November 1998. 
27 Interview with Ratih Hardjono, Jakarta 3 October 1999. 
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Megawati's failure to consolidate her support base laid the foundations for the first coalition 
that included rival Islamic parties in a democratic polity since the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet in 
1956/57. Despite deep mutual suspicions, in June 1999 Amien Rais proposed Abdurrahman as 
the presidential candidate of an alliance between traditionalist and modernist Muslim parties. 
Called the Central Axis, the coalition was designed to serve the shifting political interests of both 
sides.28 For PKB and Abdurrahman, on the one hand, the offer provided the unique chance of 
gaining the presidency for an NU leader.29 Earlier in the year, Abdurrahman had speculated about 
becoming president until PKB's modest performance in the June polls seemed to have put an end 
to his hopes. PAN, PPP, Bulan Bintang and PK, on the other hand, found it increasingly difficult 
to maintain their support for Habibie. The President was engulfed in a number of political 
scandals, and even Golkar officials began to question openly whether Habibie was the best 
· candidate. The nominatfon of Abdurrahman thus promised to prevent Megawati's ascent to power 
· and, at the same time, shield the modernist parties from charges that they intended to secure 
another term for Soeharto's deputy. In spite of its obvious strategic benefits, functionaries of all 
parties harbored serious doubts over the coalition. Both sides had for decades. traded ideological 
argtiments and personal insults in a rivalry that Adam Schwarz called 'deep, long-lasting and 
bitter.' 30 In a speech in front of NU officials in July 1999, Amien addressed the reluctance of 
traditionalist ulama to work with modernist groups: 
"I know, it's funny. Here I am, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah, offering the 
presidency to the boss of NU. I know that many of you don't believe me. But please 
learn to trust me. I'm not joking. We need to unite for the sake of the nation."31 
Ultimately, the short-term interest ofdenying Megawati the presidency outweighed concerns over· 
the workability of the coalition and Abdurrahman's competence to govern. In a remarkable 
display of his political skills, the effectively blind NU chairman sidelined opponents of his 
candidacy within PKB, convinced ultra-modernists that he would represent their cause, won the 
support of the armed forces and recruited the majority of Golkar members of the MPR for his 
campaign. On 20 October 1999, Abdurrahman beat Megawati to become Indonesia's fourth 
28 Suharsono, · Cemerlangnya Poros Tengah: Terpilihnya Gusdur Terobosan Besar Elite Politik Islam, 
Prenial Press, Jakarta 1999. . 
29 Many PKB politicians and NU kiai were sceptical about Abdurrahman's nomination, however. Their 
scepticism was related not only to the potential difficulties in cooperating With modernist parties, but also 
to Abdurrahman's poor health and erratic political behaviour. Interview With Saifullah Yusuf, NU youth 
leader and Abdurrahman's nephew, Jakarta 12September1999. · 
30 Schwarz 2004: 389. 
31 Amien Rais during a speech at a meeting of Ansor, NU's youth organisation, Jakarta 24 July 1999, 
personal notes by the author. 
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president. Megawati, for her part, took up the vice-presidency. Subsequently, Abdurrahman 
formed a 'rainbow' cabinet in which every significant party was represented. 
Disintegration and Tension: The End of the Central Axis 
The formation of a broad-based government coalition improved the chances of democratic 
consolidation and the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces. The compromise 
between major Islamic groups appeared to bridge some of the differences that had caused deep 
political fragmentation in the past. Backed by a solid majority in the legislature, the government 
enjoyed the necessary preconditions for institutional stability and coherence in policy making. 
These improved indicators were of a highly theoretical nature, however. In the arena of 
realpolitik, the expectations for accelerated democratisation collapsed as quickly as the multi-
party alliance on which they were built. Abdurrahman, it turned out, had no intention of 
maintaining the coalition that had paved his way to power. The new President admitted openly 
that he had stitched together the alliance with the single purpose of facilitating his election: 
"Amien, Yusril and all the others fell for my trick. Did they really believe I 
would take care of their interests? If they thought so, then that's their 
mistake. I haven't changed at all. My opinion on them hasn't changed. In 
fact, the way they behaved during the election just showed how greedy and 
unreliable they are."32 
For Abdurrahman, who according to Angus Mcintyre was 'convinced of his own superiority' and 
'omniscience', the electoral coalition had ceased to exist on the day of his inauguration.33 The 
. . 
country's presidential system, Abd\lrrahman argued, guaranteed him an undisturbed five-year 
term, with or without the support of the legislature. Consequently, he began to systematically 
dispose of his f<;>rmer partners. Hamzah Haz, chairman of PPP, was sacked from cabinet only one 
month after his appointment. Wiranto was forced to resign. in February 2000, and Jusuf Kalla 
from Golkar as well as Laksamana Sukardi from PDI-P lost their ministerial posts in April over 
unspecified corruption charges. Six months into his rule, Abdurrahnian had effectively 
dismantled the alliance through which he had pursued his presidential campaign. 
32 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta 2 March 2000. 
33 Angus Mcintyre, 'Middle Way Leadership in Indonesia: Sukarno and Abdurrahman Wahid Compared', 
in: Grayson J. Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith (editors), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2001: 92, 94. 
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The disintegration of the government coalition created fresh tensions between key political 
parties and the societal constituencies they represented. This was particularly the case in the 
Muslim community, where tensions b.etween traditionalist and modernist groups grew 
significantly. The modernist side felt that Abdurrahman had defaulted on his promises and was 
deliberately harming their interests. One modernist critic of the president's leadership complained 
that 
."although Gus Dur was elected through the Central Axis, namely the Islamic parties 
( ... ), he has not returned this favour of the Muslim community with pleasant 
expressions of gratitude. On the contrary, Gus Dur increasingly enjoys himself by 
releaSing statements that corner the Muslim community."34 
ln addition to the removal of Islamic figures from cabinet, other issues that raised anger in the 
modernist community were Abdurrahman's proposal to open trade relations with Israel, his . 
·initiative to lift an MPR ban on communism that dated back to 1966, a Christmas speech viewed 
as overly pro-Christian and a series of statements that indicated lack of concern for the fate of 
Muslims in the ongoing religious conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku.35 The latter topic 
motivated thousands of Muslim demonstrators to convene at the Monas Square in Jakarta in 
January 2000, where prominent Islamic leaders denounced the alleged fusensitivity of the 
President tow~ds the suffering ofMoluccan Muslims.36 Addressing the crowd, Amien Rais even 
called for a jihad to assist Muslims in the fight with their Christian opponents, to which 
Abdumihman responded that 'I don't care if you want jihad, or you want jahid (asceticism), the 
. bottom line is that if you threaten the stability of the state, we'll take action. ' 37 The event 
·catalysed the formation of modernist opposition against Abdurrahman's rule and helped to turn 
what was essentially an elite conflict over power, resources and privileges into a dispute between 
key Muslim constituencies on the ground. The intra-Islamic 'honeymoon', which had marked 
Abdurrahman's election oniymonths earlier, was over.38 
34 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Menyakiti Hati Umat: Bahaya Pemikiran Gus Dur II, Pustaka: Al-Kautsar, Jakarta 
2000: 14. 
35 Conflicts between Christian and Muslims had broken out in Ambon in January 1999, quickly spreading 
to other parts of the Maluku archipelago, particularly Halmahera. By the end of 1999, the Christian side 
appeared to be have gained the upper hand in the conflict, which cbst thousands of lives and was portrayed 
by both parties as an 'onslaught' on the hands of their respective adversaries. . 
36 Kirsten E. Schulze, 'Laskar Jihad and the Conflictin Ambon,' Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1, 
Spring 2002: 67. . 
37 Khamama Zada (editor), Neraca Gus Dur di Panggung Kekuasaan, Lakpesdam, Jakarta 2002: 132. 
38 Amien Rais andZarman Syah, Bulan Madu NU-Muhammadiyah, Madjid Press Solo, Jakarta 1999. 
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The challenge launched by modernist Muslim leaders against Abduriahman mobilised 
traditionalist clerics to defend the embattled President. Before the election, many kiai had 
expressed serious reservations about Abdurrahman's ability to lead a stable government, and they 
. had conveyed these concerns to the proponents of his candidacy. 39 NU clerics and officials had 
known the combativeness and managerial shortcomings of their chairman for decades, and some 
of them had warne~ modernist· politicians that 'you have no idea what you are getting yourself 
into. '40 They had also pointed out that an all~Islamic coalition carried high risks, with its. possible 
collapse likely to trigger violence at the grassroots. ·Thus the majority of kiai viewed it as 
inappropriate that modernist leaders now attacked the President for a behavioral pattern about 
which they were already well apprised. Sahal Mahfudz, the chairman of NU' s supreme advisory 
board, spoke for most kiai when he reminded opponents of Abdurrahman that 
"we had predicted a lot of what is happening now. In meetings with Amien and 
others, we had emphasised that Gus Dur's nomination needed to be considered 
carefully. They said they had.( ... ) Now they can't just dump Gus Dur like trash. 
Now it's not only about Gus Dur, it's about the dignity of NU, and it's about the 
relations between our communities on the ground.'>41 
For a large number of traditionalist clerics, the prospect of Abdurrahman being unseated by his 
modernist 9ritics also threatened the institutional benefits they had enjoyed as a consequence of 
an NU leader holding the presidency. There had been a considerable increase in payments · tO 
pesantren from local bureaucracies, and companies sought to recruit kiai close to Abdurrahman 
as business facilitators. In short, the possibility of a chaotic end to Abdurrahman's presidency was 
likely to affect NU's social prestige, cause unrest in· its strongholds and result in the loss of 
lucrative privileges gained under his rule. 
In the period between April and December 2000, the approach of traditionalist leaders towards 
. . . 
the presidential crisis focused on mediation efforts and appeals for calm on both sides. Many kiai 
felt overwhelmed by the task, however, as the number of Abdurrahman's opponents increased 
steadily. In addition to modernist politicians, the President also engaged in conflicts with the 
security forces, Golkar leaders and his Vice-president. Thus NU leaders arranged a series of 
meetings with groups that were seen as crucial for Abdurrahman's survival. In April 2000; for 
. example, the new NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi held a. gathering with senior military officers at 
39 Fraksi Kebangkitan Bangsa, Menegakkan Kebenaran: Kesaksian Fraksi kebangkitan Bangsa DPR RI 
Tentang Dana Yanatera Bulog dan Bantuan Sultan Brunei, FKB DPR RI, Jakarta 2001: 1. .· 
40 InterView with Ahmad Anas Yahya, Member of PKB Central Board, Jakarta 10 October 1999. 
41 Interview with Sahal Mahfudz, Malang 16 April 2000. 
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his pesantren in Malang to 'demonstrate that there are no disturbances in the relationship between 
NU and the armed forces, despite recent reports to the· contrary. ' 42 On the other side of the 
equation, senior ulama tried to convince Abdurrahman that he had to improve his relationship 
with other societal forces ifhe wantedto stay in power. On most occasions, however, they found 
Abdurrahman stubborn: 
"We tried a lot, believe me. We talk to him at pesantren, in small circles, we visit 
him at the palace. We tell him that he will go down if he continues like this. But 
mostly, he just laughs and says that everything will be alright. He thinks that the 
situation is under control."43 · 
There was indeed little indication that Abdurrahman listened to the advice from within NU. Most 
of the concessions that the Presidetit handed to his opponents were of a temporary nature and 
often followed by fresh attacks on their interests. He agreed to delegate some presidential powers 
to Megawati in August 2000 but subsequently reshuffled his cabinet without her consent and 
isolated her from important policy decisions. He made frequent promises to Golkar chairman 
Akbar Tanjung of increased cabinet representation, but failed to deliver and, at the same time, 
continued to denounce Golkar as the major obstacle to further democratisation. fu order to 
appease the armed forces, he withdrew his initiative for radical military reform and reversed his 
stand on Aceh and Papua, but insisted on the promotion of generals considered loyal to his rule, 
albeit with little success. As a result, key political groups alienated. by Abdurrahman forged a 
coalition against him, with Parliament serving as its major institutional base. 
Violence and Islamic Jurisprudence: NU Between Power and Democracy 
The growing tensions between Abdurrahman and the oppositional coalition in Parliament 
. aggravated the conflict between traditionalist and modernist groups. Among the many grievances 
against the President, the major factions in the legislature had picked two cases of financial 
misconduct as grounds for impeachment proceedings against Abdurrahman. The first case, 
referred to as 'Buloggate', was concerned with the transfer of funds from a welfare fund for 
. . 
employees of the National Logistics Agency to the President's masseur, while the second case, 
42
_ Interview with Hasyim Muzadi, Malang 17 April 2000. . 
43 Interview with Cholil Bisri, Surabaya 25 July 2000. While most kiai were sceptical of Abdurrahman's 
self-assuring attitude, his election to the presidency had consolidated his spiritual status and prestige within 
the NU community. Many NU commentators referred to him more than ever as a wali (protege of God or 
saint)· whose moves were not always comprehensible to outsiders. Masduki Baidlawi, 'Memahami Tiga · 
Langkah Gus Dur',Aula 21:9, 1999. 
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'Bruneigate', related to a private donation from the Sultan of Brunei to Abdurrahman. In.January 
2001, Parliament issued its first memorandum, demanding an explanation from the President and 
initiating a long process aimed at his removal. The maneuver sparked angry reactions from 
traditionalist groups at the grassroots, particularly in East Java. The main target of PKB-affiliated 
militias like Gerakan Pembela Bangsa (GPB, Movement to Defend the Nation) were offices and 
educational institutions associated with Muhammadiyah. Between February and July 2001, 
Muhammadiyah recorded attacks on 5 universities, 12 schools, 5 clinics, 4 mosques, 9 offices and 
at least 18 houses of its leaders.44 In. addition to locally limited violence, several groups sprang up 
that prepared to march on Jakarta to defend Abdurrahman against what they viewed as 
unconstitutional moves to unseat him. The President, according to O'Rourke, 'tacitly endorsed 
such threats' as a deterrent to discourage Parliament from continuing the impeachment 
proceedings.45 While Abdurrahman distanced himself from individual acts of destruction, he 
pointed to the traditionalist outrage as evidence for his claim that several provinces would. seek 
separation from In.donesia if he lost the presidency. The prediction of senior NU kiai that 
· Abdurrahman's election and subsequent removal from office could result in violence between 
traditionalist and modernist groups had turned into reality. 
The extent to which NU kiai organised, encouraged or tolerated some of the violence against 
modernist institutions andle~ders remains unclear. Muhammadiyah officials certainly believed 
that NU clerics were responsible for the acts of their followers, and an offer by NU Chairman 
Hasyim Muzadi for financial compensation appeared to confirni that assumption.46 There is no 
doubt, however, that senior kiai contributed to the emergence of an atmosphere in which violence 
was condoned as a legitimate instrument of political competition. In. January 2001, one of 
Abdurrahman's closest confidants, Noer Iskandar, declared that the blood of Akbar Tanjung and 
Amien Rais was halal, which according to Islamic jurisprudence made it legal to kill them. In. 
addition, a meeting in Sukabumi in April 2001, which was attended by some of NU's most 
respected clerics, decided that opponents of Abdurrahman could be classified as bughot, or rebels 
against the legitimate govemment.47 That categorisation, in tum, made their violent suppression 
not only justifiable, but mandatory. In order to consolidateAbdurrahman's presidential authority 
.44 Andree Feillard 2002: 127. 
45 O'Rourke 2002: 397. 
46 Hasyim acknowledged in February 2001 that in the culture of pesantren, followers of kiai were certain to 
obey their orders. Thus if so many santri were participating in violent protests to defend Abdurr:ahman, said 
Hasyim, the conclusion was unavoidable that the kiai 'tolerated' these actions because 'they are really 
angry now.' 'Hasyim Muzadi: "Para Kiai di Jawa Timur Sudah Marah"', Kompas, 7 February 2001. 
47 'Hasyim Muzadi; "Bughot Dibahas dengan Pendekatan Fikih dan Ketatanegaraan"', Koran Tempo· 15 
April 2001. 
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in religious tenns, the kiai called for the title of waliyul amri dlaruri bissyyauka.h (legitimate 
interim ruler according to Islamic law) to be bestowed on.him- the same title Nahdlatul Ulama 
had granted Sukarno in 1954. By implication, Muslims were obliged to defend the holder of that 
title against attempts to remove him. Suchjurisprudentiai verdicts did not only coincide with, but 
in fact provided legitimacy to, the creation of paramilitary organisations like Pasukari Berani Ma.ti 
(PBM, Troops Ready to Die). PBM volunteers were trained in several NU strongholds in East · 
Java, and proclaimed that they were prepared to die 'a martyr;s death to defend Gus Dur,'48 
Modernist groups reacted to the crisis With sharp critiques of traditionalist clerics and their 
. . . 
religio-political concepts. Islamic intellectuals with modernist backgrounds pointed particularly· to 
the ·ease with which kiai were prepared to use their jurisprudential authority .in order to justify 
repressive action against Abdumihman's opponents. They also criticised the tendency of NU 
figures to convey spiritual messages they. Claimed to have received through exclusive 
. communications with deceased saints. These messages predicted; not surprisingly, that 
Abdurrahman would ultimately overcome his enemies.49 The modernist rejection of supernatural 
. discourses had been a point of contention between the two main Muslim constituencies for more 
than a century, but the current <;risis provided the dispute with immediate political relevance. 
. . 
Andree Feillard argued that 'NU's exacerbated feelings were now starting to play into the hands 
. . 
of (its) adversaries, always keen to criticize trends to shirk (associationism) and a lack of 
rationality among traditionalists. ' 5° Cons~uently, modernist leaders launched fierce attacks on 
what they saw as attempts by traditionalist kiai to protect Abdurrahman with jurisprudential 
edicts and spiritual prophecies. Husein Umar, a prominent Dewan Dakwah figure, recalled how a 
. . . 
· kiai ·reminded Akbar Tanjung that an angel located in Abdurrahman's chest could Qbserve . 
. whether the DPR Chairman recited the al-Fatihah prayer.s 2000 times a day. Only then, the kiai 
asserted, would Akbar have the privilege of 'encountering the soul of Gus Dur.' Husein attacked 
these 'irrational arguments' as attempts to 'deify the ulama' and spread 'slander' in the Muslim 
community. Feill~d called Husein's ¢tique 'a terrible slap for NU's respecte9 kiais.'51 Some 
modernists, however, did not limit themselves to intellectual 'slaps'. Islamist splinter groups like 
48 Feillard 2002: 127. .· · . . . . .· . 
49 The President himself told ·senior kiai of such dreams and inspirations in order to strengthen their resolve: 
'Gus Dur talked about regularly reoccurring dreams, in which he had talks with the wali songo (lit. 'nine 
saints', semi-mythical figures credited with Islamising Java) ~d his grandfather, HasjimAsj'ari. They all 
told him that he will survive all challenges, and that his opponents would be punished.' Interview with 
Cholil Bisri, Jakarta 25 May 2001. · · . 
5° Feillard 2002: 134. 'Shirk' describes a concept that considers the powers or attributes of people or 
inanimate things as being of equal or higher status than those possessed by God. 
51 Feillard 2002: 134. · 
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the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood) and the Front Pembela Kebenaran 
(FPK, Front of Defenders of the Truth) established militias in anticipation of the announced PBM 
march on Jakarta. 
Undeterred by criticism of their leadership, the majority of NU kiai continued their defence of 
the President and even supported his plans for disbanding the legislature. On 22 July 2001, one 
day before the MPR was scheduled to impeach Abdurrahman and swear in Megawati as his 
successor, hundreds of kiai convened in Batu Ceper to discuss their response to the escalation of 
the crisis. Noer Iskandar, the host of the event, demanded in his opening speech that the clerics 
formulate a firm stand vis-a-vis 'the maltreatment of Gus Dur, the maltreatment of NU, and the 
maltreatment of the kiai. '52 That stand, he left no doubt, could only be to support the suspension 
of Parliament and the declaration of a state of emergency, which Abdurrahman had indicated 
would occur in the next couple of hours. Even more moderate NU officials concurred with the 
general view among the audience that the legislature had lost its right to exist. Hasyim Muzadi 
spoke at length about how 'Parliament has betrayed the people and engaged in unconstitutional 
moves to unseat the legitimate President. ' 53 The DPR, Hasyim maintained, could no longer claim 
to represent the electorate as it had violated commonly accepted democratic procedures. 
Encouraged by feisty speeches and messages conveyed from the palace, the NU clerics decided to 
· ask the President to proceed with his emergency plans. Abdurrahman's inner circle later claimed 
that it was this appeal by the kiai that convinced the President to issue the emergency decree in 
the evening of 22 July. 54 This is highly unlikely, however. Abdurrahman had been threatening to 
make this move for several months, and he had told key members of his cabinet that he was 
determined to realise his plan despite their opposition. In addition, presidential aides appeared to 
play an important role in the Batu Ceper gathering. The discussions were interrupted several 
times because the President had made special requests via telephone, mostly asking the kiai to 
recite a specific prayer. 
The impeachment of Abdurrahman and the inauguration of a new government on 23 July 2001 
came as an anticlimax to the presidential crisis. Family members and aides escorted the deposed 
head of state from the palace to a vacation in the United States, preventing him from further calls 
on his supporters to mobilise. Leading NU clerics, who just one day before had approved of 
disbanding the legislature, tried to establish contacts with the new power holders. Even the PKB 
52 Speech by Noer Isk:andar in Batu Ceper, 22 July 2001, personal notes by the author . 
. 
53 Speech by Hasyim Muzadi in Batu Ceper, 22 July 2001, personal notes by the author. 
54 Feillard 2002: 135. 
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faction in Parliament, which initially.decided to boycott its proceedings, resumed full operations 
in the institution dissolved by Abdurrahman's decree. Most importantly, however, the violence at 
the grassroots stopped once it had become clear that NU kiai had no intention of opposing the 
new government It appeared that most clerics were prepared to defend Abdurrahman as long as 
he was in office, but saw no benefit in post-factum challenges to his removal. 
.'Pillars of Civil Society'?: Muslim Groups and the Challenges of Democracy 
Despite this easing of tensions, the severe social and political confliCts between Muslim 
·mainstream organisations in the first half of 2001 calls into question some of the basic 
assumptioris regarding their role in civil society and democratic consolidation. The literature on 
Nahdlatul Ulamaand Muhammadiyah had since the early 1990s focused on their contribution to 
democratisation at the grassroots. Western observers in particular measured the democratic 
credentials ·.of both organisations by their ability to contain the spread of groups with more 
Islamist agendas. Martin van Bruinessen, for instance, asserted that 'moderation and tolerance 
have long been characteristic of the mainstream members of these organisations (as) both have 
resolutely opposed issues that could lead to the further polarisation of society (such as the Jakarta 
· Charter). ' 55 Bruinessen concluded that NU and M~ammadiyah are 'vehicles of a democratic 
climate' and 'pillars of civil society; ,56 concurring with Hefuer's notion of centrist Muslim 
organisations as proponents of 'civil Islam'.57 Such classifications led many observers to 
downplay obvious cases of undemocratic behaviour in the two mainstream groups. Greg Barton,. 
· for example, explained NU's democratic deficiencies as resulting from the fact that 'NU ulama 
are a rustic and eccentric group, being drawn primarily from rural stock. ' 58 With significant non-
democratic dispositions belittled as 'rustic' and 'eccentric', Barton maintained that NU leaders 
are generally 'moderate' and 'tolerant'. 
ss Martin van Bruinessen, 'Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagements with Civil.Society and Democratlsation', 
· Paper Presented at the Third International Conference and Workshrip 'Indonesia in Transition', Universitas 
Indone5ia, 24-28 August 2003: 17. There have been few serious attempts to re-introduce the syariat clause 
of the Jakarta Charter after 1998. Radicai Musltm groups that demonstrated for its reinstatement, typically 
at annual sessions of the MPR, have received little societal support. In the political arena, only PPP, PK and 
Bulan Bintang s:Ympathised with the idea, With the vast majority of parties firmly opposed. 
56 Bruine8sen 2003: 6. · . · 
s7 Hefner 2000: 218. 
ss Greg·Barton, 'The Prospects for Islam', in: Grayson J. Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith (editors), Indonesia 
Today: Challenges of History, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2001: 252. · 
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The engagement of NU and Muhammadiyah in the competition for political hegemony in the 
post-Soeharto system warrants a reassessment of their relationship with the state and civil society. 
During authoritarian rule, b'oth organisations created important niches for political activities and 
discourses outside of formal institutions and norms imposed by the regime. NU and 
Muhammadiyah were part of a civil society that was largely concerned with protecting itself from 
intrusion by the control apparatus of the New Order. The 1998 regime change, however, 
fundamentally altered their relationship with the state. They decided to participate actively in the 
political structures of the post-authoritarian polity, supporting the creation of parties to defend the 
interests of their constituencies. Although NU and Muhammadiyah formally remained 
independent socio-religious organisations, their dominant role in PKB and PAN was undeniable. 
The vast majority of PKB and PAN functionaries were members of NU and Muhammadiyah 
respectively, and the voting patterns of the 1999 elections demonstrated that the public tended not. 
to differentiate between the organisations and their affiliated parties. 59 The post-1998 changes 
turned NU and Muhammadiyah into electoral competitors and participants in the political 
negotiations over power, resources and privileges.6° Consequently, NU became an integral part of 
the regime when its chairman assumed the presidency in 1999, and it concentrated all its efforts 
on defending the incumbent against mounting opposition from society and the political elite. In 
doing so, leading NU officials and clerics exposed political attitudes that did not always focus on 
'inculcating civic values in their members.'61 In fact, the edicts outlawing opposition to 
Abdurrahman and calls for disbanding the legislature were neither supportive of a 'democratic 
climate' nor did they accord with NU's self-image as a 'pillar of civil society.' 
The social unrest and political instability associated with Abdurrahman's removal pointed to the 
ambivalent. contribution of the two largest Muslim mainstream organisations to democratic 
consolidation in the post-authoritarian state. Hefuer and van Bruinessen were correct in lauding 
both sides for consistently opposing the formal Islamisation of the state as demanded by some 
groups at the ultra-modernist fringes . of the political spectrum. The promotion of moderate 
Islamic concepts of political organisation supported the evolution of a pluralist party system and 
59 Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Suryadinanta, Indonesian Electoral BehaviOur, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2004: 370; Muhaimin Iskandar, Manajemen Komunikasi · Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa dalam Pemilu 1999, Pustaka Bumi Selamat, Jakarta 2001: 185. 
60 Benyamin Fleming Intan maintained that only by remaining in the realm of civil society can religious 
groups ·avoid the conflicts associated with the fight for hegemonic control of social and political 
institutions. Once the line is crossed from engagement in civil society to political competition With rival 
constituencies, conflicts are almost inevitable. Benyamin Fleming Intan, "'Public Religion" and the 
Pancasila-based State of Indonesia: A Normative Argument within a Christian-Muslim Dialogue (1945-
1998)', Doctoral dissertation, Boston College, 2004. 
61 Bruinessen 2003: 6. 
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helped to reduce societal resistance to Western forms of democracy. This moderation did not 
extend to the style and procedures of direct political competition among themselves, however. 
The attempts by modernist politicians to unseat a head of state they had voted into office only 
months earlier, and the willingness of traditionalist leaders to condone repressive measures in his 
defence, exposed a selective commitment to the upholding of democratic norms and rules. 
Evidently, both currents of the Muslim community found it difficult to translate their civil society 
values developed under decades of authoritarian rule into a normative framework for their 
behavior as political actors in the post-Soeharto system. 62 The prolonged political conflicts, with 
violence at the grassroots and paralysis of government in the centre, impacted negatively on 
public perceptions of civilian leadership qualities. As a result, the popularity of the armed forces 
and former generals active in politics increased con5iderably. Military officers, who had faced 
' 
severe societal resentment in the early phase of the transition, now blamed civilian leaders for 
'the complete mess they have created. '63 Particularly the communal violence in East Java and the 
mobilisation of political militias assisted the armed . forces in propagating their traditional 
prejudice that 'if civilians are in charge, they do nothing but fight among themselves, even 
threaten to kill each other in God's name.'64 After two years of political chaos, an increasing 
number of Indonesians appeared to agree. 
III. COURTING THE GENERALS: ISLAMIC LEADERS AND THE 2004 ELECTIONS 
The collapse of the Abdurrahman government had important consequences for the relationship 
between Islamic groups and the constellation ~f power within them. The coalition that facilitated 
Abdurrahman's election in 1999 had been designed to overcome memories of failed all-Islamic 
experiments since the. colonial period, but the bitter conflicts that followed .only deepened the 
existing divisions and sentiments. Although the chairmen of NU arid Muhammadiyah, Hasyim · 
Muzadi and Syafii Maarif, managed to rebuild their personal ties through a series of social and 
cultural initiatives, the political rift between the two largest Islamic constituencies was 
significant. It all but excluded the possibility of further coalitions between traditionalist and 
. . 
modernist Muslim parties in the foreseeable future, particularly in the run-up to the 2004 
62 The problem was not, as Howard Federspiel suggested, that NU and Muhammadiyah 'have become more 
energized in political affairs with their cadre and members actively recruited for the newly formed political 
parties.' Rather, NU and Muhammadiyah - despite official declarations to the opposite - were turned from 
civil society organisation8 into political interest groups. Howard Federspiel, ·'Indonesia, Islam, and U.S. 
Policy;, Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1, Spring 2002: 110. · 
63 Confidential interview With a one-star general, Bandung 21 September 2001. 
64 Confidential interview with a one-stir general, Bandung 21September200L 
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elections. In addition to the widening gap between key Islamic groups, the events surrounding 
Abdurrahman's removal also created new divisions within Nahdlatul Ulama. Loyalists of the 
deposed President accused leading NU and PKB functionaries of not doing enough to defend 
Abdurrahman and of reconciling too quickly with his opponents. The Chairman of the PKB 
branch of East Java, Choirul Anam, claimed that thousands of his supporters had been ready to 
flock into the capital and confront Abdu:rrahman's adversaries, but that Matori Abdul Djalil and 
Hasyim Muzadi had prevented them from taking action. 65 Matori had participated in the MPR 
session that impeached Abdurrahman, despite PKB's official boycott, and Hasyim had made it 
clear· that NU acknowledged the legitimacy of the new government.66 Consequently, 
Abdurrahman insisted on Matori's replacement as PKB Chairman, and his relationship with 
Hasyim Muzadi was diimaged irreparably. Like the split between the largest Islamic 
· constituencies, the factionalism within NU was certain to impact on the process of coalition 
building for the 2004 polls. 
The political elite began to prepare for the 2004 elections as soon as Megawati took office, 
despite the fact that her term was scheduled to last for more than three years and thus longer than 
that of any democratic government in indonesian history. There were several reasons for this. To 
begin with, the largest political parties had agreed after Abdurrahman's fall that they would allow 
Megawati to serve out the remainder of the presidential term without major challenges to her rule. 
According to Amien Rais, key ·politicians signed an agreement that guaranteed Megawati 'that 
·she will not be brought down halfway into her presidency, because if.she were impeached too, 
that would be a joke for Indonesia's democracy.'67 This decision diverted the focus of political 
competition from active opposition against the incumbent to the issue of succession. Most 
importantly, Megawati also fulfilled her side of the contract with the political elite. She supported 
the election of PPP leader Hamzah Haz as her Vice-president, included members of most political 
parties in her government and largely refrained from conflicts with the legislature. During her 
three years in office, she did not dismiss a single minister, compared to 15 cabinet reshuffles 
65 Feillard 2002: 136-137. 
66 Hasyim, for his part, blamed the PKB faction in Parliament for failing to stop the impeachment 
proceedings against Abdurrahman. In a brochure that compiled reports on his leadership and was 
distributed at an NU event in 2002 in Jakarta, it was maintained that 'NU as a grassroots-oriented 
organisation was exposed to political mud flying around as a result of the less than optimal role played by 
the PKB elite~' The brochure stated that the 'capability of every single Member of Parliament from. the 
PKB faction was still appalling.' Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Infonnasi Media, Kiprah PBNU 
2000-2001: Analisa dan Evaluasi Pemberitaan tentang Kepeminpinan K.H. A. Hasyim Muzadi, elKapim, 
Malang 2001: x, xii. · 
67 "'Saya Sangat Menikmati Memimpin MPR'", Koran Tempo 3 October 2004. 
250 
involving more than 30 cabinet members under Abdurrahman's rule,68 In terms of policy, the 
Megawati government stayed away from controversial initiatives for change, turning it into 
'something of a holding operation'69 under which political actors concentrated their resources for 
the 2004 race. Finally, the upcoming elections were also the main subject of inter-elite 
negotiations over· amendments to the constitution. In August 2002, the MPR decided that the 
president and vice-president would be elected in a direct ballot, encouraging party leaders and 
political figures to position themselves within the new electoral framework. 
Candidacies and Frictions: Islamic Groups and the Presidential Race 
The divisions between and· within Islamic groups impaired their ability to find prospective 
candidates for the presidential contest. Given the conflicts under the Abdurrahman. government, 
the nomination of a joint candidate representing both traditionalist and modernist parties like in 
1999 was out of the question. Abdurrahman refused to meet Ami en Rais for more than two years 
after his fall, and even after he agreed to an encounter in July 2003, he ruled out the possibility of 
political cooperation. Pledging publicly not to 'fall into the same hole twice', Abdurrahman · 
insisted that 'Ami en has proven that he is not trustworthy'. 70 On the modernist side, the support 
for the renewal of an all-Islamic alliance was equally weak. Many modernist politicians viewed 
the failure ofAbdurrahman's presidency as evidence of the political immaturity of traditionalist 
leaders. They contended that NU-affiliated clerics in politics 'believe that running the state is like 
running a pesantren - all the authority, all the funds are in the hands of the kiai, and there is no 
accountability.'71 In addition to these mutual sentiments; the all-Islamic option lacked credible 
candidates. Some youth leaders in both NU and Muhammadiyah mentioned Nurcholish Madjid as 
a possible candidate, but his nomination never gained political momentum. After scoring high 
levels of support in opinion polls, Nurcholish considered participating in the convention held by 
the Golkar party to select its presidential nominee. He finally withdrew from the contest in protest 
. against Golkar's internal.convention procedures, and fell seriously ill when campaigning for the 
general elections began. 
68 P .N.H. Simanjuntak, Kabinet-Kabinet Republik!ndonesia Dari Awai Kemerdekaan Sampai Reformasi, 
· Penerbit Djambatan, Jakarta 2003: 432. 
69 Crouch 2003: 15 · 
70 Abdurrahman Wahid on TV7, 20 April 2004. 
71 Interview with Djoko Susilo, Jakarta 30 March 2001. 
251 
Traditionalist and modernist groups did not only face insurmountable difficulties in nominating 
a joint candidate, but they were also divided internally over the best nominee for their respective 
constituencies. Amien Rais was determined to run for the presidency again, but as an ICG report 
noted, it was 'barely imaginable that the Islamic parties would join to nominate him. '72 His 
relationship with PPP and Bulan Bintang was tense since Amien had failed to fulfil his promise to 
lead these parties in 1998. PPP officials were leaning towards a renewed alliance with Megawati, 
and Yusril made no secret of his refusal to back Amien's nomination. Even Partai Keadilan, 
which formed a joint faction in Parliament with PAN, appeared reluctant to back up its former 
patron. That left PAN and Muhammadiyah as the only organisational vehicles for Amien's 
campaign. PAN was unlikely to receive much more than the 7 percent of the votes it gained in 
1999 and thus insufficient to bring victory in the presidential ballot. PAN's weakness and the 
non-committal attitude of modernist parties caused Muhammadiyah leaders to promise Amien 
full institutional support for his 2004 candidacy, departing :from their 1999 position that electoral 
assistance was possible only through Muhammadiyah elements active in P AN.73 In the 
traditionalist community, similar divisions occurred. Despite strong reservations on the part of 
senior kiai, Abdurrahman insisted on competing in the popular ballot.74 He was certain that he 
could regain the presidency for NU·and provide ultimate proof that his 2001 ouster had been the 
work of a tiny elite. NU leaders around Hasyim Muzadi believed, however, that their organisation 
would have a much better chance of participating in the next government if it nominated a vice-
presidential candidate to pair up with one of the key contenders. The split caused heated debates 
between the two camps, with one group suggesting that the former president was physically unfit 
for office and the other accusing Hasyim of having received bribes from Megawati.75 
New Electoral Patterns: The Gubernatorial Elections of 2002-03 
The elections of new governors in the majority of Indonesia's provinces throughout 2002 and 
2003 mirrored the deep divisions within the civilian elite and catalysed the emergence of new 
patterns of coalition building. At the centre of these new electoral patterns were retired military 
officers as partners for civilian forces keen to deny their opponents access to important 
72 International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections', Asia Report No. 
71, 18 December 2003: 11. 
73 'Sikap Muhammadiyah Berdampak Positif Pada Perolehan Suara PAN', Sinar Harapan 12 February 
2004. 
74 'Tarik Ulur Pencalonan Gus Dur', Gatra 12 March 2004. . 
75 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Ada Dana Pelicin Rp. 3 Milyar', Kompas 28 July 2002. 
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bureaucratic posts. In East Java, for example, the PDI-P leadership decided in 2003 to support the 
re-election of incumbent governor Imam Utomo, a retired two-star general and former 
Corrirnander of the province. PDI-P was locked in a paralysing power balance with PKB in the 
East Java legislature, with each party controlling one third of the seats. From PDI-P's perspective, 
Imam's nomination promised to hand the governorship to a neutral mediator and prevent a 
possible PKB victory. Abdurrahrnan, for his part, r~sponded to PDI-P's move by pushing for 
another retired general, Abdul K.ahfi, to be named PK.B's nominee.76 Kahfi's's nomination stirred 
opposition froin some leading kiai who favored PKB Secretary-General Saifullah Yusuf for the 
post. 77 Abdurrahman prevailed, however, setting up a contest between two retired generals for 
one of Indonesia's most crucial governorships. One member of East Java's election committee 
predicted an easy victory for Imam: 
"Imam has them all in his pocket. He has prepared his re-election for years, paying 
off the right people. And his ties to the military make him respectable in the eyes of 
the political elite. That's why his opponents see nominating another military officer 
as the only way to beat him."78 
. Imam won the ele~tion by a large margin: Beside his military background, the access to state 
resources and other privileges associated with incumbency had given him a decisive advantage 
over his competitor. hnam' s victory reflected an emerging pattern of electoral behavior within the 
elite that evoked memories of the pre-1971 period of Soeharto's ruk when, according to 
Sundhaussen, 'many provincial and district assemblies favored the appointment of colonels and 
. generals, even ( ... ) when political parties still had an important say in these assemblies.' The 
major reason for this phenomenon was 'the reluctance of party politicians to back a candidate 
from a rival party; they would rather vote for someone who is considered "neutral" in party 
politics.'79 Despite the stark differences between the early New Order and the post-Soeharto 
· polity, Sundhaussen's assessment could well be applied to describe the character of provincial 
politics in 2002 and 2003. 
. East Java was not the only case in which retired military officers profited ·from civilian 
divisions to defend or gain key bureaucratic positions. In Central Java, PKB nominated a local 
76 Abdurrahman had earlier mentioned three retired generals who had the potential of representing PKB in 
the election for governor: Kahf;i, .a former depufy governor of Jakarta, and .the two former Conim.anders of 
East Java, Haris Sudarno and Djoko Subroto. 'PKB Mengajukan Tiga Jenderal', Suara Merdeka 4 June 
2003. . 
77 'Pencafonan Kahfi tak Lewat Rapat Resmi', Suara Merdeka 3 July 2003. 
78 Interview with Aribowo, Deputy Chairnian of East Java's Election Commission, Surabaya 23 June 2003. · 
79 Sundhaussen.1978; 52. . 
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NU leader to run as vice-governor on the ticket of the incumbent, retired two-star general 
Mardiyanto.80 PDI-P also decided to support Mardiyanto's re-election bid despite its triumph in 
the 1999 polls with 43 percent of the votes and strong pressure from the grassroots to nominate a 
party figure for governor. PAN, for its part, recruited the one-time Commander of Jakarta, retired 
Maj.Gen. Kirbiantoro, as its nominee for the gubernatorial election. The PDI-P leadership 
celebrated Mardiyanto's eventual win against his former colleague as a huge success for its 
negotiation skills.81 Several local PDI-P chairmen disagreed, however, and left the party in 
dismay. In West Java, PKB sent retired general Tayo Tarmadi into the elections for governor, 
facing an experienced bureaucfll,t nominated by Golkar, Danny Setiawan. The Golkar candidate, 
who was a leading figure in FKPPI, won the. ballot. 82 In Lampung, incumbent governor 
Oemarsono, also a former officer, ran with Anny Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu's brother as 
his candidate for the vice~governorship. The pair was backed by the PDI-P Central Board, but lost 
against a local businessman who had obtained the support of local legislators, The governor-elect 
was arrested on corruption charges, however, leading to the annulment of the vote by the central 
government and a re~rtm of the election. Subsequently, Ryamizard's brother joined forces with a 
new candidate for governor and, this time, emerged as part of the winning team. In addition, 
victories for retired military officers were .. recorded in North SW:natra, Jakarta, East Kalimantan 
and Maluku. 83 
Islamic Communities, Military Candidates: Building Alliances for the 2004 Polls 
The alliances between civilian forces and retired military officers in local elections prepared the 
scene for similar electoral patterns at the national level. Amien Rais was the first party leader and 
presidential hopeful who publicly lobbied retired military officers to become his running mate .. 
After his failure· to enlist the backing of modernist parties, the presentation of a popular retired 
general appeared as the next best strategy to broaden his support base. In September 2003, the 
80 Ali Mufiz was Deputy Chairman ofNU's Central Java branch and Chairman of the. provincial chapter of 
MUI (Majelis uiama Indonesia, the Council of Indonesian ·Muslim Clerics). 
81 'Mardiyanto Menang Mutlak', Suara Pembaruan 24 July 2003. . 
82 Despite his connection with a military-affiliated organisation, some newspapers praised Setiawan as a 
'civilian governor in an era of reform.' 'Danny Setiawan, Gubemur Sipil di Era Reformasi', Pikiran Rakyat 
13 June 2003. · 
· 
83 At the district level the trend was different, however. Only very few retired military officeni were 
nominated as candidates for the posts of bupati or mayor. This suggests that the inclination of political 
·parties to nominate ex-military candidates was directly linked to the significance of the contested post for 
national politics.· The more important. a particular post to the intere~ts of the central party leadership, the 
more likely the latter was to intervene in the nomination process and favor a candidate with a military 
background. 
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former Muhammadiyah chairman introduced the idea of a civilian-military alliance as the major 
platform of his campaign. He argued that the expertise of former generals was needed to secure 
the territorial iiltegrity of the state against separatist threats and other security disturbances.84 In 
Amien's view, the blend between his image as a reform-minded civilian with the nationalist 
credentials of a retired military leader was certain to attract substantial support from a society 
unsettled by six years of political transition. Consequently, he approached Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and offered him the vice-presidential nomination on his ticket.8·5 ·Many within 
Amien's inner circle di~agreed:. 
"I told Pak Amien that recruiting a retired officer as his partner for the election could 
ruin his reformist image. Besides,- it was clear that Susilo had either plans. In the 
meetings with Amien, Susilo just said nothing. He was obviously preparing his own 
candidacy."86 
· Susilo's refusal to pair up with Amien was not the only setback in the latter's campaign. The 
parliamentary elections in April 2004 saw a further drop in the support for PAN, which was 
overtaken by two other parties and now only ranked seventh in terms of popular votes.87 This 
decline in Amien's electoral standing discouraged other potential candidates from considering his 
. offers for political cooperation. He inquired with both Endriartono and Agum Gumelar if they 
were interested in the vice-presidential nomination, but received negative responses.88 By the 
time Amien had to make a definitive decision in May, there were already three other tickets with 
civilian-military pairs in the race. He ultimately chose former minister Siswono Yudohusodo as 
his ·partner for the elections and turned his earlier concept upside down: what had been planned as 
an integrated civilian-military ticket was now popularised as the only genuine civilian duo 
confronting the dominance of retired officers in the presidential competition. 89 
Many of the modernist Islamic parties that refused to endorse Amien's candidacy formed 
· alliances with retired military officers as Well. Bulan Bintang declaied its support for Susilo early 
· 
84 'Amien Rais Pilih W apres dari Kalangan TNI'~ Kompas 13 September 2003. 
85 'Cawapres dari Kalangan Militer Jadi Pilihan Amien Rais', Kompas 22 February 2004. 
86 Confidential interview with senior advisor to Amien Rais, Jakarta 3 October 2003 .. 
87 At the April polls, Golkar finished first with 21.6 percent, followed by PDI~P with 18.5; PKB with 10.5; 
PPP with 8.2; and Partai Demoktrat and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahteia, Prosperous Justice Party) with 7.5 · 
and 7.3 percent respectively. PAN received 6.4 pereent of the votes, ahead of Bulan Bintang and PBR 
.(Paitai Bintang Reformasi, Reform Star Party) with 2.6 and 2.4 percent respectively. PKS had been formed 
out of the old PK as the latter had failed in 1999 to reach the 2 percent threshold required to compete in the 
2004 ballot. PBR, ·for its part, was founded by the Muslim leader Zainuddin MZ after his departure from 
PPP. 
88 'Politicians Courting Military Criticized', Jakarta P~st 21April2004. 
89 'Siswono: Negara Aman Tidak Hams Dipimpin Militer', Kompas 25 June 2004. 
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on in the nomination process and was one of the three parties that formed the core of his 
coalition. Party chaiiman Yusril Ihza Mahendra had built up a close working relationship with 
Susilo during their time together in several post-Soeharto cabinets, and they had shared many 
· grievances against the respective incumbents. Some elements of the party elite and the Bulan 
.Bintang grassroots opposed Susilo's nomination, however, Ahmad Soemargono, a former KISDI 
figure and one of Bulan Bintang's most prominent ultra-modernist figures, declared his 
resignation from the party and threw his support behind Amien Rais.90 Equally, a large number of 
. branches in the regions opted to join Amien's campaign and risk open conflict with the Central 
Board. PPP witnessed similar conflicts. Hamzah Haz had initially sought the vice-presidential slot 
on Megawati' s ticket, but after she had picked Hasyim Muzadi, PPP decided to nominate its 
Chairman for thepresidency and Agum Gumelar as his running mate. The move.sparked protest 
from some factions within PPP, which declared their support for Amien as well. Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, for its part, was split between supporters of Amien and Wiranto, who had won the 
nomination of the Golkar party in an internal ballot. The sympathy for Wiranto within PKS 
surprised many, but appeared to have originated from his personal protection of KAMMI leaders 
during the 1998. student protests.91 The pro-Wiranto group caused a deadlock in the internal party 
deliberations as to which candidate to recommend to its voters, delaying the decision to the final . 
phase of the campaign. Although the party ultimately opted for Amien, 21 percent of PKS' s 
supporters still voted for Wiranto, the highest percentage for ·the former 1NI Commander among 
those major parties that did not campaign for him.92 
. Former generals also played important roles in the search for presidential nominees within the 
traditionalist Muslim community. In Nahdlatul Ulama and PKB, there was both strong support 
for and· fierce opposition against another candidacy of Abdurrahman Wahid. Even after the 
Election Commission indicated that Abdurrahman was likely to be excluded from the presidential 
. . 
· ballot for health reasons, the prospect for the nomination. of a candidate acceptable to all Nl! 
factions remained remote. The former president made it clear thathe would not endorse any Nu 
candidate considered disloyal to him, mentioning Hasyim Muzadi by name. Once again, the 
recruitment of retired military leaders appeared to many as an attractive solution, offering to 
90 'PBB Gelar Rakomas, Sosialisasi Dukungan atas SBY-Kalla', Koran Tempo 16 May 2004. 
91 I am grateful to Greg Fealy for providing this information. A PKS~sponsored publication lauded Wiranto, 
among others, for participating in the presidential elections in a democratic way and thus 'using 
constitutional means to receive the sympathy of the people.' Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer, Refleksi Masyarakat 
Baru, Bandung 2004: 255. . 
92 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 'Results from Wave XV Tracking Surveys', 4 August 
2004. . . . 
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bridge internal differences and improve the electoral standing of the traditionalist constituency. 
Thus PKB officials consulted in late 2003 with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono about the possibility 
of him running as the party's presidential candidate.93 Muhaimin Iskandar, Deputy Chairman of 
PKB and Abdurrahman's nephew, was certain that Susilo would emerge as PKB's nominee: 
"I'm sure that it will be Susilo. We are in negotiations with him, and Gus Dur, 
despite his official claims that he wants to enter the race himself, has given his 
approval. "94 
Partai Demokrat, however, won enough votes in the April elections to nominate Susilo for the 
presidency on its own, and PKB leaders felt that his interest in PKB as a possible electoral vehicle 
declined as a result. Hopeful that his popularity alone would deliver victory, Susilo offered no · 
concrete inducements to PKB to win the party's backing.95 The· negotiations over Susilo's 
possible nomination by PKB were broken off in late April, and when the Election Commission 
officially excluded Abdurrahman from the poll in May, the party was acutely conscious of its lack 
of a candidate. As expected, Abdu1Tahman ruled out PKB support. for Hasyim Muzadi who had 
joined Megawati's campaign as her vice-presidential nominee.96 Finally, the ex-president threw 
his support behind Wiranto and allowed his younger brother, · Solahuddin Wahid, to run as the 
deputy of the former Commander-in-Chief. Despite his intention to boycott the ballot in protest 
against his disqualification, Abdurrahman campaigned actively for the pair. Senior kiai loyal to 
Abdurrahman also called on their santri to elect Wiranto, arguing that voting for Hasyim Muzadi 
constituted a violation of Islamic norms as he ·had paired up with a female presidential 
candidate.97 
Civilian Empowerment? Susilo and the Electoral Politics of 2004 
The result of the first round of presidential elections in July 2004 highlighted the success of 
Susilo Barn.bang Yudhoyono in combining the traditional features of a military leader with the 
images of post-Soeharto reform. Ranking first with 33.6 percent, Susilo was viewed by voters as 
· firm but consensus-oriented, consistent but _open-minded, conservative but liberaL This blend of 
New Order paradigms with democratic values enabled Susilo to attract support from all major 
93 'PKB Juga Lirik SBY', Surya 28 January 2004. 
9>1 Interview with Muhaimin Iskandar, Jakarta 29 January 2004. . 
95 'Gus Dur Mengaku Tidak Pemah Beri Restu SBY', Jawa Pos21 April 2004 . 
. 
96 'Gus DurTak Dukung Muzadi Jadi Cawapres', Konipas 24 April 2004. 
97 'Kiai Khos Haramkan Umat Islam dan NU Pilih Mega-Hasyim', Koran Tempo 3 June 2004. 
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socio-political and religious constituencies. Wiranto, on the other hand, was largely identified 
with the political inflexibility of the New Order;98 fu addition to an unfavorable reputation, the 
confusion within the traditionalist Muslim community and Golkar over which candidate to 
support also undermined the electoral chances of the former TNI chief. Abdurrahman, despite 
calling on his supporters to vote for Wiranto, gave .. interviews in which he predicted that the 
retired general had no chance of winning.99 Furthermore, many kiai received financial 
contributions from Wiranto as well as Megawati's side and thus did not issue a definitive 
recommendation for either party. In the absence of a clear order from their kiai, a large number of 
NU-affiliated voters abstained or opted for Susilo. The same ambivalence applied to Golkar's 
. attitude. By most accounts, the party machinery was not fully mobilised to support its candidate. 
· Akbar Tanjung had apparently little interest in a Wiranto victory, and a lot of local party leaders 
who had spent all their resources on the parliamentary elections were reluctant to raise further 
funds for an uncertain cause. Thus Wiranto came only third with 22.2 percent, behind Megawati 
who claimed second place with 26.6 percent and qualified for a second-round encounter with 
Susilo in September. Amien Rais and Hamzah Haz finished fourth and fifth respectively and were 
eliminated from the race. 
The second round of the poll saw key Muslim groups and parties once again deeply divided. fu 
the modernist spectrum, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera declared its support for Susilo, while PAN was 
clearly leaning towards the former general despite officially remaining neutral. 100 The two parties 
joined forces with Bulan Bintang, which had been part of Susilo's campaign since May 2004. 
PKS, PAN and Bulan Bintang were opposed to what was widely perceived as Megawati's 
· secularist attitude to political affairs, and certainly were not in favor of a traditionalist Muslim in 
the vice-presidency. They were also highly critical of Megawati's lackluster performance since 
2001, declaring that a change of the national leadership was inevitable. These ideological and 
political considerations were of such importance that they overcame concerns over Susilo's 
military background, particularly in PKS. On the other hand, PPP and one of its splinter parties, 
PBR, became members of the Nationhood Coalition (Koalisi Kebangsaan), which pledged to 
secure Megawati's reelection. Other members of the coalition included PDI-P, Golkar and a 
number of smaller secular-nationalist parties. PPP leader Hamzah Haz felt that his party had 
received a fair share ofresources and positions under Megawati's rule and sought to continue this 
98 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 'The People's Voice: Presidential Politics and 
Voter Perspectives in Indonesia', Repoit on a Series of Focus Groups Conducted during May in Seven 
Indonesian Provinces Ahead of the July 2004 Presidential Elections, June 2004: 6, 12~ 
99 'Gus Dur Writes OffWiranto', Laksamana.Net 3 June 2004. 
100 'Susilo and Kalla Win PKS's Support', Jakarta Post 27 August 2004. 
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arrangement, while PBR joined the Coalition with the explicit notion of defending civilian 
supremacy against the danger of a resurgent military. 101 On the traditionalist side, efforts to 
reconcile Abdurrahman and Hasyim Muzadi in order to unite the Nahdlatul Ulama vote behind its 
Chairman were unsuccessful. 102 The former president assigned one of his daughters to accompany 
Susilo to important pesantren and campaign for him, effectively neutralising Hasyim Muzadi's 
appeal to support him as the only NU cadre left in the presidential competition. Ultimately, the 
majority of modernist and traditionalist Muslims voted for Susilo. He won the election in a 
landslide against Megawati, who could only defend her strongholds in predominantly non-
Muslim areas like Bali, Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara. 
Susilo's victory completed a senes of electoral successes by retired military officers in 
provincial and national polls. This phenomenon occurred despite new electoral mechanisms that 
provided civilian-based parties with the instruments to secure important government posts for 
their cadres. In provincial legislatures, parties that controlled the largest number of seats but fell 
short of an absolute majority still tended to select their nominees for key executive posts from 
independent candidates, often with military backgrounds. At the national level, the first direct 
presidential poll in Indonesia's history, long seen as a means of empowering civilian groups and 
mass organisations, had three retired officers competing in the race. There are two inter-related 
explanations for this .. First, the deep divisions within and between civilian constituencies 
encouraged their leaders to seek former generals as partners in order to resolve internal conflicts 
and improve their electoral prospect vis-a-vis other participants in the poll. The split within the 
Muslim community and its various groups was not the only example in this regard, but it 
provided significant insights into the motivation of large civilian forces to support former 
generals not directly attached to them. The internal conflict in Nahdlatul Ulama w~ a case in 
point, with one faction shifting support from Wiranto to Susilo to undennine the vice-presidential 
nomination of the NU chairman. The second explanation relates to the improved public image o.f 
the armed forces and its retired personnel since the constitutional crisis of 2001. The surge in 
societal support for notions of political stability and the corresponding decline of trust in civilian 
leadership qualities created incentives for politicians to integrate former generals into their 
cqmpaigns. As a result, by late 2004 retired officers had been installed in the presidency and 
crucial posts in local administrations. Democratic elections, previously viewed as an obstacle to 
101 PBR Deputy Chair Zainal Maarif asserted that 'this doesn't mean that we think Susilo is militaristic, 
maybe he is a military man who can be democratic, but it is better to leave civilian supremacy in civilian 
hands.' 'SBY: Pada Akhimya Rakyatlah Yang Menentukan Pilihannya', Surabayawebs 23 August 2004. 
· 
102 'Gus Dur Tak Akan Dukung Hasyim Muzadi', Koran Tempo 27 July 2004. 
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the participation of both active and retired military figures in politics, had evolved into one of its 
most effective vehicles. 
IV. ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN POST-SOEHARTO INDONESIA~ SECURITY THREAT 
OR OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MILITARY? 
The conflicts within the Muslim mainstream were not the only development in Indonesian Islam 
that played into the hands of the military. Earlier chapters of this study have also highlighted the 
way in which a small, but violent segment of extremist Islam underpinned the claim of the armed 
forces to political privileges under pre-1998 governments. This section will discuss the role of 
. . 
militant Muslim groups in the post-New Order polity as well as their impact on the position of the 
military vis-a-vis civilian politicians. It will show that the issue of violent Islaniist radicalism · 
. . 
·allowed officers to pursue limited political and economic interests, but that unlike in the 1950s 
and 1970s, it did not form a key element in the military's efforts to maintain and expand its 
participation in domestic affairs. 
In the post-Soeh~o era, violent Islamic extremism found its representation in three different 
types of groups: terrorist cells, 'anti-vice' militias and paramilitary groups that. intervened in 
communal conflicts. The leaders of terrorist cells were largely Islamic militants who had fled 
Indonesia in the 1980s and returned to their homeland after the regime change of 1998.103 The 
most prominent among them was Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. He headed Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which 
. functioned as an umbrella organisation for militant cells across the archipelago and, in fact, 
Southeast Asia. Beginning in 2000, Jemaah Islamiyah carried out a series of bombings in several 
Indonesian provinces. Initially, the attacks focused largely on Christian churches · and . 
institutions, 104 but after September 111\ the terrorists increasingly chose targets associated with . 
the US or its Western allies. In January 2002, the Singaporean government announced that it had 
103 Greg Fealy;. 'Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?', in: Southeast Asian Affairs 2004, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore 2004: 104-121; Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of 
Islamic Radicalism in Post,.Soeharto Indonesia', South East Asta Research 10:2, July 2002: · 117,.54. In 
exile, these leaders had participated in guerilla wars in Afghanistan and the Philippines or received 
extensive· training· in jihadist doctrine and practices in Malaysia; Pakistan and the Middle East. Upon their 
return, they organised themselves in small groups and cells in vari_ous Indonesian regions, but.maintained a 
well-organised communication network established under decades of authoritarian rule and exile. Most of 
. the older leaders had links to the NII rebellion of the 1950s, and many of their recruits orginated from 
families associated with Islamist insurgencies in the past 
104 In May 2000, a bomb exploded at a Protestant church in Medan, injuring at least 47 people. The incident 
set the tone for a string of similar attacks, culminating in the Christmas eve bombings of 2000 that hit 
churches in ten Indonesian Cities in six provinces. Eighteen people were killed and 36 were badly injured. 
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. arrested members of a TI cell that had planned to blow up the US embassy in the city state, and 
that the intelligence gathered from the suspects pointed to Ba'asyir's involvement. The 
hidonesian government appeared unwilling to confront Ba'asyir, however, fearing a backlash 
from the Muslim community that viewed foreign demands for action as part of a Western anti-
Islamic campaign. Only after the Bali· bombings of October 2002 did Megawati order her 
ministers to take action, resulting in the arrest ofBa'asyir and new anti-terrorism legislation. 
Despite their significant domestic and international repercussions, the terrorist attacks launched 
by n were at no point a significant threat to the authority and stability of the government. Unlike 
the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s, TI's activities did not require the political elite to support 
eXten8ive military operations and expand the resources of the armed forces. The hunt for JI 
terrorists was,. for the most part, a challenge for police· investigators rather than military 
strategists. Nevertheless, military officers still managed to use the issue of lslamist terrorism to 
. . 
their benefit Most significantly, they furthered their international rehabilitation after years of 
isolation, offering cooperation in the 'war against terror' to the United States. While existing · 
.sanctions were not lifted,. Western governments eased their pressure on 1NI to reform itself, 
prioritising the development of its counter-terrorism capacities instead.105 Moreover, officers 
. argued that the threat posed by jihadist ·terrorists justified a. larger role for TNI iil domestic 
security. Ryamizard, for example, declared it 'impossible' for the police to handle terrorism on its 
own, and suggested that the military's territorial units be at the 'forefront' of the anti-terror 
campaign. 106 His pleas were partially heeded by the government, granting 1NI a larger role in a 
task force set up after the bombing of the Australian emba8sy in September 2004. The terrorist 
threat was, however, not much more than an addendum to the list of other reasons successfully. 
advanced by military officers to justify their continued involvement in domestic security. Political 
developments after 2001 had reduced public demands for military reform to such an extent that 
further justifications for slowing down the pace of change in the armed forces were redundant. 
hi contrast to the underground operations of n, the 'anti-vice' militias posed a threat of a 
. largely non-terrorist nature by publicly attacking what they viewed as 'un-Islamic activities'. The 
most prominent such group was FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Front to.Defend Islam), which was 
formed in August 1998 and earned out raids on nightclubs, prostitution venues and gambling 
·racilities.107 Police and military officers were widely suspected of backing FPI as they profited · 
105 Marcus Mietzner, 'Politics of Engagement: The Indonesian Aimed Forces, Islamic Extremism. and the 
"War on Terror", Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1, Spring 2002: 71-84. 
106 
'KSAD: Intelijen Militer Harus di Depan', Suara Merdfdcli 20 August 2003 
107 Alip Purnomo, FPI Disalahpahami, Penerbit Mediatama Indonesia, Jakarta 2003: 3 l. 
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from increased security payments from the attacked venues. Police began to take action against 
FPI leaders in 2002, however. FPI chairman Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab was arrested in 
October of that . year, and he suspended his organisation shortly afterwards. 108 FPI resumed 
operations in February 2003, but seems to have lost much of the influence it possessed in the pre-
2002 period. Finally, the third type of militant Islamist groups trained paramilitary fighters to 
assist the Muslim side in communal conflicts. Established in January 2000, Laskar Jihad (LJ) sent 
thousands of its members to Maluku and Paso to support Mlislims.in the religious violence raging 
there.109 The ease with which the militia made it to Maluku in April 2000 led an ICG report to 
conclu.de 'that the LJ received the backing of elements in the military and the police.' 110 These 
elements benefited from LJ's operations in several ways. Most.importantly, it was.alleged that a 
group of officers dismissed by President Abdurrahman . intended to destabilise his rule by . 
nurturing violent conflict among societal groups. Their support for. LJ was apparently· 
discontinued after Abdurrahman's fall, however, pointing to the contingent character of the 
cooperation. Second, it was also obvious that ongoing communal clashes created additional 
income opportunities for officers on the ground, offering profits in sectors ranging from 
transportation to arms trade. The conflict economy provided incentives for officers to prolong the 
violence, but LJ was by no means the only instrument to achieve that goal. For example, one 
. militia that had close ties to the military in Maluku and was known to have stirred up fresh 
· violence by unprovoked attacks and bomb explosions was made up of Christian criminals that 
attacked largely Christian targets. 
In general terms, developments at the extremist fringes of Indonesian Islam after 1998 provided 
limited opportunities for military officers to expand their political and economic· space. In 
contrast to the role of militant Islam under pre-1998 regimes, extremist Muslim groups during the 
. post-Soeharto era were only of secondary importance for the position of the armed forces vis-a-
. vis· civilian governments. The threat posed by Islamist terrorists to governments after 1998 was 
on a much smaller scale than that launched by the Darul Islam rebellion against. the political 
leadership of the 1950s. Equally, the manipulation of post-1998 Islarnist groups by individual . 
108 'Ketua Umum FPI Habib Rizieq Ditahan', Kompas 17 October 2002. . 
109 Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia', 
Indonesia 73, 2002: 145-69; and Robert W. Hefner, 'Civic Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi 
Violence in Indonesia', in: Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (editors), New Media in the Muslim 
World: The Emerging Public Sphere, Indiana University Press; Bloomington and Indianapolis 2003: 158-
179. 
110 International Crisis Group,· 'Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims,' Indonesia Briefing, 10 October 
2001: 13. LJ leader Jafar Umar Thalib had several meetings with TNI officers to discuss the presence of his 
troops in Mafoku, and he claimed that none of them suggested that TNI wanted LJ to withdraw. 
Mohammad Shoelhi, Li:tskar Jihad: Kambing Hitam Konflik Maluku, Puzam, Jakarta 2002: 27. 
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officers for short-term political and economic gains had a significantly lesser impact on the role 
of the military in politics than New Order intelligence operations in the 1970s on the legitimacy 
of the military-backed regime. Clearly, developments in the Islamic mainstream played a much 
larger role in influencing the outcome of the civil-military transition than the security threats from 
the Islamist fringes. As argued in this chapter, serious divisions between key Muslim groups 
contributed to the fractured state of civilian politics during the post-authoritarian transition. These 
conflicts encouraged major political forces to turn to the military and its leaders for assistance in 
confronting their opponents. The political infighting during much of the post-Soeharto period, 
.demoristrated most vividly in the constitutional crisis of 2001, delivered crucial posts in local 
. . 
government to retired generals and assisted the armed forces in repairing their public image 
damaged during decades of repressive rule. This surge in the military' s societal reputation and 
political significance prepared the way, finally, for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's rise to. the 
presidency in 2004. The prediction of Muslim leaders in the early phase of the democratic 
transition that there would be 'a new era of Indonesian politics dominated by a united, purposeful 
alliance of Muslim parties' remained unfulfilled.111 
111 Fealy2003: 151. 
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CONCLUSION 
"My military friends say_that they would bow under civilian supremacy only when 
civilians are of supreme quality."1 
Since the end of the authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia's armed forces have gone through 
tremendous political change. After forty years of institutionalised participation in or dominance 
of political affairs, the military faced the uncertainty of democratic liberalisation and open 
exposure of its past. The last time the military had operated under a democratic system had been 
in the 1950s, and it had played a major role in its downfall. The chances for a similar scenario 
after Soeharto's departure were small, with the military discredited by its involvement in decades. 
of political repression and social control. Consequently, the post-authoritarian transition offered 
. . . 
civilian actors the challce to reduce the formal privileges of the armed forces and take control of 
the political institutions. As tensions within the civilian political sphere heightened, however, the 
military found effective ways to adapt to the climate of open democratic competition. In fact, 
· many of the reforms that were initially designed to remove· the residual powers of the illilitary 
created new opportunities for active and retired officers to engage in the political process. By 
· 2004, the armed forces were no longer the backbone of authoritarian rule but an influential 
mediator and participant in domestic politics, despite their formal exclusion from·the political 
institutions of the state. 
This conclusion will.assess the role of the armed forces in post-Soeharto politics on the basis of 
the analytical tools and empirical material presented in the main parts of the thesis. It Will begin 
with an evaluation of the extent to. which the Indonesian armed forces after 1998 continued to 
participate in the four main areas of military interv_ention. The discussion of the military's 
engagement in political institutions, the economy,. the management of its internal affairs arid the 
socio-cultural sector will confirm that the position of the armed forces in the democratic transition 
·was, ih Larry Diamond's terms, of a 'hybrid' character:2 while marginalised from formal politics, 
the-military maintained a privileged position in political life. The reasons for this, as will be 
. . 
illuininated in the subsequent sections, are related to deeply entrenched historical _legacies, the 
nature of the 1998 regime change and specific problems in the process of derri.ocratic 
consolidation. Integrating these explanations into the two-generation model of civil-military 
1 Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono in an interview with the Jakarta Post in November 2004. See · 
'Transparency will Be Instituted in Defense Mninistry', Jakarta Post 4 November 2004. · 
2 Larry Diamond, 'Thinking AboutHybrid Regimes', Journal of Democracy 13:2, 2002: 21-35. 
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relations developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, the chapter concludes by highlighting the 
lessons learnt from the Indonesian case as valuable contributions to the scholarly debate on the 
role of the armed forces in post-authoritarian transitions. 
Adapting to the Post-Soeharto Polity: TNI after 1998 
Militaries· tend to intervene in four areas that are of pivotal interest to them: political affairs, the 
economy, institutional military mechanisms and the socio-c~ltural sector. The assessment of their 
. involvement in these fields allows for a comparative analysis of their role in politics and society 
as a whole. To begin with, the Indonesian armed forces after 1998 had to accept a drastic 
reduction of their participation in formal political institutions. Their representation in the national 
and local legislatures was reduced in 1999 and ultimately terminated in 2004. In addition, active 
· officers were no longer allowed to hold cabinet posts and other key positions in the bureaucracy. 
There were; however, residual pockets of formal military engagement in politiCal institutions. The · 
Commander-in-Chief, for example, remained an ex-officio member of cabinet, giving him access 
to and influence on key policy decisions made by the government. Senior officers were also 
entitled to hold important positioris in the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs 
and the Department of Defence, entrenching them in political institutions concerned with military 
matters and obstructing the civilianisation of positions in the defence establishment. Moreover, 
military figures often started successful political careers after retirement. Although former 
officers were no longer subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and pursued a wide 
variety of political interests and personal ambitions, they were widely viewed as representative of 
the armed forces and its core norms and values. Retired generals defended key governorships 
against civilian opponents and rival ex-officers, became leading executives in politicai parties and 
in 2004 ~ined a significant number of seats .in the national and regional legislatures. The victory 
of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the presidential elections of 2004 opened the door for many of 
his retired. associates to take up posts. in the new government. :He appointed s ministers with 
military and police backgrounds, equaling the number of retired generals in the last Soeharto 
cabinet. 
The chafacter of military intervention in the economy also underwent substantial change after 
1998. The large military conglomerates built up during thirty years of stable growth under the 
New Order suffered greatly in the economic crisis of 1997 and 1998, leading to a decline in 
revenues. In addition,· many of the key Chinese entrepreneurs who had paid sig0ificant sums to 
the military as an institution and to its individual leaders experienced serious financial difficulties 
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and had to suspend or reduce their contributions. Furthermore, the military now faced an 
increased number of competitors in one of its main commercial areas, the protection business. 
The police, security forces of political parties, ethnic and religious militias and criminal gangs 
became major players in providing 'security services' to businesses and entertainment venues, 
absorbing payments previously reserved for military officers. The reduced cash flow threatened 
the ability of the armed forces to maintain their practice of self-financing, forcing military leaders 
to intensify their more 'informal'; and often questionable, business activities. Local officers 
· engaged with bureaucrats in illegal logging and smuggling of goods ranging from sugar to luxury 
cars, and soldiers stationed in conflict areas profited from selling weapons, services in the 
transportation sector, commercial hostage taking and trading with drugs. In more institutional 
terms, senior officers rented. out many of the vast military-owned properties to investors who 
subsequently used the land to build shopping malls and supermarkets. These schemes provided 
considerable income opportunities for the military and the individual officers who signed the 
deals. Finally, the military continued to profit from security payments from large companies that 
did not entrust their protection to less effective.forces like the police or political militias. The US-
based gold mining company Freeport McMoRan, for example, paid 5.6 million dollars to TNI in 
Papua in 2002 alone.3 Several other large gas and mining projects across the archipelago offered 
similar forms of compensation. 
In managing its internal affairs, the military enjoyed a level of autonomy last seen in the 1970s. 
In the later periods of the New Order, many officers had objected to Soeharto's deep intervention 
in military appointments despite the ongoing civilianisation of his regime. At the end of 
Megawati's term, by contrast, the armed forces had almost complete control over their personnel 
affairs. In addition, the military had successfully defended its territorial command structure 
against occasional attempts to reform it, allowing the officer corps to sustain its financial self-
sufficiency. Largely independent from central budget allocations, the military was also able to 
escape more intensive scrutiny by the legislature. Staffed with politicians who lacked technical 
knowledge of military affairs but showed great interest in lobbying the armed forces for their 
support in political conflicts, the parliamentary commission on defence and security only rarely 
exercised its control function properly. As a result, the military was able to run operations like the 
campaign in Aceh largely without effective supervision by civilian authorities. The Department 
of Defence, for its part, did not establish meaningful mechanisms of civilian democratic control 
either. In the first 18 months of the post-authoritarian transition, the ministry was headed by 
Wiranto, who commanded the armed forces at the same time. Under Abdurrahman, the 
3 'Freeport Shareholders on the War Path', Asia Times 23 June 2004. 
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department was drawn into protracted political conflicts between the palace and the legislature, 
making it largely dysfunctional. During the Megawati presidency, finally, Minister of Defence 
l'vlatori suffered a stroke after two lackluster years in office. The post was left vacant for 14 
months, during which time the chiefs of tJie various services went on to procure expensive 
military hardware without the necessary approval of the ministry. 4 During a hearing at 
Parliament, Commander-in-Chief Endriartono Sutarto joked that he was 'happy' not to have a 
Minister of Defence, and when a new chief of the department took office in October 2004, he 
warned him not to 'talk about issues related to the armed forces. ' 5 
The relationship of the armed forces with society, the cultural sector an:d the media also 
experienced an essential trallsfonnation after the · l998 regime change. The military faced 
unprecedented scrutiny by the press, with articles uncovering many of its human rights abuses 
since 1965. Civil society leaders launched sharp attacks on the armed forces and their 
unwillingness to support faster and more wide-ranging reforms. With the traditional instruments 
of intimidation and state-imposed censorship increasingly ineffective, officers had to adapt their 
public relations strategies to the requirements of an open democratic climate. In this respect, they 
·used several approaches. First of all, they increasingly influenced journalists with financial 
inducements rather than threats of sanctions. Reporters who previously feared serious 
consequences if called in by central or local military units were now greeted with 'envelopes' 
containing money, encouraging them to 'improve' the quality of their coverage on TNI. In 
addition, officers also employed paid writers who published articles in influential papers that 
promoted the viewpoint of the armed forces or mdividual military leaders. They also began to 
'groom' academics who were seen as important allies in propagating a positive image of the 
armed forces. Identifying young researchers with the potential of influencing societal opinions, 
generals would offer scholarships for further education or other forms of assistance. Moreover, 
the officer corps increased its cooperation with society groups that could be called upon to oppose 
public calls for legal investigations into past abuses or policy initiatives aimed at reducing the 
privileges of the armed forces. Human rights activists faced a relentless stream of protesters~ often 
organised in groups featuring Islamic symbols and names, which called the military critics 
'unpatriotic' and 'itn-Islamic' for demanding accountability from particular officers. In short, the 
post-Soeharto military was forced to replace its traditional concept .of social control with more 
. modem practices of strategic communications. 
4 
'Indonesia Segera BeliKorv:et dari Belanda', Kompas 1 July 2004. 
5 
'Mega Manja Militei-, Biarkan Kursi Menhan Kosong', Duta Masyarakat 27 February 2004; 'Panglima 
TNI Keberatan TNI Diletakkan di Bawah Dephan', Kompas 9 November 2004. 
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The extent of military involvement in key socio-political sectors after 1998 points to the hybrid 
character of the changes that have occurred. In most cases, the armed forces were able to offset 
the reduction of privileges enjoyed under the Soeharto regime by adapting successfully. to the 
norms and procedures of the post-authoritarian polity. The loss of their legislative representation, 
for example, was compensated by the participation_ of numerous retired generals in electoral 
processes, capturing important executive posts as a result In the economic sector, the decline of 
institutional military businesses . led to an expansion of non-formal activities and enterprises. 
Furthermore, the increased· scrutiny of civilian control institutions did not produce effective 
mechanisms of democratic oversight, but in fact allowed the armed forces to exercise greater 
autonomy than under the previous regime. Finally, the erosion of its social control network 
encouraged the officer corps to. adopt new strategies to influence public opinion and defend itS 
institutional interests. The. reasons for this mixed record of civil-military reforms after 1998 are 
rooted in a ·combination of factors, relating to developments in both military politics and the 
civilian political sphere. The following sections will highlight some of the key explanations for 
·the problems in reforming Indonesia's post-Soeharto military . 
. Historical Legacies 
The historical legacy of Indonesian military politics has created significant obstacles to the 
.·establishment of democratic control over the armed forces after 1998. Military officers have 
traditionally viewed the origin of the army in the country's war for independence as an eternal 
mandate for engagement in political affairs. They harbored a. deep sense of entitlement and 
believed that it was theif destiny to save the nation from alleged civilian ineptitude and threats to 
its territorial integrity. When the democratic system of the 1950s denied the armed forces a 
privileged position in the regime, military leaders actively worked toward its replacement 
Subsequently, the military claim to participation in government wa~ institutionalised and 
remained a key element of political life until Soeharto's fall. The formal abolition of the Dual 
Function in 2000 did little to change the mindset of the officer corps, with many of its members 
still convinced that only the aimed forces were capable of defining and defending national 
interests beyond the self-absorbed interests of civilian groups. ln addition ,to the. ideological 
heritage evolved over decades of political dominance, the institutional structures developed in the 
early period ~f TNI's formation also left important legacies for tlie post-authoritarian system. 
Fitst of all, the practice of military self-financing, begun in the guerilla war and maintained 
throughout the New Order, allowed the armed forces to operate independently from Civilian 
control authorities. Civilian leaders of the post-Soeharto. polity, emerging from a· devastating 
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economic crisis and overwhelmed by a myriad of other financial needs, were little inclined to 
embark on the huge task of bringing the military fully on budget and establishing control over its 
operations. Moreov~r, the army's territorial command system, which had entrenched the military 
in local politics as a virtual shadow government, provided the armed forces with a significant 
advantage over other political entities adapting to the new democratic framework. While political 
parties, regional legislatures and non-governmental organisations struggled to establish a 
presence -in post-New Order local politics, the army could rely on its decades-old institutional 
base that reached down to the village level. 
The fragmentation of key civilian forces formed an equally decisive legacy for the outcome of 
- the civil-military transition after the end of Soeharto's rule. Far from exposing the 'unity of 
democratic purpose among civilian political elites' that Diamond and Plattner viewed as an 
essential precondition for achieving democratic control over the military, Indonesia's major 
societal groups have been engaged in long-standing rivalries. This study has pointed to disputes 
within the Muslim community as one of the_most important sources of conflict in civilian politics. 
The controversy between secularly oriented Muslims and proponents of a formal role for Islam in 
state affairs on the one hand, and the deep antagonism between traditionalist and modernist 
groups on the other, have caused Serious divisions in the civilian political sphere. These cleavages 
destabilised the democratic polity of the 1950s, and opened opportunities for the-armed forces to 
justify and enforce their claim to a permanent political role. During two successive authoritarian 
systems, the splits Within the Muslim community provided critical opportunities for incumbent 
regimes to legitimise their rule. Most significantly, traditionalist and modernist Muslims rarely 
had the same attitude towards authoritarian governments. NU supported _Sukarno's Guided 
Democracy while modernist leaders were thrown-into jail; in the early New Order period, by 
contrast, traditionalists were marginalised while modernist politicians took over the single Islamic 
party authorised by the regime. By 1997, the power relations had been reversed once again: NU 
leaders backed Soehaito's rule against mounting opposition from society and non-regime elites; 
the chairman of Mlihammadiyah, on _the other hand, had embarked on a widely publicised 
- - -
campaign to challenge Soeharto' s monopolistic grip on the presidency. The inability of these key 
civilian actors to_ define a common platform for democratic change-assisted the New Order in 
prolonging its rule and had-a profound impact on the character ofregime change when an external 
econoinic shock calised the increasingly sultanistic system to collapse. 
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Intra-Systemic Regime Change 
Beside the importance of historical legacies, the thesis has highlighted the character of the 1998 
regime change as a key factor in determining the quality and pace ofpost-Soeharto civil-military 
reforms. Power was transferred from Soeharto to his deputy within the institutional framework of 
the existing regime, resulting in a post-authoritarian government that consisted largely of 
politicians groomed by the fallen New Order. Unlike in other autocratic and sultanistic regimes, 
where oppositional forces often take power amidst the tumultuous breakdown of the old system, 
Indonesia's non~regime . groups were largely excluded from the executive and legislative 
institutions of the immediate post-1998 polity. This intra-systemic regime change was the result 
of developments in the military as well as in civilian elite politics. On the military side, the 
outcome of factional struggles that had divided the armed forces in 1997 and 1998 played a 
significant role in shaping the nature of the power transfer. The victory of moderate officers over 
their hardline adversaries allowed the former to negotiate an orderly hand-over of authority from 
Soeharto to Habibie. Had the hardliners won the intra-military competition, and had martial law 
been declared as a result, the consequence would have almost certainly been further violence and, 
ultimately, the complete collapse of the regime and its institutional infrastructure. Executive 
powers would not have been transferred to key figures attached with the Soeharto government, 
but to a transitional leadership consisting of oppositional leaders, however divided they may have 
been. In this sense, the triumph of the moderate faction in the armed forces avoided a Tienanmen-
style bloodbath, but also prevented the very implosion of the old regime that typically produces a 
clear break with the authoritarian past and, in Trinkunas' words, 'broad opportunity structures' 
for democratic consolidation. 
The other critical factor that caused the intra-systemic regime change was the continued 
· fragmentation within the civilian elite. Even as rapid economic decline and mounting societal 
unrest eroded the power of the regime, many key civilian forces refused to work together toward 
a democratic alternative to the faltering government. The mutual distrust among the civilian elite 
was so deep that some leaders preferred the continuation of Soeharto's rule to the uncertainty 
associated with its replacement. Unwilling to present a coherent concept for a future without 
Soeharto, civilian figures surrendered the momentum for regime change to the student movement 
and violent popular protest. When the May riots and the stubbornness of the students had finally 
brought the regime to the brink of collapse, there was no coalition of key societal leaders standing 
ready to take its place. Instead, the power vacuum was filled by the negotiation efforts of 
moderate military officers, who succeeded in organising a transfer of power within the structures 
and procedures of the New Order. This regime change arranged by main beneficiaries of 
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Soeharto's patronage network not only allowed important elements of the old system to take 
charge of the post-authoritarian government and define its reform agenda. It also excluded the 
possibility of a cross-constituency transitional government that could have served as a platform 
for political cooperation between previously antagonistic societal groups. Without such an 
opportunity to overcome traditional differences, the cleavages that cut across the civilian political 
spectrum extended into the post-Soeharto polity alid caused significant problems for the stability 
of its governments and the establishment of effective control over the military. 
Democratic Politics and Civilian Conflict 
Complex historical legacies and the intra-systemic regime change predisposed Indonesia to a 
difficult process of transition as far as the creation of democratic civil-military relations is 
concerned. Deeply entrenched military mindsets and institutional features," combined with the 
extension of important New Order power structures into the post-authoritarian polity, were 
certain to cause problems in the attempts to subordinate the armed forces to democratic civilian 
control. Balancing the dramatic effect of the sudden termination of autocratic rule, the residual 
powers exercised by elements attached to the old regime had the potential to obstruct, and 
eventually neutralise, processes of reform. Aguero's emphasis on the importance of the 'initial 
conditions' of the transition has played a crucial role in guiding the analysis of this study, but 
developments that occurred under post-Soeharto governments were equally essential for the 
transition outcome. Cottey, Edmunds and Forster have proposed five explanatory criteria that 
determine the pace and quality of civil-military transitions. Besides highlighting the influence of 
historical legacies, they argued that the delegitimisation of alternatives to the democratic system 
is an important condition for reducing the level of military intervention in politics. States in which 
the democratic polity is constantly challenged by proposals for other forms of governance have a 
smaller chance of successful transition than those where the principle of democratic government 
is endorsed by a vast majority of citizens. Despite widespread frustration with its deficiencies, 
Indonesia's post-1998 polity has only been opposed by numerically small elements at the 
extremist fringes. The . amendments to the constitution were the result of elite negotiations 
involving all key parties and groups, ·and did not cause significant ruptures in the political 
process. It is this broad consensus on the principle of democratic governance that has given 
Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition a better chance of succeeding than the experiment with 
liberal democracy in the 1950s, when a wide variety of alternative concepts of governance were 
in circulation and undermined the stability of the parliamentary system. 
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Cottey, Edrilunds and Forster have paid less attention, however, to the possibility of destructive 
conflicts between key civilian forces over political power and resources within the :framework of 
the democratic polity. While there was a stable consensus on the political character of the state, 
parties and societal groups differed immensely over the norms and procedures of open democratic 
competition. The constitutional crisis of 2001 revealed that even civilian figures and religio-
political organisations with reputable democratic credentials were prepared to condone mass 
violence as a legitimate instrument of intra-civilian competition, providing opportunities for the 
anned forces to mediate and repair their image damaged by decades of authoritarian repression. 
The highly selective endorsement of democratic values and the extreme intra-civilian tensions 
that it caused pointed to the protracted cleavages in Indonesia's political landscape'. Controversies 
over the rules and regulations of democratic interaction not only affected the rivalry between 
illlportant civilian constituencies, but also aggravated the internal :fragmentation in important 
political parties and groups. The habit of antagonistic factions to establish rival leadership boards 
if they lost in internal elections or policy debates, which before 1998 had been blamed on 
manipulative regime practices, continued under the democratic system.6 AJ5 a result, civilian 
politics were susceptible to efforts by residual elements of the previous regime to defend their 
institutional interests. Significantly, retired military officers were recruited -as senior party 
officials and candidates for executive positions at the local and national level in order to bridge 
internal differences within parties and increase their appeal to the electorate .. The persistent 
divisions within the civilian political sphere, often reflecting long-standing rivalries and disputes, 
offset the positive impact of the high levels of support for the democratic polity and created 
serious hurdles· on the path to reforming the armed forces. 
The International Context 
In their studies on civil-military reforms in the post-authoritarian societies of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Cottey, Edmunds and Forster concluded that the incentive to join important 
international organisations was 'by far the single greatest external factor' in removing opposition 
to structural change in the armed-forces. The prospect of becoming a member of NATO or the 
European.Union, with privileged access to development funds and soft loans, has succeeded in 
6 During the 2004. NU Congress in Boycilali, Sahal Mahfudz commented on the fragmentation within his 
organisation as follows: 'I admit that the conflict that is happening now is even worse than the one in 1994 
in Cipasung. Back then, the conflict occurred bec_a~se of the intervention by the Soeharto regime which 
involved the bureaucracy and the military. But," alt4ough there is no external intervention anymore, the 
infighting now is even more appalling.' See 'KH Sahal: Pilih Mustofa Bisri Sebagai Alternatif, Kompas 30 
November 2004. 
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overcoming even the strongest objections from conservative generals to reforms of the military. 
NATO and the EU made it very clear that if candidates for membership did not adjust their 
mechanisms of military control to standards established by their organisations, no admission was 
possible. Faced with the potential loss of billions of dollars in aid and other forms of assistance, 
civilian governments forced their militaries to comply. Turkey, for example, which in the past 
had experienced levels of military participation in politics very similar to those of Indonesia, 
pressured its generals to accept substantial cuts to the privileges. In Indonesia, no such tools of 
international pressure were available. APEC and ASEAN, the two main multi-lateral associations 
in which Indonesia engages, are organisations_ that do not require their members to meet 
particular democratic standards. The IMF and the World Bank, on the other hand, missed the 
chance to use their extensive economic powers during the monetary crisis to demand more wide-
ranging reforms of Indonesia's security sector. Prioritising changes in economic policy and the 
·restructuring of the banking system, IMF and World Bank officials did not view military reform 
as a matter of immediate urgency. Although they later began to raise the issue as an important 
instrument to reduce corruption and remove obstacles to ·further investment, by 2003 the IMF's 
emergency loan program had been largely phased out and the window of opportunity had closed. 
Other developments in international relations had an equally mixed impact on Indonesia's civil-
military relations. In general terms, the post-Cold War constellation had made it more difficult for 
militaries to grab power from civilian governments without risking international isolation. There 
was an instinctive feeling within the Indonesian officer corps that simply overthrowing the 
civilian post-1998 government was not an option, and the fear of international sanctions was 
partly responsible for that. Changes in the political priorities of the United States after 2001, 
however, eroded the deterrent of international consequences in the case of military coups. When 
. Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan in 1999, the US initially implemented sanctions.and 
demanded the immediate return to the democratic system. After the terrorist attacks of September 
11th, however, the US courted Musharraf as an important ally in their fight against Islamic 
radicalism in· Asia. In late 2004, Musharraf was still concurrently Pakistan's President and 
commander of the army, despite earlier promises to give up his position in the military. 
Indonesian officers followed such developments with great interest, and learnt that defaulting on 
reform benchmarks did not necessarily cause negative reactions-from the United States. In 1999, . 
the US administration had declared that bringing officers responsible for human rights abuses in · 
East Timor to justice was a precondition for re-establishing full military-to-military ties with 
Indonesia. By 2004, all officers indicted for the events in East Timar had been acquitted by 
Indonesian courts, but officials of the Bush government asked Congress to lift existing sanctions 
in the light of TNI' s importance for the 'war on terror'. While Congress did not fulfill the request, 
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the pressure on TNI to reform itself had been eased significantly. fu addition, the fudonesian 
armed forces moved to reduce its dependence on military hardware from the US. Similar to the 
shift in the early 1960s, when the military leadership increasingly purchased equipment from the 
Soviet Union instead of the US, the post-Soeharto top brass began to buy ships, helicopters and 
jets from Russia, Europe and South Korea. At the end of the Megawati government, the armed 
forces felt. sufficiently self-confident enough to reject international pressure for further military . 
reform as inappropriate and not worthy of serious consideration . 
. Institutional Factors and Military Culture 
The final two factors proposed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster relate to the extent of institritional 
reform and the persistence of specific military cultures. fu the area of institutional change, 
Indonesia has taken some important steps forward, but has failed to revamp the structural base of 
TNI's power. Most of the institutions necessary to establish democratic control over the armed 
forces were created and equipped with formal powers to carry out their duties .. The legislature 
was strengthened and tasked with . exercising oversight over the military, the Department of 
Defence was restructured and received additional authority over TNI Headquarters, the Police 
were separated from the armed forces. and a variety of societal 'watch dogs'· scrutinised the 
operations and personal track records of officers. These structural reforms did not result in 
effective control, however. fu addition to a multitude of internal problems ranging from lack of 
expertise to . insufficient resources, efforts to subordinate the military to the newly created or 
reformed bodies were hampered by the omissibn of the two most important institutional reform 
targets: the military's :finances and the amiy's territorial command structure. The military was 
largely allowed to maintain its :financial independence fro)ll the central government and to use its 
. territorial network to tap into economic resources in the regions. With this, the other institutional 
reform measures,. as courageous and wide-ranging they may have been, could not fulfil the hopes . 
initially put in them. Finally, the reform initiative was also not backed by a supportive military 
culture. Indonesia's armed forces had since their inception defined themselves as a·domestic 
security force and a political supra-institution, making the idea of 'military professionalism' a 
foreign ·concept for their officers. this problem was further complicated by the spread of 
militaristic values to . the civilian sector. After 1998, political parties expanded their security 
forces and developed them into panimilitary groups with ranks anci codes similar to that practiced 
by TNI. Ethnic and religious groups also established militias. With organisational militarism 
emerging as a significant feature of post-Soeharto civilian politics, expectations that parties and 
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other groups would give high priority to the professionalisation of the armed forces became 
increasingly remote. 
The application of the five explanatory criteria developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster to 
the case of Indonesia produces a mixed picture of the country's progress in its efforts to establish 
democratic control over the. armed forces. In their comparative scheme, Indonesia has stagnated 
in the first generation of civil-military reforms, and has failed to initiate second-generation 
changes. The development of a new institutional framework appeared to be heading in a 
promising direction after the civilian government and rapid reformers in the armed forces moved 
in 2000 to revamp the army's .territorial command system and, closely related to this, the 
military's financing system. The plans collapsed, however, amidst protracted conflicts between 
civilian forces over political hegemony and economic resources, bringing the military reform 
process· to a halt and consolidating the position of officers opposed to further change. With the 
most important areas of institutional change excluded from the first-generation agenda, the 
second generation of reforms had no realistic chance of succeeding. Consequently, the oversight 
exercised by· civilian control institutions over the military remained scant. In addition to the 
· explanations offered by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, this thesis has proposed two additional 
elements that need extensive consideration when discussing the conditions for successful civil-
military transitions. The character of regime change and the extent of conflict between key 
civilian forces iri the democratic polity are crucial determinants of the transition outcome. The 
engagement of the military in negotiating the transfer of power and deep divisions within the 
civilian political sphere have the potential to obstruct, delay and even derail processes of civil-
military reform. In Indonesia, it remains to be seen if the government of Susilo Bambang 
· Yudhoyono will be able to give new impulses to the project of reforming the armed forces and 
· subordin~te them firmly to civilian control. His support for the maintenance of the territorial 
command structure and his rejection of ideas to place TNI under. the direct control of the 
· Department of Defence suggest, however, that any further progress in military reform will be 
slow and tortuous. 
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